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Responding to developments within the field of British nuclear culture, this thesis uses 
the concept of the sociotechnical imaginary (STIM) to trace the social and cultural history of 
the Sellafield nuclear complex in Cumbria between 1945 and 1990. Drawing upon oral 
histories of the people who built, worked at, and lived alongside Britain’s largest nuclear 
complex, this study identifies distinct forms of cultural expression particular to the local area, 
as rural citizens responded to nuclear developments by framing their rural identities and 
unique experiences of nuclear science in relation to a set of contested and dynamic ‘nuclear 
imaginaries.’  
 
I will examine the evolution of public attitudes towards nuclear technologies, showing 
how social responses were structured and given shape by a series of imagined nuclear futures 
which were created and embedded into British cultural life. Examining the early years of the 
British nuclear project, I will demonstrate how a ‘utopian nuclear imaginary’ was cultivated 
within government at the end of the Second World War, becoming embedded within society as 
nuclear technologies were imagined as heralding a series of desirable social, political, and 
economic futures. 1 I will go on to trace how these imaginaries were subject to contest and 
redefinition by ordinary people, who resisted the proliferation of nuclear technologies, forging 
‘dystopian’ imaginaries which challenged and entered into competition with the utopian 
imaginary propagated by government. Exploring the dynamic interplay between these two 
imaginaries, the following chapters will not only historicise the nature of public responses to 
nuclearisation, but uncover the social processes behind their creation, ultimately pointing 
 
1 S. Jasanoff, ‘Future Imperfect: Science, Technology, and the Imaginations of Modernity’, in S. Jasanoff, and 
S. Kim, (eds.), Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2015), p. 4. 
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towards the immense power of ordinary people as agents of social change, capable of 
substantiating, challenging, and redefining ‘top-down’ narratives of sociotechnical progress.  
 
This echoes recent historiographical trends within the field of nuclear culture, which 
have pointed to the significance of the localised context in shaping our understanding of public 
responses to nuclearisation during the twentieth century. Furthermore, this also corroborates 
recent studies of rural Britain, which have demonstrated the agency of rural ‘peripheral’ 
communities to challenge the socio-spatial inequalities and power relations emanating from 
the urban core. Appropriating these two insights, this thesis ultimately demonstrates the 
plurality of cultural responses to the nuclear age, the presence and power of sociotechnical 
imaginaries to shape and inform these responses, and the agency of ordinary people to resist, 
challenge, and redefine dominant cultural assumptions about nuclear technologies and their 




 As the radioactive dust settled amidst the desert haze on the morning of July 16 1945, 
the scientists and military personnel of the Allied Forces’ ‘Manhattan Project’ witnessed the 
first successful detonation of the atom bomb, destined to devastate the Japanese cities of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki less than a month later. This devastating example of nuclear fission 
marked the birth of a new technology afresh with a teeming multitude of potential scientific, 
military, and civilian applications. It at once signalled the dawn of a new epoch dominated by 
the spectre of nuclear technologies and their geo-political permutations. Engaging with this 
process from the British context, this thesis will consider the impact of nuclear technologies 
(specifically weapons and power production) upon British life between 1945 and 1992, using 
 7 
the Sellafield nuclear complex in West Cumbria as a lens to observe this process at both 
national and local scales.2 
 
Despite Sellafield’s central role in the production of nuclear technologies and technical 
expertise, the tight restrictions upon access to the site and the transmission of information has 
meant that no comprehensive study has even been conducted upon the social and cultural 
history of the plant.3 This has not gone unnoticed within the existing historiography, with the 
late Jeff Hughes asking “where are the sociological studies of Harwell, Windscale and 
Aldermaston? […] where are the British people in these histories, the workers who made 
nuclear technologies, the people whose lives were shaped by them, overtly or covertly?”4 
Answering this call by placing an overdue emphasis on the significance of the people who 
built, worked at, and lived alongside nuclear technologies as part of the fabric of nuclear 
society, this project aims to redress the balance of historiography in favour of the ordinary 
 
2 The term Sellafield will be used throughout to refer to the entire nuclear complex, encompassing both the 
plutonium production site known as Windscale, and the power producing plant known as Calder Hall. Until 
1981 the entire plant was known as Windscale, when it was renamed Sellafield as part of a rebranding exercise. 
Despite this, I will use the name Sellafield throughout, referring to Windscale specifically when referring to the 
plutonium production plant, and Calder Hall when referring to the power production site. 
3 A few notable studies have focused on specific elements of the plant’s history, for example Brian Wynne, who 
has produced two studies examining the regimes of lay/expert knowledge in the region, and a more 
comprehensive treatment of social attitudes towards nuclear expansion in the twenty-first century. Elsewhere, 
Lorna Arnold has published a book devoted to the events of the Windscale Fire, which forms one of the 
subsequent chapters within this study, and Sally Macgill has examined media responses to the radiation 
controversies of 1983, a subject also examined in subsequent chapters. See, B. Wynne, ‘Misunderstood 
Misunderstanding: Social Identities and Public Uptake of Science’, Public Understanding of Science, 1.3 
(1992), pp.  281- 304; B. Wynne, ‘May the Sheep Safely Graze? A Reflexive View of the Expert-Lay 
Knowledge Divide’, in S. Lash, B. Szerzynski and B. Wynne, (eds.), Risk, Environment, and Modernity: 
Toward a New Ecology (London: Sage, 1998); B. Wynne, C. Waterton and R. Grove-White, (eds.), ‘Public 
Perceptions and the Nuclear Industry in West Cumbria’, Centre for the Study of Environmental Change 
Lancaster University, 2007, pp. 1- 78, 
<www.csec.lancs.ac.uk/docs/Public%20Perceptions%20Nuclear%20Industry.pdf> [accessed 29 June, 2018]; L. 
Arnold, Windscale 1957: Anatomy of a Nuclear Disaster (London: Palgrave, 2007); S. Macgill, The Politics of 
Anxiety: Sellafield's Cancer-Link Controversy (London: Pion Ltd, 1987). 
4 J. Hughes, ‘What is Nuclear Culture?: Understanding Uranium 235’, British Society for the History of Science, 
45.4 (2012), p. 501.  
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individuals who were as much a part of Britain’s nuclear story as the technologies they 
produced.  
 
Local citizens’ stories and experiences lie at the heart of this project. Using the 
framework of the sociotechnical imaginary to understand how citizens imagined and conceived 
of nuclear futures, it has been possible to simultaneously explore the richness of cultural life 
during the nuclear age and the respective roles of the state and citizenry in the co-production 
of post-war ‘nuclear’ society. This has also led to a greater appreciation of the role 
geographically and socially ‘peripheral’ communities play within national cultural life. 
Originating in a sense of intrigue into the potential role that the remote Western Cumbrian 
peninsula may have played in the production of British nuclear culture, the project argues that 
Sellafield and the surrounding areas played a key role in shaping British social responses to 
nuclearisation. Sellafield helped embed nuclear technologies into the fabric of British life by 
inextricably linking these technologies with imaginaries of social, (geo)political, military, and 
economic prosperity at both local and national levels. The utopian imaginary then came under 
challenge as a series of incidents at the plant revealed the inherent radiobiological, 
environmental, socio-cultural, and moral dystopias that accompanied the development of 
nuclear technologies.5  
 
Offering Sellafield as a multi-layered and nuanced case study of post-war British 
(nuclear) culture, I argue that Sellafield’s chronology very much mirrored, and in turn co-
produced, British cultural responses to nuclear technologies. Heralded as the apotheosis of a 
 
5 The framework of the sociotechnical imaginary (STIM) explores how citizens imagined a future characterised 
by nuclear technologies. Aligning the focus on utopias and dystopias within political theory and cultural studies, 
this shows how the public responded to nuclear developments by imagining them as representative of a future 
which was utopian and desirable, or dystopian and undesirable. The STIM concept will be explored in greater 
detail in a subsequent section of this introduction. 
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new post-war world order, nuclear technologies (and by extension, Sellafield) symbolised what 
Ian Welsh described as “peak modernity” to a British public reeling from the hardships of 
prolonged war with Nazi Germany, and the decline of Britain’s colonial status.6 It was in this 
context that the nuclear project at Sellafield became imbued with a national importance by the 
late 1950s, as a signifier of Britain’s international status, its ability to defend itself from foreign 
aggression, and a seemingly limitless source of cheap energy during a period of profound 
energy shortages throughout post-war Europe. In this context, the public unveiling of Sellafield 
in 1956 helped embed an imaginary of nuclear utopianism at both national and local scales, as 
nuclear technologies became inextricably wrapped up in a series of desirable national and 
regional imagined futures. 
 
Despite limited localised opposition from disaffected individuals, this imaginary 
subsisted for the first decade of the plant’s operation. It was only in 1957, when a fire broke 
out in one of the piles used to produce military grade plutonium that the early fervour and 
patronage surrounding the use of nuclear technologies came under scrutiny. Whilst the fire 
exposed the vulnerability of the British public to the dangers of radioactive contamination, 
national confidence in the nuclear project was sustained by the government’s suppression and 
cover-up of the true severity of the incident and the imaginary of nuclear utopianism survived 
largely unscathed at the national level. Despite this, the local population’s key role in tackling 
the fire and managing the radioactive aftermath gave them an intimate awareness of the dangers 
of nuclear technologies. They were aware of how close to a full meltdown the plant had been, 
and the true severity of the radiobiological contamination endured by the local people and 
environment. These experiences, coupled with the government’s suppression of the incident in 
the public domain, induced an undercurrent of hostility and a deep-seated cynicism amongst 
 
6 I. Welsh, Mobilising Modernity: The Nuclear Moment (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 17.  
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sections of the local population, for whom the fire espoused an alternative dystopian future. 
This exposed the potential hazards of nuclear power production and the state’s scant regard for 
their welfare in the relentless pursuit of fissile material. 
 
In the aftermath of the Windscale fire, local citizens increasingly challenged the utopian 
credentials of nuclear technologies, pointing to the fire as evidence that these technologies 
could go wrong. This contributed to an emerging unease amongst local citizens as the fire’s 
radiobiological effects upon workers and residents exposed the dangers of radioactive 
contamination. Fears regarding contamination were exacerbated in the years 1960-1963, when 
it transpired that a series of unplanned releases of Strontium 90 had taken place over the 
previous seven years, and that the UKAEA (United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority), who 
operated and ran the plant had, since 1956 deliberately raised discharge levels “as part of a 
deliberate and organised scientific experiment.”7 Throughout this period, growing local 
concerns about the dangers of radioactivity coalesced with broader international debates about 
the dangers of fallout from nuclear weapons testing, and the levels of radiation in the 
atmosphere. 
 
Much like the trajectory of the Cold war itself, the period from the late 1960s into the 
mid 1970s was largely a quiet period in Sellafield’s history.8 The decade from 1963 onwards 
saw the formation of a new public limited company called BNFL (British Nuclear Fuels 
Limited), who took over reprocessing and fuel fabrication duties from UKAEA in 1971, and 
arguably represents the least turbulent era in the site’s history. Within much of this period 
 
7 Welsh, Mobilising Modernity, p. 88. 
8 During this period, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signaled a period of détente in the Cold war arms 
race, as geopolitical tensions between the major superpowers cooled somewhat, despite a series of bitterly 
contested proxy-wars such as Vietnam (1955-1975) and the Second Indochina war (1953-1975). 
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Sellafield functioned away from the attention of the majority of British society, much as the 
Cold war experienced a temporary détente as tensions between East and West warmed slightly. 
Despite this, the radioactive discharges regularly flowing from Sellafield’s pipeline into the 
Irish Sea became a major point of contention within the growing ecological movement, which 
had set its sights on reducing marine radioactivity. The 1963 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
had conclusively established that levels of global radiation posed a threat to human and 
environmental life and could not continue to rise. This argument had particular traction 
amongst the international community, for whom Sellafield’s discharges spoke to the British 
government’s cavalier attitude towards the marine disposal of radioactive waste, with its 
dumping practices off the coast of Spain and Portugal already a major source of political 
contention.9 With the 1972 London Convention regulating the pollution of sea by dumping 
practices, Sellafield’s increasing radioactive discharges stood diametrically opposed to 
prevailing international wisdom and consensus regarding the undesirability of the sea as a 
means of radiological ‘dilution.’ The tone was effectively set for the next decade of Sellafield’s 
history, as public attitudes towards radioactive discharges became increasingly hostile and 
egregious throughout the 1970s.  
 
Whilst such sentiments were largely found within the ecological and environmental 
movements at the start of the 1970s, by the middle of the decade public attitudes towards 
nuclear power had begun to shift in response to a series of agreements which saw Sellafield 
store and reprocess foreign nuclear waste. Embodied in the Daily Mirror’s 1975 publication of 
an article which depicted Sellafield as the “nuclear dustbin of the world”, social and 
environmental arguments over the reprocessing of foreign fuels and the proposed expansion of 
 
9 See J. Hamblin, Poison in the Well: Radioactive Waste in the Oceans at the Dawn of the Nuclear Age (New 
Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2008). 
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the Sellafield site reached a climax during the 100-day ‘Windscale inquiry’- an independent 
judicial review into the 1977 construction of a Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (known as 
THORP) at Sellafield.10 As the largest public inquiry in British history at the time, the inquiry 
functioned as a contact zone between competing nuclear epistemologies and became the forum 
for competing imaginaries of nuclear (or non-nuclear) futures. Public responses to the 
Sellafield plant during this period became characterised by a more complex array of 
subjectivities, as public attitudes were informed by environmental, social, and moral 
imaginaries, which were extended into broader debates about nuclear reprocessing, 
atmospheric and marine contamination, and state hegemony. The inquiry saw the imaginary of 
nuclear utopianism become supplanted by the resistant dystopian renderings of the 
environmental movement and left-leaning political organisations, for whom nuclear 
technologies embodied an undesirable social, political, moral, and environmental future.  
 
Public concerns regarding nuclear technologies reached a crescendo in 1983, when an 
ITV documentary entitled Windscale: The Nuclear Laundry published a series of harrowing 
claims regarding the purported links between nuclear technologies and excess cancer deaths 
amongst British children. This marked the beginning of an incredibly turbulent period in 
Sellafield’s history, catapulting the plant to international media attention. Briefly followed by 
the disastrous ‘beach incident’ of November 1983, whereby the Irish Sea became contaminated 
by the release of a large quantity of radioactive solvent which washed up along a 70-kilometre 
section of Cumbrian coastline.11 Together, these two incidents shattered the illusion of nuclear 
utopianism, exemplifying the dystopian environmental and radiobiological consequences of 
 
10 Daily Mirror, 21 October 1975, p. 1. 
11 This incident became known locally as the ‘beach incident’, although the contamination spread along a 70km 
section of coastline and multiple beaches were affected. The term ‘beach incident’ has been used to align with 
the name given by local citizens who used this term throughout the oral interviews. 
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nuclear technologies repeatedly admonished by anti-nuclear groups throughout the Windscale 
inquiry. At the national level, this saw a swell of resistant public sentiment towards Sellafield 
and nuclear technologies more broadly, as both incidents embedded a dystopian sociotechnical 
imaginary which stressed the hazardous environmental effects of nuclear power, emphasised 
the threat to public health through atmospheric and marine contamination, and inextricably 
linked radiation, and more specifically Sellafield with an exponential increase in local cancer 
cases. Locally however, the picture was more nuanced and contradictory, as citizens became 
socially dislocated between competing scientific claims and imagined futures.  
 
Local citizens were forced to reconcile the presence of a highly toxic environmental 
contagion with the assurances of the nuclear industry which asserted that no public threat 
existed. This created a specific set of social conditions whereby the local population were 
dislocated between competing imagined nuclear futures, simultaneously at risk from the 
radiobiological and environmental effects of Sellafield, whilst safeguarded by the industry’s 
operational and regulatory procedures which ensured that there was no threat to public health. 
Responding to this context, local citizens mobilised their innate knowledge of the local 
environment, their familiarity with aspects of nuclear science, and their experiences of the 
nuclear industry. Drawing upon this repository of knowledge, local citizens mediated between 
competing nuclear imaginaries by producing their own locally-specific understandings which 
were simultaneously the product of these imaginaries and their own experiential knowledge.12 
This contributed to an intensely localised form of nuclear culture which simultaneously 
acknowledged, resisted, and grappled with the environmental, biological, and socio-cultural 
 
12 This understanding develops the insights of Brian Wynne’s work on Cumbrian sheep-farming communities in 
the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster of 1986. The STIM framework offers a new way of thinking thorough 
and historicising his findings, observing the role of earlier British environmental incidents in framing social 
responses to Chernobyl. See Wynne, ‘May the Sheep Safely Graze?’, in Lash, Szerzynski and Wynne, (eds.), 
Risk, Environment, and Modernity. 
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inequalities wrought by the nuclear industry, whilst recognising the region’s dependency upon 




With its focus upon the production of ‘British nuclear culture’ and its localised variants, 
this project operates on a few different levels. First and foremost, this is a social and cultural 
history of the Sellafield site, born out of the dearth of literature on the social and cultural history 
of the British nuclear power programme, particularly the ordinary lived experience of everyday 
nuclear workers, and the lack of engagement with rural experiences of nuclear culture. With 
the recent historiographical trend towards a deeper appreciation of the range of British nuclear 
experiences and the localised variants of nuclear cultures, the thesis aims to redress the 
inherent urban bias within this literature and present the significance of rural experiences of 
the nuclear age.13  
 
With this focus, the second key aspect of this research is to consider whether localised 
nuclear cultures emerged in the West Cumbrian context. I have found that citizens produced 
their own forms of nuclear culture by framing their experiences, geographies, and identities in 
relation to a set of sociotechnical nuclear imaginaries.14 This produced a unique and 
geographically specific series of cultural responses as citizens engaged with and co-produced 




13 These historiographical developments will be considered in greater detail within the literature review.  
14 Again, this will be elaborated on within a subsequent section which aligns the various methodological strands 
which informed this project.  
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Thirdly, the thesis identifies not only the range of cultural responses to nuclear 
technologies but the sociotechnical processes through which these were engendered. By 
engaging with the range of social responses towards Sellafield we gain a more detailed insight 
into the production of nuclear cultures as nuclear imaginaries originated and became embedded 
and resisted within society. This not only provides a framework for understanding the 
chronology of social attitudes towards nuclear power in Britain, but also the social processes 
behind their creation. This reflects the increasing engagement between scholars of nuclear 
history, who are committed to understanding how people responded to nuclear technologies 
and STS (Science, Technology and Society) studies, which seeks to understand the 
relationships between scientific knowledge, technological systems, and society. With this in 
mind, this thesis explores the diverse range of cultural expressions towards nuclear 
technologies, investigating how these expressions sat alongside and co-produced broader social 




 Placing an overt focus on the experience of everyday life in a nuclear community, this 
thesis sits amongst an existing body of work on ‘nuclear culture’. Scholars have increasingly 
eschewed military, political, and scientific approaches to the nuclear age, alternatively 
favouring social, cultural and psychoanalytical histories which have sought to emphasise the 
role of ordinary people as key agents of social change. This aligns with the conceptual 
framework of STIM which draws upon STS to examine the interconnected role(s) of society, 
state, science, and ordinary people in the production and dissemination of sociotechnical ideas. 
STIM shows that the physical, social, and ontological components of nuclear technologies are 
both social products and producers. Nuclear scholarship is well versed in the concept of 
nuclear technologies as a social product; many studies exist which historicise the role of nuclear 
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technologies within culture. In its recognition of these technologies as social agents, the 
existing literature is somewhat lacking, despite the radical implications this has for our 
understanding of nuclear culture. We must therefore be attentive to the ways in which nuclear 
technologies and knowledge both “embed and are embedded in social practices, identities, 
norms, conventions, discourses, instruments, and institutions- in short, in all the building 
blocks of what we term the social.”15  
 
Analysing this process within the context of the nuclear complex at Sellafield, we are 
able to identify not only the range of cultural responses to nuclear technologies but also the 
sociotechnical processes through which these materialised. This subtly repositions studies of 
nuclear culture, aligning the approach of cultural historians who examine how everyday 
citizens responded to nuclear technologies with the conceptual tools of STS scholars, who seek 
to understand the relationships between scientific knowledge, technological systems, and 
society. This moves studies of nuclear culture towards a more detailed understanding of the 
social processes behind their creation. The STIM concept therefore offers a valuable tool for 
scholars of nuclear culture to interrogate how nuclear knowledge was shaped by the mutual 
imbrications of science and technology on the one hand, and society on the other. This sits 
between the work done by Margaret Gowing and Lorna Arnold upon nuclear institutions such 
as the UKAEA and BNFL and the more recent work of Jeff Hughes, Jon Hogg, and Kate Brown 
 
15 S. Jasanoff, States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and Social Order (London: Routledge, 
2004), p. 3.  
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who have called for a more overt focus upon the role of society and ordinary people in the ‘co-
production’ of nuclear meaning-making as agents of social change.16  
 
Furthermore, I have also drawn upon interdisciplinary insights from cultural 
geography, highlighting the importance of place in understanding STIMs. Specifically, I have 
explored the role of space, place, and landscape in the production and embedding of nuclear 
imaginaries. In particular, I have examined how the spatial and material components of built 
and natural landscapes helped shape individual and collective identity, giving structure and 
agency to particular imagined nuclear futures. Identity makes up an important strand of this 
research project, as the development and operation of the nuclear industry shaped national, 
regional, and individual identities. These identities in turn, amplified or attenuated particular 
imaginaries as citizens identified the nuclear industry as representative of both desirable and 
undesirable futures. This once again identifies the centrality of STIM in understanding how the 
cultural, spatial, material, and ontological components of nuclear technologies interacted to 
produce divergent expressions of nuclear culture. 
 
Recent trends within the field of nuclear culture have seen a move away from ‘top 
down’ histories of the nuclear age instead tracing the social and cultural changes instigated by 
the development of nuclear technologies. This scholarship originated in America in the 1980s 
with a series of pioneering research projects which foregrounded cultural studies of the nuclear, 
without specifically addressing ‘nuclear culture’ as a concept. This subsequently inspired and 
 
16 M. Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1935-1945 (London: Macmillan, 1964); M. Gowing, and L. Arnold, 
Independence and Deterrence (London: Palgrave, 1974); L. Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb (London: 
Macmillan, 2001); Arnold, Windscale 1957; Hughes, ‘What is Nuclear Culture?’, pp. 495- 518; J. Hogg, and C. 
Laucht (eds.), ‘Introduction: British Nuclear Culture’, British Society for the History of Science, 45.4 (2012), pp. 
479- 493; J. Hogg, and K. Brown, ‘Introduction: Social and Cultural Histories of the British Nuclear 
Mobilisation Since 1945’, Contemporary British History, 33.2 (2019), pp. 161- 169. 
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influenced a series of American scholars who considered nuclear culture in greater detail. This 
movement coalesced with the ‘cultural turn’ of the 1980s, and by the turn of the century there 
had been a large expansion of historical work examining the approaches, applications, and 
methods of ‘nuclear culture’. 
 
The earliest work on nuclear culture, and perhaps the most influential within the field, 
was produced by Paul Boyer’s 1985 seminal work By the Bomb’s Early Light, which examined 
American reactions to the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the nascent 
vulnerabilities felt within the immediate aftermath and onset of the new ‘Atomic Era.’17 Whilst 
the term ‘nuclear culture’ was not coined until the work of Michael Messmer in 1988, Boyer 
produced one of the first histories which utilised an array of cultural sources, such as books, 
newspaper articles, radio broadcasts, films, and popular music as historical markers which trace 
“the nation’s mood” during the latter half of the 1940s.18 Boyer’s seminal study left an indelible 
mark on the field of nuclear culture, paving the way for future historians such as Spencer Weart, 
Allan Winkler, and more recently Jonathan Hogg who has specifically engaged with the British 
context.19 Across a series of articles and a monograph, Hogg traces the multitude of public 
responses to nuclear technologies during the ‘long’ twentieth century, arguing that the 
interaction between the ‘official’ narratives of the nuclear state and the more ‘unofficial’ 
narratives of everyday citizens had far-reaching consequences for national culture, as the 
British public confronted official government narratives with attempts to control, respond, 
resist, and represent the nuclear nation-state.20 As nuclear historians have continued to move 
 
17 P. Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994). 
18 M. Messmer, ‘Nuclear Culture, Nuclear Criticism’, Minnesota Review, 30.0 (1988), pp. 161– 180. 
19 S. Weart, The Rise of Nuclear Fear (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2012); A. Winkler, Life 
Under a Cloud: American Anxiety About the Atom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
20 J. Hogg, British Nuclear Culture: Official and Unofficial Narratives in the Long 20th Century (London: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2016). 
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away from political, military, and scientific narratives and towards an understanding of the 
sociological, cultural, psychological, and ontological resonance of nuclear technologies, the 
concept of nuclear culture has been repeatedly disputed, interpreted, defined, and re-defined, 
pushing the ever-expanding theoretical and methodological frames of the field in their attempts 
to produce and refine a coherent definition of the topic.  
 
The increasingly popularity of nuclear culture has resulted in a number of 
historiographical literature reviews of the concept which have reviewed the current scope and 
use of nuclear culture.21 Part of a special edition of the British Journal for the History of Science 
which highlighted the lack of coherence regarding definitions of ‘British Nuclear Culture’, 
Jonathan Hogg and Christoph Laucht sought to re-define the term as the “rich, complex, and 
contestable… interactions between nuclear science, technology, and British life.”22 More 
recently, Hogg and Kate Brown produced an introduction to a special issue of Contemporary 
British History, arguing that the social and affective imprint left by the introduction and 
subsequent permanence of nuclear infrastructure is too often relegated into broad contextual 
assumptions or journalistic metaphors, such as the ‘shadow of the bomb’ or the ‘mushroom 
cloud of fear.’23 They contend that such phrases have been used to explain away the emotions 
and experiences of a generation, calling for a more thorough understanding of the complexities 
of the British nuclear story. These developments have seen the field of nuclear culture broaden 
in scope whilst becoming increasingly nuanced, with scholars engaging not only with the 
national as a frame of reference but also with the regional and local variants of nuclear cultures.  
 
21 I recently co-authored a piece for Oxford Online Bibliographies which provided a theoretical and conceptual 
overview of some of the key texts in the field. See, H. Roberts, E. Gibbs, ‘Nuclear Culture’, Oxford Online 
Bibliographies: Military History. doi 10.1093/obo/9780199791279-0187. 
22 Hogg, and Laucht, ‘Introduction: British Nuclear Culture’, pp. 479- 493. 
23 Hogg, and Brown, ‘Introduction: Social and Cultural Histories of the British Nuclear Mobilisation Since 
1945’, pp. 161- 169. 
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Eschewing the monolithic treatment of individual national contexts, cultural scholars 
have attested to the pluralism of cultural life within the atomic era, outlining the competing 
attitudes and ideologies that comprised the period. In particular, Jeff Hughes argued that the 
definition of nuclear culture is too generalised and should be deconstructed and applied to local 
experiences and contexts. He critiqued the term’s uncritical use as a broad, monolithic category 
which subsumed highly localised nuclear subjectivities within a catch-all umbrella term.24 His 
work highlighted the existence of multiple nuclear cultures within Britain during the Cold war 
and exposed the pluralistic nature of British experiences, with an emphasis on their cultural 
and geographic variables. Hughes’ influential article has seen a move towards localised studies 
of nuclear culture which have sought to highlight the regional and geographic variants of 
nuclear cultures. These have attempted to deconstruct ideas surrounding British nuclear culture 
further by focusing on the localised experiences of citizens nearby Sizewell Power Station, in 
inner-city London, and in Wales.25 These publications all sought to assert the diversity of 
British nuclear culture, taking into account local cultures, economies, and ecologies to 
demonstrate the unique ways nuclear technologies impacted individual communities. Hugely 
important to my research, this emerging strand of nuclear culture scholarship advocates the 
exciting potential of intensely localised research centred around nuclear communities or nearby 
nuclear sites. These offer a more nuanced picture of nuclear culture, acknowledging the key 
roles geography and experience play in its formation.  
 
24 Hughes, ‘What is British Nuclear Culture?’, pp. 495- 518. 
25 Within the British context, Laucht and Johnes have attempted to diversify the term further, arguing that each 
of the ‘four nations’ within Britain developed and experienced their own nuclear cultures. (C. Laucht, and M. 
Johnes, ‘Resist and Survive: Welsh Protests and the British Nuclear State in the 1980s’, Contemporary British 
History, 33.2 (2019), pp. 226-245; C. Wall, ‘Nuclear Prospects’: the Siting and Construction of Sizewell A 
Power Station 1957-1966’, Contemporary British History, 33.2 (2019), pp. 246- 273; H. Atashroo, 
‘Weaponising Peace: The Greater London Council, Cultural Policy and ‘GLC Peace Year 1983’, Contemporary 
British History, 33.2 (2019), pp. 170- 186. 
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Through a focus on the local as a scale of enquiry, these studies have shown that nuclear 
knowledge and meaning making occur on an intensely localised level, often in interaction with 
national narratives. This thesis examines this assertion, tracing the production and evolution of 
social attitudes towards nuclear technologies in the immediate vicinity of the Sellafield nuclear 
complex. Lying at the heart of both nuclear weapons and energy production, Sellafield offers 
a nuanced case study to interrogate the local as a scale for the production of nuclear culture, 
whilst providing a rich historiographical insight into the complexities and ‘hidden histories’ of 
the British nuclear story. This acknowledges the current historiographical bias towards both 
urban histories of the nuclear age and histories of nuclear weapons. Scholars have thus far been 
captivated by the “fabulously textual” nature of the nuclear bomb, and despite limited work in 
this context, the history of nuclear power has all too often been treated as a passing concern or 
subsumed within analysis of nuclear weapons.26 By focusing on the history of Sellafield as a 
nuclear power producing site, this thesis hopes to redress this imbalance and assert the 
significance of nuclear power as fuelling nuclear culture. Similarly, by focusing on a rural site 
the project bucks the trend of spatial studies of the nuclear age which are favourably weighted 
towards the urban context. 
 
 
26 J. Derrida, ‘No Apocalypse, Not Now (Full Speed Ahead, Seven Missiles, Seven Missives)’, Diacritics, 14.2 
(1984), p. 23. For examples of the limited work that has been done on the socio-cultural history of nuclear 
power, see Wall, ‘Nuclear Prospects’, pp. 246- 273; F. Zonabend, The Nuclear Peninsula (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993); B. Wynne, ‘Misunderstood Misunderstanding’, pp. 281- 304; X. Fang, 
‘Local People’s Understanding of Risk from Civil Nuclear Power in the Chinese Context’, Public 
Understanding of Science, 23.3 (2014), pp. 283– 298; G. Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and 
National Identity After World War II (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009). Scholars are also increasingly 
interrogating the various elements of the nuclear fuel-cycle, see J. Hogg, “Keep Orkney Active Not 
Radioactive”: Resistance to Uranium Mining on the Orkney Islands, 1971–1980 (Palgrave: forthcoming); G. 
Hecht, Being Nuclear: Africans and the Global Uranium Trade (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2012); K. Bickerstaff, 
‘“Because We’ve Got History Here”: Nuclear Waste, Cooperative Siting, and the Relational Geography of a 
Complex Issue’, Environment and Planning A, 44.0 (2012), p. 2611– 2628; R. Benford, H. Moore, and J. Allen 
Williams, ‘In Whose Backyard?: Concern About Siting a Nuclear Waste Facility’, Sociological Inquiry, 63.1 
(1993), pp. 30- 48. 
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During the Cold war, the city functioned as a strategic environment, both through its 
status as a potential enemy target and as a nexus for nuclear knowledge and meaning-making. 
Providing a useful introduction to the emerging field of the ‘nuclear city’, Matthew Farish and 
David Monteyne have examined the ways in which broader Cold war politics permeated the 
urban environment, presenting the city as a hub for anti-nuclear protest, public civil defence 
initiatives, battle simulations, and council interventions in national nuclear policy-making.27 
Whilst Matthew Farish has examined the role of the city as a strategic environment during the 
Cold war, thinkers such as Susanne Schregel and Eric Singer have explored the relationship 
between civil defence and local resistance within the city, as urban spaces became grounds for 
conflict between different social and political agendas.28 Meanwhile, rural spaces served 
largely as the infrastructural framework for governmental nuclear and foreign policy, with 
nuclear power plants, weapons research centres, airfields, and long and short-term storage 
facilities located away from urban centres and in remote, often intensely rural locations.  
 
Despite its huge infrastructural contribution to Britain’s nuclear history, the rural 
environment has received scant scholarly attention. The limited scholarship that does exist 
recognises the cultural significance of rurality, and has begun to trace the divergent nuclear 
attitudes, beliefs, and identities adopted by rural citizens, which are often more complex and 
 
27 M. Farish, and D. Monteyne, ‘Introduction: Histories of Cold War Cities’, Urban History, 42.4 (2015), pp. 
564- 583. 
28 Scholars have also focused upon post-war urban planning, which saw the physical landscape and architecture 
of the city reimagined and redefined to adapt to the developing technologies of the nuclear age. Here, Hornsey 
has looked at the experience of London and the ways in which the city adapted new urban planning initiatives in 
the Cold War age. For further reading, see R. Hornsey, ‘“Everything is Made of Atoms”: The Reprogramming 
of Space and Time in Post-war London’, Journal of Historical Geography, 34.0 (2008), pp. 94– 117. Elsewhere, 
Jennifer Light has investigated how military techniques and technologies informed strategies designed to tackle 
urban problems. See J. Light, From Warfare to Welfare: Defence Intellectuals and Urban Problems in Cold 
War America (London: John Hopkins University Press, 2003); also M. Farish, ‘Disaster and Decentralization: 
American Cities and the Cold War’, Cultural Geographies, 10.2 (2003), pp. 125– 148; S. Schregel, ‘Nuclear 
War and the City: Perspectives on Municipal Interventions in Defence (Great Britain, New Zealand, West 
Germany, USA, 1980-1985)’, Urban History, 42.4 (2015), pp. 564- 583; E. Singer, ‘Civil Defence in the City: 
Federal Policy Meets Local Resistance in Baltimore, 1957–1964’, Urban History, 42.4 (2015), pp. 547- 563. 
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nuanced than urban scholarship has made explicit. Much of this work highlights the 
vulnerability of rural communities to radioactive fallout from nuclear weapons and from the 
activities of the military-industrial complex, most of which was situated in rural areas. Using 
the nuclear bunker as a medium for analysis, Luke Bennett has explored how the dangers of 
fallout brought Cold war anxieties directly into rural communities by breaking down an 
existing urban/rural binary and contradicting spatial notions of urban centres as attack targets.29 
Similarly, Chris Perkins and Martin Dodge have argued that the verticality of satellite imagery 
served to regulate rural fears about nuclear attack by selectively removing rural military bases, 
nuclear and civil defence infrastructure and security installations from topographic maps and 
doctoring aerial images.30 Another recent study by Rosanna Farbøl considers the rural 
environment’s strategic military and civil defence function, examining the role of custom-built 
‘ruin towns’ in Denmark which were used as a setting to culturally imagine and materially 
prepare for a post-nuclear attack scenario.31 
 
Despite the apparent dearth of rural nuclear studies in the British context, there has been 
a degree of scholarly engagement with the nuclear bunker.32 Nuclear bunkers were often built 
in secret, remote locations in order to protect civil defence groups and ministers; whilst 
individual families often took it upon themselves to build and construct permanent or make-
shift bunkers within the domestic dwelling. Historians have thus attempted to map the 
 
29 L. Bennett, ‘Cold War Ruralism: Civil Defence Planning, Country Ways and the Founding of the UK’s Royal 
Observer Corps’ Fallout Monitoring Posts Network’, Journal of Planning History, 17.3 (2017), pp. 205- 225. 
30 C. Perkins, and M. Dodge, ‘Satellite Imagery and the Spectacle of Secret Spaces’, Geoforum, 40.0 (2009), pp. 
546– 560. 
31 R. Farbøl, ‘Ruins of Resilience: Imaginaries and Materiality Imagineered and Embedded in Civil Defence 
Architecture’, in M. Cronqvist, R. Farbøl, and C. Sylvest, (eds.), Cold War Civil Defence in Western Europe: 
Sociotechnical Imaginaries of Survival and Preparedness (London: Palgrave MacMillan, [forthcoming 2021]. 
32 For examples of studies on rural testing sites in the US, see J. Masco, The Nuclear Borderlands: The 
Manhattan Project in Post-Cold War New Mexico (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 12; V. 
Jones, Manhattan, the Army and the Atomic Bomb (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1985); P. 
Hales, Atomic Spaces: Living on the Manhattan Project (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1997). 
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meanings and representations of the nuclear bunker both during the Cold war and in the post-
Cold war era. Luke Bennett has examined the physical, affective and symbolic role of nuclear 
bunkers during the Cold war, considering the uses and meanings of these nuclear spaces 
through notions of meaning-making, place-attachment, hobby practices, social materiality and 
trauma studies.33 His previous work presented the nuclear bunker as a form of ‘cultural ark’, 
revealing through its form and content official efforts to assuage the public whilst ensuring the 
ongoing continuity of governance, offering an example of the British nuclear state in 
microcosm.34 This study develops the insights contained within this work, acknowledging that 
rural citizens often held radically different attitudes towards nuclear technologies than their 
urban counterparts. As I will argue, due to the increased contact and familiarity with (and threat 
posed by) nuclear installations such as Sellafield, rural citizens experienced these technologies 
in different ways, producing intensely localised forms of nuclear culture which were the 
product of social imaginaries, socio-cultural identities, geographies, and experience, which 
form the major historical themes which inform my project.  
 
There is a considerable amount of literature on identity in the nuclear context, with 
scholars turning their attention to the ways in which nuclear technologies both shaped and were 
shaped by notions of national identity.35 Despite this, very few have interrogated the role of 
nuclear technologies in shaping individual or localised notions of identity. The limited 
 
33 L. Bennett (ed.), In the Ruins of the Cold War Bunker: Affect Materiality and Meaning Making (Maryland: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2017). 
34 L. Bennett, ‘The Bunker: Metaphor, Materiality and Management’, Culture and Organization, 17.2 (2011), 
pp. 155– 173. 
35 Gabrielle Hecht and Nick Ritchie have examined the Scottish and French contexts to argue that nuclear 
technologies co-produce shared notions of national identity, whilst studies by Baylis and Stoddart and Hymens 
have argued that nuclear decision-making was often the product of state leaders’ conceptions of national 
identity. See Hecht, The Radiance of France; N. Ritchie, ‘Nuclear Identities and Scottish Independence’, The 
Non-proliferation Review, 23.5 (2016), pp. 653- 675; J. Baylis, and K. Stoddart, The British Nuclear 
Experience: The Roles of Beliefs, Culture and Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); J. Hymens, The 
Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002). 
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literature on this topic has thus far focused on studies of the technical identities of nuclear 
workers at the Livermore National Laboratory and in US, British, and Canadian contexts, 
whilst Kate Brown and Lindsay Freedman have explored the ways in which urban communities 
embraced nuclear identities.36 In particular, Freedman observed that the US metropolis Oak 
Ridge in Tennessee developed a self-identification as the ‘Atomic City.’37 Others, such as 
Joseph Masco have identified that nuclear technologies impose upon both individual and 
collective conceptions of identity and reveal the systems of power within society. In his 2006 
study, The Nuclear Borderlands, Masco argues that “a close analysis of where nuclear projects 
are situated and how they are executed reveals a hidden aspect of the nuclear age, namely, the 
nuclear state's equation of citizenship [...] the social contexts informing nuclear projects 
therefore necessarily evoke questions about historical presence and identity, often of race and 
rights, always of citizenship and sacrifice.”38 Masco goes on to argue that exposure to radiation 
has a profound impact upon individual identity, dislocating irradiated bodies from their past 
selves, “creating new social beings, and with them, new tactile experiences of everyday life.”39  
 
Through its subject focus on individuals who lived alongside and experienced nuclear 
technologies and radiation, this project develops these insights, arguing that local citizens 
responded to the context of nuclearisation by producing and expressing distinct forms of 
identity. Citizens constructed a sense-of-self which was the product of social representations 
of, and their own engagement with nuclear technologies and the state that controlled them. This 
 
36 S. Johnston, The Neutron’s Children: Nuclear Engineers and the Shaping of Identity (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012); H. Gusterson, Nuclear Rites: A Weapons Laboratory at the End of the Cold War 
(California: University of California Press: 1998); K. Brown, Plutopia: Nuclear Families, Atomic Cities, And 
the Great Soviet and American Plutonium Disasters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
37 L. Freedman, Longing for the Bomb: Oak Ridge and Atomic Nostalgia (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2015). 
38 J. Masco, The Nuclear Borderlands, p. 12.  
39 Ibid., p. 32.  
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interpretation rests upon Roy Baumeister and Mark Muraven's interpretation of identity as 
“adaptation to social, cultural, and historical context.”40 This advocates that individuals form 
an identity in response to a specific socio-cultural context (such as nuclearisation), producing 
a sense-of-self which allows them to exist within this context. This understanding places a 
greater emphasis on the role of experience in shaping nuclear culture, as citizens drew upon 
their experiences of nuclear technologies in the production and performance of coherent 
‘selves’ and identities informed by the nuclear context.  
 
Drawing heavily from the content of pre-existing (externally conducted) oral history 
interviews and those personally conducted, this project will demonstrate that local individuals 
held a unique set of experiences of living nearby or working alongside a nuclear facility, which 
shaped the cultural responses they held towards these technologies. Through the construction, 
day-to-day operation, management, or simply residing nearby nuclear facilities, ordinary 
people were (and are) implicated in the operation of nuclear facilities. This has been made clear 
within the existing literature, with Kate Brown examining the transnational links between two 
atomic cities in America and Russia, divided by politics and ideology, yet united through their 
nuclearity. Her study tells the stories of Ozersk in the Urals and the American nuclear facility 
in Richland, arguing that the shared experiences of nuclear production transcended ideological 
differences between the two cities and their inhabitants, inextricably linking them through their 
nuclear past and toxic legacies.41  
 
Amongst nuclear workers and residents there often exists a set of shared knowledge, 
ways of working, collective experiences, and understandings which (whether implied or made 
 
40 R. Baumeister, and M. Muraven, ‘Identity as Adaptation to Social, Cultural, and Historical Context’, Journal 
of Adolescence, 19.0 (1996), pp. 405- 415. 
41 Brown, Plutopia. 
 27 
explicit) combine to form an operational culture amongst workers and communities linked to 
nuclear sites. Some of the existing research in this area focuses explicitly upon the Sellafield 
region, such as Brian Wynne’s study which looks at the experience of sheep farmers in the 
Lake District, or Lorna Arnold’s examination of both official and unofficial experiences of the 
1957 Windscale fire.42 Adopting a sociotechnical approach to the rural nuclear context, Brian 
Wynne uses the experiences of Cumbrian sheep farmers to argue that lay expertise is often 
refuted, dismissed, and castigated by scientific and professional authorities who claim an 
‘exaggerated certainty’ over the experience-based knowledge of lay peoples. Wynne argues 
that public trust in nuclear expertise is therefore characterised by lay experiences of 
dependency, alienation, and a perceived lack of agency, whilst remaining heavily mediated by 
the conduct of the industry.43 Much of the literature in this field has come from sociology or 
STS and often focuses on the Eastern European context, with scholars such as Olga 
Kuchinskaya arguing that Belarussian citizens who experienced the Chernobyl disaster hold 
special knowledge about radiation.44 This has been corroborated by Thom Davies’ study within 
the exclusion zone surrounding Chernobyl, which found that radiation victims often contest 
official conceptions of radiation through local knowledge, shared memory, and informal 
activity.”45 Furthermore, Kate Brown’s recent study of the exclusion zone has contested the 
narrative of ecological regeneration that has been noted in these accounts, attesting instead to 
the Soviet Union’s suppression of the true radiobiological and environmental consequences of 
 
42 Wynne, ‘Misunderstood Misunderstanding,’ pp.  281- 304; Arnold, Windscale 1957. 
43 Wynne, ‘May the Sheep Safely Graze?’ 
44 O. Kuchinskaya, ‘Articulating the Signs of Danger: Lay Experiences of Post-Chernobyl Radiation Risks and 
Effects’, Public Understanding of Science, 20.3 (2011), pp. 405– 421. 
45 T. Davies, ‘A Visual Geography of Chernobyl: Double Exposure’, International Labour and Working-Class 
History, 84.1 (2013), p. 116. 
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the incident. This she argues, has had contemporary ramifications upon reactor programmes 
throughout the world and the handling of reactor incidents, such as at Fukushima in 2011.46  
 
The majority of the work that focuses on the role of experience in shaping responses to 
nuclear technologies comes from the wider literature on studies of risk. Originating from 
Ullrich Beck’s seminal 1986 study on ‘risk society’, many historians and sociologists have 
examined the ways in which nuclear experiences changed ideas surrounding risk and risk 
perception.47 Unusually within nuclear studies, most of this research has thus far focused 
specifically on nuclear power, with studies identifying the role of experience in shaping lay 
perceptions of risk; specifically identifying the risk/benefit trade-off reasoning used by people 
living close to nuclear power plants.48 Other works have focused upon the quantification of 
risk in relation to the proximity of a nuclear power plant. For example, Ian Welsh examined 
the NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard) phenomenon and the ways in which risk affected residents 
living in differing proximity from ‘nuclear risks’, whilst a host of other scholars have identified 
 
46 K. Brown, Manual for Survival: A Chernobyl Guide to the Future (New York: W.W. Norton and Company 
Ltd, 2019) 
47 U. Beck , Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: SAGE Publishing, 1992); K. Parkhill, D. 
Venables, and P. Simmonds, ‘From the Familiar to the Extraordinary: Local Residents’ Perceptions of Risk 
When Living With Nuclear Power in the UK’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 35.1 (2010), 
pp. 39- 58; D. Venables, N, Pidgeon, K. Parkhill, (et al.), ‘Living with Nuclear Power: Sense of Place, 
Proximity, and Risk Perceptions in Local Host Communities’, Journal of Environmental Psychology, 32.0 
(2012), pp. 371- 383; F. Diaz-Maurin, ‘Chronic Long-term Risk of Low-level Radiation Exposure: Bridging the 
Lay/expert Divide’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 74.5 (2018), pp. 335- 339.  
48 Fang, ‘Local People’s Understanding of Risk’, pp. 283– 298; S. Malin, ‘When is Yes to the Mill 
Environmental Justice? Interrogating Sites of Acceptance in Response to Energy Development’, Analyse & 
Kritik, 36.2 (2014), pp. 263- 286. 
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geography as a vital factor in shaping social attitudes towards risk.49 These insights have 
informed my understanding of the role of geography in the production of nuclear culture, as 




‘Space’, ‘place’, and ‘landscape’. 
 
The project draws upon a number of insights from cultural geography to conceptualise 
the role of the physical environment within and around Sellafield as an important social agent 
in the production and dissemination of nuclear imaginaries, cultures, and identities. Previous 
historical scholarship has attested to the vital significance of place within both Cold war and 
nuclear history. Gabrielle Hecht has argued that “it is impossible to view nuclear technology 
as a separate whole that exists apart from the social, political, and spatial relations that bring it 
to life.”50 Likewise, Becky Alexis-Martin and Thom Davies remarked that it is becoming 
increasingly “important to examine how nuclear technology interacts with space and place, 
inhabiting a wide range of geographic scales.”51 Despite this, historical studies within the 
existing literature have tended to reduce nuclear places to “mere sites or settings for human 
 
49 I. Welsh, ‘The NIMBY Syndrome: Its Significance in the History of the Nuclear Debate in Britain’, The 
British Journal for the History of Science, 26.1 (1993), pp. 15- 32; Benford, Moore, and Allen-Williams, ‘In 
Whose Backyard?’, pp. 30- 48; Fang, ‘Local People’s Understanding of Risk’, pp. 283– 298; W. Freudenburg 
and D. Davidson, ‘Nuclear Families and Nuclear Risks: The Effects of Gender, Geography, and Progeny on 
Attitudes toward a Nuclear Waste Facility’, Rural Sociology, 72.2 (2007), pp. 215– 243; M. Lima, ‘On the 
Influence of Risk Perception on Mental Health: Living Near an Incinerator’, Journal of Environmental 
Psychology, 24.0 (2004), pp. 71– 84; J. Eiser, J. van der Plight, and R. Spears, Nuclear Neighbourhoods: 
Community Responses to Reactor Siting (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1995); J. Baxter, and D. Lee, 
‘Understanding Expressed Low Concern and Latent Concern Near a Hazardous Waste Treatment 
Facility’, Journal of Risk Research, 7.7-8 (2004), pp. 705- 729; Bickerstaff, ‘“Because we’ve got History 
Here”’, p. 2611– 2628; K. Bickerstaff P. Simmonds, ‘Absencing/Presencing Risk: Rethinking Proximity and the 
Experience of Living with Major Technological Hazards’, Geoforum, 40.0 (2009), pp. 864– 872.  
50 Hecht, Being Nuclear. 
51 B. Alexis-Martin, and T. Davies, ‘Towards Nuclear Geographies: Zones, Bodies, and Communities’, 
Geography Compass, 11.9 (2017), p. 2. 
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action”, largely omitting discussions of the power of place in shaping everyday behaviour and 
culture.52  Whilst historical approaches have been guilty of prioritising history over place, the 
literature from geography, psychology, and sociology has tended to neglect the “meaning of a 
place at a particular historical moment.”53 Acknowledging these oversights, I will apply a new 
conceptual framework that integrates geographic work on the meaning of ‘space’ with more 
recent scholarship on ‘landscape’ to argue that the physical infrastructure of the Sellafield 
project played a vital role in co-producing and embedding nuclear imaginaries. This makes a 
further point about the utility of spatial studies of nuclear culture, which are lacking within the 
British context. By engaging in the significance of nuclear spaces in the shaping of the British 
nuclear story, this project hopes to add a new dimension to studies of nuclear culture, calling 
for a more thorough appreciation of the ways in which the physical environment has shaped 
and been shaped by the production of British nuclear culture.  
 
This approach follows the work of Doreen Massey, who asserted that places should be 
treated “in terms of the social relations which they tie together”, offering a unique point at the 
intersection between social relations “constructed on a far larger scale than what we happen to 
define for that moment as the place itself.”54 By treating Sellafield as a place, we begin to see 
how it performed cultural work within local and national contexts. This rests upon W.J.T. 
Mitchell’s understanding of ‘landscape’, a term he used to describe how space and place 
functioned as an adjective rather than a verb, “not as an object to be seen or be read” but “as 
 
52 M. Page, The Creative Destruction of Manhattan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), p. 252. A 
notable exception to this is Linda Ross’ recently completed PhD thesis, which examines the physical and social 
environments of the Dounreay nuclear complex in Scotland. See, L. Ross, ‘Nuclear Fission and Social Fusion’: 
The Impact of the Dounreay Experimental Research Establishment on Caithness, 1953-1966', PhD thesis, 
(University of the Highlands and Islands, 2019), available at <https://pure.uhi.ac.uk/en/studentTheses/nuclear-
fission-and-social-fusion> [accessed 22 January 2020]. 
53 Page, The Creative Destruction, p. 253; Alexis-Martin and Davies, ‘Towards Nuclear Geographies,’ 
pp. 1- 13. 
54 D. Massey, Space, Place and Gender (Cambridge: Polity Publishing, 1994), pp. 153ff. 
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commodity and potent cultural symbol” actively at work within society.55 Mitchell’s definition 
argues that, when locations are viewed as landscapes, the cultural work that space and place 
perform is revealed. If space tells us what actions happen within a place, landscape tells us that 
these actions have a cultural significance because they reveal the power relations that exist 
within space, whilst actively perpetuating them. Sellafield therefore exists in both material and 
cultural realms. It is neither mere bricks and mortar nor an area of pure subjectivity but a 
cultural site actively engaged in the production of social attitudes towards nuclear technologies. 
This forms a key concept within this study as I seek to interrogate the role of the built and 
physical environment in the production of nuclear culture. This identifies the interactions 
between the built, constructed landscapes of the nuclear industry with the natural landscapes 
of the rural community in which they were located as a key area in the formation of nuclear 
identity and the structuring of imagined futures.  
 
 Scholarship from cultural geography has shown that the places we inhabit form a key 
role in the way in which we perceive ourselves and the identities we construct. Specifically, 
Doreen Massey has shown that identities are inextricably linked with spatiality, whilst Matless 
has claimed that landscape functions “as a vehicle of social and self-identity.”56 Exploring this 
concept in the English context, David Matless argues that the English landscape functions as a 
vehicle for specific projections of national identity, showing that both the built and seemingly 
‘natural’ world around us function in the production of socio-cultural identities. This insight 
forms a key contribution within this project as I seek to foreground the role of place in 
characterising attitudes towards nuclear technologies. Whilst Matless’ work focuses on the 
national scale, a number of historical works have engaged with this theoretical slant in an 
 
55 W. Mitchell, Landscape and Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), pp. x, 1.  
56 D. Massey, For Space (London: Sage, 2005); D. Matless, Landscape and Englishness (London: Reaktion, 
2016), p. 29. 
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increasingly localised context, examining the role of specific locations in the production of 
rural identity. Research in this area has seen individual sites identified as key producers of rural 
identities, with Mark Riley exploring the farm as a nexus for community memory and identity, 
and Marianna Dudley analysing the Severn Bore as a place in which (counter) cultural 
knowledge and identities intersect.57  
 
Dudley is one of a number of scholars who have interrogated the social imprint left by 
militarised landscapes throughout Britain. In her comparative research on five military bases, 
she identified that Jeffrey Sasha Davis’ idea of ‘double erasure’ characterised the experiences 
of communities evicted from military sites throughout the UK. Here, she argued that the 
military erased the social histories of the lands they inhabited, then sought to minimise the 
visibility of their presence within them, preferring to depict the environmental biodiversity 
within the lands they occupied.58 This informed my approach to researching the Sellafield site, 
which found that local farming communities were physically and culturally written out of the 
landscapes in which they occupied, as their interests (both material and cultural) were 
subsumed in favour of the machinations of the military-industrial nuclear complex. Whilst 
Dudley’s research identifies the gradual ‘greening’ and rise of environmentalism within the 
MoD, I found that farmers’ losses were then subsumed within discourses of state protection 
and Britain's post-war ascendancy. The military presence was not erased from the site, but was 
symbolically legitimated by reference to the military and political needs of the nation. In this 
 
57 M. Riley, ‘Emplacing the Research Encounter: Exploring Life Histories’, Qualitative Inquiry, 16.8 (2010), 
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Histories: Intersections of Memory, Narrative and Environment (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017), pp. 81- 
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58 M. Dudley, An Environmental History of the UK Defence Estate: 1945 to the Present (London: Bloomsbury, 
2014), p. 164; J. Davis, J. Hayes-Conroy, and V. Jones, (eds.), ‘Military Pollution and Natural Purity: Seeing 
Nature and Knowing Contamination in Vieques, Puerto Rico’, GeoJournal, 69.0 (2007), pp. 165– 79.  
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way, the military presence became an accepted part of everyday life in the local area, informing 
localised identity by foregrounding the plant’s contribution to the prosperity of the nation.  
 
Elsewhere, Chris Pearson, Peter Coates, and Tim Cole have examined how militarised 
landscapes play an important role in shaping national and regional identities, as control over, 
and the use and purpose of land prioritises certain interests and subjugates certain groups.59 
This has been explored in the nuclear context by Andrew Blowers, who argues that nuclear 
technologies signify and perpetuate rural identities by inscribing a set of unequal power 
relations upon ‘peripheral’ host communities from urban ‘centres’. He attests that nuclear 
infrastructure contributes to a specific socio-cultural identity amongst host communities who 
identify these developments within a broader sense of powerlessness from mainstream political 
decision-making and society.60 Taking inspiration from this context, we can see how the 
remoteness of the Sellafield site informed the way in which local citizens conceptualised the 
nuclear project and their status within British society. Marianna Dudley's recent article on the 
production and development of wind power in Orkney has shown that energy production had 
the means of subverting traditional ‘core’/’periphery’ power structures and disrupting the flow 
of power from the urban centre to the rural ‘edgelands’ or ‘periphery’.61 For some, Sellafield 
became a means of connecting the remote West Cumbrian region with the wider nation, serving 
as an altruistic representation of West Cumbria’s central importance within post-war British 
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60 A. Blowers, The Legacy of Nuclear Power (London: Routledge, 2016); A. Blowers, and P. Leroy, ‘Power, 
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society. For others, the remote siting of the Sellafield complex mirrored the region’s socio-
economic dependence (and subservience towards) the ‘core’. By siting the complex about as 
far from major urban centres as is physically possible within the relatively dense geographies 
of England, the nuclear complex reproduced the socio-spatial inequalities of the periphery by 
locating a potentially hazardous industry within a rural area seemingly deemed of less value to 
society. This committed the region to a long-term reliance upon a single state-run industry and 
overrode centuries of historical land-use and local attachments to place. This served to 
reproduce the socio-cultural identities of the region as ‘peripheral’ - at once a part of British 
society as an energy producer and apart from the mainstream as the expendable host of a 
dangerous new industry. As I will go on to demonstrate, this subjective identity became 
embroiled within imagined visions of the future, attenuating dystopian nuclear imaginaries by 
speaking to an undesirable local future of cultural, economic, environmental, and 
radiobiological subjugation at the hands of the nuclear state.  
 
This insight dovetails with a growing body of work examining the rural identities of 
communities ‘on the edge lands’ or ‘periphery.’62 Some of this literature is concerned with the 
socio-economic inequalities of energy production, with studies by Dudley and Hogg focusing 
on the issue of wind energy and uranium mining in the Scottish island of Orkney, whilst 
Rebecca Wheeler has examined how windfarms have impacted rural notions of identity in 
Cumbria, Cornwall, and Norfolk.63 In particular, Dudley uses the case study of Orkney to 
highlight the “influence of geographical edges as materially and imaginatively capable of 
 
62 M. Kuhn, ‘Peripheralization: Theoretical Concepts Explaining Socio-Spatial Inequalities’, European 
Planning Studies, 23.2 (2015), pp. 367- 378. The term ‘edge lands’ was introduced in 2002 by Marion Shoard, 
see (M. Shoard, ‘Edgelands’ in J. Jenkins, (ed.), Remaking the Landscape (London: Profile Books, 2002). 
63 Hogg, “Keep Orkney Active Not Radioactive”; R. Wheeler, ‘Reconciling Windfarms with Rural Place 
Identity: Exploring Residents’ Attitudes to Existing Sites’, Sociologia Ruralis, 57.1 (2017), pp. 110- 132. 
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disrupting a narrative of one-way power emanating from the centre.”64 The fourth and fifth 
chapters of this study in particular show how environmental and grass-roots activism from the 
periphery came to challenge the state’s handling of nuclear technologies, with the environment 
mobilised as a key contact zone between disaffected locals and the state. This sits within an 
emerging body of work on ‘energy landscapes’, which seeks to historicise the relationships 
between energy production and the public. At the forefront of this literature is Rebecca Wright, 
who has recently written that energy production has a complex and nuanced history which is 
inherently ingrained within the social and emotional life of the British public.65 Other studies 
of the ‘periphery’ have focused upon the impact of environmental disaster upon rural identities, 
specifically, work by Tim Cooper and Anna Green on the Torrey Canyon oil spill of 1967 has 
shown that the state’s handling and treatment of the local environment and people perpetuated 
identities of difference between the Cornish public and the rest of British society.66 Serving as 
both the site of a major environmental disaster (Windscale 1957) and as a semi-militarised 
landscape engaged in the production of energy, my treatment of Sellafield has been greatly 
informed by these studies which advocate the utility and exciting potential of marrying 
historical environmentalism and cultural geography, particularly when examining the role of 
place in producing elements of identity and culture.  
 
Focusing on the way in which geography, identity, and experience shape the production 
of nuclear culture, this project reflects recent methodological shifts within the field of nuclear 
culture, which have seen scholars interrogate not only the range of cultural expressions of the 
 
64 Dudley, 'The Limits of Power’, p. 316. 
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nuclear, but also the way in which these cultures were co-produced within society as ordinary 
citizens produced nuclear knowledge. The most recent literature on nuclear culture has refined 
and broadened the field, starting to trace the ways in which nuclear knowledge “both embeds 
and is embedded in social practices, identities, norms, conventions, discourses, instruments and 
institutions.”67 This definition reflects a growing engagement with STS, which is engaged with 
understanding the relationships between scientific knowledge, technological systems, and 
society. Taking inspiration from this cross-disciplinary context, this thesis is located within this 
broader trend, sitting across the field of nuclear culture and broader STS literature, specifically 
the work of Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim and their notion of the sociotechnical 
imaginary (STIM). 
 
Using the STIM Model in Nuclear History. 
 
Seeking to understand the evolution and permanence of nuclear technologies as part of 
the cultural framework of British life during the twentieth century, I have employed the 
framework of the ‘sociotechnical imaginary’ as an outline for analysis.68 Coalescing with very 
recent work in the field of civil defence history, this concept offers an analytical framework 
that showcases the dynamic interplay between science, technology, materiality, culture, and 
politics in contemporary society. Jasanoff has shown that STIM “helps explain a number of 
otherwise troublesome problems: why do technological trajectories diverge across polities and 
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periods [history]; what makes some sociotechnical arrangements more durable than others 
[culture]; how do facts and technologies transcend and reconstruct time and space [geography]; 
and what roles do science and technology play in connecting the individual’s subjective self-
understanding to a shared moral and social order [identity]?”69 STIM therefore aligns with the 
key themes which lie at the heart of this research project and can be used to investigate the 
areas of history, scale, cultural production, geography, and identity.  
 
Specifically, I will use STIM to show how social attitudes towards nuclear technologies 
emerged, were embedded and resisted over time. This offers a new lens through which to 
consider the chronology of social attitudes towards nuclear technologies throughout the 
twentieth century and also the social processes behind their creation. This thesis therefore aims 
to show the analytical potential of this interdisciplinary approach for scholars of nuclear 
history, identifying not just the diverse range of cultural expressions towards nuclear 
technologies, but also how these expressions sat alongside and co-produced broader social 
attitudes towards nuclear technologies, society, and the state.  
 
 Taking its lead from the terms ‘sociotechnical’, understood as the interplay between 
science, technology, and social life, and ‘imaginary’, a set of collective beliefs about “futures 
that should or should not be realised”, the ‘sociotechnical imaginary’ refers to the social 
processes through which society desires and prioritises certain futures above others.70 In her 
most recent formulation, Jasanoff defines sociotechnical imaginaries as:  
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“collectively held, institutionally stabilized, and publicly performed visions of desirable 
futures, animated by shared understandings of forms of social life and social order 
through, and supportive of, advances in science and technology.”71 
 
This definition aligns the focus on utopias and dystopias within political theory and cultural 
studies and offers up a “sophisticated understanding of the role of science and technology in 
social life.”72 Underpinning this definition is the idiom of ‘co-production’, through which 
nuclear technologies appear as an active social agent capable of diverse cultural work. Co-
production can be understood as a two-way dynamic through which “scientific knowledge… 
both embeds and is embedded in social practices, identities, norms, conventions, discourses, 
instruments, and institutions.”73 Through this rubric, nuclear “knowledge and its material 
embodiments [are] at once products of social work and constitutive of forms of social life.”74 
In other words, nuclear knowledge and material artefacts are both social products and social 
producers. This is an important point. As Peter Bennesved and Casper Sylvest note, whilst “it 
is a common inclination to identify social effects of specific technologies [...] the reverse 
dynamic- how social practices, norms, identities and institutions shape specific understandings 
of our responses to a technology- appears less habitual.”75 In recognition of this, the project 
observes how nuclear technologies were in turn co-produced by society, using the life-cycle 
model as a structure to observe interactions between nuclear science and British society.  
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 Having made some suggestions regarding the analytical potential of the STIM model 
within studies of nuclear culture, I will now outline its key utility within the context of this 
project, specifically using the life-cycle model of STIM as a framework for understanding the 
trajectory of social responses to nuclear technologies within Britain and the spread and flow of 
nuclear ideas across both time and space. This approach was greatly informed by a series of 
discussions and roundtables during August 2019 and February 2021 at two separate 
conferences which led to the formation of the Cold War Civil Defence book project.76 In these 
discussions, it was proposed that the life-cycle model offered a framework exploratory and 
spacious in nature; something to thinking with(in) rather than a theory or concept to be 
mechanically applied. It was an important distinction that the theory was not to become a 
straitjacket. With this in mind, the life-cycle model offers a heuristically useful structure for 
analysing the operation and life-cycle of STIMs.77 By understanding how nuclear ideas 
originated, were embedded into society, and encountered resistance, we gain a greater insight 
into the temporality of nuclear knowledge, charting not only how cultural attitudes towards 
these technologies evolved, but why they did so.  
 
 Attempting to give shape to this process, Jasanoff offers an explorative structure for 
understanding the life-cycle of sociotechnical imaginaries. Compartmentalising this process 
into four distinct phases, Jasanoff explores how imaginaries “originate in the visions of single 
individuals or small collectives”, rising to the status of an imaginary when “the originator’s 
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vanguard vision comes to be communally adopted” through a process known as embedding.78 
Here, imaginaries become interwoven into the fabric of everyday life as “collectively held, 
institutionally stabilised, and publicly performed visions of desirable futures.”79 These 
imaginaries are then subject to contest and resistance by individuals and social groups, who 
may oppose any part of these imaginaries, ranging from “specific policies to visions of the 
future and their underlying social norms.”80 This can be traced within large organisations or 
within the subtle activities of ordinary people within daily life, remembering James Scott’s 
point that “those with power... are not, however, in total control of the stage. They may write 
the basic script for the play but, within its confines, truculent or disaffected actors find 
sufficient room for manoeuvre to suggest subtly their disdain for the proceedings.”81 The fourth 
and final stage is extension, which deals with how imaginaries are moved from one spatial 
setting to another, often with the help of “translation agents” who redefine these imaginaries 
in the process of applying them within another context.82 In this thesis, the embedding and 
resistance phases are particularly useful in helping us reveal the British public’s complicated 
relationship with nuclear technologies and helping us understand how these technologies 
represented a series of desirable political, social, and cultural futures, whilst also forming a 
fertile site of political, environmental, and cultural resistance.   
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The life-cycle model structures our understanding of social attitudes towards nuclear 
technologies by displaying their evolution as part of a process. To this end, previous scholars 
have produced useful models that attempt to understand the historical arc of attitudes towards 
nuclear technologies, dividing the second half of the twentieth century into distinct ‘ages’- 
those of ‘innocent expectation’, ‘doubt’, ‘anguish’, and ‘public justification’; or ‘discourses’- 
‘trust in technology’, ‘danger and distrust’, ‘consensus and co-operation’, and ‘security.’83 
Instructive as these are, they divide the nuclear half-century into neat categorisations which 
fail to account for the complexity of these positions, nuances of scale, and largely omit the role 
of ordinary citizens in shaping these changes. These represent a more socially deterministic 
approach which sees this periodisation as the product of single events rather than complex, 
conflicting, and competing social forces. The lens of the sociotechnical imaginary 
simultaneously challenges the chronologies these models offer, and conceives of shifting 
attitudes, not as products of random events, but of discernible social forces in the life-cycle and 
evolution of nuclear power as a sociotechnical imaginary. 
 
 This approach sits within a nascent body of work applying STIM in multiple national 
and historical contexts. Over the last two years several journal articles have appeared which 
examine STIM in areas such as marine diplomacy (Robinson and Orsini), public ‘crisis 
discourses’ (Kalmbach, Marklund, and Åberg), industrial development (Schiølin), airspace 
(Lawless), governmentality (Smallman), and climate change (Levidow and Raman, and 
 
83 T. O’Riordan, ‘The Prodigal Technology: Nuclear Power and Political Controversy’, The Political Quarterly, 
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Sovacool et al).84 In particular, two special issues have focused on the role of imaginaries in 
connecting social and technological orders.85 Christopher Lawrence examines how satellite and 
remote sensoring of nuclear facilities in South-West Asia fed into American national 
imaginaries of global transparency and temperate foreign policy.86 Maxime Polleri has also 
focused on nuclear science, examining public controversies of nuclear power and radiation in 
post-Fukushima Japan. Polleri argued that “there is an increasing need for studies which are 
attentive to the ways in which nuclear infrastructure, its governance and the rationalisation of 
radioactive contamination risks are enmeshed in specific ways”, as well as a more detailed 
interest in how these relationships manifest at ground level amongst ordinary citizens; both of 
which align with the research aims for this project.87  
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Many of these studies have acknowledged that imaginaries are “typically contested, 
changeable, flexible and loose around the edges.”88 Indeed, in a forthcoming edited collection, 
Marie Cronqvist and Matthew Grant recognise that “more attention has to be paid to the 
quotidian, messy, and partial ways [STIMs] were understood and sometimes rejected in 
everyday life”, arguing that ordinary life was characterised by a distinct “fuzziness” as STIMs 
were enacted and played out amongst ordinary people.89 At the crest of this new wave of 
thinking, this forthcoming edited collection looks at the role of sociotechnical imaginaries of 
survival and preparedness, examining how imaginaries of Cold war civil defence manifested 
in various national contexts throughout Western Europe.  
 
Focusing on West Germany, Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland, Sweden, 
and NATO affiliated nations such as the US, this edited collection explores how civil defence 
was imagined, communicated, and structured particular ways of thinking about nuclear war. 
This demonstrates that nuclear war was seen as plannable, containable, and survivable through 
structured and co-ordinated national response procedures. Some of these articles examine 
imaginaries of civil defence, rooted in Second World War notions of aerial bombardment and 
shelter defence systems.90 Meanwhile, Casper Sylvest and Peter Bennesved have shown how 
visual media such as civil defence films played an important role in embedding imaginaries of 
preparedness and survivability, pointing to the significance of the visual (and moving) media 
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in “structur[ing] the imagination of nuclear war and ways of surviving such a catastrophe.”91 
Adopting a similar approach that focuses on the role of material structures in giving “mass and 
solidity” to nuclear imaginaries, Rosanna Farbøl explores how Danish ‘ruin towns’ embedded 
the imaginary that nuclear war was survivable. She shows how these sites served as “a stage 
for enacting and performing a future war, whereby the merely imagined was given a concrete, 
tangible expression [which] added materiality, spatiality, realism and presence to what was 
largely speculative, discursive and imaginary.”92 Elsewhere, Jonathan Hogg explains that 
imaginaries of civil defence were firmly located within particular social, geographical, and 
discursive contexts. He argues that whilst sociotechnical imaginaries often originated at official 
or state level, these imaginaries were “strengthened and made durable once [they] became 
intertwined with localised contexts and, of course, individuals working within them.”93 This 
assertion corroborates the central claim of this thesis, that ordinary people act as major agents 
of social change, helping co-produce, embed, resist, and redefine sociotechnical imaginaries of 
nuclear technologies, producing multiple geographic, social, and discursive contexts which 
require a greater degree of historical engagement if we are to understand the plurality of British 





In order to investigate the range of cultural responses to the nuclear plant at Sellafield, 
this study uses an interdisciplinary approach whereby cultural archives synthesise with a range 
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of oral history sources, acting as “subversive strands of knowledge” which contrast official 
nuclear narratives and offer new interpretations of the British nuclear age.94 To mitigate any 
distortion within the source material a number of different sources were analysed in 
conjunction with each other, derived from a combination of pre-recorded oral history 
interviews, personally conducted oral interviews, newspaper articles, and archival sources. 
These included internal government paperwork, legal transcripts, industry reports and inter 




The archival material relating to the history and operation of the Sellafield site, and of 
British nuclear history itself is located in three main repositories. In Cumbria, the Workington 
and Whitehaven archives hold hundreds of records relating to the site’s construction, operation, 
and management, alongside hundreds of microfiche reels of newspaper records from the local 
West Cumberland Times and Star and West Cumberland News. The bulk of the material 
relating to the early history of the British nuclear weapons, and civil nuclear programme 
however exists down in The National Archives in Kew. As various files have become available 
through declassification and FOI requests, this archive (whilst typically erratic and scattered) 
has grown to a substantial size, providing an excellent resource for researchers. The third 
repository is situated in the North of Scotland in Wick, at the newly constructed Nucleus 
Archive. This facility opened in late 2015, designed to house the various nuclear records that 
previously existed in various locations across Britain, in one location. This site has been open 
to the public since 2017. However, the process of collecting, collating, and cataloguing the 
various records scheduled to be housed there is conservatively expected to take a minimum of 
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five years. Consequently, these materials were unavailable for the duration of the project. This 
placed a heavier reliance upon the records housed in Cumbria and at the National Archives.  
 
The Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre has an impressive array of 
documentation covering the history of the Sellafield site. This archive was particularly useful 
for housing copies of original planning applications for the village of Seascale, the notes of the 
Local Liaison Committee (LLC) which documented relations between the plant and locals, 
copies of official pamphlets produced by the UKAEA and BNFL, various parish records, and 
the legal transcripts from the Windscale inquiry which forms one of the chapters of the study. 
Relevant folders were obtained through a key word search of the archive’s catalogue and 
through consultation with the archivists, who were able to identify a number of collections 
which held articles relating to Sellafield, specifically within the minutes of Council meetings 
and local land applications.  
 
By far the majority of the de-classified records relating to Sellafield are housed within 
the National Archives, notably in the AB series of documents. Unfortunately, during the 
Christmas break in my first year of study, this entire collection was withdrawn from the shelves 
at the National Archives without prior warning and remain unavailable at the time of writing. 
It later emerged that the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA), the government body 
responsible for the records had requested that the records be withdraw pending a security 
review process.95 This move demonstrated the “ineluctable, even agonistic vulnerability of 
 
95 This decision was the subject of a parliamentary exchange between the M.P. for the constituency of 
Edinburgh North and Leith, Deidre Brock M.P. and the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy, Richard Harrington M.P. This exchange can be found here. ‘Nuclear Power and Nuclear Weapons: 
Public Records’ <https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2019-02-13/220931> 
[accessed 21 February 2019]. 
 47 
archives to political whim and social upheaval” and the susceptibility of the researcher to the 
mandates of historical curators.96 
 
The files withdrawn exist in two parts, firstly the ES series, which are the records of 
the Atomic Weapons Establishment, which concern the research, development and testing of 
Britain’s atomic weapons programme. Secondly, the AB series are the records of the United 
Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, largely concerning the civilian nuclear energy 
programme. Totalling thousands of files, these two series have been withdrawn in their entirety, 
with no indication given regarding their future availability.97 This created a significant obstacle 
in my research and regrettably consumed a considerable amount of time, as repeated attempts 
to obtain these records were pushed back. In total, 39 FOI requests were submitted for key 
documents- all of which were rejected. Whilst the archive may serve as “a site for knowledge 
production, [and] an arbiter of truth” this shows that it must also be understood as “a 
mechanism for shaping the narratives of history” which serves not as the sum of all texts but 
what Michel Foucault described as “a monument to particular configurations of power.”98 In 
this context, this thesis cannot help but be a product of the structures of power which govern 
access to nuclear knowledge in the UK. Herein I encountered something of the exclusion from 
the zones of knowledge which control nuclear meaning-making endured by the historical actors 
at the centre of this study. I therefore became a part of the histories I was writing, not only 
through the selective interpretation of historical material inherent within any historical study, 
 
96 A. Burton (ed.), Archive Stories: Facts, Fictions, and the Writing of History (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2005), p. 3. 
97 Speculation ranges from whether the NDA had realised there was something within the files which should not 
be made publicly available, or whether an audit was taking place prior to the files being moved to the new 
facility at Wick. The deafening silence of the NDA on this matter despite national media attention has done 
nothing to dispel the former. For press reports on this issue, see R. Booth, ‘British Nuclear Archive Files 
Withdrawn Without Explanation’, Guardian, 23 December 2018 <theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/23/british-
nuclear-archive-files-withdrawn-without-explanation> [accessed 24 December 2018]. 
98 A. Stoler, ‘Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance’, Archival Science, 2.0 (2002), pp. 90- 96; Burton, 
Archive Stories, pp. 2- 6. 
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but as an active participant in the hegemonic power structures of nuclear governance, as the 
historical ‘truth(s)’ I uncovered were, at least in part, a distorted vision of the past.99  
 
The archive serves “not as a transparent window into the past, but as an instituted site 
of memory construction.”100 It may be better understood as a screen onto which power relations 
are inscribed in accordance with state values and ethnographies. Here, political decision-
making behind-the-scenes at the NDA controlled the archive’s contents and imposed upon the 
project by dictating “what can and cannot be said, and what will and will not be 
remembered.”101 It is clear that even in the era of digitization and file sharing, where one might 
expect data to be more accessible and to move about more freely, the historical archive remains 
an “archive of choices.”102 It is the product of overt practical, political, and economic decision 
making about what to preserve, what to make accessible, and what to keep hidden from public 
view. Responding to this context, I sought to bypass the hegemonic narratives of the archive 
by reading ‘against the grain’, identifying and examining alternative data sets, eschewing 
conventional search methods, and examining the quotidian minutiae of the archive to discern 
patterns of inclusion, from which it was possible determine what was not said and had been 
redacted by the NDA.103 It thus became possible to circumvent the political obstacles 
hampering my research by identifying copies of the missing material duplicated in other files 
and categorised according to different search criteria and keywords.  
 
99 H. White, Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1979), pp. 126f; K. Haltunnen, ‘Self, Subject, and the “Barefoot Historian”’, The Journal of American 
History, 89.1 (2002), pp. 20- 24. 
100 J. Hellbeck, Revolution on My Mind: Writing a Diary Under Stalin (Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 2009), p. 417; Stoler, ‘Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance’, p. 87. 
101 P. Fritzche, ‘The Archive and the Case of the German Nation’, in A. Burton (ed.), Archive Stories: Facts, 
Fictions, and the Writing of History (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), p. 186. 
102 C. Armstrong, M. Evenden, and H. Nelles, The River Returns: An Environmental History of the Bow 
(Montreal: McGill Queens Press, 2014), p. 19. 
103 For further reading on working ‘against the grain’ of the archive, see A. Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: 
Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
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Taking a more lateral approach to the process of data collection, I decided to adapt my 
search method, amending key word searches and filters to get at the information via alternative 
routes. For instance, I found a number of papers relating to the 1983 ‘beach incident’ within a 
folder categorised under ‘Greenpeace’ which alluded to, and in a couple of instances quoted 
material from the withdrawn files. Similarly, by searching within the folders of government 
departments such as the Department for the Environment (DoE), the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food (MAFF), the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, and the Prime 
Minister’s Office it was possible to obtain sufficient information and source material without 
access to the blocked files. Likewise, in some cases books by Lorna Arnold, Peter Hennessy, 
and Ian Welsh quoted from, or detailed material within these files.104 Having identified several 
records prior to their censorship, it was also possible to search for the same documents in the 
Whitehaven archive, where a number of items had been photocopied and were held in a very 
dusty (and seemingly forgotten) filing cabinet. Approaching the source material via this 
unconventional ‘through the back door’ approach allowed me to circumvent the significant 
obstacles posed by the loss of the National Archive files and discover alternative material 
which offers up a series of new findings about everyday life and the cultural impact of the plant 
upon the local region. Despite these efforts, the withdrawal of archival material placed a greater 
emphasis on the oral history component of my research and the analysis of newspaper articles. 
This indirectly (but pleasingly) realigned my research efforts with the study’s initial objectives 
 
104 L. Arnold, Windscale 1957; P. Hennessy, The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War (London: Penguin, 
2003); Welsh, Mobilising Modernity. 
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and its focus on the everyday histories of the people who built, worked at, and lived alongside 




The newspaper articles were identified through the search functions of the UK Press 
Online (which includes Daily Mirror, Daily Express, Daily Star, Sunday Express, and Star on 
Sunday), the Daily Mail historical archive, the Times digital archive, and the Guardian and 
Observer digital archive database, where multiple keyword and date-range searches were 
performed. Local newspaper articles were sourced from the Workington Library which houses 
microfiche reels of the Whitehaven News, [West Cumberland] Times and Star, Evening News 
and Star, North-Western Evening Mail, and the [West Cumberland] News and Star.106 Here, 
articles were identified by date, with searches performed between 1946, the year in which the 
Sellafield site was first being planned for development and 1984, as the year following the 
‘beach incident’ and the point at which articles about the plant dwindled in number. 
 
The use of newspaper articles has been informed by studies of nuclear language and 
literature, which have applied poststructuralist theories of discourse analysis to uncover the 
linguistic tropes and rhetorical devices contained within nuclearised language. This has given 
rise to a rich vein of scholarship examining newspaper narratives in British, Indian, and Italian 
 
105 The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 threw into dispute the validity of this claim, with suggestions that 
the Soviet plutonium production plant ‘Mayak’ near the town of Kyshtym could hold this claim. See, D. Soran, 
and D. Stillman, ‘An Analysis of the Alleged Kyshtym Disaster’, (Los Alamos National Lab: New Mexico, 
1982), <https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/5254763> [accessed June 2018]; See also, K. Brown, Plutopia. 
106 Brackets indicate where a newspaper changed its name within the period. 
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contexts, particularly focusing on the themes of fear and hope.107 Elsewhere, studies by Alison 
Young and Adrian Bingham have placed particular emphasis on deconstructing British 
newspaper narratives and discourse, analysing media depictions of anti-nuclear protest and 
nuclear weapons, whilst Jonathan Hogg has expanded upon Gabrielle Hecht’s use of the term 
‘nuclearity’ to understand how nuclear symbols and motifs were transmitted, circulated, and 
(re)produced within newspapers, pointing to the formation of a post-war British identity 
directly inflected by this context.108 In particular, Hogg has argued that newspaper articles play 
an important role in shaping and reflecting public opinion; “often pitched at what is assumed 
to be the dominant worldview or to appeal to an assumed set of shared opinions.” He argues 
that newspaper articles might be used as “a window into the social creation and reinforcement 
of [nuclear] meaning.”109 This project sought to develop these insights by analysing the spread 
and flow of nuclear narratives at both national and local levels, and paying attention to the use 
of language, syntax, and imagery to deconstruct the role of the media in embedding, resisting, 
and extending particular nuclear imaginaries. This was also informed by the aforementioned 
study by Peter Bennesved and Casper Sylvest which examines the role of media 
communication in structing and embedding social imaginaries of preparedness and 
survivability through civil defence.110 
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Oral History.  
 
Through analysis of oral histories, newspaper reports, and primary documentation from 
a number of different archives throughout the UK, this research aims to provide a holistic and 
nuanced overview of the public responses to the nuclear project at Sellafield at both national 
and local level. The oral history strand to my research method offers insights into one of the 
key research aims of the project, exploring if, how, and where host communities co-produced 
nuclear technologies, acting not as passive absorbers but active components in the production 
and dissemination of nuclear culture. Examining this process, I conducted a series of oral 
interviews with local residents and utilised existing oral histories with community members, 
drawing upon both my own interviews and those obtained from existing repositories, such as 
the voluminous ‘Sellafield Stories’ project, which I will cover shortly. Combining this 
synthesis of new and existing oral histories provided a historical richness that sheds light upon 
what Hogg has referred to as “the hidden histories” of the Cold war, understood as those 
individual voices which represent the plurality of British experiences of the conflict.111 Instead 
of relying purely upon my own interviews, which were hampered by time constraints due to 
archival restrictions and the COVID-19 pandemic, these oral materials synthesised, acting as 
“subversive strands of knowledge” which contrast with official nuclear narratives and offer 
new interpretations of the British nuclear age.112  
 
At the onset of the study, it was intended to interview around twenty or so individuals 
who lived in close proximity to the Sellafield plant or had worked there between 1947 and 
1990. It was hoped that this would allow for a sufficient range of responses which would not 
only prove representative of the nuanced nature of local opinion towards the plant but provide 
 
111 Hogg, “The Family that Feared Tomorrow,” p. 538. 
112 Davies, ‘A Visual Geography of Chernobyl’, p. 127. 
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a sufficient depth of material for analysis. However, during the research process I was able to 
gain access to a repository of interviews conducted between 2009 and 2010 as part of a multi-
million-pound oral history project known as ‘Sellafield Stories.’ At the time it was 
commissioned, this was the largest oral history project conducted in the UK, containing 
interviews from over a hundred local residents and former employees who had been invited to 
share their life-histories. This formed part of a legacy project commissioned as the former 
operating company British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL) was broken up and control of the plant 
was taken over by the NDA. This collection formed a short published volume entitled Sellafield 
Stories, authored by journalist Hunter Davies who collated thirty of these interviews into a 
short manuscript which documented individuals’ personal recollections and anecdotes about 
living alongside and working at the plant. 
 
This book formed a useful start-point for the project. However the transcripts from these 
interviews proved much more valuable as the overwhelming majority of material collated as 
part of this project was excluded from the final manuscript and remained untouched in storage 
boxes at the local Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, where the project had been 
based. As part of my research, I was able to gain access to these interviews, and their 
accompanying transcripts, audio, and video files. These insights are yet to be explored in any 
detail within the historiography and represent a rich and varied composition of responses to the 
nuclear condition from individuals varying from construction workers, teachers, police 
officers, process workers, farmhands, nuclear scientists, scientists’ wives, and plant 
management. Owing to the vast number of interviews which had been collated, the quality and 
ethical practice adhered to by the interviewers, and the lack of scholarly analysis of these 
sources, the decision was taken to utilise this existing resource and conduct a smaller number 
of individual interviews than originally planned, preferring instead to produce a hybrid 
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approach which saw the existing narratives of the ‘Sellafield Stories’ project analysed 
alongside a smaller sample of personal interviews.113 By analysing these oral histories 
alongside an array of other primary source materials, it became clear that the pre-existing 
‘Sellafield Stories’ interviews already offered a strong indication of the localised and 
marginalised local voices sought by the project, fulfilling the research aim to not only 
document and capture the historical memories of Britain’s first ‘nuclear community’ but to 
bring these memories into a co-constructed and democratic narrative, attentive to the ways in 
which ordinary people shaped, and were shaped by the development of nuclear technologies 
throughout the second half of the twentieth century.114  
 
In addition, a small number of interviews were found within existing national archives 
and contributed towards the overall research project. Specifically, the ‘National Life Stories’ 
collection at the British Library featured a small number of interviews with individuals who 
had worked at or lived by the plant, as did the ‘Oral History of the Electricity Supply in the 
UK’ and the ‘Oral History of British Science’ projects. These interviews were conducted at a 
similar time to the ‘Sellafield Stories’ project, between 2010 and 2015. Local archives were 
also a useful source of interview transcripts, with the Ambleside Oral History Group having 
conducted several interviews with local residents between 1986 and 2013, providing a valuable 
insight into the attitudes of older members of the local population who were not alive to feature 
in the ‘Sellafield Stories’ project. Selective use was also made of question-and-answer extracts 
collated in 1983 as part of a sociological study of local attitudes by Sally Macgill and a 1990 
study by local anti-nuclear activist Jean McSorley entitled Living in the Shadow: The Story of 
 
113 The methodological implications of this decision will be examined in the following section.  
114 Riley, ‘Emplacing the Research Encounter’, pp. 651- 662. 
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the People of Sellafield.115 This monograph featured interviews with a number of disaffected 
locals who opposed the nuclear industry, and as such provided a useful repository for anti-
nuclear attitudes. However, care was taken to ensure that these punctuated my own research 
rather than imposing an anti-nuclear spin or politicising the project. With this in mind, I have 
utilised this resource sparingly and with great care, largely where gaps appeared in my own 
interviews and the ‘Sellafield Stories’ project. This resource was particularly useful in relation 
to the early years of Sellafield’s history where few individuals are still alive to share their 
memories and throughout the chapter on the Windscale Inquiry of 1977 which did not feature 
heavily in the interview process, as respondents frequently chose to structure their nuclear life-
histories around major flashpoints, such as the Windscale Fire of 1957 and the leukaemia 
controversy and ‘beach incident’ of 1983. I also drew upon a recent local history study where 
residents had been invited to share their memories of growing up in Seascale by way of 
contributing to an online message board, where contributors could respond to or create 
particular discussion topics, such as ‘The Great Fire of Windscale’, ‘Farms of Seascale’, and 
‘Seascale School.’ Something of an exercise in nostalgia for local residents, this discussion 
board yielded a number of fascinating insights and memories of growing up next to Sellafield 
and was later turned into a book called Atom Kids: The Oral History of Seascale.116 Whilst this 
study may not resemble the conventional model of oral history as practiced by the historian, 
this study represented a hugely valuable resource and functioned as a form of multi-layered 
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group interview, as locals chose which memories to convey and structured discussions of 
growing up near Sellafield.117 
 
Whilst these materials functioned as an incredibly valuable resource in my research, I 
was able to conduct four separate interviews with members of the local community. These 
interviews were conducted in neutral venues and residents’ homes in accordance with their 
preferences, with full ethical approval provided by the University of Liverpool. As part of this 
process, the storage of oral transcripts was permitted for a three-year period via the university’s 
encrypted M-Drive system, with all interviewee names anonymised as standard. A further four 
interviews were planned, but ill health, the bereavement of a key gatekeeper within a local anti-
nuclear group, and the COVID-19 pandemic meant that these were unable to take place. The 
call for interviewees was published by the Beacon Museum in Whitehaven and the Industrial 
History of Cumbria Group. However, more success was obtained through word of mouth and 
a ‘snowballing’ process whereby respondents recommended and introduced me to potential 
interviewees, who comprised of three men and one woman aged between 50 and 90.118 Of the 
interviews which did not take place due to ill health, the unfortunate passing of one interviewee 
and his family’s wishes to withdraw from the project, and the interruption of the COVID-19 
pandemic, the participants comprised of three women aged between 47 and 84, and one man 
in his fifties. Whilst the interviewees for the ‘Sellafield Stories’ project relied upon volunteers, 
 
117 Furthermore, with the increasing power of digital and social medias, this represents something of a 
methodological shift amongst grass-roots oral history, as the internet is increasingly facilitating the interview 
process through sites such as StoryCorps and the Social Voice Project, which are growing in popularity as a tool 
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account the growth of digitised story-telling platforms and their significance within the academy. 
<https://www.ohs.org.uk/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/OHJ_48-1_p21_OHSconf2020_advert.pdf> [accessed 
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History and the Digital Revolution: Toward a Post-Documentary Sensibility’, in R. Perks, and A. Thompson 
(eds.), The Oral History Reader (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 102- 122. 
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interviewees were recruited through access to gatekeepers in local institutions such as the 
Women’s Institute, a local Church, and the Rotary Club. This meant that I was able to interview 
a number of people who had or perceived that they had little to say about the nuclear industry, 
as opposed to the contributors for the ‘Sellafield Stories’ project, who had self-identified as 
having a connection to the industry. This enabled a more nuanced insight into local attitudes, 
as it became clear that people who did not feel as if they had anything of any value to contribute 
to the project yielded a range of fascinating quotidian insights that provided a more well-
rounded and accurate impression of everyday attitudes within the local community and 




Instructive as these oral histories were, the interviews from the ‘Sellafield Stories’ 
database formed the bulk of the material analysed, which necessitated an appreciation of the 
theoretical implications this had for the thesis. The project originated as an oral history in the 
‘reminiscence’ model, which prioritises the recording of oral interviews “for the sole purpose 
of recovering voices and placing them on the historical record.”119 This type of history was 
pioneered by the work of early oral historians such as Studs Terkel during the Great Depression 
of the 1930s.120 These type of studies are often not bolstered by a huge degree of theoretical 
engagement; indeed, it is not their purpose or objective to do so, instead placing the emphasis 
on the retrieval of historical information before the voices, histories, and information held by 
their respondents are lost. In utilising this source, I have interpreted the data using what is 
known as the ‘theoretical model’ of oral history, which fuses together the ‘reminiscence model’ 
 
119 L. Abrams, Oral History Theory (Oxford: Routledge, 2016), p. 15. 
120 As one of many writers employed by the Federal Writers’ Project between 1936 and 1940, Terkel and his 
colleagues were responsible for recording the voices and narratives of ordinary Americans from differing 
regions, occupations, and ethnic backgrounds. (Abrams, Oral History Theory, p. 155.) 
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with informed theoretical insights which help decoding oral material. As the ‘Sellafield Stories’ 
project was not created for an academic audience, it was important to subject the material to 
the required levels of theoretical rigour, paying close attention to the way in which the material 
was collated and interpreted. Through this approach, it was possible to both focus on the 
memories shared during the interviews and observe the subjectivities and identities held by 
respondents as they articulated these memories. As oral historian Lynn Abrams has argued, the 
oral encounter functions as a conduit for the articulation of the self or multiple selves; “the 
interview becomes a process in which the respondent actively fashions an identity. And even 
in an interview where the declared aim is merely to gather information it is rare for the 
respondent not to reveal something of themselves.”121  
 
This project takes the middle ground between theoretical and evidential approaches, 
stressing the significance of the (often overlooked) ‘reminiscence model’, particularly within 
nuclear and Cold war studies, where many individuals who lived through the early atomic age 
are now entering old age and whose stories are at risk of disappearing from the historical record 
completely. Conducted around a decade prior to my study, the ‘Sellafield Stories’ interviews 
were a vital source of information on the early years of the civil nuclear programme and the 
plant’s development, providing a rich dearth of information and memories which are 
increasingly difficult to preserve as historical actors pass away. Occasionally side-lined by the 
academy, community histories such as these play a major role in the production of histories of 
nuclear culture and, when combined with the required theoretical understanding of oral 
historians, offer an incredibly rich data set which not only adds to our understanding of British 
 
121 Ibid., pp. 23, 33. 
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nuclear experiences but in many cases challenges the existing historical record.122 This study 
has been informed by theoretical insights from practitioners of oral history, through which I 
have applied a new frame of analysis to the field of British nuclear culture, fusing existing oral 
history approaches with interdisciplinary research methods to create a new cultural history of 
the nuclear complex at Sellafield.  
  
Inherent within the field of oral history is the pitfall of translation, as material is 
translated from one medium into another for analysis. This represented a potential problem for 
this study, as the majority of interviews had been conducted by other people and I could 
exercise no control over the process of translation, nor the mediums in which the interviews 
were translated. To overcome this problem, I analysed the material in all available formats, 
drawing upon the written transcriptions, the accompanying audio files, and where available 
video files. Scholars of oral history have acknowledged that each of these forms represents a 
mutation of the original interview, each of which highlights different elements of the interview 
performance and produces something of a slippage between them.123 The most widely 
recognised format used in oral history is the interview transcript, a written piece which attempts 
to codify the aurality of the interview. However, the text of the transcript is not beyond 
reproach, as its textual nature introduces specific distortions upon the source material and 
forces it to conform to linguistic and syntactic norms, which may not have occurred in the 
original interview. Whilst transcripts are highly accessible, Abrams has argued that “there can 
only be a semblance of similarity… between the narrative as told and the narrative as written 
 
122 For examples of similar projects in the global context, see A. Maurer, and R. Hogue, ‘Introduction: 
Transnational Nuclear Imperialisms’, Journal of Transnational American Studies, 11.2 (2020), pp. 25- 43; B. 
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[accessed 3 January 2020]. 
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down; something happens in the process of speech being translated into text.”124 Portelli takes 
this one step further, remarking that “expecting the transcript to replace the tape for scientific 
purposes is equivalent to doing art criticism on reproduction, or literary criticism on 
translations.”125 Whilst the interview is a “multi-layered communicative event,” the transcript 
does not reproduce the subtleties conveyed within speech.126 Despite attempts to recreate the 
vocal nuances from the audio file the “tone and volume range and the rhythm of popular speech 
carry implicit meaning and social connotations which are not reproducible in writing.”127 This 
induces a loss of historical meaning, as the transcript, by its very nature, focuses on recording 
the words spoken verbatim (or as close as possible). Specifically, the oral qualities of the 
interview can be easily overlooked once the interview has been transcribed and the ease of 
working with this format dominates. To overcome the pitfalls of analysing transcript material 
alone, the accompanying audio and, in some cases video files were analysed in conjunction 
with the transcripts in order to obtain a more nuanced insight into the nature of interviewees’ 
responses.128 
 
Early oral historians failed to give orality any great consideration, treating the interview 
as a means of accessing historical information, as opposed to thinking about the interior 
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qualities of the interview, such as the specific speech employed by the historical subject.129 
Despite this, the orality inherent within the interview can reveal “important attributes of the 
story, the contents, the practice of telling and the culture which produces it.”130 Here, speech 
analysis facilitated a greater degree of interpretation as the speed of speech often conveyed 
something of the narrator’s emotional state, where interviewees slowed down to add greater 
emphasis or struggled to convey specific memories, or sped up to display a greater degree of 
familiarity and ease with a topic, or even a desire to gloss over certain points. For example, 
discussions around childhood leukaemia cases in the nearby region often caused interviewees 
to speak slowly, or in broken sentences as they sought to arrange and convey their feelings and 
memories in a coherent manner. The following example came from a mother recalling her 
experiences of the Windscale fire: “Oh, Oh, Oh, I cannot tell you the, Oh, it was, it was 
horrendous. It was horrendous… Because we didn’t know, we didn’t know…”131 Here, pauses 
played an important role in the meaning of speech, as sporadic or irregular pauses emphasised 
emotional subject matter, whilst other interviewees introduced heavy rhythmic pauses in their 
speech when conveying their memories of Sellafield’s early years, relating the story in the form 
of a pioneering, epic narrative; “I was a government servant and I’d been given a job to do… 
I didn’t feel any qualms about working for the bomb at all.”132 Since interviews can shift 
between these styles, listening to the form and cadence of speech revealed “variations in the 
narrator’s attitude towards his or her material”, whereby it became possible to identify 
something of the respondent’s emotional state when discussing certain topics, as previously 
coherent and eloquent respondents underwent discernible changes in their pattern of speech 
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when discussing issues such as the levels of radiation they had absorbed.133 Throughout the 
project, I used both the audio file (when available) and the transcript in conjunction during the 
analysis stage. Working from the interviews in their transcribed form, I returned to the audio 
file to analyse specific dialogue in order to gain a more accurate insight into the oral 
performances within the source material. In this way, I have attempted to retain as much of the 
source’s true form as possible, quoting material in a manner that both reproduces the words 
said and the way in which they were said, without burying the overall meaning within layers 
of linguistic notation.  
 
 By paying close attention to the construction of the narrative, it was possible to gain an 
insight into the process of identity formation, as various interviewees articulated a specific 
sense of self during the interviews, constructing their narrative in such a way as to say 
something about how they perceived themselves or wished to be perceived. This offered a 
window into the socio-cultural identities inherent within the local community as interviewees 
constructed and performed elements of their identity in the interview setting. The ability to 
reveal the underlying identities that subtly unfold throughout the interview process is one of 
the key values of an oral history approach. Indeed, oral historians have tended to be “more 
theoretically promiscuous than most in the historical profession”, committed to the pursuit of 
elements such as identity, subjectivity, memory, and narrative- now commonly understood as 
playing a major role in the construction of historical material.134 Specifically, the interviews 
uncovered both historical and present subjectivities as respondents chose to “dig deep, to reflect 
 
133 A. Portelli, ‘The Peculiarities of Oral History’, History Workshop Journal, 12.1 (1981), p. 99. 
134 A. Portelli, ‘Oral History as Genre’, in M. Chamberlain, and P. Thompson (eds.), Narrative and Genre: 
Contexts and Types of Communication (London, 2004), p. 23. 
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on the inner self, to reconcile any conflicts and then to reconstruct the self as a coherent whole 
in the form of a single narrative.”135 
 
 In the telling of their life-histories, respondents perform their history to an audience in 
the interview context, becoming ‘narrators’ of key life events in front of an interviewer who 
may be able to discern performative techniques which reveal something of the narrators’ 
relationship to their past, and their sense of self. Oral historian Lynn Abrams has argued that 
“narrative is not merely the content of the story, but the telling of it” through the specific 
arrangement and dramatisation of the story, by way of “emphases, embellishments, cadences, 
structure, digressions, [and] silences.”136 It is not necessary to be a scholar of linguistics to 
observe these subtleties, but oral historians should observe “how people shape their narratives 
in order to make a point.”137 These performances often draw upon a variety of narrative forms 
which “suit the story they are telling and the meaning they wish to impart.”138 For example, 
some respondents structured their memories around how little they knew about the plant, 
fashioning an identity as the unwitting victims of a government conspiracy: “we didn’t really 
realise what it was then, it was just gonna make electric for everybody.”139 Likewise, others 
produced a narrative which reflected Sellafield’s role in the Cold war, framing their memories 
around the need to “contribute to the nation” providing “what we needed for our stock of 
plutonium and our standing as a nuclear power.”140 The manner in which these memories are 
conveyed reveals something of the narrator’s sense-of-self, alternatively telling the story from 
the perspective of Cold war heroism and victimhood. In his oral history of Holocaust survivors, 
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Lawrence Langer noted that interviewees positioned themselves within the narrative in 
different ways.141 By being attentive and sympathetic to the narrative structures and 
performances of his interviewees, Langer showed that whilst his subjects were performing their 
life-histories in radically different ways, each was “telling a version of the truth as they grasped 
it,” communicating the story as they understood, experienced, and remembered it.142 These 
choices are of significance to the oral historian, who “ought to be conscious of the performance 
shapes and forms that oral narratives assume” as these insights reveal something of the 
meanings the narrator (and perhaps the wider collective) ascribe to their life-history.143 Here, 
the ‘Sellafield Stories’ project was particularly instructive as citizens drew upon a set of 
collective and individual identities when narrativising particular aspects of their history, 
revealing not only the socio-cultural identities they assumed at particular moments in time, but 
also a historical sense-of-self as they look back on and reconceive of these events in the present.  
 
 Tracing the intersection between individual and collective memory, the oral encounter 
revealed specific cultural identities amongst the local community, disclosing how and where 
nuclear technologies had produced a collective sense of self amongst the local community. 
Multiple narratives sounded the same themes as specific memories, experiences, and 
subjectivities were collectively appropriated and specific “system[s] of knowledge” 
appeared.144 Abrams has argued that narrators look to wider culture to “construct a memory 
story with which he or she can feel comfortable at that moment… often one in which the story 
 
141 L. Langer, Holocaust Memories: The Ruins of Memory (Yale: Yale University Press, 1993), p. xi. 
142 Ibid. 
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told coheres with larger cultural understandings.”145 In this instance, some interviewees 
subsumed their memories of issues such as radiation sickness or industrial injury within a wider 
context of the Cold war, remarking that the period was one in which “they had to be men and 
take the risks.”146 This allowed the more harrowing or disturbing elements of their job to be 
more comfortably internalised within wartime notions of military necessity, bravery, and a 
belief in the need to ‘do your bit’ in the post-war arms race. These individual memories were 
subsumed within a deeply embedded (and imagined) collective narrative of the Cold war as a 
military and domestic conflict, producing a collective identity shaped by notions of 
triumphalism, pioneering spirit, and a sense of heroism amongst Sellafield workers during its 
early operation.147  
 
 Likewise, the interview encounter intensified and highlighted individual memories that 
stand in opposition to and challenge collective or dominant narratives. For example, interviews 
with farming communities identified a clear narrative of farmers as having been subjugated by 
the nuclear industry, systematically stripped of their land and exposed to excessive amounts of 
radiation.148 This narrative emerged strongly within interviews amongst farming families and 
was markedly absent from interviews with people employed by the plant, who often used the 
oral encounter to convey divergent attitudes regarding factors such as the plant’s large 
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contribution to the local economy.149 By observing the dynamic interaction between individual 
and collective memories, which memories are appropriated by the collective and which ones 
remain individual, it was possible to gauge the identity and sense-of-self that a specific narrator 
or a group wished to have attributed to them. This strand of analysis showed that nuclear 
identities were not homogenous even at the local level, but rather that citizens drew upon 
particular imaginaries and visions of the future and fashioned an individual or collective sense-
of-self which allowed them to comfortably co-exist within that context. This moves us towards 
a more nuanced understanding of how nuclear imaginaries shaped individual and collective 
identities, and in turn, how these identities co-produced or attenuated particular imagined 




 The thesis is made up of five core chapters, each of which follows the chronological 
story of the Sellafield plant and its varied engagements with the British public. These chapters 
are sequential and build upon and reference one another to reveal the dynamic interrelationship 
between nuclear technologies and British society throughout the second half of the twentieth 
century. Chapters One and Two explore how, born out of the context of the Second World War, 
nuclear technologies became enmeshed within a series of imagined desirable social, 
(geo)political, and military futures which originated within government and became embedded 
into the fabric of British society. The chapter will show how the pursuit of nuclear science 
became embroiled within notions of modernity and national identity, serving a strategic geo-
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political function as signifier of Britain’s continued superpower status. It will then explore how 
these intertwined with notions of regional identity, offering a social, political, military, and 
economic panacea within the context of heightening Cold war geopolitics, domestic austerity, 
energy shortfalls, and a regional economy devastated by the financial depression of the inter-
war years. This focus helps unravel how the local and the national intersected in the production 
of nuclear culture, as the imaginary of nuclear utopianism propagated at state level assimilated 
with a series of local social processes such as long-term unemployment, historically harsh 
working conditions, and poor wages to embed an imagined utopian future of regional and 
national prosperity enshrined through the pursuit of nuclear technologies.  
 
Chapter Two takes an overt focus on the built nuclear environment, examining how the 
physical infrastructure of the Sellafield plant and associated developments within the 
neighbouring village of Seascale dovetailed with post-war ideals of domestic regeneration and 
urban modernity, publicly performing and physically embodying an imaginary of nuclear 
utopianism within the physical and cultural landscape of British life.150 In keeping with the 
actor-network theory (ANT) concept of non-human things having agency, and the work of 
spatial theorists such as W.J.T. Mitchell who argue that landscapes and places can perform 
cultural work, I will show how the physical structure of Sellafield, and the myriad of 
infrastructural developments such as housing, roads, railways, and supply networks embedded 
the imaginary of nuclear utopianism within a localised corner of British society, disseminating 
and publicly performing this imaginary at national and international level through the national 
 
150 Jasanoff, ‘Future Imperfect’, in Jasanoff, and Kim, (eds.), Dreamscapes of Modernity, p. 6. 
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media and official governmental and royal endorsement.151 The STIM model therefore offers 
a unique angle upon the geographic component of this study, attentive to the ways in which 
space functions in the production of sociotechnical systems as both a product and producer of 
imaginaries, and an active agent in embedding (and resisting) nuclear imaginaries.  
 
 Chapter Three traces the events of the Windscale fire in 1957 to show how the local 
public began to challenge and resist the imaginary of nuclear utopianism, as a series of 
operational and political shortcomings resulted in a fire in one of the piles used to produce 
plutonium for the British nuclear weapons project, massively contaminating the local 
population with radioactive fallout. This chapter details how the incident animated forms of 
opposition at the local level, as citizens resisted the government’s handling of the incident and 
subsequent attempts to cover-up the fire by minimising its impact and placing the blame upon 
local employees. The chapter shows that whilst the government was able to maintain control 
over the form and content of nuclear imaginaries at the national level through a policy of 
suppression and fabrication, at the local level the imaginary of nuclear utopianism came under 
increasing scrutiny and became supplanted by attitudes of more ardent scepticism and hostility. 
STIM therefore allows us to interrogate scale, in keeping with the ruminations of nuclear 
scholars who have called for a more thorough investigation of how localised nuclear thoughts 
operated at the level of the nation. Using this focus, we see how nuclear technologies became 
“enmeshed in performing and producing diverse visions of the collective good, at expanding 
scales of governance from communities to the nation-state,” providing a more nuanced insight 
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into the complexities of the British nuclear story, and the emergence of multiple, competing 
imaginaries which entered into productive tension with one another at differing geographic 
scales.152 Observing this process, it becomes clear that the local population responded to the 
fire by producing their own imagined nuclear futures, characterised by the injurious 
consequences of radiation exposure and their callous treatment at the hands of the state. This 
fed into the production, dissemination, and embedding of a resistant dystopian imaginary, 
through which sections of the local population asserted the undesirable social and destructive 
radiobiological consequences of nuclear technologies, increasingly resisting these technologies 
and the supremacy afforded to them by the state. 
 
This focus leads into Chapter Four, which traces how the localised resistance 
encountered in the aftermath of the Windscale fire dovetailed with the emergence of the 
ecological and environmental movements throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s. As I will 
demonstrate, these two processes helped embed resistant social, political, moral, and 
environmental imaginaries at both local and national level. This chapter points to the Windscale 
inquiry of 1977 as a historical yardstick between the dominant imaginary of nuclear utopianism 
which subsisted for much of the first three decades of the nuclear age and the resistant 
dystopian imaginaries which characterised the 1980s. The chapter shows how the Windscale 
inquiry highlighted the emergence of new kinds of resistance towards nuclear technologies, 
predicated on their utility, the methods of governance that sustained them, their environmental 
and ecological impact, and the visions of the future that they entailed. Acknowledging the role 
of identity in embedding resistant imaginaries, I explore how local citizens resisted the 
expansion of the Sellafield site as not only potentially hazardous to their wellbeing but as 
another example of their ‘peripheral’ status in society, as the recipients of “everyone else’s 
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unwanted nuclear waste” and hazardous industrial processes.153 In this context, the issue of 
reprocessing drove a wedge between the local population and the government, casting a 
subjective binary between the ordinary public and a nefarious and autocratic ‘nuclear state.’ In 
this example, the STIM framework shows how science and technology shape identity by 
positioning the individual either within or outside shared visions of desirable (or undesirable) 
futures, and correspondingly, how these identities amplify or attenuate these visions of the 
future. Elucidating the role of science and technology “in connecting the individual’s 
subjective self-understanding to a shared moral and social order,” this aligns STIM with the 
research aims of this project and within broader studies of nuclear culture by exploring the 
interrelationship between social imaginaries and identity.154  
 
 
 The final chapter of this study, Chapter Five, shows how two major incidents at 
Sellafield in 1983 dissolved the imaginary of nuclear utopianism at the national level. 
Allegations regarding the plant’s excess marine and atmospheric discharge and its carcinogenic 
effects upon the local community embroiled the plant in a public relations scandal, particularly 
through the purported links between radiation and the high number of cancer cases amongst 
local children. The imbrication of nuclear power with childhood leukaemia and excess cancer 
deaths embedded a dystopian sociotechnical imaginary which stressed the hazardous 
environmental effects of nuclear power, emphasised the threat to public health through the 
contamination of the marine and atmospheric environments, and inextricably linked radiation, 
and more specifically Sellafield, with an observed excess of cancers. The chapter will go on to 
examine the localised context, revealing that this this process was more diverse and nuanced 
at the local level, as citizens were forced to mediate between the dystopian imaginary which 
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emerged in the national media, and the assurances provided by BNFL, which assured them that 
the plant represented no threat to public health. In this section, I explore how local citizens 
became caught between competing imagined nuclear futures and responded to this context by 
producing their own locally specific forms of nuclear knowledge which were simultaneously 
the product of these imaginaries and their own experiential knowledge of nuclear technologies. 
This once again reinforces the central argument that ordinary people (despite their socio-
geographic status) function as active agents of social change, capable of substantiating, 
challenging, disrupting, and redefining hegemonic, state-ordained imaginaries of 
sociotechnical progress, and popular forms of cultural resistance.  
 
The final section offers some suggestions by way of conclusion, pointing to the role of 
the Sellafield nuclear power facility in shaping and co-producing social attitudes towards 
nuclear technologies throughout the second half of the twentieth century. Emphasising the 
significance of the localised, rural context in shaping our understandings of the production and 
performance of nuclear culture, the thesis ultimately calls for a more detailed understanding of 
the ways in which culture interacts with science and technology in the production of 
sociotechnical systems. This points to the concept of the ‘nuclear imaginary’ as an instructive 
framework for understanding the chronology and mechanics of social attitudes towards nuclear 
technologies. This aligns the emerging work on sociotechnical imaginaries with more 
established insights from nuclear studies, employing recent conceptual and theoretical insights 
from STS to demonstrate the centrality of ordinary people and localised contexts in the 
production of nuclear culture. In so doing, this project responds to one of the central questions 
within the cultural historiography of the nuclear age, answering calls for further engagement 
in the localised variants of nuclear culture, and going some way towards resolving the late Jeff 
Hughes’ desire for “theoretically informed social and cultural histories of nuclear Britain” akin 
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to those in the American context.155 In his insightful 2012 article, Hughes asked “has British 
nuclear historiography stalled?”156 I hope to demonstrate that not only is nuclear historiography 
well and truly alive, but to highlight the radical potential for future studies through a broader 
critical engagement with theoretical insights from science and technology studies. By 
appropriating these insights, we gain a far greater appreciation for the role of nuclear 
technologies in everyday life throughout the nuclear age, tracing how nuclear science 
embedded itself and became embedded in “social practices, identities, norms, conventions, 
discourses, instruments and institutions- in short, in all the building blocks of what we term the 
social.”157 Tracing this process in the early years of the British nuclear project, the following 
chapter will demonstrate how initial social responses to nuclear technologies drew upon, and 
in turn co-produced an imaginary of a utopian social, (geo)political, and military order; 
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1: The Utopian Dream. 
 
This chapter will argue that social responses to nuclear technologies were characterised 
by overt public support during the early years of the post-war period. Exploring nuclear 
weapons and civil power production through the concept of the sociotechnical imaginary, this 
chapter identifies the creation and embedding of a utopian nuclear imaginary within British 
society, as nuclear technologies became inextricably linked with a series of desirable military, 
(geo)political, social, and economic futures at both national and local levels. I will show how 
this imaginary originated within government ministers in Whitehall and became embedded into 
the social and cultural fabric of British life. Understood as the process through which an 
imaginary becomes institutionalised within popular consciousness and public life, the 
embedding stage of the STIM life-cycle occurs when “the merely imagined is converted into 
the solidity of identities and the durability of routines and things.”158 Applying this definition, 
I will show how the pursuit of nuclear science became enmeshed within Britain’s geo-political 
aspirations, simultaneously enshrining Britain’s position within a fractious post-war order, 
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showcasing its technological and scientific prowess through notions of modernity, and 
providing energy for the fuel-strapped nation.  
 
The chapter will argue that the pursuit of nuclear technologies at Sellafield fed into 
notions of national and regional identity. This helped embed an imaginary of nuclear 
utopianism, rooted in imaginaries of Britain’s colonial past, a post-colonial future, and 
perceived identity as a civilising nation. This interpretation points towards the role of identity 
as a social agent and a vital component in embedding, stabilising, and publicly performing an 
imagined desirable nuclear future at both national and local levels. It also offers a new 
interpretation of the role of specific nuclear sites such as Sellafield as social agents in the co-
production of nuclear culture. Through its physical form, and as a cultural symbol of 
modernity, Sellafield embodied both nuclear ideas and material reality, consolidating and 
embedding the ideological construct of nuclear utopianism within British social life. As the 
nation’s first plutonium production facility and the world’s first nuclear power plant, I argue 
that Sellafield publicly performed and helped embed “a desirable [nuclearised] future” 
predicated upon notions of Britain’s geo-political power, political autonomy, and cultural 
ascendancy.159 
 
Engaging with recent developments within studies of nuclear culture, I will explore 
nuclear imaginaries at both national and local contexts, pointing to the distinct sociotechnical 
processes through which imaginaries became embedded at different scales. Specifically, I will 
demonstrate how nuclear imaginaries interacted with notions of identity, showing how the 
successful construction and operation of the Sellafield plant sat alongside and contributed 
towards a strong sense of local identity. This helped embed the imaginary of nuclear 
 
159 Jasanoff, ‘Future Imperfect’, in Jasanoff, and Kim, (eds.), Dreamscapes of Modernity, p. 6. 
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utopianism at the local level, as the plant became embroiled within imagined futures of local 
prosperity and socio-economic recovery following a period of post-industrial decline. I will 
also explore the vital role of secrecy in this process, showing that the state’s control over the 
dissemination and flow of nuclear knowledge was a key component in embedding utopian 
nuclear imaginaries. 
 
I demonstrate that secrecy operated on three registers. Firstly, I trace how the scientific 
and operational cultures of the plant mirrored and drew upon wartime principles of military 
secrecy. This symbolised the vital role of the plant and local community in national defence 
and contributed to a proud sense of local identity. This subjective identity helped embed the 
imaginary of nuclear utopianism at the local level as workers looked to their pivotal role in the 
defence of the nation within the context of escalating Cold war tensions. Secondly, I will 
demonstrate how tight restrictions on the dissemination of nuclear information allowed the 
state to subsume less desirable elements of the industry such as radioactive contamination and 
the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons, and to accentuate desirable ones such as energy 
production and the role of isotopes within medical science. Thirdly, I show how the suppression 
of radiation knowledge allowed the state to cultivate a public image of nuclear safety, through 
which Sellafield appeared as a desirable and secure form of employment in the context of the 
region’s traditional and dangerous heavy industries. This leads into the final strand of the 
chapter which examines how these facets interacted with the localised context of mass 
unemployment, low wages, and poor job security to embed a desirable imagined future of 
regional prosperity attained through the pursuit of nuclear science.  
 
Examining how this process played out at the local level reveals how the local and the 
national intersected in the production of nuclear culture, as the imaginary of nuclear utopianism 
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propagated at state level assimilated with a series of local social processes, such as long-term 
unemployment, historically harsh working conditions, and poor wages to embed an imaginary 
of nuclear prosperity within British society. Social responses to nuclear technologies were 
therefore characterised by the dynamic interplay between public concerns at both local and 
national levels, as the nuclear project appealed to a diverse range of political, cultural, and 
socio-economic registers at multiple scales. This simultaneously highlights the utility of 
thinking about nuclear technologies through the lens of the sociotechnical imaginary to 
understand the cultural work they performed, and the interaction between the local and the 
national context in the production of British nuclear culture.  
 
1.1: The Origins of Nuclear Utopianism. 
 
The position occupied by nuclear technologies within British social and cultural life in 
the post-war era was inextricably bound up in their military origins during the closing chapters 
of the Second World War.160 In July 1945, a team of Allied scientists working at Los Alamos 
as part of the ‘Manhattan Project’ produced the first successful detonation of a fissile nuclear 
weapon. Codenamed ‘Gadget’, the twenty-two-kiloton nuclear device exploded in the New 
Mexican desert at the USAAF Alamogordo Bombing and Gunnery Range, witnessed by a team 
of scientists and military personnel who had devoted the previous thirty-four months to the 
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production of a nuclear device capable of being deployed in the field of war. The ‘Manhattan 
Project’ was a joint venture between the US, the UK, and Canada which built upon the British 
government’s ‘Tube Alloys’ research and development programme which had explored 
nuclear weapons production.161 Put off by the spiralling costs of the initial ‘Tube Alloys’ 
project and lacking the infrastructure to produce a weapon of their own, the British government 
entered the ‘Manhattan Project’ following a series of agreements with the US which promised 
continuing nuclear cooperation after the war, (Quebec 1943, Hyde Park 1944, and Washington 
D.C. 1945). Despite these treaties, four months after the war ended US Senator Brien 
McMahon introduced the ‘Atomic Energy Act’ which backtracked on these agreements and 
prohibited the sharing of nuclear science between the US and her wartime allies. Unanimously 
passed by the senate and signed into law by President Truman in August 1946, this act rode 
roughshod over the wartime alliances between the US and UK, blindsiding British politicians 
who believed they would achieve post-war nuclear capacity in partnership with the Americans.  
 
Cut adrift from the geopolitical security offered by nuclear partnership with the US, 
Britain faced an uncertain military and political future.162 Spurned by their former allies who 
had relied upon their expertise in the production of the bomb, Britain now had to confront the 
stark reality of its status as a second-rate world power below the US and the USSR.163 Into this 
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Test of Greatness: Britain's Struggle for the Atom Bomb (London: John Murray, 1994), p. 39; ‘Penney, William 
George, Baron Penney (1909–1991)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (online ed.), 
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49920;jsessionid=C8EF2725A7031289B435962BE01183BB> [accessed February 2018]. 
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context, leading scientists and key politicians such as Ernest Bevin, Clement Atlee, and 
Winston Churchill asserted that Britain should develop an independent nuclear weapon as a 
safeguard against hostile foreign aggression and to cement its superpower status within a 
volatile post-war geo-political climate.164  
 
The pursuit of nuclear weapons became wrapped up in a series of desirable military and 
political futures, whereby Britain’s military security and international hegemony was enshrined 
through the production of an independent nuclear weapon. Operating at both military and 
political levels, this offered a means of asserting geo-political hegemony through an ostensibly 
military display of force. Describing this process, Gabrielle Hecht has coined the term 
‘technopolitics’, identifying the “strategic practice of designing or using [nuclear] technology 
to constitute, embody, or enact political goals.”165 She has argued that nuclear weapons served 
as an “ultimate political trump card”, through which nations could define themselves. They 
offered a means to express superpower status (such as the US in 1945, and the USSR in 1949), 
assert their declining sovereignty (Britain in 1952, and France in 1960), or challenge 
international hierarchies (China in 1964, and Israel in the mid 1960s).166 This directly 
correlated nuclear weapons and political power, as “geopolitical status seemed directly 
proportional to the number of nukes a nation possessed.”167 Britain’s pursuit of an independent 
nuclear weapon therefore operated on both (geo)political and military levels, becoming 
enmeshed within various imagined political, social, and military futures. 
 
 
164 M. Gowing, and L. Arnold, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945–1952, Volume 
1: Policy Making (London: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 21, 174, 216; T. Botti, The Long Wait: The Forging of the 
Anglo-American Nuclear Alliance, 1945–58 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), pp. 61- 75. 
165 Hecht, The Radiance of France, p. 56. 
166 G. Hecht, ‘The Power of Nuclear Things’, Technology and Culture, 51.1 (2010), p. 3. 
167 Hecht, Being Nuclear, p. 6. 
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The political dimensions of nuclear capacity have been neatly characterised by political 
historians John Baylis and Kristan Stoddart, who argue that “as atomic weapons were seen by 
many to be the last word in weapons… Britain had to have them” to ensure she did not become 
politically toothless and “totally dependent on the United States.”168 This was an acute fear 
amongst political elites who held deep concerns about Britain’s declining colonial status, 
symbolised by the US’s refusal to share nuclear information and the damning indictment of 
senators who claimed an Anglo-American nuclear alliance would be like “trading a horse for 
a rabbit.”169 Faced with an undesirable future of political and military submission to the US, 
government ministers perceived nuclear weapons as a military and political necessity for 
Britain to retain its autonomy and super-power status, allowing Britain to “negotiate with the 
US government on the basis of equality.”170 Britain’s possession and mastery of nuclear 
weapons therefore fused with imagined desirable military and (geo)political visions of the 
nation’s future, becoming technopolitically coupled with Britain’s international hegemony and 
its desired status as a world superpower.  
 
Jasanoff has argued that imaginaries are formed when ideas “originate in the visions of 
single individuals or small collectives” and “come to be communally adopted.”171 In the early 
Cold war years, a distinct nuclear imaginary began to take shape as the British political 
establishment communally identified the centrality of nuclear technologies within Britain’s 
future. Scientist Sir William Penney argued as much, stating that “the discriminative test for a 
first-class power is whether it has made an atomic bomb- we have either got to pass the test or 
 
168 J. Baylis, and K. Stoddart, ‘The British Nuclear Experience: The Role of Ideas and Beliefs (Part One)’, 
Diplomacy & Statecraft, 23.0 (2012), p. 339.  
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170 Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, p. 209. 
171 Jasanoff, ‘Future Imperfect’, in Jasanoff, and Kim, (eds.), Dreamscapes of Modernity, p. 4. 
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suffer a serious loss of prestige both inside the country and internationally.”172 No longer 
simply a military prerogative, a series of senior political officials increasingly saw the 
production of a British nuclear weapon as a matter of both national security and international 
reputation. Cabinet member Ernest Bevin admitted to a government select committee, “we 
have got to get this thing over here whatever it costs… we’ve got to have the bloody Union 
Jack flying on top of it!”173 Similarly, Winston Churchill told the cabinet that Britain “could 
not expect to maintain its influence as a world power unless it was prepared to develop the 
most up-to-date nuclear weapons.”174 This identified the centrality of weapons production 
within Britain’s geopolitical aspirations, tying the pursuit of the atom bomb within imagined 
futures of Britain’s military security and international prosperity. Animated by visions of this 
desirable future, a select group of cabinet members dubbed ‘Gen 163’ took the decision to 
produce an independent British nuclear weapon in 1947, committing to the production of fissile 
material and the construction of nuclear reactors for this purpose.  
 
1.2: ‘Windscale’: Britain’s First Nuclear Reactor. 
 
Mirroring the American model at Los Alamos, it was initially believed that the reactor 
would be cooled by water and would need to be located at least fifty miles from any major 
urban centre, given the inherent danger of nuclear fission and the quantity of water required.175 
However, new research proposed an air-cooled system which offered much greater efficiency 
and did not require such vast quantities of water. This made remote regions such as Scotland, 
 
172 New York Times, ‘Lord Penney, 81, Atomic Scientist and Father of British Bomb, Dies’, 7 March 1991 < 
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174 P. Hennessy, Cabinets and the Bomb (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 48; Gowing, Independence 
and Deterrence, p. 209. 
175 H. Bracey, Industry and the Countryside: The Impact of Industry on Amenities in the Countryside (London: 
Faber and Faber Ltd, 1963), p. 101.  
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and areas of West Cumbria a viable option for the new reactor.176 With infrastructural 
challenges involved in producing the reactor as far north as Scotland, three ordnance factories 
in West Cumbria between Whitehaven and Millom were identified as possible locations for the 
new reactor, with the Sellafield site appearing the most promising.177 Fig. 2.0 shows the 
Sellafield ordnance factory as it was in 1943, characterised by a disjointed and hastily 
constructed series of outbuildings and warehouses.  
 
 
Despite its suitability the Sellafield site was quickly ruled out, as fabric manufacturer 
Courtaulds had received council permission to develop a rayon factory there. The second-
 
176 Bracey, Industry and the Countryside, p. 102.  
177 Ibid., p. 102.  
Fig. 2.0: ‘Royal Ordnance Factory Sellafield’, 1943. With kind permission from the Beacon Museum, 
Whitehaven. 
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choice Drigg site therefore became the de facto location for the new reactor and was reported 
in the national press as the site chosen by the Ministry of Supply (MoS).178 Fearful that a 
nuclear complex at Drigg would reduce the availability and quality of the manpower available, 
Courthaulds chose to abandon the Sellafield project and instead moved production to 
Ireland.179 This vacancy allowed the MoS to move production back to the preferred site at 
Sellafield, which was renamed ‘Windscale’ in order to avoid confusion with the uranium 
extraction plant ‘Springfields’ in Preston.180 In 1947 work began to convert the ramshackle 
outbuildings of the former ordnance factory into a working nuclear reactor for the express 
purpose of creating military-grade plutonium for use in Britain’s nuclear weapon. Construction 
ran between 1947 and 1951 when the second of the two Windscale piles was completed and 
began producing plutonium for the first British nuclear bomb, detonated at Montebello, 
Australia in October 1952.  
 
1.3: ‘Calder Hall’: The World’s First Commercial Power Plant. 
  
As Windscale demonstrated the viability of producing plutonium for nuclear weapons, 
attention soon turned to the potential civilian applications of the piles, with the heat from the 
reactors identified as a potential source of electricity for the National Grid. Whilst Britain’s 
weapons project ran some seven years behind the US, and three years behind the USSR, neither 
nation had a full-scale reactor designed to produce electricity.181 Consequently, the pursuit of 
nuclear power was seen as an opportunity for Britain to catch up with the Soviet and American 
 
178 Ibid. 
179 Ibid., pp. 102f; Welsh, Mobilising Modernity, pp. 47f. 
180 Early paperwork also refers to the site as ‘Winscales.’ 
181 The USSR had developed an experimental plant at Obninsk in 1954, however this was a pilot plant and 
designed for technology research purposes ahead of the production of the widely adopted ‘RBMK’ models of 
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 83 
nuclear programmes, simultaneously winning international prestige through the pursuit of 
nuclear technologies and providing a much needed source of energy in the face of post-war 
fuel shortages and an ever-increasing public demand for electricity. As part of this process, the 
Chief engineer responsible for the design and construction of Windscale, Christopher Hinton 
was tasked with constructing a nuclear reactor on the Sellafield site, capable of producing 
electrical power by the end of 1956. With the Windscale piles designed to optimise the 
production of military-grade plutonium, a new reactor named ‘Calder Hall’ was built adjacent 
to the Windscale piles for the generation of electricity. The image below (Fig. 3.0) shows the 
Sellafield site in 1956, with the cooling towers of Calder Hall on the right, emitting steam. To 
their left are the two pencil shaped Windscale piles on the other side of the River Calder.  
Fig 3.0: ‘Aerial image of Windscale Works and Calder Hall’, National Archives, 
(MAF 298/160). 
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Constructed by the newly formed United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) who 
had taken over operations from the MoS in 1954, Calder Hall was the first of four magnesium 
oxide (Magnox) reactors built in the UK and began producing energy for the National Grid on 
October 17, 1956, operating for nearly five decades until 2003.182  
 
The construction of Calder Hall represented a key moment in the evolution of social 
attitudes towards nuclear technologies, as the technopolitical value of the bomb extended into 
the civil realm and its devastating power was repositioned as a creative, rather than a 
destructive entity. By transcending the bomb’s military origins, representations of Calder Hall 
produced utopian visions of social, political, and economic life predicated upon the power of 
the atom as a force for good. This logic was formalised in Eisenhower’s infamous 1953 ‘Atoms 
for Peace’ speech, which advocated peaceful uses of nuclear energy, harnessed for the common 
good of humanity.183 This reflected the specific place science occupied within post-war society 
as a progressive symbol of modernity. Historian Ian Welsh argued that during this period 
society placed a large amount of faith in scientific establishments to resolve social, economic, 
and political problems, with “science seen as having a central part to play in the task of social 
and economic reconstruction and in the forging of a new world order.”184 Identifying a period 
between the late 1930s and early 1960s, Welsh coined the term ‘peak modernity’ to describe 
how “the ideological objectives of nation states were united behind visions of the planned 
 
182 The Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) also constructed Magnox reactors at eight further sites- 
although these were engaged solely in the production of energy and not optimised for military use.  
183 L. Weiss, ‘Atoms for Peace’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 59.6 (2003), pp. 34- 44. 
184 Welsh, Mobilising Modernity, p. 19.  
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transformation of society by rational, scientific means.”185 Subsumed within broader notions 
of scientific prowess and modernity, the prospect of generating power from the atom forged 
symbolic links between nuclear energy, Sellafield, and Britain’s ongoing prosperity, as nuclear 
power became intertwined with a series of utopian social, economic, and political imaginaries. 
 
Much like the bomb before it, the pursuit of nuclear energy was something of a double-
edged sword, designed to “serve a number of symbolic functions by winning increased public 
support and increasing Britain’s prestige through the demonstration of scientific and technical 
prowess.”186 UKAEA historian Margaret Gowing argues that the decision to produce nuclear 
energy was made as it would have “a good psychological effect on public opinion… and on 
prestige vis-à-vis the Americans” whilst historian and journalist Chapman Pincher suggested 
that it would take “the edge off the destructive aspects of the bomb, which the government 
regarded as good propaganda.”187 This was a point corroborated by local citizens, who 
explained that Calder Hall was designed as a smokescreen to “allay people’s fears about 
radiation and so on, [which were] tied up with Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the bomb,” thus 
redirecting public attitudes towards peaceful uses for nuclear technologies.188 As an act of 
public legitimation and geopolitical posturing, the production of nuclear energy represented 
many of the same foreign policy objectives as the pursuit of the nuclear bomb, yet without its 
 
185 This belief had its origins in the era of industrialisation, whereby technological and scientific advances 
powered society’s progress- particularly during wartime, where advances such as radar, the proximity fuse, 
Barnes Wallis’ ‘bouncing bomb’, and the Spitfire were synonymous with the success of the war effort. As the 
latest instalment in a long line of scientific advances which promised to improve quality of life, nuclear power 
functioned as a symbol of modernity offering a seemingly endless supply of cheap energy to power the post-war 
era; simultaneously signifying Britain’s international technological prowess and generating a vital supply of 
electricity. For further reading, see Welsh, Mobilising Modernity, p. 17. 
186 Welsh, Mobilising Modernity, pp. 54f. 
187 Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, p. 447f; Windscale: Britain’s Biggest Nuclear Disaster, S. Aspinall. 
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188 In this context, the nuclear energy programme not only spoke to a desirable future but also detracted from the 
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dehumanising and destructive aspects. In this way, nuclear power became the flipside of the 
nuclear coin; what historian Paul Boyer has termed the “sunny side of the atom”, imbued with 
much of the technopolitical value assigned to the bomb with the added by-product of producing 
domestic electricity for the National Grid.189 This aligned the military and (geo)political 
utopias embodied by nuclear weapons with imaginaries of domestic social and economic 
prosperity, which had particular salience within the context of post-war austerity, continued 
rationing, and fuel shortages.  
 
As a domestic source of electricity amid post-war fuel shortages, nuclear power 
appeared to safeguard Britain’s future energy needs, offering a timely solution to an 
increasingly bleak long-term energy projection based on a seemingly antiquated reliance on 
insufficient supplies of fossil fuels. Despite fuel rationing during the 1950s, many major 
European nations suffered from energy shortfalls as energy demands doubled over a ten-year 
period. The inadequacy of Britain’s energy supply was thrown into sharp relief by the Suez 
crisis of 1956, which had proven not only a devastating blow to British prestige, but had 
highlighted its dependence on fossil fuels from the Middle East, who contributed 90% of 
European petroleum during the 1950s.190 The political instability of the Middle Eastern region 
“sent a panic through both Britain and France” and was a key factor in both nations committing 
to the large-scale development of nuclear energy in the aftermath of Suez. By 1957, French 
officials admitted that “[domestic] energy must be produced at any price”, whilst Britain had 
tripled its investment in nuclear energy, aiming to produce one third of its annual consumption 
by 1965.191 Fearful of being held to ransom by foreign powers, ministers urged that “the uneven 
 
189 Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light, p. 299.  
190 Hamblin, Poison in the Well, p. 118. 
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distribution of fuel in the world and its rising cost make it absolutely necessary that we take 
this opportunity” to develop nuclear power, which would serve as a safeguard against West 
Asian dominance in the energy market.192 In this way, nuclear power production appealed to a 
desirable economic and social future whereby Britain could transcend global fluctuations in 
the energy market and safeguard its own interests by becoming self-sufficient in the production 
of energy.  
 
 Representative of a desirable and autonomous British future, nuclear power production 
aligned socio-economic and scientific imaginaries together. This projected a harmonious vision 
of the future whereby advances in nuclear science offered an innovative utopian antidote to 
challenges within post-war British society. Recalling the mood of the period, interviewees such 
as Peter Graham described how nuclear power was championed as “the brave new technology 
that was going to save mankind from the loss of oil.”193 Local residents explained that nuclear 
power was at the cutting edge of science, describing how “nuclear was the glamour industry to 
get into… it seemed like it was going to blossom up and become the big industry.”194 Indeed, 
this narrative was echoed by contemporary scientists, who boldly projected that “a quarter of 
all Britain’s electricity would come from atomic plants by 1966, a half by 1973, and the whole 
of Britain would be converted to nuclear power by the end of the century” providing electricity 
to the nation “at a cost no more than that of a traditional coal power station.”195 This was also 
reflected in the writings of social commentators from the period such as Harold Bracey, who 
described nuclear energy as “the embodiment of futurist expression, representing a modernist 
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drive to the new”, in direct contrast to “the old traditional power station.”196 As a continuation 
of this logic, specific reactor locations became entwined within imagined visions of the future, 
with the Sellafield plant projected as a “site for the construction of Britain’s future.”197 Through 
its dual function as a producer of military grade plutonium and the UK’s first civil nuclear 
reactor, Sellafield represented Britain’s defence aspirations and the dawning of a new age of 
modern energy production, concurrently functioning as a fulcrum for a series of imagined 
social, economic, military, and political utopias. 
 
1.4: A Desirable National Future. 
 
 Having identified the socio-political context out of which nuclear utopianism 
originated, the following section of this chapter will show how these imaginaries were 
embedded into national society through the construction and operation of the Sellafield nuclear 
complex.198 Specifically, I will demonstrate how the Royal patronage of the Calder Hall power 
plant helped embed the imaginary of nuclear utopianism by inextricably linking Sellafield with 
the future prosperity of the nation. Tracing the content of newspaper and government 
narratives, I will show how the involvement of the monarchy within the nuclear power 
programme “publicly performed” and “institutionally stabilised” disparate strands of the 
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nuclear imaginary, firmly embedding imagined futures of national prosperity within the nuclear 
project at Sellafield.199  
 
Whilst Windscale became operational with very little fanfare or public involvement, 
the construction of Calder Hall became a major public spectacle used by the political 
establishment to embed a positive imaginary of nuclear technologies within national society. 
Whereas Windscale’s military functionality was ostensibly a national secret, Calder Hall’s role 
in the production of electricity became a national spectacle, a public demonstration of Britain’s 
post-war socio-economic resurgence. One of the ways in which this was achieved was by 
publicly associating the newly crowned Queen Elizabeth II with the nuclear project at the 
opening ceremony of the Calder Hall plant in October 1956. This mobilised “one of the prime 
sources of symbolic legitimation” within British society, appropriating the vast popularity, 
cultural gravitas, and moral integrity of the monarch to institutionally stabilise the imaginary 
of nuclear utopianism within British social and cultural life.200 
 
 The Queen’s attendance drew a huge amount of international attention. Local 
newspapers described a media “invasion” of “over 200 representatives of the world’s press, a 
distinguished gathering of scientists and technicians from all parts of the world” who ensured 
that “the eyes and ears of the world” focused on Sellafield.201 Figs. 4.0 and 5.0 are two images 
captured that day, as the Queen delivered her public address and toured the Sellafield site. The 
fanfare surrounding the royal opening provided a “dramatic and inspiring” backdrop to the new 
technology of nuclear power, cultivating an “atmosphere of euphoria.”202 This ascribed a “new 
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kind of political cohesion” upon the nuclear project, invoking “the certainty and splendour of 





The ceremony echoed the eulogistic rhetoric of the 1955 governmental White Paper, which 
had advocated the heroism of the atomic scientists and the “brilliant discoveries [which] 
brought us to the threshold of a new age.”204 The Queen’s opening address conveyed a very 
similar message, emphasising that Calder Hall represented “the making of history,” whilst 
newspaper reports lauded that Calder Hall was “the biggest, and most successful venture that 
post-war Britain has taken”, heralding “the beginning of a new epoch.”205 Here Sellafield, and 
more specifically, Calder Hall, served as a site for expressions of national identity, as the plant 
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Fig. 4.0: ‘The Queen’s Address at the Opening of Calder Hall, 1956’, Whitehaven Archive and Local Study 
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became subsumed within notions of national pride and “became articulated with a second 
Elizabethan age of splendour” in which “British inventive genius has again been 
demonstrated.”206 A recent article by Karena Kalmbach, Andreas Marklund, and Anna Åberg 
has shown that imaginaries are characterised by “crucial examinations and redefinitions of the 
past and present as well as speculative projections into an uncertain future.”207 Developing 
these insights, we can see how the pursuit of nuclear science became embedded into the fabric 
of British society through the symbolic legitimation of the monarchy. This publicly endorsed 
the nuclear project, speaking to notions of national identity by culturally and historically 
grounding imaginaries of nuclear power within Britain’s imagined imperial history, a 
speculative post-colonial future, and its perceived identity as a civilising nation. 
 
Calder Hall appealed to and reproduced particular notions of British identity, with the 
Queen’s speech inextricably likening the development of nuclear power to Britain’s historical 
role as a global moral compass. In a carefully crafted address, she advocated that nuclear power 
would serve “the common good of our humanity”, at once placing Britain at the vanguard of 
global technological development as a guardian of nuclear morality.208 An excerpt from the 
transcript of her opening address reads:  
 
“for centuries past, visionary ideals and practical methods which have gone from our 
shores have opened up new ways of thought and modes of life for people in all parts of 
the world. It may well prove to have been among the greatest of our contributions to 
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human welfare that we led the way in demonstrating the peaceful uses of this source of 
power.”209  
 
Where the nuclear bomb had appeared as “a terrifying weapon of destruction”, Calder Hall 
represented nuclear energy’s capacity as a conciliatory force, with Britain as its benign 
benefactor.210 This rhetoric was echoed by the Manager of Sellafield, Mr H.G. Davey, who 
eulogised that, in learning to harness the power of the atom for civil purposes: “we have learned 
to tame the brute.”211 This represented a reframing of the colonial gaze with which Britain had 
once looked upon the world, with nuclear technologies the untamed ‘savage’ which required 
humanising by the white, British explorer-scientist, who toiled at the boundaries of human 
discovery to harness the power of the atom and bring it within the control of ‘civilised’ man.212 
This discursively rooted the nuclear project within notions of imperialism by symbolically 
associating nuclear power with British hegemony and imaginaries of national identity. The role 
of nuclear technologies in shaping imaginaries of national identity has been the subject of a 
recent study by Christopher Lawrence, who examined how the US’ remote sensing of nuclear 
facilities in South-West Asia fed into an imaginary of America’s identity at the forefront of 
fighting nuclear aggression and the ideological concept of ‘terror.’213 Engaging with this 
approach, we can see how the civil nuclear project appealed to particular notions of British 
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identity rooted in Western notions of imperialism and intellectual superiority over the 
colonies.214 Subjective understandings of what it meant to be British therefore produced 
particular ways of thinking about nuclear science, helping embed imaginaries of nuclear power 
as representative of desirable social, cultural, and geopolitical national futures. 
 
 Aligning with foreign policy objectives and providing a domestic supply of energy, 
nuclear technologies simultaneously reduced Britain’s dependency on oil-rich nations, 
appealed to cultural notions of Britain’s colonial identity, and consolidated its status as a global 
superpower. By appealing to notions of Britishness and imaginaries of its former imperial 
glories, nuclear technologies assimilated neatly into subjective notions of national identity, 
helping embed desirable imaginaries of a post-colonial future characterised by Britain’s 
renewed supremacy within the field of nuclear science. These imaginaries can be discursively 
traced throughout the content of official narratives from government and within the atomic 
science movement. The Chairman of the UKAEA Sir Edward Plowden, described nuclear 
power as a means of re-asserting Britain’s declining colonial status. He tied nuclear 
technologies to notions of imperialism, espousing that nuclear science offered “a new world to 
conquer,” pointing to the role of nuclear scientists “already rapidly expanding the frontiers” to 
assert Britain’s proper place in the world.215 Likewise, government ministers acceded that 
whilst “Britannia no longer rules the seas, it is a certain fact that she rules the isotopes and the 
reactors.”216 This aligned nuclear science with Britain’s subjective identity as an exporter of 
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goods and intellect, formalising the logic of the 1955 ‘White Paper on the Nuclear Power 
Programme’, which petitioned for a “rapid expansion” of reactor sales both “at home and 
overseas.”217 Through the stewardship of nuclear technologies, government ministers imagined 
a future whereby Britain served as the international “hub of atom industry.”218 In this context, 
the pursuit of nuclear energy at Sellafield was seen as returning the nation to “the vanguard of 
technical progress” and restoring Britain’s “proper part in world affairs.”219 This imaginary 
was also informed by the US’ decision to snub an Anglo-American nuclear alliance following 
the 1946 McMahon Act. In this context, the pursuit of nuclear technologies at Sellafield was 
seen as a vital component in safeguarding Britain’s future, providing irrefutable proof of its 
contribution to the Cold war arms race and its suitability as a nuclear partner to the Americans. 
 
 In an example of the interrelated relationship of sociotechnical processes, these notions 
of national identity fed back into imaginaries of political futures, as Calder Hall became 
embroiled within political efforts to obtain nuclear partnership with the Americans. Indeed, 
Calder Hall’s successful operation threw into sharp relief Britain’s successes in the face of US 
atomic isolationism, superseding the US energy programme by arriving well over a year before 
the USA’s Shippingport Atomic Power Station in Pennsylvania. This was a particular source 
of pride amongst nuclear engineers and scientists, many of whom had been involved in the 
‘Manhattan Project’ before being jettisoned by their former ally. Chief engineer of Calder Hall, 
Christopher Hinton, triumphantly declared that the British effort had been “absolutely 
magnificent. We led the world because we were two years ahead of America … [Having] 
started four wartime years behind them at Risley, with eighteen people including typists and 
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messengers, ten years later we were two years ahead of them. This had shown the bastards 
where they got off.”220 Senior government officials also celebrated this achievement, lauding 
that “we have got in first, we have got the job going, and we should develop it.”221 Its successful 
operation appeared as “a complete vindication of British ability in the face of American 
isolationism” and a critical boost to Britain’s prestige in the midst of the ongoing Suez Crisis, 
and the defection of two of the ‘Cambridge Spies’ to the Soviet Union, which had severely 
damaged Anglo-American relations.222 In this context, the successful operation of Calder Hall 
projected an idealised vision of British hegemony aimed at restoring her nuclear partnership 
with the US. Nuclear technologies and more specifically, the Sellafield site represented 
Britain’s future prosperity, projecting an imagined future of Britain’s geo-political ascendancy 
and restored status as an imperial superpower.  
 
This section of the chapter has shown how the pursuit of nuclear technologies at 
Sellafield was rooted in notions of scientific modernity and spoke to subjective understandings 
of national identity. Offering a means of politically and culturally restoring Britain’s status as 
a major international superpower, protecting from military threat, and providing a domestic 
source of energy, Sellafield embedded a series of desirable military, socio-cultural, economic, 
and (geo)political futures at the national level. The following section of the chapter will show 
how this process occurred at the local level, as the nuclear industry appealed to diverse sections 
amongst the West Cumbrian public.  
 
The Sellafield plant also embedded a locally specific vision of a utopian future as a 
provider of long-term, well-paid, and ostensibly ‘safe’ employment which reinforced the 
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region’s subjective relationship with industrial and scientific innovation. Tracing the socio-
technical processes at play at the local scale, this points to the significance of understanding 
how the local and the national interacted in the production of nuclear culture, and how social 
responses to nuclear technologies were shaped by a combination of national and local contexts.  
 
1.5: West Cumbria. 
 
 Windscale’s role in the production of the nuclear bomb, coupled with the eulogistic 
rhetoric which surrounded the opening of Calder Hall informed localised notions of cultural 
identity, as citizens framed their sense-of-self around the plant’s successes. Sellafield served 
as an immense source of pride amongst the local population, who identified with the plant’s 
successful construction and operation as a central tenet of regional identity. Tracing the 
emergence and continuation of these identities we can see how representations of Sellafield 
not only stabilised the imaginary of nuclear utopianism at the national level but actively 
embedded it into the fabric of West Cumbrian life. This approach develops work on the 
plurality of cultural responses to the nuclear age, and an increasing engagement with the 
localised variants of nuclear cultures by scholars of nuclear history.223 It also builds on a recent 
study by Jonathan Hogg, who explained that sociotechnical imaginaries of civil defence were 
“strengthened and made durable once [they] became intertwined with localised contexts and, 
of course, individuals working within them.”224 Developing this approach, the following 
section of the chapter examines the intersection between national and local visions of the 
future. Public responses to nuclear technologies were the product of the dynamic interplay 
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between national and localised contexts, as imaginaries of desirable national futures aligned 
with and co-produced divergent political, social, cultural, and economic imaginaries at the local 
level. Furthermore, I will explore the role of identity within this process, arguing that nuclear 
imaginaries interacted with localised notions of identity to embed these imagined futures at the 
local level. This will examine how nuclear technologies assimilated with and fed into local 
identities, as the Sellafield plant became a cogent representation of a desirable regional future.  
 
1.6: Construction and Operation. 
 
The pioneering nature of Sellafield’s construction and the unprecedented speed at 
which technological and infrastructural advances were made became a tremendous source of 
local pride, which fed into imaginaries of the region’s future prosperity. Throughout the oral 
histories locals described the heroic efforts of construction workers to produce such an 
experimental design within the required timescale. Former workers recounted the “ridiculously 
short time” between commissioning and construction, remarking that “it was a wonderful 
achievement, an incredible achievement to design it and built it and have it running.”225 With 
pride they recalled the technical, infrastructural and scientific difficulties overcome by local 
workers. They explained that “contractors would say ‘we want that building up in six months’, 
so they just ran at it.”226 In particular, residents recalled that “all the plant and equipment had 
to come in by road… bringing in 16 by 80ft-long heat exchangers through the narrow winding 
streets was not an easy task.”227 This process is depicted in Fig. 6.0, which shows one of the 
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heat exchangers travelling through the narrow streets of the nearby town of Egremont, whilst 
Figs. 7.0 and 8.0 show the backbreaking and dangerous work that went into the construction 
of the Windscale piles.  
 
Fig 7.0: Construction of the first Windscale pile, July 1950. 
(Sellafield Ltd) 
 
Fig. 6.0: Heat exchanger passing through Egremont. With kind 
permission from the Beacon Museum, Whitehaven. 
 
Fig. 8.0: Construction workers atop Windscale pile number one, c. 1948. (Sellafield Ltd) 
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The successes of construction were augmented by media reports which described Calder Hall 
in epic, pioneering terms as “among the finest achievements of British heavy engineering… 
and one of which everyone, from the designer to the general labourer, can be justifiably 
proud.”228 This helped embed the imaginary of nuclear utopianism within local society by 
inextricably linking the successful construction of Calder Hall with proud notions of local 
identity.  
 
The pride associated with construction extended to the running of the plant, which 
served as an ongoing source of pride both amongst the workforce and the local region, as the 
cutting-edge nature of nuclear science embedded social imaginaries of the region as a 
technological and scientific innovator. Former workers explained that work at the plant was 
“dramatic and inspiring”, providing a “vision of the future [that] was instrumental in my 
decision to move to Cumbria and joining the nuclear industry.”229 Interviewees articulated a 
deep sense of pride at the pioneering nature of their work, commenting that “we were doing 
things that nobody else had ever done before... Everything you wanted to do, you had to work 
out how to do it. It was great. It was wonderful.”230 Workers like Steve Bewsher explained that 
Sellafield “was a station with a sense of pride. We all had the view that if we were to do a job, 
we were to do our best.”231 They commented that “what we were doing was at the forefront of 
science and technology. It was new, exciting, people looked forward to going into work on a 
Monday morning because there were new things to be discovered.”232  The trailblazing role of 
local workers fostered a profound sense of local identity, energized by enthusiastic media 
narratives and official commendation which stressed “West Cumbrians’ part” in developing 
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nuclear energy and firmly entrenched the region’s position “in the vanguard of atomic 
research.”233 Local journalists enthused that “Cumberland was the pioneer county in atomic 
power” and that “now the county is known and remembered for its connection with nuclear 
development.”234 This became entrenched within local identities, as residents emphasised 
Calder Hall’s international influence as “the father of the nuclear family”, pointing to the use 
of its design on fourteen UK reactors, and plants in both Japan and Italy.235 By projecting the 
isolated and culturally backward region of West Cumbria to national and international acclaim, 
Sellafield helped embed utopian visions of social life by contributing to a proud sense of local 
identity as citizens identified the successes of the nuclear industry with imagined visions of the 
region’s future prosperity.  
 
Local identities were also bound up in ideas about Sellafield’s vital role in the defence 
of the nation. The plant’s role as the nation’s source of plutonium meant that many workers 
were immensely proud of their contribution to Britain’s nuclear arsenal, constructing a sense-
of-self which helped embed nuclear technologies within imaginaries of national defence. This 
process can be traced through the pages of local newspapers which expounded Sellafield’s vital 
role in the Cold war, lauding the “excellent staff work at the Sellafield atomic energy factory”, 
without which “the intricate plans for the explosion of Britain’s first atomic bomb may have 
come to naught.”236 These notions became internalised as part of subjective identities, as 
workers and media narratives emphasised the military necessity of their work, and their 
 
233 Romantic portrayals of this period of the nuclear industry may, in some measure, be a reflection of the 
difficulties and controversies that were to follow, yet it is clear that workers took great pride in their work and 
found in Sellafield an acute sense of collective and individual identity. (West Cumberland News, 20 December 
1947, p. 1.) 
234 News Star Supplement, 14 April 1960, p. 9. 
235 ‘The 60th Anniversary of Calder Hall: The Station, the People, the Area’, Sellafield, 5.0 (2016). 
236 West Cumberland News, date unknown, c. 1952-4, Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, (Nuclear 
Energy Folder); A. Bingham, ‘The Monster'? The British Popular Press and Nuclear Culture, 1945–early 
1960s’, British Journal for the History of Science, 45.4 (2012), pp. 609- 624.  
 101 
sacrificial role in ensuring Britain’s physical security in a period of international threat. This 
echoes Kate Brown’s study of nuclear facilities at Richland in the US and Ozyorsk in the Soviet 
Urals. Brown recognised that “residents saw the colossal effort to build nuclear weapons as an 
act of personal sacrifice. They were the front line defending the globe from the horrors of 
nuclear apocalypse.”237 Similar feelings were held at Sellafield, as citizens described that they 
had a responsibility to “contribute to the nation” by providing “what we needed for our stock 
of plutonium and our standing as a nuclear power.”238 Mediated through the wider lens of the 
Cold war arms race, the realities of plutonium production took on a deeply significant function 
as a vital component of national security. Embroiled within notions of national identity and 
civic duty, the plant became a source of honour amongst local citizens who looked to the 
military functionality of the plant as a source of pride and a feature of local identities. Relaying 
their attitudes towards their work, former employees reflected that “I was a government servant 
and I’d been given a job to do… I didn’t feel any qualms about working for the bomb at all.”239 
Others articulated their pride at working towards the nation’s defence, expressing “I was 
exceedingly proud to be a nuclear engineer, when one socialised, one was always justifiably 
proud.”240 This helped embed the nuclear project within an imagined military future, within 
which Sellafield served as a vital safeguard against foreign aggression in the context of the 
Cold war arms race and escalating geopolitical tensions.  
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The following section will show how the levels of secrecy that surrounded the Sellafield 
plant informed local identities and played a vital role in embedding military imaginaries of 
national defence. Local citizens looked to the layers of military secrecy that permeated plant 
life as a symbol of Sellafield’s immense national importance, and the centrality of the 
Cumbrian public in the defence of the realm. In this way, the cessation of civil liberties and 
censorship of the plant paradoxically served to embed imaginaries of a desirable military future 
sustained through Britain’s nuclear arsenal and deterrence policy. 
 
Substantiated by the public’s trust in science, the embryonic nuclear industry assumed 
a corporate ethos and adopted a culture predicated upon the systematic exclusion of the public. 
Secrecy was a defining characteristic of the early nuclear industry, pervading virtually all 
aspects of the nuclear lifecycle through a series of “closed and secretive institutions” which 
exercised stringent power relations through their covert activities.241 Anthropologist Joseph 
Masco has argued that “everything to do with nuclear weapons is born secret, meaning that it 
is classified without review, and the boundary between what is secret and what is not secret is 
also secret.”242 This mantra was reflected in the institutional culture of Sellafield and the 
clandestine nature of activities within the site. Factory life was the product of a simple model 
of compartmentalisation that had its origins in the ‘Manhattan Project’ at Los Alamos. Workers 
were not allowed to speak of their work to one another, only to their superiors, who could only 
converse with their superiors and so on, “until finally the two superiors turn out to be the same 
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person.”243 This ensured that information ascended up the vertical chain of command, and 
could not be passed downwards or horizontally, reproducing the culture of the ‘Manhattan 
Project’, where “you can talk with those just above you or below you, but you must not talk 
between the lines – that is, technical should not talk with operations except at the top layer.”244 
Such intellectual isolation served diverse functions, compartmentalising workers, retaining 
control over their activities and knowledge, and creating a zone of exclusion whereby the 
public were omitted from the interior workings of the industry.245 Former workers recalled that 
they “were not allowed even to discuss what we did with our parents, they just knew we worked 
at Sellafield and that I worked on graphite.”246 Others recalled that their friends were extremely 
curious about what went on at Sellafield, recounting that “they wanted to take me about and 
get drunk to see what they could find out about it!”247 This secrecy served a legitimating social 
function in the early years of the nuclear industry throughout the 1950s, substantiated by the 
public’s innate trust in science and experiences of wartime in which military secrecy had 
become a feature of daily life and a vital component in the successes of the war-effort.  
 
Rather than an object of fear, the secrecy which enshrouded the Sellafield plant simply 
developed and extended imaginaries of military secrecy cultivated during wartime and 
bolstered imaginaries of the plant’s contribution to national deterrence strategy. In this context, 
the plant’s covert operations underscored its importance within the context of the Cold War, as 
workers and residents internalised their exclusion from knowledge through the lens of national 
defence and the perceived threat from the USSR. Interviewees recalled that the secrecy of the 
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plant was not an issue within the local community, explaining that “there’d been a war and all 
sorts of things and people were tougher than they are now really. We understood that there was 
a job to be done and they’re going to do it… Compared with some of the things people had 
been through during the war, this wasn’t much. There wasn’t any apparent serious risk.”248 In 
this way, local citizens interpreted plant secrecy through their experiences of the Second World 
war and entrenched cultural visions of military secrecy as a vital component in Britain’s 
successful defence and deterrence policies. 
 
Measures of military secrecy were reflected in the very nature of the industry’s 
organisation and operational culture. Workers recalled that “the attitudes were all very military. 
Everybody had been in the military… they were all ex-people from the forces. We didn’t go 
on holiday; we went on leave. It was rank and number.”249 Workers were assigned and known 
by their numbers, rather than their names. They explained, “it didn’t matter what you had done, 
or what Sellafield thought of you… you were just a number.”250 This instigated a culture of 
institutional secrecy that closely resembled wartime scientific and industrial contexts, whereby 
workers “were managed in new isolated environments; their intellectual products were 
classified for restricted dissemination; their political activities and labour representations were 
scrutinised; their collective identity was shaped by pre-existing institutional and industrial 
affiliations; and their training, job categories and disciplinary labels were assigned largely by 
their respective governments.”251 The cultivation of a military culture normalised the plant’s 
secrecy as an extension of established military principles, simultaneously entrenching 
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Sellafield as an accepted feature of local life and embedding imaginaries of the plant’s role in 
national defence.  
 
The state’s control over the dissemination and flow of nuclear knowledge was a key 
component in embedding utopian nuclear imaginaries, allowing the state to conceal less 
desirable elements of the nuclear fuel-cycle in favour of its more utopian credentials. The 
military culture within the plant suppressed the dissemination of knowledge and allowed the 
industry to stage-manage public attitudes, cultivating a form of internal ‘atomic priesthood’ 
amongst workers, an order of monastic properties which protected against public inquiry, 
suppressed incidents, and choked potentially harmful information.252 This instigated a culture 
of operational secrecy which established a barrier of organisational bureaucracy and 
suppressed information from escaping beyond the social perimeter of factory life. By confining 
the flow of nuclear information, the industry exercised a great deal of control over public 
attitudes towards nuclear power, as they could dictate the form of public knowledge regarding 
nuclear technologies, regulating what was released into the public domain and how it was 
presented. Locals explained that the industry went largely unchallenged during this period for 
the simple reason that “we knew so little about what went on there.”253 In this way, the function 
and purpose of the plant “remained hidden and constrained” from the eyes of the local 
residents, who had “no alternative but to accept what [they were] told.”254 The secrecy which 
enveloped the plant helped embed utopian nuclear imaginaries by suppressing some of the 
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more controversial aspects of the plant such as Calder Hall’s role in the production of 
plutonium for Britain’s nuclear weapons programme. 
 
The Windscale and Calder Hall plants represented the conflicted identities of nuclear 
secrecy. Windscale was openly vaunted as producing plutonium for nuclear weapons, whilst 
Calder Hall was marketed as a power station, despite having also been optimised for the 
production of military plutonium.255 Beneath its façade as an electricity generator, Calder Hall 
was “primarily intended to produce plutonium for the UK’s atomic weapons programme. 
Producing electricity for the domestic market was a side-line for the plant.”256 Indeed, the 
electricity it did produce came at a tremendous financial cost, with each Kilowatt hour of 
electricity costing £232.257 Furthermore, the plant barely produced any electricity. Scientific 
reporter Chapman Pincher later admitted that “there were times that it was taking energy out 
off the grid, rather than pumping it in!”258 Despite its scant (and expensive) contribution to 
national energy production, Calder Hall was disguised as an electricity producer, its true nature 
obfuscated by the silence imposed on the local workforce via the Official Secrets Act (1911). 
 
Most locals did not even know what the plant did. Interviewees explained that “it was 
only when I passed my interview and came here and started to work that I realised that we were 
engaged in producing material for atomic bombs.”259 Multiple participants acknowledged “we 
didn’t really realise what it was then, we thought it was just gonna make electric for 
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everybody”, explaining that “we didn’t know [about plutonium production] until quite a while 
afterwards... We were all gonna get cheap rates and cheap electric.”260 By concealing the actual 
purpose and nature of the plant, the industry was able to cultivate a specific public image which 
eschewed the dystopian realities of the nuclear industry in favour of the more culturally 
admissible image of power production, offering a utopian image of nuclear technologies which 
transcended their role in the production of nuclear weapons. Central to this process was the 
role of language. 
 
Through technical or strategic language, nuclear workers created their own techno-
scientific worlds which obscured the dystopian realities of weapons production. This language 
was similar in essence to military-speak, forming a particular elitist discourse which excluded 
persons beyond the industry from knowledge about what the plant really did. Exploring this 
process in the American context, Carol Cohn identifies a patriarchal and overtly sexist 
technostrategic language amongst US defence intellectuals which suppressed the destructive 
power of the bomb, functioning as a form of coping strategy designed to mitigate the 
devastating potential of nuclear war for those involved in planning its implementation.261 The 
technical language spoken at Sellafield had much in common with the ‘Manhattan Project’, as 
anything to do with the production of plutonium was subsumed within techno-strategic code-
names and epithet. In his study of the ‘Manhattan Project’, historian Peter Hales wrote that 
“everything important at Los Alamos had another name. Atoms were tops. Bombs were boats. 
And atomic bomb was a topic boat. Plutonium was product… and uranium 235 was tenure.”262 
At Sellafield, anything relating to the bomb was a ‘Tommy’, shorthand for ‘atomic’, whilst the 
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site itself was “very secret and known by codenames.”263 Specific buildings were given 
colloquial nicknames which hid their role in the fuel-cycle. On account of their shape and 
purpose, various buildings were known amongst workers as “the dancefloor”, “the cactus”, 
“the football pitch”, and “the cricket pitch”, the latter two so-named for the recreational past-
times favoured amongst workers when their bosses weren’t looking.264 These names subverted 
the buildings’ intended functions, emotionally detaching the workers from their role in the 
production of weapons, whilst ensuring that operational secrecy was upheld and employees 
didn’t know any more about the plant than was absolutely necessary. Workers recalled that 
they understood very little of the true nature of their jobs, explaining that “you had an idea, but 
not … scientifically you didn’t.”265 Through pervasive attempts to safeguard state secrets, these 
bureaucratic codes hid the true nature of the chemical compounds being used and discursively 
suppressed their destructive capacity. This simultaneously ratified political discourses of 
containment, whilst exercising control over the flow of nuclear knowledge and meaning 
making. These levels of secrecy helped embed utopian nuclear imaginaries by simultaneously 
diverting public attention away from the destructive aspects of work at Sellafield and 
impressing the enormous national importance of the work that went on there. Furthermore, the 
state’s control over the flow of nuclear meaning-making suppressed the potential dystopian 
effects of radiation exposure upon the local population and workforce and cultivated an 
imaginary of nuclear safety. 
 
The following section will show how the levels of secrecy which pervaded the plant 
aligned with a social context of deference towards scientific establishments such as the 
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UKAEA and state-run scientific projects, entrenching notions of nuclear utopianism by 
emphasising the safety of nuclear technologies. Detailing this process, interviewees recalled 
that they placed a great deal of faith in the authority of state and ‘big science,’ stating that 
“people thought the government knew best- they trusted them to look after them.”266 Locally, 
there was also a large amount of respect for senior figures at Sellafield, such as Plant Manager 
Hugh Davey, Deputy Manager Tom Tuohy, and senior figures at the UKAEA such as Sir 
William Penney and Sir Christopher Hinton. One local man recalled glowingly, “the senior 
management at Sellafield then were giants of men.”267 These figures were well respected 
amongst the local community and people placed a great deal of trust in their integrity. If the 
scientists told them that the local area was safe, they felt they had little reason to suspect 
otherwise.268 Through these trust networks, local people imagined nuclear power as “a good 
clean job working for the government”, resting assumptions upon the aforementioned social 
dynamic of trust in government and notable scientists, vicariously embedding utopian nuclear 
imaginaries through their acquiescence to expert assurances from the industry and trusted state 
actors.269 In this way, local people functioned as active participants in this process through their 
willing status “as a traditionalistic and cautious onlooker in awe of the arcane mysteries of 
scientific expertise.”270 By controlling the dissemination of knowledge about radiation, the 
nuclear industry was able to shape public attitudes towards nuclear hazards, constructing an 
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State attempts to embed an imaginary of nuclear safety can be traced back as early as 
1947. Before the precise nature of the work to be undertaken at Sellafield was known, the 
government began cultivating a narrative of nuclear technologies as inherently safe and 
controllable through adequate security procedures. In a planning meeting with members of the 
local Whitehaven, Ennerdale, and Millom council, the MoS described that “any risks arising 
from these operations would be controlled with the greatest possible care and they expected no 
risks to the local population either atmospherically or by effluent into the sea.”271 Official 
industry rhetoric acknowledged the potential hazards of working with nuclear technologies but 
played down the dangers of radiation by emphasising its predictability and quantifiable nature, 
arguing that “danger exists but it can be kept under complete control” by adherence to safety 
procedures and protocols.272 Dangers were seemingly mitigated by systematic safety 
procedures, such as the wearing of coveralls and “routine creaming of hands, changing of 
footwear and other protective measures.”273 Other procedures included the infamous 
‘Windscale suit,’ consisting of a primitive form of plastic PVC hazmat suit “blown up with an 
air-line [placing you] in your own atmosphere.”274 Industry officials detailed the rigorous 
processes which measured the safety of workers, emphasising the importance of “the films 
which everyone on the staff, from the works manager downwards, is obliged to wear and which 
record to what amount , if any, of radiation the wearer has been exposed.”275 These procedures 
normalised radiation and quantified hazards, subsuming the ‘alien’ nature of radiation within 
 
271 Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, ‘Ministry of Supply: Note of Discussions on 26 th August, 
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275 Articles directly compared Sellafield with the cleanliness and sterility of a surgical operating theatre, replete 
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scientific discourses of measurability and control and regulating public opinion through the 
stage-management of nuclear knowledge.  
 
Fig 9.0: News Star Supplement, 14 April 
1960. 
Fig 11.0: Whitehaven Archive and Local Study 
Centre, (YBNFL 4/24). 
Fig 10.0: Whitehaven Archive and Local 
Study Centre, (YBNFL 4/24). 
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The industry’s ability to monitor radiation levels became a key tool in maintaining 
public support for the plant by controlling the flow of nuclear knowledge between the industry 
and the lay public, instigating an uneven power dynamic through which the industry could 
propagate the vision of nuclear safety. Owing to its invisibility, radiation defies sensory 
perception. One cannot see, hear, smell, or taste radiation, it exists only through those who can 
detect it.276 Radiation could therefore only be ‘viewed’ through the monitoring activities of the 
nuclear industry. This control over radiation monitoring actively depicted nuclear technologies 
as safe, as flexible dose limits were created which provided an ostensibly ‘safe’ level of 
radiation exposure under which no harm could occur. This asserted that since radiation was a 
naturally occurring phenomenon, humans could tolerate a certain amount of radioactivity 
without any health effects, and therefore workers could safely endure radiation exposure up to 
this level. A 1954 article in The Economist argued as much, stating that “men are gradually 
coming to terms with nuclear technology and its attendant phenomenon of radiation, and are 
finding that quite heavy doses of radiation can be harmless.”277 Former employees recalled 
internal demonstrations given at the plant where they were taught about ordinary levels of 
background radiation which posed no threat to human life: 
 
“You had an old luminous alarm clock, pebbles from Cornish beaches, pieces of granite 
from Aberdeen etc. on the table. Then we’d have a counter and we’d say, “now look, 
these are all around you. People in Aberdeen have got their houses built from this!” 
You’d put it [the Geiger counter] there and it’d go ‘tchtchtchtcht!’ “And there’s no 
problems with the people in Aberdeen; people are sitting on the beach in Cornwall 
 
276 Macgill, The Politics of Anxiety, p. 102. 
277 ‘Windscale and Beyond’, The Economist, 8 May 1954 (171.5776), p. 479. 
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surrounded by these” - ‘tchtchtchtcht!’ … You’d put it near, and it would click away 
quite loudly, [but] you’d move it away and you’d say, “you only have to go this far, 
and it’s gone.”278 
 
These demonstrations showed that radioactive tolerance levels could be safely established for 
nuclear workers, whose safety was guaranteed by adherence to strict monitoring procedures 




278 D. Wooley, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by J. Lister, 6 August 2010, p. 21.  




The process of film-badge monitoring appeared to validate the safety of the nuclear 
industry, as 1600 badges per week retrospectively analysed the radioactivity workers had been 
exposed to and measured them against accepted dosage levels.279 Those who worked in more 
active areas were issued with futuristic “fountain-pen monitors” which served as a realisation 
of the effectiveness of radiation monitoring, and the justification of the plant’s safety 
procedures, as the colour or sound given off by the badge empirically ‘proved’ that Sellafield 
was a clean and safe working environment.280 These measures were central to the belief that 
the inherent dangers of radiation could be mitigated by scientific testing. They not only instilled 
a degree of public confidence but internalised foreign elements such as radiation checks and 
dosimeters as familiar processes and elements of routine.  
 
Measuring equipment and regulatory procedures rendered the alien and unknown 
element of radiation a more mundane and everyday phenomenon, detectable through regular 
monitoring and another part of everyday life within the plant.281 Former workers articulated 
this in simple terms, recalling that “you took all the precautions- you measured- you distanced 
yourself- and you looked after yourself.”282 One former worker recalled that if his radiation 
alarm went off he simply walked the other way, stating “I had a lot of faith in the old bleep! 
[radiation monitor]”283 If a worker did suffer from over-exposure, they were simply redeployed 
within a ‘clean,’ less radioactive area of the plant and decontaminated. Industry spokesmen 
explained that “close watch is kept on the amount of radiation to which each worker is exposed, 
so that the effects of an over-dose can be offset by a temporary change of work to a non-
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radioactive part of the plant.”284 A great deal of trust was placed in the decontamination 
procedures, which involved a severe scrubbing of the skin, trimming and scraping under 
fingernails, nasal irrigation treatment and the disposal of clothing. Again, this treatment 
became a feature of everyday life at the plant which served to embed imaginaries of nuclear 
safety. One interviewee humorously recounted that “I could always tell when my husband had 
been irradiated because his hair was standing on end when he came home!”285 In this sense, 
radiation monitoring served as an act of surveillance, designed to detect, notify and control 
nuclear meaning-making, as the hegemonic control over radiation monitoring gave the nuclear 
industry total control over knowledge regarding radiation, allowing the industry to peddle a 
utopian vision of nuclear safety, safeguarded through the apparent meticulous levels of 
monitoring and care for its workers.286  
 
 As the only source of data on radiation levels the MoS (and later UKAEA) subsumed 
the threat of radiation by reference to its own monitoring statistics, which categorically proved 
that Sellafield had brought about “no noticeable change” in background radiation levels beyond 
the factory perimeter.287 At the ‘Atoms for Peace’ conferences held at Geneva, in November 
1955 and September 1958, officials gave evidence that “operations at Sellafield had not given 
rise to any radioactive hazards in the surrounding countryside” as experts proudly proclaimed 
that “people near Sellafield [are] safe.”288 Emphasising the strength of plant design, they 
explained that radiation was prevented from escaping the site works by “the thickness of the 
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285 V. Eldred, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 8 February 2010, p. 23.  
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expanded upon in more detail during the fourth chapter. (Journal of Nuclear Energy, 1.3/4 (1955), pp. 173- 
320.) 
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concrete and the general construction of the tanks,” whilst the levels of radioactivity given off 
by the plant were “so negligible that it cannot be measured.”289 This it noted, was in spite of 
the “extremely sensitive” and “amazing array of detection and measuring equipment” capable 
of detecting “any change in atmospheric radioactivity.”290 The pages of the local and national 
press reproduced the findings of the conference, with readers hearing about “mobile 
laboratories [which were] constantly touring the area testing air, soil, vegetation, and water on 
the spot”, unequivocally proving that Sellafield offered “no conceivable hazard to human 
beings, agriculture or fisheries.”291 By reproducing industry statements, the local media played 
an important role in shaping public attitudes towards the Sellafield plant and embedding the 
imaginary of nuclear safety within the public domain.  
 
Local media assured their readership that “every possible step is taken at Sellafield to 
ensure that no one in the factory or the district is in any danger from atomic sources.”292 
Obtaining their information directly from the UKAEA, newspaper narratives were at pains to 
stress the care and attention that was paid to public health, explaining that “the safety 
precautions in a plant of this kind are based on strict discipline” which ensured worker safety, 
whilst “weekly tests carried out in the immediate neighbourhood” ensured the safety of the 
public too.293 Jubilant articles impressed upon their readership that “you’re safer amongst the 
atoms!” reflecting that “there is very little danger of workers becoming heavily contaminated,” 
pointing to the strenuous decontamination procedures which ensured that the Sellafield worker 
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“will never take any contamination away from the works with him.”294 Where reference was 
made to the possible effects of radiation, the public were assured that “the symptoms are 
known, the precautions have been taken, and the remedies are ready,” as the threat of radiation 
was subsumed within the scientists’ innate mastery of radiobiology.295 These narratives 
emphasised that there was “no harm to marine or human life from the discharge of the station's 
liquid effluent into the sea,” expounding that “the threat to the health of West Cumberland is 
entirely negligible.”296 The product of industry’s ability to control public access to knowledge 
about radiation, these media narratives helped embed imaginaries of nuclear safety at the local 
level as the selective information released by the UKAEA appeared to confirm that nuclear 
technologies represented no hazard to their daily lives. This aligned with official attempts to 
trivialise the threat of radiation by comparing the levels within nuclear industry with those 
found in everyday items such as luminous wristwatches, or X-Rays conducted in footwear 
shops.297  
 
Local articles reproduced expert assurances that foot X-rays “subject a person to a much 
heavier dosage of radioactivity than would be permitted in any atomic energy 
establishment.”298 Designed for the lay reader, these reports compared radiation to sound waves 
and other invisible technologies. A copy of the local West Cumberland News stated that “West 
Cumberland is in no way likely to be affected anymore by radioactivity from Sellafield than it 
is by BBC or other sound waves, light waves, or any other waves.”299 These reports 
misrepresented the nature of radiobiology to downplay its potential effects by domesticating it 
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within controlled and knowable realms. By comparing radiation to recent scientific advances 
such as television and radio, the threat of radiation could be publicly internalised within pre-
existing emotional and scientific understandings, which simultaneously downplayed its 
magnitude and helped embed imaginaries of nuclear science as a philanthropic force in the 
transformation of modern society. 
 
Radioactivity’s banality was further depicted through its potential uses within the 
medical industry. Assertions that nuclear waste products would pose a threat to human health 
were subverted by newspaper reports which claimed that radioactive “waste may save Britain, 
and virtually the world, many thousands of pounds now spent in the reprocessing of radium.”300 
The waste, it was said, would be put to good use “in British hospitals for the treatment of deep-
seated cancers.”301 This represented a genuine research aim for the UKAEA, with former 
workers recalling working on a project to separate caesium 137 from waste liquors for cancer 
treatments at hospitals in Southampton and London.302 The medical potential of radioactivity 
was repeatedly admonished by the local newspaper, which proclaimed that “Britain is taking 
the lead in turning waste from atomic piles into a new weapon against cancer.”303 Advocating 
the utility of its waste products within the medical industry, nuclear technologies became seen 
in a more positive light, as a benign benefactor to the medical profession and a useful extension 
of the natural realm.304 This reframed dystopian imaginaries of radiation dominated by the 
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harrowing images of irradiated survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, instead emphasising the 
utopian role of radiation in an imagined medical and social future. These official attempts to 
cultivate imaginaries of nuclear safety dovetailed with a series of local social contexts, such as 
economic hardship and the hazardous working conditions of local industries. These local 
processes interacted with and helped embed imaginaries of nuclear safety, as Sellafield 
appeared a more desirable form of employment in the context of the region’s traditional 
dangerous heavy industries and its long-term socio-economic decline.  
 
The industry’s careful dissemination of nuclear information helped embed imaginaries 
of nuclear safety at the local level, and many people considered that Sellafield was a safer 
alternative to the traditional forestry, mining, chemical plants, or railway work that 
characterised the regional economy. This linked the nuclear plant with social imaginaries of a 
desirable regional future free from the inherent dangers of heavy industry, which were “seen 
as comparatively riskier than the nuclear power station.”305 Working conditions in the local 
railway and coal industries were notoriously bad, as both industries “had been reluctant to 
engage with health and safety regulation” prior to their nationalisation in 1947, and conditions 
failed to improve substantially until the 1963 Offices, Shops, and Railway Premises Act 
established “basic standards for general welfare and working conditions (such as temperature, 
ventilation, cleanliness, overcrowding, and sanitation).”306 Interviewees such as David Head 
stressed the appalling conditions in the mine-shafts, conveying childhood memories of hearing 
his father struggling to breathe at night, admitting that he had heard him “dying for years in the 
next room.”307 David explained that before Sellafield opened, all the major regional industries 
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were dangerous. He recalled that “the farmers finished up with farmer’s lung, the Forestry 
[Commission] were using chemicals they knew nothing about, and the railways started 
spraying the lines, so a lot of them fellas got things as bad as what they got at the pits.”308 In 
this context, the dearth of safe employment opportunities and locals’ experiential familiarity 
with industrial risk interacted with imaginaries of nuclear safety to embed visions of Sellafield 
as a desirable form of employment. 
 
Imaginaries of nuclear safety interacted strongly with local contexts to normalise and 
subsume unfamiliar aspects of the nuclear industry such as radiation. Within the context of the 
region’s existing chemical and munitions factories, many locals considered Sellafield an 
extension of the region’s traditional heavy industry, with “the new danger of radiation… 
merely a variant of the century old hazards of chemical works.”309 Dangerous industrial work 
was a feature of local cultures, particularly given the wartime operation of local TNT factories 
at Drigg and Sellafield.310 For many, the “environment of high temperatures, unfamiliar 
materials, and biological dangers” at Sellafield had distinct parallels with wartime experience 
at local factories, as former workers likened their work producing plutonium to wartime 
munitions workers, merely producing a different, more powerful type of explosive.311 Others 
conceived of the nuclear industry through their experiential familiarity with industrial risks 
within the mines. They noted that “it’s no different to working in Haig Pit with coal. You’ve 
got more chance of being killed in Haig Pit than you have at Sellafield… like a coal miner, you 
learn to recognise the creaking timbers- it’s just different hazards.”312 In this way, locals 
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internalised nuclear risk through their experiences in other dangerous local industries, with 
nuclear often seen as the preferred option. Workers iterated that “risk is a part and has been a 
part of their everyday lives” for successive generations, with attitudes “informed by 
longstanding memories from a previous industrial age based on the heavy industries of 
chemicals [at Marchon], coal [in the pits], and shipbuilding” [at Vickers in Barrow, and in 
Whitehaven docks].313 These experiences helped embed the imaginary of nuclear safety, as 
Sellafield appeared as a safe form of employment and in particular, a much safer means of 
energy production, functioning in stark contrast to the traditional iron-ore and coal mining 
industries which had dominated the local economy since the industrial revolution.314   
 
 Within the context of the region’s historical mining industry, Sellafield represented a 
marked departure from traditional methods of generating electricity, which necessitated 
sending men deep underground to mine iron-ore and coal from the Cumbrian earth. In this 
context, nuclear fission represented a desirable and safer alternative to coal-mining, rooted in 
notions of scientific modernity, public trust in the state, and the utopian “transformation of 
society by rational scientific means.”315 Former workers explained how they perceived that 
Sellafield “would be a nice, safe job, working for the government, and with clean hands.”316 
To the local public, Sellafield embodied a much cleaner form of energy production, as one 
local put it, “without all the muck that coal produces.”317 Local man, Dr V. Eldred explained 
that “the idea that someone might be able to generate power without mining coal was very 
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attractive.”318 Local newspapers helped embed the imaginary of nuclear safety by comparing 
the safety standards endured in the pits and local chemical factories with those at Sellafield. 
Articles explained that “atomic energy offers one of the safest of industrial employments 
[whereby] the worker has no chance of coming to harm in thirty or forty years of work- the 
highest standard ever set in industry.”319 In particular, local newspaper narratives explicitly 
juxtaposed the levels of safety offered by the nuclear industry with the harsh realities of the 
mining industry. Articles frequently conceived of nuclear technologies through the lens of 
previous industrial accidents and illnesses, concluding that “if the same thought had been given 
to safety in other industries as has apparently been the case in the realms of atomic energy, we 
would not today have so many instances of silicosis, ‘miners’ eyes’, and so many other 
industrial diseases so well known to West Cumberland.”320 In this context Sellafield 
represented the most desirable means of local employment. Workers explained “I thought I’d 
be far better in there [Sellafield] than riving bloody silage out of a pit with a gripe and wrecking 
myself.”321 In many cases, men left stable jobs in other industries to join the nuclear project on 
the basis of its apparent safety. One worker explained that he left his role producing sulfuric 
acid at the local chemical works specifically to join Sellafield. He recalled “I thought Sellafield 
was cleaner than the Marchon… I kept having nose bleeds and I thought, this isn’t for me. 
Whilst nuclear was a bit unknown… I decided to throw my hand in and go to Sellafield. I 
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reckon if I’d stayed at the Marchon I wouldn’t be alive today.”322 This was typical of local 
attitudes. Whilst the nuclear industry was new and “unknown”, in the eyes of many men it 
could not be any worse than the conditions endured within the chemical plants and particularly 
the mine shafts, which had claimed the lives of dozens of local men only a few years previously.  
 
 Imaginaries of nuclear safety registered acutely amongst local mining communities, 
who had witnessed 335 deaths over the previous thirty-five years. The same year the nuclear 
project at Sellafield was announced, the local community had been devastated by the William 
Pit Disaster on August 15, 1947. This killed 104 miners when an underground explosion 
released carbon monoxide within the mineshaft, killing all but fourteen of the men on duty. 
Older interviewees, such as George Heslop recalled this incident in harrowing detail, 
remembering locals lining the streets and “waiting for news of their loved ones.”323 This 
tragedy reconceptualised the way the local population saw the nuclear industry, which offered 
an alternative future to a life of hardship down the mines. Indeed, many local men chose to 
leave the mining industry and work at Sellafield as a direct result of this disaster. One 
interviewee explained that “the miners were a fine lot and it was fine working with them – but 
there was high mortality in those days in the mines and working conditions weren’t very 
good…”324 A former miner explained that after one period of sickness caused by the damp 
conditions down the mine he decided to interview for Sellafield, “just so’s you got paid if you 
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were off sick like.”325 Another interviewee recalled that his father had forbidden him from 
following in his footsteps and working down the mines. He explained that “he turned round 
and said ‘you’re not going anywhere near that place. You’re not working down the pit.’”326 In 
contrast, Sellafield represented a desirable and safe means of employment for locals, both a 
chance at a better life for themselves and for their loved ones. Another interviewee explained 
that “I vowed never to go down the pit.” He described how Sellafield not only offered a 
desirable future for him, but also a chance to get his father a safer job. He explained that “I 
took the opportunity to get my dad out of the coal mines to save my mother worrying and into 
Sellafield.”327 These narratives show how notions of nuclear safety interacted strongly with the 
local context, as West Cumbria’s history of mining disasters helped embed imaginaries of 
nuclear utopianism and Sellafield became embroiled within desirable local futures. In this 
context, the William Pit Disaster and the historically poor working conditions within the 
Cumbrian mines emotionally shaped the form of cultural expressions towards nuclear power. 
This provided a contextual backdrop which helped embed the imaginary that nuclear power 
represented a clean, safe and unlimited source of energy. Offering a long-term, well-paid, and 
ostensibly ‘safe’ job within an industry ran by and regulated by the state, the nuclear industry 
appealed to a number of socio-economic registers at the local level, embedding locally specific 
visions of desirable futures. This process was further augmented by the financial provisions 
offered by the nuclear industry, which entrenched imaginaries of the plant as synonymous with 
the economic recovery and prosperity of West Cumbria. 
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 Together, the physical and financial security offered by the nuclear project represented 
a prosperous future for the people of West Cumbria. This assimilated with the financial 
depression of the inter-war years to embed an imagined future of socio-economic prosperity at 
the local level. West Cumbria had endured a period of profound socio-economic decline as the 
mining and manufacturing industries which underpinned the regional economy were hit by the 
financial blight of the inter-war years, prompting mass unemployment and migration out of the 
county. Slumps within the steel, coal, and iron industries reaped “economic disaster” upon 
West Cumbria, which suffered from a period of “catastrophic industrial decline.”328 Describing 
the chastening experience of growing up during this period, older respondents remembered 
“there was no work at all really, it was the bad old days… up to the war started there was no 
work.”329 By 1934, the county had been officially branded “a distressed area” and received 
assistance from the Industrial Development Council who encouraged new industries to take 
residence in Cumbria to combat the mass exodus of men out of the county in search for work 
and 13,000 unemployed.330 This provided a fertile breeding ground for any incumbent industry 
able to offer long-term jobs and a measure of economic security to the local population 
 
In the context of financial depression, Sellafield intertwined with ideas about the 
region’s post-war revival to embed imaginaries of a desirable socio-economic future sustained 
through the nuclear industry. This imaginary was institutionally stabilised by the state, as a 
 
328 Furthermore, the region was unable to attract alternative industries due to inadequate infrastructure for 
transportation by either road or rail, and harbours too shallow to cater for steamships. (Author Unknown, 
Cumbrian Life (March 2016), p. 13; News Star Supplement, 26 April 1960, p. 1; N. Bell, ‘An Oral History of 
British Science’, interviewed by P. Merchant, 10 January 2013). 
329 J. Farrell, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 20 January 2010, p. 3. 
330 Indeed, it was only the outbreak of war in 1939 that saw the region begin to emerge from its economic 
paralysis, with the opening of a number of war-time factories seeking to escape German bombing raids, 
(Ordnance factories at Drigg in 1940, Bootle in 1941, and Sellafield in 1942, alongside High Duty Alloys, 
Marchon, and clothing manufacturer Kangol.) News Star Supplement, 26 April 1960, p. 1. 
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series of government-sponsored public exhibitions were set up in order to ‘educate’ the public 
about the benefits of nuclear technology and its central role in the region’s future.331 Public 
exhibitions of nuclear energy formed part of a flagrant campaign to gather favour for the 
nuclear plant by latching onto a romantic image of Cumbria’s industrial heritage and 
juxtaposing the prosperity of the atom with the area’s recent economic slump. In 1948, just 
after the Windscale plutonium plant was announced, Cumbria hosted the ‘Atom Train 
exhibition’ (Fig. 13.0). which visited British towns and cities making the public “atomic energy 
conscious.”332  
 
331 Initial public responses to Sellafield were characterised by resistance as the local population resented having 
lost the initial Courthaulds project. In the Commons, local M.P. Frank Anderson spoke out against the uncertain 
prospects of employment at the “new-fangled” atomic energy plant, expressing his constituents’ disappointment 
at having lost the employment prospects offered by the proposed rayon factory and the long-term security of the 
textiles industry. These concerns were echoed in local newspapers, who engaged in a series of derisive 
narratives which presented the Sellafield plant as a “Blow for West Cumberland.” This manner of low-level 
local resistance characterised the early interactions between the nuclear industry and the Cumbrian public, as the 
imaginary of nuclear utopianism took a short while to manifest. (National Archives, ‘Transcript of Commons 
Debate on Atomic Energy Plant’, 23 July, 1947, (PREM 8/682), p. 1238; Whitehaven Daily News, 24 July 1947, 
p. 1; Bracey, Industry and the Countryside, pp. 102ff). 
332 C. Laucht, ‘Atoms for the People: The Atomic Scientists’ Association, the British State and Nuclear 
Education in the Atom Train Exhibition, 1947–1948’, The British Journal for the History of Science, 45.4 
(2012), pp. 591- 608. 
Fig. 13.0: ‘The Atom Train,’ 1948. University of Liverpool’s Department of Physics Archives. 
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This was a public information campaign jointly organised by the Atomic Scientists’ 
Association and the government, designed as a “publicity stunt” aimed to “help you understand 
the facts about atomic energy”, so read the exhibit’s official guide.333 This presentation 
“focused on peaceful applications of nuclear energy... framed within the dichotomy of a bright, 
peaceful atomic future.”334 This imagined utopian future was formalised in the aesthetic design 
of the exhibition, in which “much light and warm colours are used to create an appropriate 
atmosphere” and furnish the displays with a positive ambience.335 This public performance of 
nuclear prosperity built upon the West Cumbrian Industrial Exhibition of 1948, where 
President of the Board of Trade and future Prime Minister Harold Wilson delivered a public 
speech which emphasised the region’s industrial heritage, situating the incumbent nuclear 
industry within the region’s “record of great achievement.”336 In a speech to several thousand 
onlookers, he delivered an address which situated nuclear technologies within a positivist 
narrative of the region’s recent past, with nuclear science the proverbial phoenix that would 
enable the depressed region to rise from the ashes of industrialism and reverse a generation of 
economic difficulty. Acknowledging that the region had “suffered more severe unemployment 
than any of the other distressed areas of Great Britain” he carefully juxtaposed the “industrial 
prosperity” offered by the nuclear industry with the “grim realities of life back in 1935.”337 
Together, these two public displays asserted the employment prospects and the desirability of 
the incumbent nuclear industry, as state intervention helped embed imaginaries of nuclear 
prosperity and shaped public opinion in favour of the nuclear project.  
 
333 Laucht, ‘Atoms for the People’, p. 593; ‘If Atom War Came’, Liverpool Echo, 6 November 1947; Atomic 
Scientists’ Association, Atom Train: Guide to the Travelling Exhibition on Atomic Energy (London: Atomic 
Scientists’ Association, 1947), unpaginated. 
334 Laucht, ‘Atoms for the People’, p. 599.  
335 ‘Atom Train: A Travelling Exhibition on Atomic Energy Designed by Peter Moro and Robin Day’, 
Architects’ Journal, 13 November 1947, pp. 434f. 
336 Times and Star, ‘An exhibition of West Cumbria’s Greatest Industrial Achievements’, 26 July 2012. 
<https://www.timesandstar.co.uk/news/17034042.an-exhibition-of-west-cumbrias-greatest-industrial-




Born into the socio-economic context of financial deprivation and institutionally 
stabilised at state level, imaginaries of nuclear prosperity registered acutely within the region 
and became embedded into a locally specific vision of the future. In this context, Sellafield 
represented a degree of financial surety for local workers looking for a stable income. Workers 
explained that Sellafield offered a “substantial employment lifeline”, recalling that they “were 
glad of the work” within an industry whereby “you’re generally safe and you’ve got a job for 
as long as you want it.”338 The financial credentials of the nuclear industry were emphasised 
by the rhetoric of local media narratives, which presented Sellafield “in religious terms” as 
having stimulated the economic and social regeneration of the local community.339 Sellafield’s 
“revolutionary” impact upon the local region, was likened to a form of “salvation” by 
successive newspaper articles which identified “new life and vigour in the local communities 
... where the future is looked forward to with optimism and confidence that the bad old times 
have passed and that still greater prosperity is around the corner.”340 Local media proudly 
proclaimed “Cumberland can make it!”, emphasising Sellafield’s “massive contribution” 
towards “securing the region’s future prosperity.”341 These narratives helped embed 
imaginaries of economic utopianism, as Sellafield was represented as the stimulus for the 
region’s industrial renaissance. This was augmented by the highly favourable wages offered 
by the nuclear industry which stimulated the local economy and transformed the standard of 
living for many in the local area. 
 
338 J. Farrell, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 20 January 2010, p. 11; A. 
Barnes, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by G. Wilkinson, 4 August 2020, p. 18; Bolter, 
Inside Sellafield, p. 231. 
339 Whitehaven Archive and Local Study Centre, E. Huws-Jones, ‘The Case Against THORP: Windscale and 
West Cumbria’, (Egremont Folder), p. 5. 
340 Jay, Britain's Atomic Factories; Bolter, Inside Sellafield, p. 231; Bracey, Industry and the Countryside, p. 
126. 
341 Sinclair, Windscale, p. 7; West Cumberland News, 20 December 1947. 
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Now a well-established tactic of the nuclear industry both in the UK and elsewhere, 
Sellafield offered wages which grossly outstripped all other industries in the local area.342 This 
embedded notions of nuclear utopianism as local people attained a higher standard of living 
through the economic provisions of the nuclear industry. UKAEA historian Lorna Arnold 
explained that the region became known as “the Gold coast” as the “high wages and the 
opportunity for almost unlimited overtime” transformed the region.343 Interviewees explained 
how the incursion of cash into the local region from the plant had a profound impact on the 
local economy. One local woman recalled that, whilst it was common that both men and women 
were required to work, “if the husband worked at Sellafield, the wife didn’t have to go out to 
work at all.”344 Even those who did not obtain direct employment within the nuclear industry 
reaped the benefits of the plant as “the combined wage bills put thousands of pounds into local 
circulation each week.”345 The disposable income of the nuclear workforce “stimulated 
prosperity and employment in shops, garages, laundries, building, and decorating business” as 
their generous wages trickled down into the local economy.346 This helped embed the 
imaginary of nuclear utopianism as local people “welcome[d] the prosperity the atom people 
had brought.”347 Interviewees recalled that the local area “brightened up during the course of 
the fifties… all the doors suddenly got painted because people could afford to do that kind of 
thing!”348 Similarly, the migration of skilled workers and scientists into the area “demanded 
the professional services of the doctor, dentist, teacher, and chemist”, bringing about residual 
 
342 For comparisons with the French context, see Zonabend, The Nuclear Peninsula, p. 22. 
343 Arnold, Windscale 1957, p. 11; Sinclair, Windscale, p. 10. One former Sellafield welder explained that 
labourers targeted an incredible 100 hours in a week as staff seized the virtually unlimited overtime quotas. (D. 
Head, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by J. Lister, 25 January 2010, pp. 1-6, 14.) 
344 Author’s interview with Isobel George, 6 March 2019. 
345 Bracey, Industry and the Countryside, p. 125. 
346 Ibid., 
347 G. Bruce, ‘Atom Village Beats that Quartermass Fear’, Illustrated Magazine, 3 March 1956, p. 39. 
348 M. Kipling, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 7 January 2010, p. 3. 
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employment for locals not employed at the plant, engaged in auxiliary services which 
supported the industry indirectly.349 Residents commented that, “for every job at Sellafield 
there were probably three more jobs supported round about, from taxi drivers to supermarkets”, 
adding that “almost everybody worked at Sellafield, and those who didn’t, their livelihoods 
depended on Sellafield or its employees.”350 This economic prosperity helped embed the 
imaginary of nuclear utopianism as the financial benefits heralded by the nuclear industry 
contributed to a higher standard of living amongst the local public. This entrenched the 
imaginary of nuclear utopianism at the local level, as the region’s economic regeneration 
assimilated with a series of social, cultural, and subjective processes to helped embed visions 




This chapter has shown how both nuclear technologies and the Sellafield plant became 
embroiled within imagined visions of desirable social, military, (geo)political, and economic 
futures, as national ambitions dovetailed with a series of locally specific social, political, and 
economic contexts to embed utopian nuclear imaginaries at both national and regional level. 
This reveals how the local and the national intersected in the production of nuclear culture, as 
social responses to nuclear technologies were characterised by the dynamic interplay between 
imagined political, socio-economic, cultural, and military futures at both local and national 
levels. The chapter also demonstrates the utility of thinking about nuclear technologies through 
the lens of the socio-technical imaginary to understand the cultural work they performed, whilst 
 
349 Bracey, p. Industry and the Countryside, 125. 
350 N. Bell, ‘An Oral History of British Science’, interviewed by P. Merchant, 10 January 2013; A. 
Postlethwaite, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by G. Wilkinson, 18 March 2010, p. 8. 
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advocating the reciprocity between the local and the national context in the production and 
embedding of nuclear imaginaries within British society. Exploring the roles of identity and 
secrecy within this process, this chapter has shown how national and local identities interacted 
with and helped embed these imaginaries at multiple scales. Likewise, it has demonstrated how 
local and personal identities became increasingly shaped by the security apparatus which 
engulfed the plant, which in turn strengthened imaginaries of nuclear deterrence and local 
prosperity. These layers of military secrecy allowed the state to cultivate, protect, and embed 
a series of desirable nuclear futures, at once subsuming undesirable elements of the nuclear 
industry such as weapons production and radiation effects. This cultivated an imaginary of 
nuclear safety which interacted with the localised context of mass unemployment, low wages, 
and poor job security to embed a series of imagined socio-economic, military, and political 
futures, inextricably aligning notions of regional and national prosperity with the Sellafield 
plant.  
 
Developing these insights, the following chapter takes inspiration from the fields of 
cultural geography and landscape studies to explore how the physical design, material layout, 
and infrastructure of the Sellafield nuclear complex served as an active agent in the production 
of nuclear culture, particularly during the construction phase between 1947 and 1956. The 
chapter will demonstrate that Sellafield served as a flagship for the government’s pursuit of 
nuclear technologies, specifically exploring how the plant and its associated material 
components, such as atomic housing, transport links, and leisure facilities actively embedded 
nuclear imaginaries at both national and local level by physically embodying and publicly 




2: Rural Imaginaries. 
 
 This chapter explores how the arrival of the nuclear industry in West Cumbria sat within 
the physical and cultural landscape of the region and helped embed both utopian and dystopian 
nuclear imaginaries at the local level. Where the previous chapter considered how a series of 
utopian nuclear imaginaries became embedded at various scales, this chapter takes an overt 
focus upon the localised context, demonstrating how imaginaries of nuclear utopianism 
cultivated at the national level interacted with, and were shaped by a series of local processes. 
Observing how the nuclear industry both integrated and clashed with the local West Cumbrian 
community, this chapter focuses upon the role of place within this process. Specifically, 
demonstrating how contests over the meaning and use of nuclear spaces shaped identity and 
perpetuated social imaginaries by embedding particular visions of the future. This informs our 
understanding of how the imaginary of nuclear utopianism functioned as both a material and 
social agent, operating not only as an idea, but a powerful social device capable of shaping the 
built and non-built environment. As I will demonstrate, this produced physical structures which 
extended utopian imaginaries, and in some cases, produced dystopian ones, as the local public 
looked to the physical and cultural changes wrought by Sellafield as representative of a series 
of desirable and non-desirable local futures.  
 
 The first half of the chapter shows how the development of social infrastructure around 
Sellafield, which included housing and urban planning, embedded utopian nuclear imaginaries 
by providing a higher standard of living within the local community. Conforming to ideals of 
modernity, these developments synthesised ostensibly urban ideals such as housing and 
industry within rural sensibilities and cultural landscapes. This produced new notions of 
rurality, offering a utopian social imaginary whereby the nuclear industry comfortably co-
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existed alongside and perpetuated the desirable characteristics of rural life. It will then examine 
this social dynamic in greater detail, exploring how the nuclear industry instigated a series of 
positive social and cultural changes within the local community. Tracing the contours of this 
process, I show how these changes embedded social and cultural imaginaries throughout West 
Cumbria by offering a desirable regional future predicated upon the prosperity of the atom. 
The chapter then demonstrates how these physical and social changes subsequently provoked 
resistance amongst sections of the local community who lost their employment, land, and 
traditional way of life through the arrival of the nuclear industry.  
 
 The second half of the chapter will explore how these physical and cultural 
developments embedded resistant nuclear imaginaries amongst the local public as aspects such 
as plant design, and the compulsory sale of local farmland impinged upon and overwrote 
existing social customs, identities, and economies. Examining this process, I will show how 
the existence of Sellafield and its material components embedded an imagined dystopian future 
amongst sections of the local community, for whom these developments spoke to an 
undesirable future of social and cultural subjugation at the hands of the nuclear industry. This 
section will develop the argument that, in the same way as the meanings and values of dominant 
groups can be read in nuclear sites, so too can they convey and perpetuate resistant ideologies 
of oppositional groups, as the social and physical architecture of the nuclear industry clashed 
with localised notions of identity and induced forms of resistance predicated upon dystopian 
notions of an urban invasion. Ultimately, this reveals that nuclear technologies have always 
induced forms of social resistance, even during the early halcyon years previously identified 
as a period of nuclear optimism and ‘trust in technology.’351 Recognising the omnipresent 
nature of nuclear resistance, this understanding steps away from such categorisations as 
 
351 Blowers, The Legacy of Nuclear Power; Welsh, Mobilising Modernity. 
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somewhat deterministic, failing to account for the myriad and complexity of social attitudes 
towards nuclear technologies, particularly at the local level.  
 
Shedding light upon the poorly understood nature of social responses to the nuclear industry 
during this early period, especially within the social and geographic contexts in which many of 
these installations were located, this chapter places a much greater emphasis on the role of the 
public as an agent of social change and nuclear meaning-making. By engaging with contests 
over the meaning and use of rural place, this demonstrates how ordinary citizens resisted the 
imaginary of nuclear prosperity extended by the state and produced their own forms of nuclear 
culture by engaging with the social and cultural effects of nuclear technologies at the local 
level. This evidences the dynamic interplay between ordinary people and the state, disrupting 
technologically deterministic understandings of British nuclear culture which have failed to 
account for the complexities of British responses to nuclearisation, and the power of ordinary 





The approach taken in this chapter applies thinking from cultural geography and rural 
studies that explore how places, “far from being static, are processes which change over 
time.”352 Specifically, this points to nuclear places as active and dynamic processes, which 
reflect and produce societal attitudes, norms, and identities. This aligns with the work of spatial 
theorists who argue that places “reveal, represent and symbolise the relationships of power and 
 
352 J. Bamford, F. Poppi, and D. Mazzi (eds.), Space, Place and the Discursive Construction of Identity (Oxford: 
Peter Lang, 2012), p. 11; Mitchell, Landscape and Power, p. 1. 
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control out of which they have emerged and the human processes that have transformed and 
continue to transform them.”353  
 
Nuclear places are engaged in an on-going process whereby they may embody and 
produce multiple identities simultaneously or at various times. They are either representative 
of what individuals perceive themselves to be, or what they are not.354 Furthermore, as agents 
of cultural power, nuclear places “don’t just show us what power relations exist, [they] actively 
perpetuate those relations”, often serving as a vehicle of communication for dominant or 
resistant imaginaries.355 Rosanna Farbøl  examines this process, showing how Danish ‘ruin 
towns’ (training facilities in which villages were deliberately ‘ruined’ in order to create life-
like and realistic training grounds for civil defence responses) helped embed particular ways 
of thinking about civil defence and nuclear attack. Drawing upon previous research on the 
cultural agency of landscape and the power of fallout bunkers in shaping British culture, Farbøl 
argues that “the debris and rubble of [the] ruined village gave “mass and solidity” to the 
imaginary and dystopian war civil defence prepared for.”356 Developing these insights, this 
chapter shows how nuclear places can shape identity and perpetuate social imaginaries by 
embedding particular visions of the future. This approach advocates a greater focus on the role 
of place and identity in shaping and embedding sociotechnical imaginaries. Specifically, I will 
present the physical structure of Sellafield and the myriad of housing, schools, and 
infrastructure that accompanied it as embedding an imaginary of nuclear utopianism within 
 
353 Mitchell, Landscape and Power; I. Robertson and P. Richards (eds.), Studying Cultural Landscapes 
(London: Hodder, 2003), p. 4. 
354 Robertson and Richards, Studying Cultural Landscapes, p. 16. 
355 C. Brace, ‘Landscape and Identity,’ in I. Robertson, and P. Richards (eds.), Studying Cultural Landscapes 
(London: Hodder, 2003), p. 124. 
356 Farbøl, ‘Ruins of Resilience’, in Cronqvist, Farbøl, and Sylvest, (eds.), Cold War Civil Defence in Western 
Europe, p. 1; Mitchell, Landscape and Power; Bennett, ‘The Bunker’, pp. 155– 173; Jasanoff, ‘Imagined and 
Invented Worlds’, in Jasanoff, and Kim, (eds.), Dreamscapes of Modernity, p. 322. 
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local society, producing new forms of social identity which drew upon the socio-economic 





Following the announcement of the Windscale nuclear works, government and local 
councillors quickly established adequate provisions for the influx of workers required to man 
the factory. As early as August 1947, Ministry of Supply (MoS) officials met with 
representatives of the Department of Energy (DoE) and Cumbria County Council to plan the 
housing developments necessary for the incumbent staff at Windscale, erroneously known as 
‘Winscales.’ Formally ratified the following month, they agreed to construct two hundred 
houses within the village of Seascale, a small Victorian seaside village overlooking the Irish 
Sea, two miles south of Sellafield.357  
 
Historically, Seascale had served as a quaint seaside town, servicing tourists from 
Lancashire, Yorkshire, as well as Cumbrian holidaymakers. Plans had been drawn up to 
develop the village as a major tourist destination during the nineteenth century, but were later 
abandoned in favour of Blackpool. By the mid twentieth century, Seascale functioned as a 
sleepy agricultural village of around 800 people, sandwiched between the wartime munitions 
factories at neighbouring Drigg and Sellafield. Residents reflected that very little went on in 
the village during this time. Characterising local life, residents explained that “there was the 
pub and the post office and three motor cars for years and years.”358 The region’s status as a 
 
357 Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, ‘Note of Discussions on 26th August 1947, at Carlisle, 
Egremont and Seascale regarding Housing Accommodation required in the neighbourhood of Windscale Works, 
Sellafield’, (SRDE 1/3/1/160). 
358 A. Lorton, ‘Ambleside Oral History Group’, interviewed by ‘HB’, 22 March 2005. 
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cultural backwater posed a challenge to government ministers, who acknowledged the 
“inadequacy of the existing services” within West Cumbria, which suffered from a lack of 
infrastructural facilities and was not sufficiently attractive for the calibre of scientific staff 
required.359 Internal government memorandum accepted that the “success of the Sellafield 
project was considered to depend on attracting … a number of technicians who were 
accustomed to living in very different surroundings,” identifying that the existing housing stock 
would “not be attractive to immigrants from the south.”360 It was in this context that Seascale 
was proposed as the ideal setting for a new housing development for scientific workers and 
senior management, based upon “its proximity to Sellafield, the attractiveness of the village” 
and its potential “as a centre for UKAEA employees.”361 Seascale also offered plentiful 
opportunity for expansion, as planners identified the open plains and fell-land to the North and 
South-East of the village as an ideal location for industry housing.  
 
Work soon began to develop the village and a series of new, sleek housing estates 
designed to house management and administrative staff appeared. In Seascale alone, three 
hundred houses “erupted” between 1945 and 1957, as town planners fashioned a ‘nuclear 
community’ out of the existing village, sketching out the contours of a new atomic 
landscape.362 These developments were designed to reflect and materially embed the aesthetic 
of the utopian nuclear imaginary. The design and layout of the atomic housing was the product 
 
359 Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, (SRDE 1/3/1/160.) 
360 Ibid.; National Archives, ‘UKAEA regional planning committee Egremont/Cleator Moor. Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government’, 11 January 1954, (AB 8/523). 
361 Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, ‘Seascale: Draft Village Plan,’ (Seascale History Folder), p. 
13.1. 
362 A further 1780 houses were built on the Mirehouse estate in Whitehaven, of which 400 were directly 
nominated by the authority, and the remaining majority let to Sellafield workers. Five miles south, 350 houses 
were constructed on the Orgill and Thornhill estates near Egremont, taking the number of authority dwellings to 
well in excess of 1200, as the nuclear plant sequenced a boom in local housing construction. (Bracey, Industry 
and the Countryside, p. 140); D. Wooley, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by J. Lister, 6 
August 2010, p. 16; Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, ‘Correspondence between Borough 
Librarian, D. Hay to local MP, Jack Cunningham’, (Social Impact Folder). 
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of post-war attitudes towards the built environment and its key role “in the state-led production 
of a prosperous, healthy and peaceful post-war society.”363 This imaginary borrowed from and 
extended post-war attitudes towards urban planning, as Seascale resembled a model of post-
war prosperity enshrined through the pursuit of nuclear science. Ultimately, this produced a 
whole new civic organisation reflective of and made possible by imaginaries of nuclear science 
and its role in the transformation of society. 
 
Seascale was designed not only to house workers, but to say something about the 
affluence of life in the atomic age. With nuclear energy heralded as “one of the key instruments 
of modernity, it was incumbent upon the UKAEA to provide a setting and style of housing to 
match.”364 Examining early examples of nuclear architecture, Linda Ross has shown how there 
was “a need to construct a new type of housing for a new type of community.”365 Seascale was 
envisaged as a model village for the nuclear industry, designed to house up to 4000 nuclear 
workers and 2000 visitors in a utopian “holiday resort” setting.366 Planners envisaged Seascale 
as “the ultimate of atomic housing development,” a blueprint upon which all future nuclear 
communities would be based.367 Indeed, subsequent nuclear developments, such as Dounreay, 
were built in its mould, with modern housing and “a style of town planning and architecture” 
befitting the exciting possibilities of the nuclear age.368 Underpinning this were a series of 
amenities, carefully curated to reflect the prosperity of atomic life.  
 
 
363 R. Hornsey, ‘“Everything is Made of Atoms”: The Reprogramming of Space and Time in Post-war London’, 
Journal of Historical Geography, 34.0 (2008), p. 95. 
364 Ross, ‘Nuclear Fission and Social Fusion’, p. 155.  
365 Ibid., p. 145. 
366 Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, (YSPC 1/187); Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies 
Centre, (SRDE 1/3/1/160.) 
367 National Archives, ‘Seascale Development, 17 January, 1950’, (MAF 107/75). 
368 Ross, ‘Nuclear Fission and Social Fusion’, p. 142; Glasgow Herald, 29 March 1957, p. 4. 
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Plans were made to furnish Seascale with a brand-new shopping centre, a social club, 
a swimming pool, better schools, a new library, churches, cinemas, and banks.369 This echoed 
developments in France, where nuclear establishments were legitimised by state attempts to 
modernise their siting locations, often cultural and socio-economic backwaters that benefitted 
from state investment in infrastructural developments such as mains electricity and better 
housing. As historians Chris Pearson and Kate Brown have shown in both French and Soviet 
contexts, this enveloped the industry in a series of positive cultural assumptions through the 
provision of modern amenities.370 The built environment thus functioned as a communication 
tool, designed to convey a set of cultural attitudes towards nuclear technologies, as urban 
planning became a key realm in which the imaginary of nuclear utopianism was embedded into 
the physical and cultural fabric of the region.371 
 
The physical design of atomic housing helped embed utopian imaginaries, as town-
planners produced a series of appealing houses which directly correlated the nuclear industry 
with visions of a desirable nuclear future. A recent study by Sam Wetherall explores how post-
war developments, such as council estates, “reflect[ed] an optimism that new communities 
could be forged by architecture.”372 Designed to conform to the needs and aspirations of 
incoming workers and their young families, the design of nuclear housing was based around 
 
369 ‘The Village Where Plutonium Must Mix with Ploughing’, News Chronicle and Daily Dispatch, 15 October 
1956.  
370 C. Pearson, Mobilising Nature: The Environmental History of War and Militarisation in Modern France 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012), p. 226; Brown, Plutopia.  
371 Little historiography exists on the built environment of nuclear townships in the British context, although this 
understanding points to the need for future studies in this area, as the built environment functioned as an active 
participant in the production of nuclear culture, as atomic landscapes co-produced ways of thinking about 
nuclear science. Notable exceptions to this trend are L. Ross, ‘Nuclear Fission and Social Fusion’; N. Hance, 
Harwell: The Enigma Revealed (Buckland: 2006), pp. 50- 59; S. Harper, Chapelcross and the Cold War: 
Scotland's First Nuclear Power Station (Eastriggs: 2019), pp. 25- 31. In addition to the examples referenced 
above, a standout example in the US context is Peter Hales’, Atomic Spaces: Living on the Manhattan Project. 
372 S. Wetherell, Foundations: How the Built Environment Made Twentieth-Century Britain (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2020), p. 7.  
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these ideals. By projecting an engaging model of middle-class life, these houses produced a 
new vision of community life which blended the benefits of rural living with the stylistic 
trappings of modernity. Planners insisted houses were spacious and arranged in a suburban 
layout, offset with ornate front gardens, “beautiful grass sweeps” and winding paths.373 One 
local explained that “these bosses for Sellafield were gonna come out of the towns and cities, 
so they made it open-plan. They built these massive big lawns out the front, loads of lawns. 
They got big, massive gardens for all the houses.”374 This built upon a British tradition of 
model-worker villages such as Port Sunlight on the Wirral, and Bourneville in Birmingham, 
designed to conform to the ideals of Victorian social reformers as “aesthetic, middle-class 
garden suburbs.”375 Seascale’s design conformed to this aesthetic, offering a benevolent 
reinterpretation of this philosophy, re-imagined for the nuclear age.  
 
The design and physical layout of the homes made them very desirable, particularly 
amongst new workers who were attracted to the region by the model of prosperity they were 
designed to reflect. Residents recalled their wonder at seeing their new homes, explaining that 
“those new houses were like a miracle to many of us” … “they were such beautiful houses… 
brand new.”376 Figs. 1.0 and 2.0 demonstrate how their design was optimised to appeal to 
family life, with plentiful storage and built-in spaces for family amenities such as a pram, a 
larder, refrigerator, serving hatch, and a drying room, offering all the conveniences a modern 
 
373 National Archives, ‘Seascale Development, 17 January, 1950’, (MAF 107/75). 
374 K. Mawson, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 6 August 2010, p. 7. 
375 E. Hubbard, and M. Shippobottom, A Guide to Port Sunlight Village (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 
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University Press, 1998). 
376 The physical appearance of the village was a key concern for the nuclear industry. Residents explained that 
“every four years (usually Olympic year), the painters would come round to the house and paint the house and 
your front door- the same colour every time. You didn’t get a choice in the matter as they were factory owned. 
Like the Forth Rail Bridge the painters just moved onto another street and then started all over again.” 
(Rushworth, Atom Kids, pp. 6, 37; M. Davis, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. 
McCourt, 16 December 2010, p. 14.) 
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family could want. One new arrival explained that “we thought Seascale was great… we could 
afford a three bedroomed house with a garden and a garage, for less rent than we were paying 
for this dump in Newcastle.”377 By offering a higher standard of living than was attainable 
elsewhere, the village helped embed utopian socio-cultural imaginaries by conforming to 
idealised visions of family life, projected to the nation through the content of carefully curated 
public images and press releases. 
 
 
377 P. Graham, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by G. Wilkinson, 27 February 2010, p. 5. 
Fig 1.0: National Archives (MIA/448). Blueprint for Exterior of House. Note the stipulation that the house is to be 
rendered in fresh cement render, in contrast to the cheaper and more rugged ‘pebble-dash’ style used on most 
homes in the area. 
Fig 2.0: National Archives, (MIA/448). Floor-plan of Seascale House. 
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Publicity surrounding the new development replicated the utopian nuclear imaginary, 
emphasising its suitability for young families. Figs. 3.0 and 4.0 are press releases provided to 
the national media by the UKAEA in 1955, depicting white, middle-class families enjoying the 
open spaces of the village.378 Accompanied by smartly dressed young children happily playing 
in their new surroundings, these images curated a specific image about the model of life offered 
by nuclear technologies; at once formal and respectable, cheery and homely.  
 
378 The article explains that the reporter was given a tour of the housing development by a UKAEA spokesman, 
and the images were therefore either provided by the UKAEA, or staged with their tacit involvement as part of 
this process.  
Fig. 4.0: Manchester Guardian, 16 October 1956, 
unpaginated. 
Fig. 3.0: News Chronicle and Daily Dispatch, 15 October 1956, p. 
3. 
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This also communicated cultural assumptions about the homogeneity and security of the 
suburban ‘nuclear family.’379 In particular, the images of children playing in open spaces and 
on neatly kept grass verges operated in marked juxtaposition with the sight of children playing 
amongst the rubble and debris of bomb-damaged cities. This offered a stark contrast with the 
contemporary experience of many urban citizens, offering a harmonious vision of the future, 
characterised by childhood innocence and the freedom of rural life. Another example of this 
process appeared in a 1956 edition of Illustrated Magazine. The image of a housewife hanging 
her washing in the shadow of the plant (Fig. 5.0) served to depict the plant’s banality, and its 
harmonious ingratiation into domestic, and family life.  
 
379 For further reading on the nuclear family and its centrality within Cold war society, see Hogg, ‘”The Family 
that Feared Tomorrow”, pp. 535- 549; E. May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era 
(New York: Basic Books, 2008); L. McEnaney, Civil Defence Begins at Home: Militarisation Meets Everyday 
Life in the Fifties (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000); J. Chappel, ‘Nuclear Families in a Nuclear 
Age: Theorising the Family in 1950s West Germany’, Contemporary European History, 26.1 (2017), pp. 85- 
109; C. Hagood, ‘Rethinking the Nuclear Family: Judith Merril’s Shadow on the Hearth and Domestic Science 
Fiction’, Women’s Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 40.8 (2011), pp. 1006- 1029. 
Fig 5.0: G. Bruce, ‘Atom Village Beats that Quatermass Fear’, Illustrated Magazine, 3 March 1956, p. 39. 
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The caption plays a particular role within this process, at once domesticating the threat of 
radioactivity whilst recognising (and pushing away) public fears towards it by comparing the 
smokelessness and spaciousness of the nuclear plant with the fumes and toxic atmosphere 
within the cities.380 These images formed part of a deliberate public image carefully cultivated 
by the nuclear industry with the tacit involvement of the print media. They helped embed 
imaginaries of nuclear prosperity, leaning upon and extending existing attitudes towards 
suburban modernity and the rationalisation of the rural landscape through the provision of 
ordered housing developments.  
 
 The physical layout of the village drew upon contemporary attitudes to post-war urban 
planning and the rationalisation of rural spaces for the provision of urban housing. David 
Matless has shown that post-war town planners sought to inscribe urban models of housing 
upon the rural landscape, attempting to blend the virtues of both environments and produce 
“the ideal village anatomy in the country.”381 This reflected post-war ideals of 
reconstructionism, whereby the cramped, overcrowded, and unsanitary conditions of urban 
slums were replaced by satellite towns such as Kirkby (Liverpool), Milton Keynes 
(Buckinghamshire), and Redditch (Birmingham), as rural spaces were appropriated to deal 
with urban housing requirements. These new developments sought to replace the bomb-
damaged slums of the Victorian era with modern housing optimised for community life in the 
post-war era. These imperatives were also reflected in the physical layout of Seascale and post-
war ‘New Towns’, which were structured as “key sites within an orderly environment for 
 
380 This had a particular cultural salience given the 1956 ‘Great Smog’ of London, in which between 4000 and 
12,000 people died as a result of the toxic fumes which engulfed the capital only four years before this image 
was taken. 
381 Matless, Landscape and Englishness, pp. 318f.  
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living.”382 The map below (Fig. 6.0) shows how the new housing conformed to this aesthetic, 
with a series of generously spaced-out housing estates replacing dilapidated Victorian-era 
terraces, which were pulled down and turned into a carpark for the new class of villager (Fig. 
7.0).  
 
382 Ibid.; see also P. Larkham, and J. Pendlebury, ‘Reconstruction Planning and the Small Town in Early Post-
war Britain’, Planning Perspectives, 23.0 (2008), pp. 291- 321. 
Fig. 6.0: National Archives, (MAF 107/75), ‘Cumberland County Council Planning 
Department Amended Layout, Seascale.’ 
Fig. 7.0: National Archives, (ADM 326/315), View of Seascale Car-Park. 
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National media outlets marvelled at these developments, commenting on how the new “slick 
white housing estates sprouted like magic” in stark contrast with the dour appearance of the 
older parts of the village.383 This discursive process aligned these developments with 
contemporary notions of urban modernity, embedding the imaginary of nuclear utopianism as 
the ordered village layout conformed to modern attitudes of desirable living. Furthermore, the 
zoning of housing not only reflected the imperatives of post-war urban rationalism but also 
exhibited the military principles of hierarchy and compartmentalisation. Here, the physical 
environment of Seascale reflected military order, reproducing the social and ideological 
contexts in which it was created. 
 
The ordered layout of Seascale was not only the product of post-war attitudes towards 
rural and urban environments but also the systematized nature of both nuclear science and the 
military, as the imaginary of nuclear utopianism borrowed from a more established set of 
cultural attitudes towards military and research establishments and extended them into the 
civilian realm. Marianna Dudley's work on the UK Defence Estate has shown that rural defence 
establishments were frequently reimagined “in favour of a populated, structured, and planned 
future utopia” where the natural realm was re-appropriated for the purposes of man, and 
specifically military defence initiatives.384 The physical layout of the village reflected these 
principles, as the models of atomic housing embodied military attitudes towards 
standardisation and uniformity, whilst their hierarchical nature also drew comparisons with 
military rank and status. Houses were divided into a series of developments classified 
according to the grade of worker to be housed there. Grade A “all-electric” housing was for 
senior management, and known locally as “millionaire’s row,” grades B and C housed ‘middle 
 
383 ‘The Village Where Plutonium Must Mix with Ploughing’, News Chronicle and Daily Dispatch, 15 October 
1956. 
384 Dudley, An Environmental History of the UK Defence Estate, p. 136.   
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management’, junior managers resided in Grade D accommodation, whilst Grades E and F 
were designated for technical staff.385 This also reflected the hierarchical structure of research 
establishments and universities from which many workers originated, familiar to workers who 
had served in the forces during the war and younger recruits who hailed from top academic 
institutions and would have been well-versed in the notion of seniority and rank within their 
respective research establishments. In this way, the built environment reflected the nature of 
nuclear science as the spatialisation, zoning, and orderliness of the town’s design embodied the 
cleanliness and sterility of the nuclear working environment, whilst the logics of “time, space 
and repetition” repeated the physical structure of the atom.386  
 
Within the limited literature on urban nuclear spaces, Richard Hornsey has argued that 
the atomic structure served “as an unconscious symbolic device for imagining how social order 
might be structured at a range of scales” by fashioning new understandings of the urban 
environment. He argues that post-war housing reflected the make-up of the atomic structure, 
whereby “the repeated performance of routine, facilitated through the spatialization of social 
activities and their sequential co-ordination effected a vision of social stability and security.”387 
Where Hornsey uses the model of the atomic structure to rationalise post-war attitudes to urban 
planning, I argue that the standardisation and ordering of the physical environment more 
accurately reflected the inherent logics of nuclear science, the systematic operation of the plant, 
 
385 In this way, workers could be inspired by a visible career progression structure, encouraging ambitious 
workers to pursue the tangible rewards of a career in nuclear science. (P. Adamson, O. Adamson, ‘Sellafield 
Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by J. Lister, 20 August 2010, p. 21; Ross, ‘Nuclear Fission and 
Social Fusion’, p. 134.)  
386 Hornsey, ‘Everything is Made of Atoms’, p. 97.  
387 Likewise, the model of the atom as divided into a stable nucleus and multiple encircling electrons ratified the 
relationship between West Cumbria and the rest of the nation, embodying a hierarchy of both centre and 
periphery “that gave the two particles a formal equality within the maintenance of its equilibrium” and 
enshrining West Cumbria’s role within the nation. The atom therefore served as a metaphor for the scientific 
rationalisation of space both at the local level, with compartmentalised housing and ordered town-planning, and 
at the national level, with West Cumbria at the periphery performing vital work for the security of the nation. 
(Ibid., pp. 97, 115).  
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and a military proclivity towards control and co-ordination. Whilst the atom may have acted as 
a (un)conscious device in this process, the built environment of Seascale reflected the scientific 
and military imperatives from which it emerged, borrowing from and extending established 
attitudes towards the rationality and routine of military and scientific establishments. This 
operated in tandem with post-war attitudes towards urban rationalisation, materially 
embedding social imaginaries of a desirable future manifested in the built environment.  
 
2.3: Plant Design. 
  
The nuclear imaginary also interacted with the built and non-built environment of the 
local landscape to produce new understandings of rurality. Through sympathetic and 
innovative design, the physical structure of the power plant delicately married urban and rural 
sensibilities. This helped embed nuclear imaginaries by proving that the nuclear industry could 
be consolidated alongside the rural landscape and therefore did not represent a threat to the 
inherent character and identity of the region. Local concerns regarding the imposition of urban 
life and modernity into the Cumbrian countryside had a historical pretext, dating back to the 
Victorian era where the ‘Friends of the Lake District’ sought to preserve the innate character 
of the area in the face of an invasion of tourists and a perceived urban blight.388 Attentive to 
these concerns, the structure of the plant sought not to dominate the landscape but re-imagine 
the relationship between the built and non-built environments, producing a design which 
embedded nuclear imaginaries by forging symbolic links between traditional rural identities 
and nuclear science. 
  
 
388 H. Ritvo, The Dawn of Green: Manchester, Thirlmere, and Modern Environmentalism (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2009).  
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The ‘greening’ of nuclear science manifested in the design of Calder Hall, which 
reflected the beauty and rugged terrain of the natural landscape. This drew praise from 
contemporary commentators, who saw in the plant’s design a new, utopian vision of rural and 
urban harmony. The back cover of Paul Mauger’s 1959 book Buildings in the Country 
displayed an aerial view of Calder Hall and reflected positively on the architecture of the 
nuclear industry, acknowledging “we are beginning to see exciting shapes of rationally 
designed buildings rising from the flat riverside or coastal country in which most of them 
occur.”389 This curious integration between urban and rural sensibilities embedded nuclear 
imaginaries into local society as the plant became an accepted feature of local life. This is 
epitomised by the attitudes of the local public towards the plant. One interviewee commented 
that “you’ve got this outstandingly beautiful part of the world and then this whacking great 
nuclear power plant in the middle of it- it’s part of the scenery.”390 Whilst this sentiment 
superficially conveys the exclusivity of the two realms, a closer reading reveals the clear 
situation of the plant within the local landscape.  
 
By producing a harmony between urban and rural contexts, the architecture of the 
industry embodied a delicate blend of urban and rural sensibilities: modernity married to 
tradition. This bolstered the utopian nuclear imaginary by pointing towards an imagined future 
where tradition and rurality coalesced with modernity and urbanity. Gabrielle Hecht has noted 
a similar emphasis on modernity and tradition within nuclear landscapes in France. She 
explained that French planners understood that “technological achievements did not have to be 
ugly- modernity could be beautiful” through the “harmonious marriage of the object and its 
 
389 P. Mauger, Buildings in the Country: A Mid-Century Assessment (London: Batsford, 1959), p. 31. 
390 Author’s interview with Isobel George, 6 March 2019. 
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natural setting.”391 This was a key philosophy of planner-preservationists during the period, 
who sought to preserve the natural landscape with sympathetic and complimentary designs that 
embodied man’s dominance of nature, and his appreciation for it.392 These imperatives were 
reflected in the design of Calder Hall. UK contemporaries such as impressionist landscape 
artist William Heaton Cooper lauded the plant’s “quiet power, lightness- both of weight and 
tone [and] spaciousness”, which sympathetically blended the “ancient countryside” with the 
“positively interesting buildings” of the power plant.393 Other reports emphasised “the elegant 
smokeless chimneys of the plutonium works”, which served as an ideal nesting spot for gulls 
and a variety of sea-birds.394 Planner preservationists lauded how the power station sat within 
its surroundings, marvelling at how “new shapes are evolving which relate not to human scale, 
but to cosmic forces, the sea, the clouds, and the mountains.”395 These buildings blended the 
power of the atom with the inherent power of nature, reflected in the Cumbrian fells and the 
Atlantic ocean. This helped resolve “any contradictions of the natural and new” as the 
architecture of the nuclear industry reflected the timelessness of the natural environment 
around it, at once a symbol of modernity and a product of nature.396 In this process, the design 
of the plant embedded nuclear imaginaries by harmoniously blending urban with rural: 
modernity with tradition. By producing a design which reconciled these contexts, this broke 
 
391 Similarly, Pearson has shown how, by “respecting the area’s natural beauty” and traditions, French nuclear 
sites ensured that “tradition and modernity would supposedly blend together in harmony.” (Pearson, Mobilizing 
Nature, p. 224; Hecht, The Radiance of France, p. 41.) 
392 Crowe’s 1959 study of power landscapes solicited, “how can we explore and enjoy the new experiences 
which science has opened up for us without losing touch with the organic world of which we remain a part? 
How can we explore, yet not destroy the wildflowers, travel faster than sound, yet still hear the birds’ song?” 
See, S. Crowe, The Landscape of Roads (London: Architectural Press, 1960), p. 13. 
393 W. Heaton Cooper, ‘The Atomic Landscape’, Manchester Guardian, 16 October 1956. 
394 This operated in marked juxtaposition with the visual effects of traditional fossil-fuelled industries elsewhere 
in the county. (G. Bruce, ‘Atom Village Beats that Quatermass Fear’, Illustrated Magazine, 3 March 1956, p. 
39.) 
395 S. Crowe, The Landscapes of Power: From Detroit to Disney World (London: Architectural Press, 1958), p. 
30. 
396 Matless, Landscape and Englishness, p. 304. 
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down the binaries between these categories and reconstructed them within an imagined vision 
of the region’s future.  
 
Materially synthesising urban and rural contexts, Sellafield sat within, and subtly 
altered, notions of rurality. This reflects the complexity of rurality, and its inherently malleable 
nature. David Matless has argued that there is a tendency to assume an inherent clash between 
rurality and modernity, a perception that “the natural and historical are at odds with the 
modern.”397 He reflects that cultural expressions of ruralism too often refer to “a simple, 
nostalgic and conservative longing for a ‘rural idyll.’”398 The plant’s design, and public 
representations of it point to such understandings as reductionist, as Sellafield functioned as a 
transformative symbol of modernity, and yet compatible with traditional attitudes towards the 
rural landscape and the power of nature. This is epitomised in a local Whitehaven, Ennerdale, 
and Millom Council report from the period, which assessed the state of local industry. The 
report reads that:  
 
“There is space enough in Cumberland where man can live and work, yet still have 
close contact with the countryside. He can glance up from his workbench and see the 
highest mountains in England; within a few minutes of leaving his work he can be by 
the side of some lonely lake shore, enjoying the pleasures of a romantic coastline with 
secluded coves, rocky headlands, and quiet beaches. The Cumbrian is a man of the hills 
and the sea, a twin heritage from which he draws strength and confidence. It is in the 
busy, modern factories which dot the coastal plains- in the very area where the Second 
 
397 Ibid.; D. Matless, ‘A Geography of Ghosts: The Spectral Landscapes of Mary Butts’, Cultural Geographies, 
15.0 (2008), pp. 335- 358; J. Lowerson, ‘The Mystical Geography of the English’, in B. Short, (ed.), The 
English Rural Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 152- 174. 
398 Matless, Landscape and Englishness, p. 34.  
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Industrial Revolution began where the new form of power was first put to peaceful 
uses- man is forging a bright, purposeful future.”399  
 
This extract demonstrates how the nuclear industry was seen to successfully integrate within 
localised notions of rurality, embedding socio-economic and cultural imaginaries of a regional 
future enshrined through the development of nuclear technologies. This was a social script that 
had distinct parallels in other nuclear communities throughout Europe. Hecht has shown how 
the Marcoule nuclear site in the South of France “blended harmoniously with traditional 
lifestyles” by bringing “new people, virtually unlimited employment, and regional 
modernisation.”400 The Sellafield region therefore hosted a new paradox whereby nuclear 
science moulded with the old, rural way of life of existing citizens, as the successful integration 
of nuclear workers into the local community saw nuclear technologies become a natural 
extension of the region’s pre-existing rural identity.401 This process was augmented by the 
successful integration of plant workers within the rural community which substantiated socio-




 Sellafield brought with it an influx of scientific specialists from all over the country, 
inscribing a new nuclear community over the top of the pre-existing rural population. Despite 
the social friction this may have entailed, the two communities combined relatively well. The 
harmony between the two social groups helped embed visions of a desirable local future as the 
new arrivals assimilated within the existing community structure and shared common interests 
 
399 Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, ‘Cumberland: For Industrial Expansion and Development’, 
(Nuclear History Folder). 
400 Hecht, The Radiance of France, pp. 209f. 
401 Ibid., p. 212. 
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with the locals. Newspapers reported that “the two villages are fusing into one… the atom has 
become a part of their lives,” referring to “the village where plutonium must mix with 
ploughing.” They commented on the unique context whereby “mathematics, plutonium and 
ballet have been asked to fuse, permanently with manure, ploughing and beagles.”402 Despite 
the apparent paradox this entailed, many members of the community found this transition fairly 
straightforward, finding common ground with amenable and open-minded workers. Reports 
from the time described how “the men who harness the plough, made friends with the men who 
harness the atom”, whilst oral interviewees emphasised that locals and newcomers “muddled 
along surprisingly well” and made “wonderful neighbours.”403 The Manchester Guardian 
remarked that: 
 
“It is hard to find people who are prepared to say unkind things about them… people 
seem to like the atomic engineers… They do normal things like going to church or 
playing cricket with the village teams. Their children go to the same schools… Though 
it may be surprising that a scientific community can be grafted onto another different 
one in this way, there is, of course, no real evidence that technologists are incompatible 
with the rest of the community.”404  
 
These examples suggest that the incumbent nuclear scientists and engineers assimilated 
relatively comfortably within the region’s existing identity and rural sensibilities. This 
successful ingratiation built upon positive local responses to the physical environment of the 
nuclear plant, embedding imaginaries of the nuclear industry as a welcome, and accepted 
 
402 News Chronicle and Daily Dispatch, 15 October 1956; G. Bruce, ‘Atom Village Beats that Quatermass 
Fear’, Illustrated Magazine, 3 March 1956, p. 39. 
403 G. Bruce, ‘Atom Village Beats that Quatermass Fear’, Illustrated Magazine, 3 March 1956, p. 37; D. 
Wooley, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by J. Lister, 6 August 2010 , p. 4. 
404 Author Unknown, Cumbrian Life (March 2016), p. 13. 
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feature of local life. In particular, the cultural outlets favoured by the young, vibrant workforce 
endeared them to the existing village community by providing a wealth of local entertainment 
and a series of cultural opportunities which further endorsed the utopian nuclear imaginary. 
 
2.5: Leisure Activities. 
 
 
 A series of sports facilities and social clubs were set up to entertain the new workforce, 
producing a vast array of social activities within the local community. These cultural 
opportunities bolstered imaginaries of nuclear utopianism, offering an (ostensibly) higher 
standard of living as educated elites brought with them a variety of physical and cultural 
pastimes which broadened the cultural and intellectual horizons of the area. The extreme 
isolation of the West Cumbrian coastline offered very little in the way of cultural life or 
sporting opportunities. Owing to the dearth of transport infrastructure and the extreme physical 
isolation of the plant, workers faced travelling hours afield via infrequent rail services to visit 
local cities and engage in favoured activities such as dancing, singing, or visiting the theatre. 
Finding themselves transplanted from familiar surroundings and injected into an apparent 
cultural wilderness that bore very little relation to the university campuses and urban 
environments to which they were accustomed, workers formed social groups and sporting clubs 
designed to combat the boredom of rural life and social isolation of an unfamiliar living 
environment. A former worker explained that “the villages were quite isolated [so] we all really 
mixed in… we were all people who were out on our own, well away from relatives and so you 
relied on friends.”405 Often young, single, and affluent, workers created a wide array of social 
groups, many of which fell under the umbrella of SASRA, the newly formed Sellafield Area 
 
405 D. Wooley, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by J. Lister, 6 August 2010, p. 17. 
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Sports and Recreation Association, which was designed by the UKAEA as a social hub within 
the community.  
 
SASRA was a UKAEA initiative which was designed to encourage both nuclear and 
native communities to mix. This was a broader imperative seen at other nuclear sites such as 
Dounreay, where the UKAEA emphasised the “urgent need” for a recreational centre, designed 
to “encourage and co-ordinate recreational and cultural activities, to create a proper corporate 
spirit amongst our own staff, and at the same time to enable them to intermingle sufficiently 
and satisfactorily with the local people.”406 This organisation was backed by generous funding 
from the UKAEA, hosting “gymnastics and keep fit classes on the Seascale playing field [and] 
nationally renowned opera and theatre companies in the village hall.”407 These developments 
were warmly welcomed by the local community, and contributed to a strong degree of 
affability between the local residents and the nuclear workforce.  
 
 The local community benefitted from the array of cultural opportunities brought about 
by the nuclear workforce, which helped cultivate an imaginary of the region’s vibrant and 
dynamic future. The local media celebrated the “amazing variety of social activities” hosted 
by the nuclear industry, with “classes of one kind or another held every night of the week.”408 
Residents too, seemed overwhelmingly positive about these changes. They explained that the 
village became “a terrific place to live in: the school was good, the atmosphere was good… we 
had gala weeks, with parades running through the village, fancy dress parades from the school 
or the Windscale Club, we had a whole week of festivities of one sort or another in the 
 
406 National Archives, ‘Note: Dounreay Recreational Projects, 1957/8’, (AB 8/637 24). 
407 SASRA is still in existence and continues to enjoy the financial backing of Sellafield. (Author Unknown, 
Cumbrian Life, March 2016, p. 13.) 
408 Cumberland Evening Star and Mail, 13 November 1958.  
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village.”409 Locals reflected that “the social opportunities were amazing and typical of ex 
university students,” recalling “ladies evenings once a year, buffet suppers in the hall, good 
speakers from all over the country, regular lectures, etc.”410 Citizens explained that life during 
this period “was magical, absolutely magical, you couldn’t have asked for a more supportive 
community, there was always something going on all the time.”411 Provided with good living 
conditions, generous pay, and free time, workers were able to seek leisure activities and 
happiness in their new community. They were able to spontaneously organise various leisure 
pursuits which physically enacted, confirmed, and reinforced the imaginary of the nuclear 
industry as a welcome and natural feature of everyday life. In so doing, the workforce 
performed the imaginary of nuclear utopianism to the local public, who subscribed to, and re-
enacted this imaginary through their willing participation in these activities.412 This was further 
augmented by the construction of a brand-new theatre in nearby Rosehill, commissioned by 
local industrialist Sir Nicholas Sekers to host the arts and attract international performers to the 
westernmost corner of Cumbria. Suddenly capable of attracting leading lights from the world 
of theatre, opera, and classical music, Rosehill further contributed to the embedding process 
by providing a standard of entertainment previously unimaginable for the local community. 
 
 The sudden influx of university educated scientists and academics into the area 
provided sufficient demand for a new theatre, which was built with the support of the 
 
409 D. Wooley, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by J. Lister, 6 August 2010, p. 15; M. 
Todd ‘Ambleside Oral History Group’, interviewed by J. Pilgrim, 2013. 
410 D. Wooley, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by J. Lister, 6 August 2010, p. 17; 
Rushworth, Atom Kids, p. 5.  
411 L. Johnston, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 16 December 2010, p. 22.  
412 In this context, the nuclear industry functioned as a benevolent social entity which drew upon the models of 
industrial philanthropy modelled by the Quaker Cadbury and Rowntree families, concerned with the quality of 
life of its workers and the local population. 
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UKAEA.413 The theatre enabled the region to transcend its geographical marginalisation, 
becoming a venue of national acclaim, lavishly furnished by one of the country’s leading 
theatre and film designers Oliver Messel, with support from the Royal Opera House London 
and the Rothschild family, (see Fig. 8.0).414  
 
 
The theatre hosted a remarkable array of international talent, attracting performers such as 
Dame Peggy Ashcroft, Benjamin Britten, and Mstislav Rostropovich.415 These events were 
hugely popular with the nearby Sellafield workforce, with forty-one of the forty-three 
performances in the first year being sell-outs. Sekers considered “our keenest and most 
enthusiastic and critical supporters are the members of the Atomic Station”, who provided “the 
financial and physical resources to present many types of event that are beyond the capacity of 
 
413 The theatre is still supported by Sellafield, who are the foremost capital investor in the theatre. (Whitehaven 
Archives and Local Studies Centre, ‘Personal Correspondence between Sir Nicholas Sekers and Dr. Derek 
Ockenden,’ 14 July, 1960, SASRA Correspondence 1959- 1967, (YDSO 121/15/8/1).  
414 J. Blackadder, Rosehill: The Story of a Theatre 1959-2009 (Carlisle: Bookcase, 2009). 
415 Ibid. 
Fig. 8.0: ‘Rosehill Theatre, Moresby, Whitehaven’, <cinematreasures.org/theaters/23012> [accessed 23 
February 2020]. 
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any other local organisation.”416 The presence of internationally acclaimed musicians, 
performers, and orchestras in the remote fells of West Cumbria represented a huge coup for the 
local area, who hitherto had not been used to visiting performers of any kind. Local residents 
gushed that “Rosehill has transformed our existence in West Cumberland; it has given us a 
source of entertainment of a quality and variety previously quite beyond our reach.”417 This 
shows how the nuclear project intertwined with cultural imaginaries of regional prosperity, 





Education served a vital function in helping ingratiate the incumbent nuclear workforce 
and the local Cumbrian public, as these divergent social groups overcame their demographic 
diversity in the pursuit of better education facilities for their children. The provision of 
education served as “a centre of common interest for both [nuclear and non-nuclear] 
communities,” with one local headmaster explaining that “the school has played a part in fusing 
the two elements of the population together.”418 For local residents, the pursuit of a higher 
standard of education constituted “solid proof that much good could come to the village 
through the newcomers”, cementing an understanding that the nuclear project could function 
alongside rural life, harmonising together in the pursuit of desirable local futures.419 This was 
particularly evident in their vigorous combined efforts to petition the Ministry of Education for 
better education facilities and funding to meet the growing need amongst the expanding 
population.420  
 
416 Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, ‘SASRA Correspondence 1959- 1967: Personal 
Correspondence between Sir Nicholas Sekers and Dr. Derek Ockenden,’ 14 July 1960, (YDSO 121/15/8/1). 
417 Ibid. 





Working alongside one another, the nuclear workforce and local people were able to 
obtain significant investment in the county’s education facilities, which could not cope with 
the influx of children brought about by the nuclear project. Between 1947 and 1961, the total 
population of Seascale grew by over 1,200 with similar growth in neighbouring towns and 
villages, placing severe strain upon the county’s educational facilities.421 Between 1951 and 
1962, the number of children at Seascale Primary School grew from 181 to 339, with numbers 
at neighbouring Gosforth also growing from 94 to 160.422 To cope with this growth, the 1950s 
saw the construction of one comprehensive, four secondary, four junior and five infant schools, 
“in order to accommodate the large increase in the number of children brought about by the 
construction of the Atomic Energy factory at Sellafield.”423 A former teacher explained that 
these new schools enjoyed considerable funding “to accommodate and keep happy the 
scientists and their children.”424 One of these junior schools, (Fig. 9.0) was located in the village 
of Seascale, whereas elsewhere investments in education saw the construction of secondary 




421 Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, ‘Seascale: Its Growth and Development by Adele Parker’, 
(Seascale Folder). 
422 Bracey, Industry and the Countryside, p. 165. 
423 In his 1963 sociological study of industrial communities in rural Britain, Bracey reflected that “the effect on 
local education of the employment by the Atomic Energy Authority of highly qualified professional staff has 
speeded up the reorganization of secondary education in the southern part of the county… and it has enabled the 
building of many Junior and Infant schools to proceed quickly.” See, Bracey, Industry and the Countryside, p. 
166; Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, Seascale: Its Growth and Development by Adele Parker’, 
(Seascale Folder). 
424 Author’s interview with Isobel George, 6 March 2019. 
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These developments transformed the quality of education enjoyed by local children and 
placed a much greater emphasis on its role within the local community. This demonstrates how 
the imaginary of nuclear utopianism functioned as both a material and social agent: embedded 
as an idea into local culture, then as a practice and material reality in the form of educational 
facilities, which in turn extended the logic of the imaginary through space, into the future. The 
development of educational facilities and schools brought about a dramatic change in local 
attitudes towards education which became tied up in imaginaries of the region’s future. In this 
way, “science and technology [became] enmeshed in performing and producing diverse visions 
of the collective good”, extending (and re-embedding) the logic of nuclear utopianism into an 
imagined future of regional prosperity through scientific and technical expertise.425 Local 
 
425 Jasanoff, ‘Future Imperfect’, p. 15.  
Fig 9.0: National Archives, (MAF 107/75), ‘Cumberland 
County Council Planning Department Amended Layout, 
Seascale.’ Location of new elementary school in Seascale. 
Fig 10.0: West Cumberland News, 3 October 1953. 
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councillors expressed that the county had a “wonderful opportunity to ride to success on the 
back of nuclear engineering” by developing schools and colleges to “establish a national 
reputation in the fields of atomic energy and nuclear engineering.”426 Newspaper reports spoke 
of the “fast growing need in West Cumberland for the study of industrial science,” with 
educational reform forming part of a concerted “atomic future plan” for the area.427 To pursue 
this end, local schools placed an emphasis on scientific and technical subjects such as physics 
and woodwork, which were designed to foster the technical expertise required for the future 
running of the plant.428 A former pupil explained that “I wanted to get into engineering. I took 
the appropriate subjects, technical drawing, engineering, woodwork, that sort of thing- trying 
to pick up an apprenticeship [at Sellafield].”429 Here, we see how education sat at the heart of 
plans for regional regeneration, as the pursuit of the technical and scientific excellence required 
for the plant became a key imperative of local schooling. It seems that this extension phase had 
a marked impact upon the local community, as the emphasis on teaching and learning 
contributed to a dramatic shift in local attitudes towards education, which was placed at the 
heart of the economic and social recovery of the area. 
 
Historically, education had been treated as something of a distraction amongst sections 
of the local community, for whom it represented a loss of income as children qualified for work 
at a later age.430 However, the arrival of the nuclear workers placed an increased emphasis on 
education and saw local children aspire to technical or scientific roles within the plant. Local 
teachers reflected that their arrival “brought a completely new emphasis in the school really” 
 
426 Cumberland Evening Star and Mail, 15 November 1958. 
427 Ibid.; West Cumberland News, 3 October 1953. 
428 West Cumberland News, 3 October 1953. 
429 D. McConnell, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 8 February 2010, p. 3.  
430 Previously, villagers had treated schooling with a degree of trepidation, lest their children obtain a place at 
Grammar school and earn an income at a much later age than their farming contemporaries. (Whitehaven 
Archives and Local Studies Centre, ‘D. Hay, ‘Annual Report: 1955-56’, p. 7.) 
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as pupils “are now keen to receive homework and their parents sometimes come and ask the 
headmaster what books they should read to succeed.”431 This formed part of a radical shift in 
social attitudes as children became more attuned to the social prospects afforded by the nuclear 
industry. One local headmaster recognised that “the children of the newcomers have had a 
notable effect on the children of older residents: they are becoming more eager to work, and 
are showing more interest in people and events” outside the local area.432 Here we see how the 
emphasis placed on education by the arrival of the nuclear industry extended the nuclear 
imaginary and produced new visions of social and cultural progression, as the socio-economic 
horizons of the region gradually expanded outwards. 
 
Newspaper reports explained that the shelves of local grocers and newsagents started 
selling “journals on engineering, electronics, and the atom as well as national magazines and 
newspapers” as the local public pursued educational literature.433 This shift was not purely 
amongst the scientific community and is reflected in the archival records of local libraries 
where the librarian made repeated requests for additional copies of scientific literature, 
vigorously consumed by the local community. In his annual report for 1955-56, he reflected, 
in previous years, locals “were not interested in the history and technical literature of their 
craft”, but “the influence of Sellafield… brought about an increasing demand for scientific and 
technical literature.”434 This reflected the cultural shift brought about by the industry, as the 
imaginary of nuclear utopianism extended and re-embedded visions of social progress attained 
through the pursuit of nuclear science.  
 
 
431 Bracey, Industry and the Countryside, p. 168; Author’s interview with Isobel George, 6 March 2019. 
432 Bracey, Industry and the Countryside, p. 168. 
433 G. Bruce, ‘Atom Village Beats that Quatermass Fear’, Illustrated Magazine, 3 March 1956, p. 39. 
434 Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, ‘D. Hay, ‘Annual Report: 1955-56’, p. 7. 
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The local public revelled in the improvement of local education, which contributed to 
a sense of local pride which re-embedded the utopian nuclear imaginary. Public enthusiasm for 
the improvement of educational facilities can be traced in the rhetoric of council reports. The 
local council report for the year 1955-56 identified that the “rapid evolution in our educational 
provision has ensured that the number of children remaining at school until 16 is increasing 
faster than anyone prophesised [and] the number of young men and women going on to a period 
of full-time university and technical education is rocketing.”435 This growth was such that plans 
were being drawn up for a university in West Cumbria, given government backing as part of 
the suggestions of the Robbins Report of 1963.436 Similar narratives were also found within 
regional media reports. Newspaper articles referred to Seascale as “Britain’s Brainiest 
Village”, whilst the local media reflected this rhetoric, constructing imagined and fanciful 
narratives of everyday life in “Boffinville.”437 These narratives at once embedded and extended 
the utopian nuclear imaginary at the local level, pointing to the decisive changes to the region’s 
prosperity brought about by the nuclear plant, which had provided the local community with a 
higher degree of social mobility. 
 
The arrival of the nuclear industry “considerably widened” the career options of local 
children, with the nuclear plant promising almost “unlimited opportunities for careers in 
science and administration.”438 This was bolstered by an apprenticeship scheme, made 
available for local students. Co-sponsored by the council and UKAEA, a bursary was 
 
435 Ibid., pp. 10f.  
436 Ibid. 
437 Manchester Guardian, 16 October 1956; News Chronicle and Daily Dispatch, 1 October 1956; G. Bruce, 
‘Atom Village Beats that Quatermass Fear’, Illustrated Magazine, 3 March 1956, p. 39; Cumberland Evening 
Star and Mail, 13 November 1958; D. Wooley, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by J. 
Lister, 6 August 2010, p. 12.  
438 Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, ‘Correspondence between Mr Daniel Hay and Mr J 
Cunningham,’ 17 October 1973, (Social Impact Folder.) 
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established for 160 “especially keen boys with outstanding ability” who would be “encouraged 
to study for university degrees… and craft diplomas.”439 Indeed, the first recipients of this 
stipend were featured in a double-page spread in the local newspaper (Fig. 11.0), openly lauded 
as “the atomic energy plant engineers of the future” who “will rank second only to the 
scientists.”440 This eulogistic rhetoric conveys not only the social deference afforded by the 
local public towards the nuclear project, but the plant’s transformative role in local life.  
 
 
For a community with a tradition of low-paid manual labour, Sellafield offered a greater 
degree of social mobility as workers employed in the operational side of the plant gained a 
well-paid, long-term, and skilled trade, whilst academically gifted students had the opportunity 
to qualify for more highly paid scientific work. This change extended the imaginary of nuclear 
prosperity by ensuring that young men no longer had “to leave home to search the South for a 
good job with good prospects.”441 Local newspaper reports commended the “steadily 
 
439 Despite the gender specific language used in this report, I have found no evidence that these bursaries were 
unavailable to local girls, a large number of whom also qualified for work at Sellafield. (Whitehaven News, 7 
September 1950; D. McConnell, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 8 
February 2010, p. 3.) 
440 Whitehaven News, 7 September 1950. 
441 Daily Mirror, 5 September 1950, p. 2. 
Fig 11.0: Whitehaven News, 7 September 1950.  
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increasing stream of local young men and women qualifying for jobs in the higher grades at 
Sellafield”, referring to “Cumberland’s rapidly developing industrial machine.”442 Locals 
commented that “in the early 1950s it [Sellafield] was viewed very optimistically… it gave a 
whole generation, including my dad, an opportunity undreamt of for working class families.”443 
Local man Dale McConnell summarised this position, explaining that for ambitious young 
boys, “ultimately the aim was to get into Sellafield.”444 By providing working-class families 
with direct opportunities for well-paid, skilled employment, Sellafield not only became 
synonymous with a prosperous future, but with previously unattainable goals such as social 
mobility and class migration. This was again echoed by local newspaper narratives, which 
stated that “in Whitehaven is being born a new way of life that offers prosperity and 
sublimation to unborn generations.”445 Here we see how the education functioned as part of the 
utopian nuclear imaginary, simultaneously extending and re-embedding this imaginary by 
offering a greater degree of social mobility to local children, who were offered not only a 
prosperous future, but the opportunity to transcend their social status by pursuing a career at 
Sellafield.  
 
As this section has shown, the built environment of the nuclear industry embedded and 
extended imaginaries of nuclear utopianism, positioning the nuclear project at the heart of the 
region’s future prosperity. Thus far, we have explored how the nuclear project assimilated 
within the physical and cultural landscape of the area, as the socio-cultural changes it wrought 
 
442 Cumberland Evening Star and Mail, 13 November 1958.  
443 Rushworth, Atom Kids, p. 5.  
444 Others emphasised the permanence of these imaginaries, commenting that “it’s where the good wages come 
from. I met someone who described their new neighbours by saying ‘oh and they’ve both got good jobs at 
Sellafield you know.’ This is the height of Millom’s ambition. They’ve made it, they’ve both got good jobs at 
Sellafield [laughter].” Author’s interview with Isobel George, 6 March 2019; D. McConnell, ‘Sellafield Stories: 
Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 8 February 2010, p. 2. 
445 Cumberland Evening Star and Mail, 13 November 1958. 
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combined with and extended the utopian imaginaries it engendered. The following section of 
the chapter will trace the subtle patterns of resistant sentiment which emerged at the local level, 
pointing to a deeper, more problematic relationship between nuclear technologies and the local 
community. This points towards the emergence of localised resistance amongst sections of the 
community, particularly disaffected groups such as local landowners forced to sell their land, 
farming communities who lost arable fields and livelihoods, and sections of the local 
community for whom the arrival of urban infrastructure and large swathes of migrant workers 
represented a subversion of local identities and rural sensibilities. This suggests that local 
resistance towards the nuclear project was more heavily nuanced that the oft-cited ‘NIMBY’ 
(Not-In-My-Backyard) syndrome, as cultural attitudes towards the nuclear project intersected 
with notions of local identity and rurality, producing dystopian imaginaries of nuclear science 




Whilst localised resistance can be read within traditions of opposition towards the 
electricity industry, affiliated with desires to preserve the character and protect against the 
spoliation of rural Britain, it is clear that many of these anxieties had distinct nuclear 
characteristics and should be read as concerted efforts to resist, or redefine imaginaries of 
nuclear technologies.447 Although these efforts appeared in the minority, it is nevertheless 
important that these be taken seriously as localised attempts to subvert the “unanimity of 
 
446 For further reading on the NIMBY phenomenon, see I. Welsh, ‘The NIMBY Syndrome: Its Significance in 
the History of the Nuclear Debate in Britain’, The British Journal for the History of Science, 26.1 (1993), pp. 
15- 32; M. Foley, ‘No Nukes and Front Porch Politics: Environmental Protest Culture and Practice on the 
Second Cold War Home Front’, in E. Conze, M. Klimke, and J. Varon, (eds.), Nuclear Threats, Nuclear Fear 
and the Cold War of the 1980s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 186- 205; Benford, Moore, 
Allen-Williams, ‘In Whose Backyard?: Concern About Siting a Nuclear Waste Facility’, Sociological Inquiry, 
63.1 (1993), pp. 30- 48. 
447 Welsh, Mobilising Modernity, p. 22. 
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dominant symbolic representations” of the nuclear.448 In fact, given the deep-seated power held 
by the nuclear industry and government during this period, I argue that these expressions 
should be read as particularly significant, given the social context from which they emerged. 
This alludes to a much more delicate co-production of nuclear meaning-making between 
society and state, whereby ordinary people exercised agency over the content and 
dissemination of nuclear culture and local attitudes could challenge the dominant imaginaries 
cultivated by the state. Whilst these efforts differed greatly from the more direct forms of 
opposition which the nuclear industry later encountered, the quiet and subtle articulation of 
resistance at the local level comprises a significant, yet omitted part of the history of British 
responses to nuclearisation. This resistance suggests that the socially deterministic binaries of 
‘trust in technology’, ‘the age of innocent expectation’, and ‘peak modernity’ identified in the 
previous chapters may cast too simplistic an understanding of the multitude of British cultural 
responses to the nuclear age, particularly when we dig down to the local level.449 This thesis 
sits within a broader body of work calling for a more comprehensive understanding of local 
 
448 These expressions of resistance take on a deep significance as some of the few examples of the nuclear 
industry being challenged during the early period of the atomic age, and as such, attest to a more complex 
pattern of local responses, as citizens articulated forms of nuclear resistance and imaginaries of dystopian 
nuclear futures. (Author’s interview with Isobel George, 6 March 2019; E. Dawson, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral 
History Project’, interviewed by G. Wilkinson, 13 July 2010, p. 23; Author unknown, ‘A Walk Down Memory 
Lane: Phil Hallington and David Moore Share their Calder Hall Memories’, Sellafield Magazine, 5.0 (October 
2016),<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62574
3/sellafield-magazine-issue-5.pdf> [accessed 18 February 2019], pp. 19ff; Welsh, Mobilising Modernity, p. 22. 
449 O'Riordan, ‘The Prodigal Technology: Nuclear Power and Political Controversy’, The Political Quarterly, 
59.2 (1988), pp. 161- 177; Blowers, The Legacy of Nuclear Power; Welsh, Mobilising Modernity, p. 17. 
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attitudes towards nuclear facilities.450 This ultimately points to the emergence of localised 
resistance towards the nuclear industry as sections of the local public contested the imaginary 
of nuclear prosperity and the desirable futures Sellafield was seen to represent. Here, the 
sociotechnical imaginary offers a nuanced framework around which to think through the co-
production of nuclear culture by the state and broader public at national and localised levels, 
ultimately pointing to the dynamic interplay between these elements in the production of 
nuclear culture.  
 
This suggests that STIMs are an active component in the production of nuclear culture. 
These are social agents, as Jasanoff claims, but they are constructed and illusory, and 
exclusionary. As this section demonstrates, the ‘embedding’ and ‘extension’ phases Jasanoff 
outlined can do harm and subvert aspects of the original imaginary, ultimately producing and 
helping embed resistant imaginaries. By historicising this process, we gain a greater 
understanding of the production and circulation of nuclear culture, particularly at the localised 
 
450 This aligns recent thinking regarding the plurality of nuclear culture(s) with insights from STS studies, as 
scholars have become more attuned to the social, cultural, and structural bases for social responses to nuclear 
technologies, identifying issues of trust, power imbalances, notions of identity, and geographical components of 
risk in shaping localised responses. For further reading on trust, see Wynne, ‘May the Sheep Safely Graze? in 
Lash, Szerzynski and Wynne, Risk, Environment, and Modernity, pp. 44– 83; For power imbalances, see R. 
Benford, H. Moore, and J. Allen Williams, ‘In Whose Backyard?: Concern About Siting a Nuclear Waste 
Facility’, Sociological Inquiry, 63.1 (1993), pp. 30- 48; For identity, see K. Bickerstaff, '“Because We’ve Got 
History Here”: Nuclear Waste, Cooperative Siting, and the Relational Geography of a Complex Issue', 
Environment and Planning A, 44.0 (2012), pp. 2611– 2628; For the geographical components of risk, see K. 
Parkhill, D. Venables, and P. Simmonds, ‘From the Familiar to the Extraordinary: Local Residents’ Perceptions 
of Risk When Living With Nuclear Power in the UK’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 35.1 
(2010), pp. 39- 58; D. Orsini, ‘Signs of Risk: Materiality, History, and Meaning in Cold War Controversies over 
Nuclear Contamination,’ Comparative Studies in Society and History, 62.3  (2020), pp. 520– 550; X. Fang, 
‘Local People’s Understanding of Risk from Civil Nuclear Power in the Chinese Context’, Public 
Understanding of Science, 23.3 (2014), pp. 283– 298; D. Venables, N, Pidgeon, K. Parkhill, et al., ‘Living with 
Nuclear Power: Sense of Place, Proximity, and Risk Perceptions in Local Host Communities’, Journal of 
Environmental Psychology, 32.0 (2012), pp. 371- 383; I. Welsh, ‘The NIMBY Syndrome: Its Significance in the 
History of the Nuclear Debate in Britain’, The British Journal for the History of Science, 26.1 (1993), pp. 15- 
32. 
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West Cumbrian level where many of the interactions between nuclear technologies and the 
British public were first played out.  
 
Whilst imaginaries of nuclear utopianism related to the social, economic, and physical 
regeneration of the area, these attitudes were subject to contest and redefinition within sections 
of society. Specifically, nuclear resistance was frequently animated by place, and clashes over 
the use and meaning of land. Whilst the physical nuclear landscape reflected imaginaries of 
utopianism and prosperity to one section of society, it also embodied one of subjugation and 
scientific invasion to others, as local residents articulated resistant imaginaries centred around 
the industry’s impact on physical place and historic notions of local identity. Specifically, 
localised pockets of resistance emerged through the industry’s purchase of farmland, which 
overrode local attachments to place and subverted entrenched agricultural identities. As land 
which had historically made up family holdings was taken by the MoS, farming communities 
lost income, workers, and a central tenet of their socio-cultural identity to the nuclear industry.  
 
Issues of land purchase and access combined with broader anxieties over the 
profitability of local farming to produce a hotbed of resistance towards the nuclear industry 
amongst local farming communities. Faced with little recourse or opportunity to appeal the 
decision to strip them of their land, local farming communities performed this resistance in 
indirect ways that are not always evident to the historical researcher until they press into local 
attitudes and subjectivities. In the following pages, I will show how sections of the local 
community resisted the imaginary of nuclear utopianism, forging their own imagined dystopian 
futures of the nuclear industry as a subversion of traditional attachments and meanings of place, 
and an urban imposition upon the rural landscape and character of the area.  
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2.8: Land Purchase. 
 
 
 The construction of the plant and the requisite housing and infrastructural developments 
required a considerable amount of land, much of which was owned by local citizens. Whilst 
the MoS owned land to the North-West of the River Calder where the Windscale site was 
based, the maps below show that the remaining land to the South (where Calder Hall would be 
situated, Fig. 12.0) and the intended site for worker housing (Fig. 13.0) remained in the 
ownership of local farmers and residents.  
 
 
Fig 12.0: National Archives, (MAF 107/75), ‘Windscale Works: Sellafield’. Land in blue indicates 
“Ministry of Supply Freehold” (Windscale site). Green, “Land in procession of acquisition”. Red “Additional 
land requirements” (future Calder Hall site). 
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In 1947 the MoS began evicting tenants from their homes and placing compulsory purchase 
orders upon areas of land required for the nuclear project. Government ministers ordered the 
requisition of local land without delay, extracting pressure upon local councillors by 
emphasising Sellafield’s “supreme national importance.”451 Ministers suggested that local 
farm-land deemed “not particularly well-farmed or of good inherent character” be “made 
available… even to their elimination as units.”452 They impressed the short time scales 
required, reminding local officials that “I do not need to explain to you how urgent is the job 
 
451 National Archives, ‘Seascale Development, 17 January 1950’, (MAF 107/75). 
452 National Archives, ‘Seascale’, (MAF 107/75). 
Fig 13.0: National Archives, (MAF 107/75), ‘Map of Land Acquisition: Seascale’.  
Coloured plots indicate land procured from various local farms, named in key. 
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of building about fifty houses for employees of the Department of Atomic Energy”, unsubtly 
suggesting that they give “favourable consideration” to government requests.453 In the face of 
such ardent sentiment, local councillors consented to do “all in [their] power to assist” the 
development of the atomic factory through the rapid procurement of the necessary land.454 This 
left local farmers no choice but to sell for a price determined by the MoS. One farmer’s wife 
bitterly recalled that there was simply “nothing you could do… it was just Sellafield and that 
was it.”455 Another farmer explained that “you had absolutely no appeal or nothing, they just 
came and took it… you couldn’t argue with it.”456 By the mid 1950s, a sizeable quantity of 
farm land had been re-appropriated for military and civil use as part of the nuclear industry and 
associated housing developments.457 This process naturally brought about much ill feeling 
within local farming communities, who interpreted the utopian STIM as a threat to their land, 
traditions, customs, and socio-cultural identity. 
 
The loss of local farmland broke down the imaginary of a rural/urban symbiosis 
between the nuclear industry and local community. Instead, this produced its inverse by 
overwriting local attachments to place and the historic identities inherently bound up within 
them. In the act of building roads, houses, and developing farmland, the arrival of the nuclear 
project “brought radically different concepts of nature, ecology, and power into being, but also 
threatened… indigenous connections to specific spiritually animated places.”458 Indigenous 
farming communities culturally resisted this process by emphasising their historic ties to the 
 
453 Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, ‘Correspondence between Clerk to the Millom RDC and 
J.E. Davies,’ 22 December, 1948, (SRDM 1/3/5); National Archives, ‘Correspondence between W. M. Ogden 
and J. Willoughby: Seascale Development’, 3 June, 1954, (MAF 107/75). 
454 Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, (SRDM 1/3/53). 
455 E. Dawson, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by G. Wilkinson, 13 July 2010, pp. 30, 37. 
456 K. Mawson, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 6 August 2010, p. 7. 
457 As Marianna Dudley has shown, this had commonalities elsewhere in the UK as the post-war period saw the 
gradual expansion of the defence estate and the purchase of rural land for this purpose. See, Dudley, An 
Environmental History of the UK Defence Estate. 
458 J. Masco, The Nuclear Borderlands, p. 110. 
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area and the land they had previously owned, in so doing, producing a resistant imaginary of 
the nuclear industry as antithetical to the historic identity of the region. Many families could 
trace their farming heritage back hundreds of years and local media narratives regularly 
accentuated these lands as their historical birth-right, referring to local farmers who “had 
yeoman roots here going down for five centuries.”459 One report relayed the story of a local 
farmer who was forced to give up his land, lamenting that “his ancestors have tilled the soil of 
Seascale for the past four centuries. Until officials from the Ministry of Supply arrived one 
day, quoted their price for it and told him when he had to go.”460 This confirmed a deep sense 
of localised identity predicated upon attachments to place and induced a resentment towards 
those responsible for taking what they considered as their land. One particular farmer could 
trace his Cumbrian ancestry back to 1598, he explained that “my family have only moved one 
mile in more than four hundred years.”461 For Ella Dawson, whose family had owned and 
farmed at Calder Hall for generations, the situation was very simple, “Hall Senna had been in 
our family for six hundred years… we were there before they were.”462 Faced with the loss of 
a central component of their identity, contest over the control and meaning of place and the 
natural environment fed into growing pockets of resistance towards nuclear technologies, 
which transmuted the utopian imaginary of nuclear power into an altogether more sinister 
vision of an oppressive industry, as farming communities increasingly resisted the cultural and 




459 News Chronicle and Daily Dispatch, 15 October 1956. 
460 G. Bruce, ‘Atom Village Beats that Quatermass Fear’, Illustrated Magazine, 3 March 1956, p. 38. 
461 Author Unknown, ‘A Walk Down Memory Lane: Phil Hallington and David Moore Share their Calder Hall 
Memories’, Sellafield Magazine, 5.0 (October 2016), pp. 19ff. 
462 E. Dawson, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by G. Wilkinson, 13 July 2010, pp. 30, 37. 
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2.9: Economic Impact. 
 
Whilst the industry brought a major economic boost for many citizens, local farmers 
faced economic ruin as the MoS cherry-picked the land they required and left fragmentary 
remains. Several local farms were left “uneconomic” as the partial land acquisition of the MoS 
carved up steadings and affected profits.463 This subverted the imaginary of regional economic 
prosperity as many farms were left financially insolvent and destitute. Despite the ministry’s 
promise that “adjustments would be made wherever possible to keep to a minimum the amount 
of land taken from agricultural use,” the purchase of land resulted in three local farms being 
abandoned and one halved in size, rendering it economically unviable.464 Ultimately, this drove 
down the price and led to its eventual purchase by the UKAEA for the paltry sum of £250, well 
below the market value. Many locals believed this was a deliberate ploy to minimise the cost 
of purchasing land, a suggestion which is itself indicative of the increasing schism that land 
purchase opened up between the local community and the nuclear industry.465 This scattergun 
approach to the acquisition of land was, by the government’s own admission, “far from 
satisfactory”, with ministers conceding that a number of farms had been “seriously affected” 
by the “failure” of these developments.466 Left facing economic ruin, these financial 
components fed into the dystopian nuclear imaginary, as local farming communities fashioned 
undesirable futures of the nuclear industry as economically, socially, and culturally subjugating 
them.  
 
463 National Archives, (MAF 107/75). 
464 Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, (SRDE 1/3/1/160); K. Mawson, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral 
History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 6 August 2010, p. 17. 
465 National Archives, ‘Whole House Farm’, 14 February, 1951, (MAF 107/75).  
466 Ministers remarked that “it would have been very much more satisfactory if they had acquired the whole of 
the farm units so that some re-distribution of land and buildings could have been affected in agricultural 




Farmers emphasised both their powerlessness in the face of the nuclear industry, and 
the lack of care shown for their interests by planners culturally and physically dislocated from 
the local area. Tellingly, even government ministers were forced to concede that “there is much 
local feeling about the taking of good farmland and it would be fair to say that the local 
population are in opposition.”467 This was augmented by the failure of the MoS to pay farmers 
for the land within the contractually agreed timeframes. Local farmer Ernest Moore (Fig. 14.0) 
explained that “I had to give up cattle breeding [because] they kept me waiting months for the 
money they owed me for my own land.”468 Mr. Moore was ultimately forced to take alternative 
employment in order to support his family. Fig. 14.0 visually depicts the obvious resentment 
and anguish this caused him, as he was left with no alternative but to sell milk to the scientists 
who lived on his former land.  
 
467 National Archives, ‘Correspondence between W.S. Waters and J. V. B. Willoughby, 11 May, 1954’, (MAF 
107/75). 
468 G. Bruce, ‘Atom Village Beats that Quatermass Fear’, Illustrated Magazine, 3 March 1956, p. 38. 
Fig 14.0: G. Bruce, ‘Atom Village 
Beats that Quartermass Fear’, 
Illustrated Magazine, 3 March 1956, p. 
38. 
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Mr. Moore’s sense of injustice was compounded when he later discovered that the Ministry 
didn’t want the land he had sold to them and, instead of returning it to him for the same price, 
tried to profit from it by selling it to a developer and requesting more of his land. He explained 
“they were trying to sell some of the land to someone else, they didn’t want it, they wanted 
some more of mine instead.”469 Farmers explained that the Ministry would identify a piece of 
land they wanted, name their price and take it. One farmer explained that one particular field 
had been full of crops when they requisitioned it, adding that “they came with a bulldozer one 
day and bulldozed my potatoes under.”470 Episodes such as this speak to the low-level forms 
of indirect resistance performed by local farmers who resented their powerlessness in the face 
of the nuclear industry, which could render their livelihoods insolvent with the stroke of a pen, 
as historically profitable family steadings were divided and cut up to make way for nuclear 
housing and infrastructural developments. 
 
The negative socio-economic effects of the nuclear industry embedded resistant 
imaginaries amongst farming communities, who identified the nuclear industry as a scourge 
upon their lives. Farmers explained that their livelihoods became much harder after the plant 
was built, conceding that “everything they did was really against us.”471 They explained that 
“we had to go up through the estate to get to the rest of our land… we can’t get at our land 
now, they cut it off… if you were taking cattle or anything up there they were always on lawns 
and folk were complaining. It used to be very unpleasant. If there’s tractors going up and down 
 
469 Ibid. 
470 Ibid. (During an interview with the local newspaper Mr Dawson, whose land was being examined at Calder 
Hall complained, “I wish they would make up their minds and give me something to go on. Ministry men have 
been sinking boreholes and generally jobbing about for a long time. How do they expect a chap to plan his 
farming when he doesn’t know what land might be taken away from him at the busiest time of year?” 
Whitehaven News and Star, 19 March 1953.) 
471 K. Mawson, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 6 August 2010, p. 21. 
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the road, if they leave any muck off the wheels on the road, you get complaints.”472 
Interviewees recalled that even the weather changed with the arrival of the nuclear plant as it 
became harder to grow crops. Land near the plant was frequently rendered unfertile by the 
atmospheric effects of the nuclear plant which affected local weather patterns through the 
condensing vapour emitted from the cooling towers. Farmers recalled that “when you were hay 
timing, it used to rain all over it. When you got it all ready for bringing bale in and that, it 
would just rain on it and wet it all again. Lovely day like this and you know, ‘oh how nice’ and 
then you would go out and it was raining again.”473 These localised effects of the plant on day-
to-day activities fed into localised patterns of resistance amongst farming communities, for 
whom the nuclear industry represented a dystopian imposition upon their livelihoods and way 
of life. 
 
The dystopian nuclear imaginary was embedded by the financial effects of the plant 
upon local economies and wage structures. Unable to compete with the high wages offered at 
Sellafield, many farmers lost their workforce to the nuclear plant.”474 Many of the remaining 
farms that had not been bought out or rendered insolvent by land purchase were forced to close 
and several farmers, like Ernest Moore were left with no choice but to take up roles at Sellafield 
or in auxiliary services that supported the plant. Newspapers reported that farmers made to 
“give up the land are now working alongside yesterday’s farm-labourers, as industrial hands at 
the atom plant.”475 This further augmented the discrepancy “between existing ways of life and 
 
472 The closure of several farms meant that some farmers were able to purchase additional land, although this 
resulted in undesirable pockets of disparate farmland, isolated from one another and difficult to reach. (K. 
Mawson, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 6 August 2010, p. 16.) 
473 This represented a cruel blow to an already unprofitable livelihood. (E. Dawson, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral 
History Project’, interviewed by G. Wilkinson, 13 July 2010, p. 29.)  
474 D. McConnell, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 8 February 2010, p. 13. 
475 ‘The Village Where Plutonium Must Mix with Ploughing’, News Chronicle and Daily Dispatch, 15 October 
1956. 
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the ultra-modernity of which nuclear power was a symbol”, as the nuclear industry increasingly 
clashed with proud traditions of local farming livelihoods and, in the words of one local, “really 
upset the apple cart.”476 As a threat to these traditions, a cultural resistance towards the nuclear 
industry emerged as citizens identified Sellafield as a threat to the region’s agricultural culture 
and identity. Whilst the loss of areas of farmland had threatened the identity of the farming 
communities which owned and worked them, the closure of these farms altogether represented 
a more ardent threat to the agricultural identity and traditions of the area. This assimilated with 
broader discussions about the impact of the nuclear industry upon the countryside, as local 
citizens produced resistant imaginaries of nuclear science as an alien and overtly urban 




Farmers’ prejudices assimilated with broader concerns regarding the imposition of the 
urban upon the countryside, as the built environment of the nuclear industry appeared as a 
dystopian imposition upon rural culture. Luke Bennett has shown that “where necessary to the 
interests of modernism and the metropolitan realm – the non-urban becomes infected with 
urbanist ways and priorities.”477 This was a clear concern within the local community, who 
resisted the imposition of a symbiotic relationship between uses of rural land for the sustenance 
of the urban through the provision of electricity. Local woman Jill Perry explained that there 
was a clear discrepancy between the nuclear industry and a rural way of life. She recalled 
that “the feeling in my family was this it was just another... industrial process, a man-made 
 
476 Tompkins, Better Active than Radioactive!, p. 36; P. Gordon-Duff-Pennington, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral 
History Project’, interviewed by J. Lister, 21 January 2011, p. 21.  
477 L. Bennett, ‘Cold War Ruralism: Civil Defence Planning, Country Ways and the Founding of the UK’s 
Royal Observer Corps’ Fallout Monitoring Posts Network’, Journal of Planning History, 17.3 (2018), p. 13. 
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process that interfered with nature.”478 The National Farmers’ Union (N.F.U.) expressed the 
deep suspicion of the farming community, remarking pointedly that, “farmers are not 
enthusiastic in their demands for industrial development in a rural area, since industry takes 
away employees” whilst bringing “into the area alien urban elements.”479 This purported threat 
manifested in the built nuclear environment, as the physical architecture of the plant embedded 
resistant imaginaries of an urban invasion of the countryside.  
 
In spite of the overwhelmingly positive praise for the plant’s architecture which 
emanated from national commentators and designers, it appears as though the local public 
received the nuclear environment with more scepticism. This again calls for a more localised 
focus on the production of nuclear culture, as considerable variation emerges between national 
and local scales. Regional and local media reports show that the built environment of Seascale 
was considered “garish” by many locals, who lamented the new housing estates “swamping 
the neighbourhood”, expressing fears that “the new inhabitants may be the vanguard of an army 
that will change the character of the withdrawn village.”480 Elsewhere, the physical structure 
of the plant animated fears regarding the onrush of modernity into the countryside, with locals 
viewing “the erection of massive concrete structures on the fringe of the Lake Distinct an act 
of spoliation.”481 These narratives were a feature of local media articles, with reports 
bemoaning the “gaunt buildings that had mushroomed from the earth to change the life of the 
village,” lamenting their soulless nature: “secretive and uninhabited [with] their chimneys 
 
478 J. Perry, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by J. Lister, 3 January 2011, p. 8. 
479 Bracey, Industry and the Countryside, p. 123. 
480 Manchester Guardian, 16 October 1956; Bracey, Industry and the Countryside, p. 146. 
481 S. Sinclair, Windscale: Problems of Civil Construction and Maintenance, (London: George Newnes Ltd, 
1960), p. 5. 
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pointing like aimless fingers into the sky.”482 Reflecting on these developments, an article in 
the Manchester Guardian cautioned that:  
 
“in our efforts to make our cities smokeless and to bring other benefits to our nation we 
might very well destroy a great deal of our magnificent countryside, a heritage which 
it is only too easy for great concerns to underrate. For this and other reasons connected 
with destructive power there are still many people today who can only think of atomic 
power with feelings of dread or resentment and who wish that it had never been 
discovered.”483 
 
This passage suggests that local citizens were becoming concerned with the growing use of the 
rural landscape for the provision of the nation, as areas of natural beauty were becoming 
increasingly ‘infected’ with urban concerns. This undermined hegemonic visions of nuclear 
utopianism in favour of dystopian realities of urban blight and rural spoliation. This aspect of 
the dystopian nuclear imaginary not only revolved around the physical effects of the nuclear 
industry, but also upon the socio-cultural effects of migration into the county, as Sellafield’s 
construction sequenced the arrival of thousands of scientific staff and labourers from outside 
the local area. 
 
 The arrival of labourers required to build the nuclear plant helped embed a series of 
undesirable social futures as locals resented the imposition of alien elements considered 
antithetical to notions of rurality. This imaginary also built upon an undercurrent of anti-Irish 
sentiment during this period, as the behaviour of migrant contract workers brought a series of 
 
482 G. Bruce, ‘Atom Village Beats that Quatermass Fear’, Illustrated Magazine, 3 March 1956, p. 37. 
483 Manchester Guardian, 16 October 1956.  
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social ills into the countryside, subverting the inherent character and relative lawfulness of the 
region.484 Plant construction required thousands of migrant workers from areas of the UK and 
particularly Ireland, who were lodged in specially constructed camps ran by the Ministry of 
Works. These camps consisted of temporary accommodation arranged into barracks, designed 
to house workers in a tight, military style layout, with basic amenities and a sombre 
functionality. Migrant workers were a source of considerable unease amongst the local 
population, who expressed fears that “if large numbers of single men, or men living away from 
their wives come into an area with little to do during their free time, unpleasant social effects 
often follow.”485 Similarly, local media narratives stressed the “prospect of invasion by a 
battalion of ‘rough labourers”, whose attitude and way of life contrasted sharply with ordinary 
country residents.486 These concerns also borrowed from wider cultural assumptions about the 
lawlessness of Irish workers. In this way, the nuclear industry was seen to be responsible for 
bringing in ‘alien’ elements into the area, as anti-Irish prejudices aligned with the moral 
conservatism of the region, embedding an undesirable future of weakening rural values.  
 
An undercurrent of anti-Irish sentiment emerged throughout the interviews, as 
respondents recalled the unruly behaviour of “the Paddies” who “were always singing and 
dancing- cause they liked their drink.”487 Indeed, the heavy drinking and social activities of the 
construction workers brought about a large increase in the number of police cases for 
disorderliness and drunkenness. Local media outlets often featured reports of skirmishes 
between the migrant workforce and local police.488 Similar issues emerged in Scotland, where 
 
484 For further reading on anti-Irish sentiment in Britain throughout the twentieth century, see P. Garrett, ‘”No 
Irish Need Apply”: Social Work in Britain and the History and Politics of Exclusionary Paradigms and 
Practices’, The British Journal of Social Work, 32.4 (2002), pp. 477- 494. 
485 Bracey, Industry and the Countryside, p. 127. 
486 Ibid. 
487 J. Richardson, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by G. Wilkinson, 10 June 2010, p. 16.  
488 West Cumberland News, 25 December 1954, p. 7; West Cumberland News, 25 November 1954. 
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workers at Dounreay were viewed as “drunk and incapable, proverbially urinating” and 
fighting in the street, as citizens recalled that the region became a nuclearised equivalent of the 
‘Wild West.’489 In Cumbria, their behaviour was such that even Sellafield management 
acknowledged the negative social effects they had brought to the area. Plant manager H.G. 
Davey admitted that “there was a considerable amount of heavy drinking in Nethertown”, 
whilst another resident recalled that “the public houses in Whitehaven and Egremont took a 
hammering on Saturday nights.”490 Workers’ behaviour was such that locals would avoid 
particular pubs and areas of their home town, explaining that many people were “concerned 
with whether the Irish labourers would get pissed and molest your daughters and that sort of 
thing.”491 The unruly conduct of the workers was apparently only regulated by the camp’s 
Roman Catholic padre, who appeared to be “the only man who had any real influence amongst 
the Catholics,” and was regularly required to “keep the peace” between workers and local 
residents.492 This reflects the considerable unease with which the two communities integrated 
during the early years of Sellafield’s construction, as the nuclear plant became embroiled 
within broader concerns regarding the declining moral character of the region. 
 
Fears regarding the subversion of rural values existed at other nuclear sites throughout 
the UK too. Linda Ross has observed that the community local to Dounreay were fearful of the 
impact of an “alien population to whom the culture, traditions, and religious outlook of the 
Highlands are entirely foreign.”493 At both Dounreay and Sellafield, the influx of migrant 
workers animated fears of moral degradation, provoking resistance amongst locals resentful of 
the perceived decline of rural values. Residents recalled that, prior to the nuclear industry 
 
489 Ross, ‘Nuclear Fission and Social Fusion’, p. 298. 
490 Bracey, Industry and the Countryside, pp. 127f. 
491 N. Bell, ‘An Oral History of British Science’, interviewed by P. Merchant, 10 January 2013. 
492 Ibid., p. 128. 
493 John O'Groat Journal, 28 May 1954, p. 3; Ross, ‘Nuclear Fission and Social Fusion’, p. 88. 
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“people never used to lock their house, doors, or anything! One day the police came and said 
‘get your doors locked, we’ve a load of Irishmen working here now’- we had to go to Egremont 
to buy locks… because we didn’t have any!”494 In this way, the conduct of the workers spoke 
to an undesirable future of the region’s physical, social, and moral degradation. Here, nuclear 
specific concerns assimilated with broader prejudices regarding Irish immorality and the 
spoilation of the rural area, embedding resistant imaginaries of Sellafield as a subversion of the 
region’s inherent character and values.  
 
Fears about the decline of traditional rural values and customs were augmented by the 
influx of scientists responsible for running the plant. This brought similar concerns regarding 
the imposition of urban, university educated elites upon the region’s rural way of life, helping 
embed resistant imaginaries of cultural subversion. West Cumbria held (and still has) a distinct 
cultural particularness. In his 1956 study of the nearby village of Gosforth, William Morgan 
Williams wrote that the geographical isolation of the area led to the retention of distinct cultural 
features and a long tradition of autonomy. He pointed to the “unsuccessful introduction of the 
manorial system” within West Cumbria, the “absence of the tied cottage” and “consequent 
retention of a large group of free farmers” as historical precedents which had established a 
unique form of cultural autonomy.495 This is a view shared by Brian Wynne, who identified 
“the upland hill farming region in the Lake District is one of the few locations of relative 
solidarity and distinctive cultural identity left in industrial Britain… these communities share 
an unusually demanding livelihood as a way of life; they occupy a distinct and sought-after 
geographical locality and have common historical traditions, linguistic dialects, and 
 
494 E. Dawson, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by G. Wilkinson, 13 July 2010, p. 31. 
495 W. Williams, The Sociology of an English Village: Gosforth (London: Routledge, 1956). 
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recreational pursuits.”496 Against this cultural backdrop, the influx of scientific academics 
appeared incongruous to the social mores and specific worldview of farming communities, for 
whom the social changes wrought by the nuclear project represented a dystopian future of 
cultural marginalisation. 
 
Based upon a predilection towards standardisation, method, and procedure, the 
scientists held an intellectual framework which clashed with farmers’ way of life and values. 
Agricultural communities, particularly fell sheep farmers hold an experiential form of 
knowledge relied upon oral-storytelling, folklore, and a historic form of craft tradition 
embedded through generational apprenticeship, a unique mastery of the local environment and 
“specialist hill-farming expertise.”497 These cultures are predicated upon an intrinsic lack of 
control over nature and a strong proclivity towards adaptation and survival. This formed a 
diametric opposite to the practices of the scientific community and the nuclear industry, which 
emphasised an ethos of prediction, control, and “engendered an exaggerated sense of certainty” 
regarding issues such as radiation and dosage limits.498 Emphasising the social disparity 
between the two communities, interviewees recalled that the scientists “had a different sort of 
view on life to what the ordinary West Cumbrian would have had,” laughing that local people 
were “more bothered about vegetables than atoms.”499 One respondent remarked that “father 
didn’t like Seascale after they all arrived. They were involved with the local churches and 
things changed with a lot of young, lively, intelligent people coming in.”500 One interviewee 
recalled that “they came up here and turned the place upside down. What did we care about 
 
496 B. Wynne, ‘May the Sheep Safely Graze?’ in: Lash, Szerszynski, and Wynne Risk, Environment and 
Modernity, p. 283. 
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nuclear fission? Closest thing we knew was bloody fishing… Mind you, you need rods for that 
and all!”501 Into this context, nuclear science appeared as a subversion of the region’s rural 
characteristics and a foreign element incongruous with the concerns and world-view of the 
local population. 
  
The sense of disparity between urban and rural contexts was epitomised by a satirical 
magazine article (Fig. 15.0) which mocked the union between farming and scientific groups. 
Published by the national Pixillated [sic] magazine in 1955, this parody was written by ‘Ritchie 
Pincher’ (a play on the scientific correspondent for the Daily Express, the well-known 
journalist Chapman Pincher) and focused on the fictitious Cumbrian village of ‘Boilerscale.’ 
Poking fun at official attempts to develop nuclear technologies within a backward, inward-
looking community, the article described Boilerscale as “the sleepy old Cumbrian village 
[which] woke up one day to find that the atom-smashers had arrived- and then it went back to 
sleep again.”502  
 
 
501 Author’s interview with Albert Donald, 3 March 2019. 
502 The Beacon Museum Whitehaven, ‘Atom Village versus Quatermass Fear’, ‘Sellafield Stories Collection’. 
Figs. 15.0 and 16.0, Left to right: ‘Farmers’ discussion’ and ‘”Hubby is just normal” says Mrs Quartermaster’. 
The Beacon Museum Whitehaven, ‘Atom Village versus Quatermass Fear’, Pixillated Magazine, ‘Sellafield Stories Collection’. 
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This satirised the mutual imbrication of scientific and farming communities through the 
archetypical stereotypes of local farmer ‘Isiah Dangleberry’ and “atom-smasher Crispin 
Quatermasster”, (a play on the hit 1953 BBC drama ‘the Quatermass Experiment’ where 
scientists oversee the creation of a British space programme and the first manned flight into 
space).503 The article takes a playful swipe at both communities, parodying scientists who want 
to supercharge the growth of rhubarb with nuclear isotopes, and farmers who begin “beating 
their ploughshares into plutonium”, teaching scientists how to get “slewed as neuts [a dialect 
word for neutrons]” and complaining about the sudden onset of ‘piles.’504 Likewise, Fig. 16.0 
shows a housewife hanging her a three-legged pair of her husband’s trousers on the line, whilst 
stressing the normality of local life. This image operates in marked juxtaposition with Fig. 5.0 
displayed earlier, conveying a set of assumptions about the bizarre cultural make-up of the 
local area. Whilst a satirical parody of the social balance within the area, this article alludes to 
a clear divergence between social groups, indicative of, if not an overt animosity, but a degree 
of social friction between long-standing residents and the scientific community. 
 
Whilst local residents and the incumbent nuclear workers muddled along together 
relatively well during the early years of the nuclear industry, there remained clear social and 
cultural divergences between the groups. This is indicative of an ongoing cultural resistance 
towards the nuclear industry. In many cases, whether through design or choice, the two 
communities failed to integrate, and local residents in particular looked upon the new arrivals 
as spoiling the social life of the village. This embedded resistant imaginaries amongst local 
residents who viewed the nuclear enterprise as a subversion of local social norms and 





nuclear industry, remembering a distinct sense of “them and us in the community,” and a 
“mutual resentment” between “the old and the new.”505 Characterising this relationship, one 
respondent shared, “my grandfather was very sceptical. He said that he would work with the 
scientists, but he would never trust them.”506 Likewise, former employees recalled that “if you 
were a southerner, nobody wanted to know you- there was a lot of animosity from people.”507 
This speaks to the deep-rooted social discord between the two groups, as both communities 
exercised a degree of insularity in their social interactions.  
 
Designed as a blueprint for a utopian social order and a homogenous, classless society, 
the nuclear industry ultimately stratified local life and divided the community, as the secrecy 
of the scientific community presented a severe “obstacle in terms of normal day-to-day 
conversations.”508 Characterising this divergence, one respondent explained that: 
 
“The problem was, locals were used to sitting down and having a good chat about what 
had happened in their day; whether that was rounding up sheep or issues with cattle. 
They were going out to the local pubs and the Windscale club at the time, and suddenly 
they were faced with people who could not talk about the job they did because they had 
all signed the Official Secrets Act. The scientists and engineers could talk to each other 
about work and the things that they were doing, but locals were excluded from that. It 
created a divided village for a long time because locals could not understand why these 
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people who were moving into their community couldn’t talk to them. They didn’t have 
any common ground.”509 
 
The secrecy of plant life contributed to a degree of social distance between the two groups in 
the formative years of Sellafield’s operation as, in many cases, the local population sought to 
keep the nuclear industry at arm’s length. They were simultaneously grateful for the plant’s 
economic provisions, and yet fearful of a dystopian future “dominated by scientists, controlling 
a strange, forbidding experiment.”510 This demonstrates how the technology, classified as 
secret, created social cleavages, undoing aspects of the embedding process of the imaginary. 
The fragmentary integration between the two groups unravelled the social aspects of the 
utopian STIM, and embedded resistant imaginaries amongst locals, for whom the nuclear 
enterprise represented a challenge to existing social hierarchies and local village life, 
illuminating dystopian futures of their social and cultural subjugation.  
 
The disconnected social dynamic between locals and nuclear workers reflected the 
failure of urban planners to fully integrate the two communities. Government plans for a built 
nuclear utopia were hampered by post-war financial pressures and Seascale’s physical layout 
failed to conform to the original visions of 1940s town-planners. Whilst initial plans 
accommodated a village of up to four thousand people, by January 1950 this figure had been 
revised down to two thousand inhabitants, after the local council refused government requests 
 
509 Ibid. 
510 G. Bruce, ‘Atom Village Beats that Quatermass Fear’, Illustrated Magazine, 3 March 1956, p. 37. 
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to fund the entire development.511 This had a drastic impact on the physical make-up of the 
village, resulting in two disparate plots divided by both physicality and culture.  
 
By 1950 construction had already started on the atomic housing located outside the old 
village. It had been intended to develop this land first, and then knit the two communities 
together by building upon the land between ‘old Seascale’ and ‘new Seascale’, thus unifying 
the two developments.512 Financial pressures and government cutbacks negated this plan and 
cast the village into a physical and social binary which aggravated the social disparity between 
the two communities.513 This embedded dystopian imaginaries of cultural subversion, as locals 
explained how the stratified nature of local housing “changed the community beyond all 
recognition”, dividing the village into “old Seascale” and “new Seascale.”514  
 
Residents described that the village had been a small and close-knit community, but 
“that all went to pieces when all the off-comers came in. Some wouldn’t mix, some were never 
happy here, they didn’t stop long.”515 The hierarchical model of government housing also 
meant that workers frequently moved around between authority houses within Seascale and 
other UKAEA sites. Residents described how Seascale became “a transit camp” for UKAEA 
personnel, commenting that most of the inhabitants did not consider it ‘home.’516 They 
 
511 A deal was eventually struck between the local housing authority and the Ministry of Supply which saw the 
council construct 441 properties and the UKAEA 512 by the end of 1959. (National Archives, ‘Outturn 
1957/58: The Authority’s Housing Policy,’ (AB16/1427 115); National Archives, ‘Seascale Development, 17 
January, 1950’, (MAF 107/75); National Archives, ‘D. A. Shorlaw to C.J. Highton, 1 July, 1954’, (AB 8/523). 
512 National Archives, ‘Seascale Development, 17 January, 1950’, (MAF 107/75). 
513 Town planners were deeply unhappy about these developments, expressing that “the whole question of the 
development of Seascale is far from satisfactory and because of the failure of the MoS to proceed further with 
their plans we now have a sprawled ribbon development.” (National Archives, ‘Seascale: CPB. 2447’, (MAF 
107/75.)  
514 M. Steele, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 20 August 2010, p. 31; T. 
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515 K. Mawson, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 6 August 2010, p. 9.  
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complained at how their village became “a sort of war department settlement, where if you 
lived on a certain street you were on a certain status within the works, then if you moved up 
the ladder you moved house- it was just bonkers.”517 Whilst planners had deliberately tried to 
avoid creating an ‘atom town’, fearful of fostering the illusion of “a strange and secretive caste 
of ‘atomics’, withdrawn from the ways of mortal men,” the fragmented village layout 
materially manifested the cultural differences between the two groups, embedding the social 
aspects of the dystopian STIM.518 This created a social division between the new arrivals and 
the local people, as the material layout of the village meant that difference became “manifested 
in the built environment long before the first atomic arrived.”519 
 
Through the controversial provision of social housing, locals expressed and articulated 
their resistance to the domineering power structures of the industry, juxtaposed against a 
subjugated local population seemingly swept aside and overlooked in the interests of the 
nuclear enterprise. Whilst the local area suffered from a chronic shortage of social housing, of 
the 442 new homes built between 1947 and 1963 only ten were made available for the local 
public.520 The housing situation provoked “expressions of deep dissatisfaction” amongst local 
residents, whilst town councillors decried the situation as “a scandal.”521 This narrative was 
greatly compounded by the local media, who argued that it was “morally wrong that houses 
should be allocated to Ministry people when there was a greater need among the people of 
Whitehaven.”522 This was a view shared amongst the public who viewed the housing situation 
as an injustice upon the local population, bemoaning “that newlyweds have to fulfil a three-
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year waiting qualification when an electrician from Cardiff could come up and get a house 
immediately.”523 This sentiment also permeated the oral interviews, as residents explained that 
“the most criminal thing of all that happened was with the Sellafield houses- they were reserved 
for off-comers. Anybody that was brought up in the village that wanted a house, they weren’t 
allowed one. The locals were just absolutely totally victimised. That should never have been 
allowed.”524 One couple recounted their anger that, despite having grown up in the village they 
had been refused housing in Seascale as they did not work at Sellafield.525 The material 
structure of the village and patterns of housing allocation therefore undid the social aspects of 
the utopian STIM as local residents were excluded from benefitting in the socio-economic 
provisions afforded by the atom in favour of the newly arrived plant workers. This spoke to a 
dystopian future of socio-economic marginalisation, aligning issues such as housing allocation 
with broader concerns regarding the hegemonic power of the nuclear industry, and the 
disproportionate share of influence it had within local politics.  
 
Centred around issues of power and representation, residents resisted the political 
power wielded by the nuclear industry, forging a resistant imaginary of nuclear technology as 
a subversion of local interests and autonomy. The new arrivals dominated local politics, 
stripping power away from the local residents and placing it firmly within the hands of people 
affiliated to the industry. Following their arrival, plant workers rapidly obtained council 
positions and seats of power. Newspaper reports from 1956 show that within two years, ten out 
 
523 Ibid. 
524 Former residents recounted that the UKAEA housing officer virtually “ran Seascale from a little office,” and 
would show overt favouritism “for his friends.” (K. Mawson, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, 
interviewed by C. McCourt, 6 August 2010, pp. 9f; J. Jones, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, 
interviewed by C. McCourt, 20 August 2010, p. 5; D. Wooley, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, 
interviewed by J. Lister, 6 August 2010, p. 13.) 
525 J. Hall, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 27 May 2010, p. 9. 
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of the twelve available seats on the local council were occupied by “off-comers.”526 This 
uprooted existing power relations and embedded dystopian imaginaries amongst locals who 
emphasised their increasing marginalisation. Tellingly, interviewees referenced feelings of 
manipulation, complaining that “the scientists want to run the whole village their way in next 
to no time and they have the expertise, the ability to manipulate and they do just that.”527 
Residents explained how the industry's power extended beyond the factory gates and into the 
local community, describing that it behaved “a bit like a cuckoo in the nest.”528 Others 
explained that local people had very little political autonomy, as the village “became like a 
company town in the US… basically the plant owned the town.”529 Similarly, newspaper 
reports decried that “control of their own village, passed from their hands overnight”, whilst 
disaffected locals referred to the town as “the Seascale Soviet” observing commonalities 
between local life and the lack of self-determination afforded subjects of the Soviet Union.530 
This was a common occurrence in nuclear communities, where incumbent workers assumed 
control of, or drastically re-organised local political groups. Dounreay farmer Morris Pottinger 
recalled that “you ended up with a certain domination of the council” by the nuclear cohort 
who were “quite vocal” in their views. He explained that “you found people coming on to the 
town council and you found the Caithness people backing off” as control of local political 
organisations was gradually absorbed by staff from the nuclear plant.531 With similar processes 
evident in West Cumbria, the loss of political autonomy embedded forms of resistance amongst 
local people, who looked to the socio-cultural effects of the nuclear industry as symptomatic 
 
526 ‘Off-comers’ is a local term used to describe anyone not born in West Cumbria- regardless of how long they 
have lived in the area. (News Chronicle and Daily Dispatch, 15 October 1956.) 
527 The switch from the past to the present tense in this section of the interview also suggests that this sentiment 
still exists, and to some extent, that these power relations are still being perpetuated. (M. Steele, ‘Sellafield 
Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 20 August 2010, p. 31.) 
528 M. Todd, ‘Ambleside Oral History Group’, interviewed by J. Pilgrim, 2013. 
529 Author’s interview with Martyn Day, 17 September 2019.  
530 G. Bruce, ‘Atom Village Beats that Quartermass Fear’, Illustrated Magazine, 3 March 1956, p. 39; Cumbrian 
Life, March 2016, p. 13.  
531 Ross, ‘Nuclear Fission and Social Fusion’, p. 273. 
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Focusing on the contested meanings of nuclear places and their wider role in embedding 
both utopian and dystopian nuclear imaginaries, this chapter has shown that the Cumbrian 
public responded to the arrival of the nuclear industry in more complex ways than have been 
recognised by historians. Instead, local people challenged, resisted, and supplanted the 
imaginary of nuclear utopianism propagated at the national level. Drawing upon the material, 
cultural, and social changes wrought by the nuclear industry, local citizens constructed and 
articulated a series of dynamic, intertwined, and locally-specific undesirable futures heralded 
by the nuclear industry. These dystopian imaginaries were then embedded into local culture, 
entering into productive tension with the utopian nuclear imaginary. This understanding 
provides a more nuanced insight into the historiography of British social responses to 
nuclearisation, demonstrating the power of ordinary people to act as agents of nuclear meaning-
making. Responding to scientific and political developments and the sociotechnical processes 
that engulf them, we can see how ordinary people, even when seemingly politically powerless 
and socially peripheral, exercise significant agency over sociotechnical trajectories and 
produce their own forms of nuclear culture. This history takes on a deep significance for our 
understanding of the complexity of British responses to nuclearisation, demonstrating that 
social attitudes towards nuclear technologies were not technologically deterministic or as 
simplistic as has been previously ascertained, but rather were the product of the public’s 
engagement with, and redefinition of sociotechnical imaginaries of desirable (utopian), and 
undesirable (dystopian) nuclear futures. 
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This chapter also points to the plurality of nuclear cultures throughout Britain, 
particularly calling for greater engagement with the localised geographic contexts in which 
nuclear technologies were created, designed, and embedded. It also corroborates recent 
suggestions that “the social impact and persistence of nationwide nuclear sociotechnical 
imaginaries cannot be fully understood without reference to the localized social, geographical 
and discursive contexts in which [they were] located and enacted.”532 However, whilst Hogg 
argues that nuclear imaginaries were “strengthened and made durable once [they] became 
intertwined with localised contexts [...] and individuals working within them,” this chapter has 
demonstrated that local contexts and individuals also possess the power to disrupt and 
challenge these imaginaries, embedding their own resistant imaginaries which simultaneously 
espouse an alternative imagined future to the one propagated by the state, and disrupt the flow 
of power from the core to the periphery.533 The sociotechnical imaginary therefore emerges as 
a heuristically useful tool for thinking through the co-production of nuclear culture between 
state and populace at a range of scales. Ultimately, this alludes to a deeper, more problematic 
relationship between nuclear technologies and local society, which was to have deep 
ramifications for the future, paving the way for the hostility and more aggrandized resistance 





532 Hogg, ‘Normalising Nuclear War’, in Cronqvist, Farbøl, and Sylvest, (eds.), Cold War Civil Defence in 
Western Europe, p. 3. 
533 Ibid., p. 9. 
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3: Utopian Dreams/ Plutonium Nightmares. 
 
Taking the events of the Windscale fire in 1957 as its point of departure, this chapter 
points to increasing patterns of localised resistance towards the nuclear project between 1957 
and 1963, as a series of incidents combined to unravel the utopian nuclear imaginary at the 
local level. Drawing upon a range of sources from oral testimony, newspaper narratives, and 
internal government documents, I show that this occurred in two ways. Firstly, the fire 
delegitimised the imaginary of nuclear safety, demonstrating that nuclear technologies were 
inherently dangerous and could not be completely controlled. Secondly, it exposed official 
attempts to cover-up and suppress the cause of the fire and the threat to public health. These 
two factors exposed the misleading nature of the utopian STIM by showing that not only were 
nuclear technologies dangerous but that the government could not be trusted to keep the public 
safe from their hazardous effects. Identifying the reciprocal relationship between public trust 
and imaginaries of nuclear safety, this chapter demonstrates how the fire weakened the trust 
relations between the nuclear industry and the local public, who expressed increasing concerns 
about the effects of radiation. Sociologist Brian Wynne has shown that people’s attitudes 
towards nuclear risk are mediated by the levels of trust they have in nuclear authorities.534 This 
chapter develops this argument, revealing that the industry’s attempts to cover up the fire 
heightened public concerns about radiation, embedding a dystopian imaginary of nuclear 
technologies as a threat to the public health of the local community. 
 
These findings divert from previous studies of the local context, which found that 
citizens responded to the Windscale fire with little or no concern. Whilst these conclusions 
 
534 Wynne, ‘Misunderstood Misunderstanding’, pp. 281- 304. 
 196 
speak to general patterns of response in the initial aftermath of the fire, “relatively little 
information is available on the social and psychological consequences of the Windscale 
accident.”535 Pointing to the long-term effects of the local milk ban, the contamination of farm 
produce, and ongoing debates about the effects of radiation exposure, I demonstrate that the 
fire had a number of more enduring psychosocial and biological consequences. Tracing the 
impact of the incident firstly upon the local community, then looking to specific social groups, 
such as children, nuclear workers, and farmers, I will tease out and identify patterns of local 
resistance as citizens imagined the deleterious effects of radiation upon public health. 
 
Used in conjunction with the oral histories the STIM framework demonstrates that 
citizens resisted the nuclear project in subtle ways. As Claire Waterton, Brian Wynne, and 
Robin Grove-White have demonstrated, it is “radically misleading” to assume that just because 
“there is no observable public protest about a hazardous activity… this means the public 
accepts the hazard and trusts in the authorities who are meant to be in control.”536 Rather, this 
chapter demonstrates that the local public responded to the fire by actively resisting elements 
of the nuclear project, imagining a dystopian future characterised by the physical and 
radiobiological consequences of radioactive contamination. These patterns of response have 
been missing or given only fleeting attention within the existing historical record. This chapter 
sheds light upon the localised impact of the fire and contributes to the broader historiography 
by admonishing the significance of the local and rural context in shaping our understanding of 
Britain’s nuclear history. Very few studies have examined nuclear resistance during the 1950s, 
with scholarly attention largely devoted to the 1960s as the anti-nuclear movement, 
 
535 J. Smith, ‘Nuclear Accidents’, in J. Walls, C. Sharrard, F. Livens (et al.), (eds.), Nuclear Power and the 
Environment (London: Royal Society of Chemistry, 2011), p. 63. 
536 Wynne, Waterton and Grove-White, (eds.), Public Perceptions and the Nuclear Industry in West Cumbria, p. 
24.  
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spearheaded by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), espoused direct resistance 
towards nuclear technologies through mass demonstrations and protest.537 This chapter diverts 
from this understanding by highlighting the emergence (and permanence) of anti-nuclear 
sentiment in West Cumbria from as early as 1957.  
 
The previous chapters have shown that up to this point, nuclear resistance had been 
largely predicated upon the misgivings of disgruntled individuals who had been disaffected by 
the construction, siting policies, and socio-economic impact of Sellafield. This chapter shows 
that localised responses to the Windscale fire built upon these attitudes, prompting this 
resistance to morph into a deeper, more coherent and collective localised opposition towards 
nuclear technologies. This aligned with an emerging undercurrent of resistance towards nuclear 
technologies, witnessed in the formation of the CND in November 1957, increasingly ardent 
public support for an international nuclear test-ban agreement, and public inquiries into the 
siting of nuclear power plants at Hunterston in Scotland, and Bradwell in Essex.538 The fire 
therefore emerges as an important historical juncture in the trajectory of public responses to 
nuclear technologies. It was the first act of a second phase which saw the imaginary of nuclear 
utopianism begin to give way to expressions of more sinister, dystopian realities and a broader 
resistance to nuclear technologies and the state that wielded them. 
 
 
537 For examples of literature on anti-nuclearism in 1950s Britain, see Hogg, ‘”The Family That Feared 
Tomorrow”: Nuclear Fear and Individual Experience in Late 1950s Britain,’ British Journal for the History of 
Science, 45.4 (2012), pp. 535- 549; Wall, ‘Nuclear Prospects’, pp. 246- 273; A. Bingham, ‘The Monster’? The 
British Popular Press and Nuclear Culture, 1945-early 1960s’, British Journal for the History of Science, 45.4 
(2012), pp. 609- 624; G. McKay, ‘“Just a Closer Walk with Thee”: New Orleans-Style Jazz and the Campaign 
for Nuclear Disarmament in 1950s Britain’, Popular Music, 22.3 (2003), pp. 261– 281. For studies which focus 
on the 1960s, see J. Burkett, ‘Re-Defining British Morality: ‘Britishness’ and the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament, 1958–68,’ Twentieth Century British History, 21.2 (2010), pp. 184– 205; H. Nehring, ’The 
British and West German Protests against Nuclear Weapons and the Cultures of the Cold War, 1957–
64’, Contemporary British History, 19.2 (2005), pp. 223– 241; M. Phythian, ‘CND’s Cold War’, Contemporary 
British History, 15.3 (2001), p. 133– 156. 
538 See Welsh, Mobilising Modernity, p. 90; Manchester Guardian, 30 January 1957. 
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3.1: The Windscale Fire. 
 
The Windscale fire was the result of an uncontrolled release of energy in pile number 
one of the two plutonium producing Windscale reactors between 8th and 11th October 1957. 
The fire was caused by an unsuccessful attempt to release energy trapped within the reactor 
core through a technique known as a ‘Wigner release’, which was designed to disperse 
accumulated energy in a safe and controlled manner. These releases were relatively common 
and had occurred eight times previously without incident. Despite this, at some time between 
8th and 9th of October, one of the fuel cartridges inside the reactor core burst open and ignited, 
spreading fire throughout the core. To combat the rising temperatures, staff switched on the 
fans designed to regulate the core’s temperature, inadvertently fuelling the flames of the fire 
further. At this point, the full severity of the situation was realised. Increasingly concerned, 
reactor managers removed an inspection plug and saw four fuel channels glowing a deep, 
cherry red, concluding that the pile was now ablaze, and had been burning for some 48 hours.  
 
 Several unsuccessful attempts were made to cool the pile, first by pushing the stuck 
cartridges out of the back of the pile and into the cooling ponds below. The incredible heat and 
intense radioactivity rendered this impossible, as the scaffolding poles workers used to try to 
remove the cartridges melted in the heat of the blaze. Workers watched in horror as scaffolding 
poles dripped with molten metal and radioactivity levels kept on increasing. Desperate to cool 
the smouldering reactor, liquid carbon dioxide was poured onto the charge face of the pile, but 
to no affect. Eventually, Deputy Works Manager Tom Touhy ordered the fans be shut off and 
the pile doused with water. Despite the risk that this would trigger an explosion, the fire was 
finally brought under control on October 11th, three days after it had been discovered. Largely 
due to the heroism of the operating staff who remained on site tackling the fire, the bravery of 
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Tuohy, and more than a healthy slice of luck, a nuclear explosion had been averted, but at 
considerable radiobiological cost to the surrounding countryside and its inhabitants.  
 
3.2: Nuclear Safety. 
 
The fire delegitimised the carefully crafted imaginary of nuclear safety, espousing an 
alternative future where nuclear technologies represented a tangible threat to public health. 
Less than twelve months after the royal opening of Calder Hall, the fire flew in the face of the 
overwhelming positivity which enveloped the civil nuclear project up until this point. Official 
UKAEA historian Lorna Arnold reflected that during this period “nuclear power seemed 
brilliantly promising and full of hope… [as] the perennial fountain of world prosperity.”539 
Contemporary commentators too, noted that “the discovery of nuclear energy has come like an 
answer to prayer.”540 In the context of ardent public positivity, the incident at Windscale shook 
public confidence in the nuclear project, particularly at the local level where the fire unravelled 
the utopian STIM by exposing the vulnerability of the local public and subverting “the 
depiction of nuclear power as a harbinger of modernist progress.”541  
 
The fire provided irrefutable evidence that nuclear technologies were inherently fallible 
and subject to the same (or worse) stresses and potential hazards as any other industry. The 
utopian STIM had propagated the view that nuclear science was intrinsically safe, controllable 
through adherence to operational and scientific principles which regulated and contained the 
 
539 Arnold, Windscale 1957, p. xxi.  
540 G. Thomson, ‘Britain’s Drive for Atomic Power’, Foreign Affairs, 10.0 (1956), p. 96. 
541 Historian Ian Welsh has argued that the fire induced “a major loss of public confidence” in nuclear 
technologies by exposing the inherent vulnerability of the general public if something went wrong. See, Welsh, 
Mobilising Modernity, pp. 96f.  
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immense power of the atom. This imaginary had been embedded at both scientific and political 
levels by senior figures who assured that radiation could not affect public health. Only two 
years earlier in 1955, the Minister of Works, Nigel Birch, stated that “there is no danger at all 
associated with radioactivity from the use of atomic power for civil purposes. Such radioactive 
materials as are emitted are very weak and their effect is not cumulative. Their radioactivity 
ceases almost at once. I want to dispose of any suggestion that the use of atomic energy for 
civil purposes raises any danger.”542 As the previous chapter demonstrated, public statements 
such as this ensured that imaginaries of nuclear safety had become deeply entrenched within 
local culture, as the harmful effects of radiation were seemingly mitigated through scientific 
advances and strict operational protocols.  
 
Imaginaries of nuclear safety were similarly embedded amongst scientists working at 
the plant, who were increasingly over-confident in their abilities to harness the immense power 
of the atom. At this time, confidence at Sellafield was at an all-time high. Buoyed by the royal 
endorsement of nuclear energy barely twelve months previously, the nuclear scientific 
establishment was “a socio-intellectual community... operating in a pervading atmosphere of 
scientific self-confidence.”543 Historian Ian Welsh has argued that the success (or lack of major 
incident) throughout the previous decade had instilled a spirit of autonomy at Sellafield, 
identifying “a positive disposition towards risk-taking” within the “early, ‘heroic’ phase” of 
the nuclear industry.544 In this context, the fire exposed the fallacy of imaginaries of nuclear 
safety and the self-confidence within the atomic science community. Looking back, former 
 
542 Hansard, ‘Nuclear Explosions (Genetic Effects)’, 22 March 1955 
<hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1955/mar/22/nuclear-explosions-genetic-effects> [accessed 22 July 
2019]. 
543 Wall, ‘Nuclear Prospects: The Siting and Construction of Sizewell A Power Station, 1957-1966’, p. 250; 
Wynne, Rationality and Ritual, pp. 12- 19. 
544 Welsh, Mobilising Modernity, p. 48. 
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scientists acknowledged that during this period, the reactor was pushed “much too near the 
precipice,” in response to demands for ever-increasing yields of fissile material.545 They 
explained that the fire “was a useful reminder we didn’t know everything! There was a general 
feeling [that] we had to be a bit more careful, we had to think about things rather a lot more 
than we had done before.”546 This provided a bleak reality check to the nuclear scientific 
establishment, shattering imaginaries of nuclear safety by evidencing the potentially 
catastrophic consequences of scientific indulgence and nuclear chauvinism. Furthermore, the 
fire not only had repercussions within the scientific community but also undermined the local 
public’s confidence in the nuclear project by pointing to the possibility of another, more serious 
incident in the future. 
 
By exposing the potential effects of an incident at Sellafield, the fire contributed to a 
greater sense of vulnerability amongst the local public. This supplanted the utopian STIM as 
local citizens imagined the possibility and injurious consequences of another future incident.  
This process can be seen in oral history interviews, where local citizens conveyed the anxieties 
they felt after the fire. Interviewees recalled that “a lot of people, including myself were very 
frightened that it would happen again”, whilst some parents were so scared of a future incident 
that they “got nervous and took their children away” from the area altogether.547 Characterising 
public responses during this time, writer Stuart Sinclair contended that: 
 
545 The upcoming moratorium on nuclear testing (1963) and the failure of Britain’s first thermonuclear weapon 
to achieve the ‘magic megaton’ yield resulted in the development of a second weapon, which required five times 
the tritium of the first. These increasing demands for fissile material placed the reactor under increasing strain 
by forcing operators to reduce safety thresholds in order to increase efficiency. Specifically, the aluminium ‘fin’ 
casing which surrounded the fuel cartridges was reduced by 25mm, whilst the cartridges themselves were 
increased in size. This yielded an increase in productivity but pushed the reactor beyond its operational capacity. 
The temperature of the reactor was also raised to achieve similar results. Ultimately, these two elements 
combined with a series of operational and design flaws to cause the fire in pile number one. (Windscale: 
Britain’s Biggest Nuclear Disaster, S. Aspinall. London: BBC, 2007.) 
546 F. Graham Brightman, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by G. Wilkinson, 1 July 2010, 
p. 2 
547 M. Davis, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 16 December 2010, p. 28. 
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“Nothing like this had happened during the seven years in which the factory had been 
at work, and during which time the early prejudices against the industrial invasion of 
the countryside had been broken down. If one mishap could occur, would others follow 
with more serious consequences?”548 
 
In the aftermath of the fire the imaginary of nuclear safety began to break down, as citizens 
renegotiated the relative risk posed by the nuclear industry and imagined an alternative reality 
whereby the plant represented on ongoing threat to public health. In his seminal 1992 study of 
risk, Ulrich Beck explained that social attitudes towards hazards such as nuclear power are 
constructed through a reflexive process. At first, citizens trust the technology and the 
institutions which control it; after hazardous issues arise “people become reflexive and aware 
of the catastrophic consequences of technological development.”549 Examining public 
responses to nuclear accidents, sociologists J. Richard Eiser, Joop van der Plight, and Russell 
Spears have identified similar trends, demonstrating that nuclear incidents (however severe) 
induce anxieties amongst effected communities by exposing the threat of future incidents. They 
argue that “evidence that incidents occur with mild consequences is taken to show that they 
could also, with a little less luck, occur with severe consequences.”550 This also echoes the 
work of Dan Cordle, who identifies that nuclear incidents, whether imagined or real induce a 
“sense of increasing and heightened insecurity” amongst the public by introducing the 
possibility of nuclear disaster.551 As the following section will demonstrate, by proving that 
something could go wrong, the fire heightened public concerns about issues of nuclear safety. 
 
548 Sinclair, Windscale: Problems of Civil Construction, p. 6. 
549 Beck, Risk Society; X. Fang, ‘Local People’s Understanding of Risk from Civil Nuclear Power in the 
Chinese Context’, Public Understanding of Science, 23.3 (2014), p. 284. 
550 Eiser, van der Plight, Spears, Nuclear Neighbourhoods, p. 169.  
551 D. Cordle, Late Cold War Literature and Culture: The Nuclear 1980s (London: MacMillan, 2017), p. 48. 
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However, this was not a straight-forward or linear process, as the UKAEA’s attempts to 
suppress the incident’s severity ensured that the local public reacted with little apprehension in 
the initial aftermath of the fire, as its true consequences were hidden from the local community.  
 
The reaction of the public was at first one of indifference and calm. Existing studies by 
Christine Wall, Lorna Arnold, and Ian Welsh have all asserted that initial public reactions 
“appear to have been limited.”552 Indeed, the content of national media reports in the days 
following the fire paint a picture of public inertia, with an article in the Daily Express on the 
day of the fire carrying very little mention of it at all, instead emphasising the increased social 
opportunities afforded by the nuclear industry.553 Likewise, a headline in The Times declared 
“no apprehension in West Cumbria!”554 These responses have historically been taken as 
evidence of the apathy of the local population towards the fire, and their ongoing trust in the 
safety and operation of the Sellafield plant. Despite the seeming lack of public outcry or anxiety 
within the local area, these conclusions fail to account for the censorship of information in the 
initial aftermath of the fire, as local citizens were given fragmentary and politically censored 
information. Furthermore, they overlook that attention was limited only in the initial days as 
authorities successfully concealed the severity of the incident from the public. Residents 
recalled that, “what one read about was there had been a small fire in a shed, a charcoal store 
or something like that, they played it down.”555 In the days that followed, the accident was 
thrust in local consciousness through the extensive coverage of local newspapers. Only two 
weeks later, a local newspaper commented that “whatever the record might be for headline 
holding by a single incident, the Windscale accident must have come very close to breaking it. 
 
552 Wall, ‘Nuclear Prospects’, p. 247; Arnold, Windscale, p. 71; Welsh, Mobilising Modernity, pp. 98f.  
553 Daily Express, 12 October 1957.  
554 The Times, 12 October 1957.  
555 Author’s interview with Albert Donald, 3 March 2019. 
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It has held the headlines for a fortnight, and it isn’t finished yet- not by a long chalk.”556 As 
information gradually permeated the veil of secrecy erected by the authority, the apparent 
indifference of local society gradually gave way to a more overt form of intransigence as it 
became clear that they were being given incomplete, misleading information by UKAEA 
officials. 
 
3.3: Local Contamination.  
 
The UKAEA’s reticence to communicate with the local public was interpreted with 
suspicion by the local population, who expressed significant concern about the length of time 
it took the UKAEA to inform them about the fire. During the three days whilst the fire raged, 
residents were not told of the incident or given instructions to protect themselves from the 
airborne radiation. In fact, “fire-fighting efforts had been underway for 24 hours before even 
the local Chief Constable was formally notified.”557 This was itself an official policy which 
sought to exclude the public from goings on at the plant. Former Health and Safety Manager 
Huw Howells recalled that, “at that time it was thought that the peace of mind of the people 
concerned was more important than to pass on any information because undoubtedly it would 
be misinterpreted.”558 Designed to stage-manage public opinion, this aspect of the utopian 
STIM paradoxically embedded dystopian imaginaries of nuclear safety by heightening public 
fears about radiation.  
 
Whilst the official line of the UKAEA was that at no point had radiation limits been 
breached, and that it was prepared to warn the public should they have done, their failure to 
 
556 West Cumberland News and Star, 26 October 1957.  
557 W. Patterson, The Fissile Society Energy, Electricity and the Nuclear Option (London: Earth Resources 
Research Ltd, 1977), p. 20.  
558 Inside Story: Our Reactor Is on Fire, D. Blakeway. London: BBC, 1990. 
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disclose information was interpreted as a deliberate policy of suppression, designed to hide the 
threat to public health. The limited release of information had a profound effect on local 
attitudes towards the plant, contributing “to [a] growing public alienation and scepticism” 
amongst the local community.559 The local West Cumberland News and Star referred to the 
fire’s “sobering” effect on local opinion.560 This acknowledged that there had been a dramatic 
shift in public attitudes in the days following the incident, as public opinion changed from a 
“state of initial acceptance to one of considerable concern and despair.”561 This was also 
confirmed by a local councillor, who told the national press that “this business is far more 
serious than we imagined at first. I don’t think the [UK]AEA has been completely honest with 
us. People who were quite calm to begin with are getting worried.”562 This unravelled aspects 
of the utopian STIM by simultaneously weakening public trust in the nuclear authorities and 
exacerbating public concerns about the harmful effects of radiation. 
 
Evidencing the local public’s growing concern about their safety, citizens petitioned 
their M.P., Frank Anderson to call upon the government to tell the truth regarding the severity 
of the fire and the relative threat it posed to the public. In the House of Commons, Anderson 
subjected Prime Minister Harold MacMillan to a barrage of questions, referring to the “very 
strong condemnation” amongst his constituents at the lack of public information given to 
them.563 Residents bemoaned the “lack of full information available to the public,” and 
complained that “absolutely nothing was done” to protect them.564 One resident, whose 
 
559 Welsh, Mobilising Modernity, p. 116. 
560 West Cumberland News and Star, 22 October 1957.  
561 West Cumberland News and Star, 19 October 1957, p. 6 
562 Daily Express, 16 October 1957, p. 5. 
563 He described the public relations procedures as “sadly lacking” and committed to visiting the Prime Minister 
on a second occasion to impress upon him the concerns of local residents. Hansard, ‘Atomic Energy 
Establishment: Windscale (Accident)’, 28 November 1957, <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1957-11-
28/debates/5d7735ad-0ea9-48f4-a49a-eeaadfba35cc/AtomicEnergyEstablishmentWindscale(Accident)> 
[accessed 27 January 2018]. 
564 National Archives, (EG 4/3191); Inside Story: Our Reactor Is on Fire, D. Blakeway. London: BBC, 1990. 
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property backed onto the plant explained that, “I was quite annoyed because we had gone 
almost three days before they had informed us that there was anything seriously wrong with 
the works.”565 The letters page of the Manchester Guardian was awash with embittered 
residents, angered that “at the very least, we might have wanted to stay indoors” and “shut 
[our] windows to avoid escaping radioactivity.”566 Over the following days, coverage in the 
national newspapers took a similarly disapproving tone, reflecting the growing hostility 
amongst the local public. These animosities were the feature of reports by the Daily Mail and 
Daily Express, who asserted “the right of individuals to know how to protect themselves.”567 
The Daily Express ran a feature with the headline: “Distrust- That is the mood which is growing 
among the ordinary people who work at Calder Hall, or live in the surrounding Cumbrian 
villages.”568 Prominent magazine, the New Scientist reported that the public had been “severely 
shaken” by attempts to “minimise the gravity” of the accident and by the “extremely late hour” 
at which their health had been considered.569 Efforts to protect the imaginary of nuclear safety 
by disclosing limited amounts of information to the public therefore contributed to a wave of 
local resistance. This fed into and embedded dystopian imaginaries of nuclear technologies as 
a threat to public health by challenging the safety of nuclear technologies and the integrity of 
the authorities responsible for managing them, exposing their deliberate attempts to hide and 
suppress the threat to local people.  
 
 
565 McSorley, Living in the Shadow, p. 12.  
566 Manchester Guardian, 15 October 1957; see also, H. Bolter, Inside Sellafield: Taking the Lid off the World’s 
Nuclear Dustbin (London: Quartet Books, 1996), p. 40; Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, 
‘Minutes of the First Meeting of the Windscale Emergency Liaison Committee,’ 2 December 1957, (SRDE 
1/3/2/6). 
567 Daily Express, 16 October 1957; Daily Mail, 16 October 1957. 
568 Daily Express, 17 October 1957, p. 9. 
569 New Scientist, 17 October 1957; Welsh, Mobilising Modernity, p. 99. 
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Nuclear secrecy was thus reinterpreted, not as a benign component of a future utopia 
but as a political instrument that disguised the plant’s risk to public health. Disengaging with 
the imaginary of nuclear safety, local people saw the UKAEA’s silence as an indication of the 
threat to public health. Sociologist Ulrich Beck argued that because radiation is an invisible 
hazard, people are “dependent on scientific and administrative knowledge about the 
hazards.”570 He found that when these vehicles of communication are found to be unreliable, 
public trust in the institutions breaks down and people lean upon their own “experience-based 
expertise.”571 We can see this happening in the aftermath of the fire as citizens, increasingly 
aggrieved by the slow and incoherent information emanating from the UKAEA, refuted the 
industry line that they were not at risk from the fire. Instead, residents relied upon their own 
knowledge of local weather patterns to demonstrate that radioactive fallout had contaminated 
the local area, disputing the industry’s claim that they had not been exposed to airborne 
radionuclides and that the vast majority had been blown out to sea.572  
 
The few official statements that had been released sought to play down the severity of 
the incident and its threat to public health, concluding that “no-one in this area is in danger” by 
explaining that radiation had passed harmlessly over the Irish Sea.573 These statements 
contradicted the experience-based knowledge of local people, who resisted attempts to mislead 
 
570 Beck, Risk Society; O. Kuchinskaya, ‘Articulating the Signs of Danger: Lay Experiences of Post-Chernobyl 
Radiation Risks and Effects’, Public Understanding of Science, 20.3 (2011), p. 407. 
571 H. Collins, and R. Evans, ‘The Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise and Experience’, Social 
Studies of Science, 32.2 (2002), pp. 235- 296. 
572 In her official history, Arnold explained that during the fire “the weather pattern was complex and 
changeable.” She noted that whilst initial wind patterns “appeared to be blowing offshore and out to sea”, above 
these light, variable, easterly winds there was an inversion layer at 400ft, and above that south-west winds 
prevailed. Then, in the early hours of 11 October, a cold front caused the wind to freshen and veer northerly, 
blowing from the north-west for some twelve hours. Thus, there were two distinct plumes: the earlier carrying 
material north-east, the latter moving to the south-east over England and eventually over Western Europe. See, 
Arnold, Windscale, p. 53; National Archives, ‘Plowden/PM’, 11 and 12 October 1957’, (AB 16/2441); 
Manchester Guardian, 12 October 1957.  
573 West Cumberland Times, 19 October 1957, p. 6. 
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them. One interviewee recalled the lack of credibility in these statements. He explained that “it 
was obvious that it [the radiation] hadn’t blown out to sea and quite a lot of it was in the coastal 
strip.”574 This claim was particularly patronising, given the intimate knowledge of wind and 
weather patterns held by the agricultural communities dotted along the coast. One resident 
joked that, “one thing a countryman does know is which way the wind is blowing! He looks at 
the cows and their tails!”575 In light of the contradiction between their own understanding and 
industry assurances, residents became increasingly suspicious of the seemingly misleading 
information given to them by the UKAEA and began constructing their own interpretations of 
nuclear risk. This was a process acknowledged by contemporary newspaper reports. The Daily 
Express noted that local people had become distinctly “sceptical about the assurances that have 
been proffered by experts,” whilst the local Barrow News protested that “these scientists leave 
us baffled”, with reassurances which are “no more than wishful thinking.”576 These narratives 
suggest that the local population, whilst ostensibly apathetic in their initial responses to the 
Windscale fire, became increasingly disturbed by official attempts to mislead them and 
minimise the threat to public health.  
 
Using their experiential knowledge, local citizens challenged the credibility of the 
utopian STIM and imaginaries of nuclear safety, formalising the threat to public health through 
the harmful effects of radiation exposure and official efforts to hide this evidence. Attempts to 
conceal the extent of radiation exposure were debunked by local scientists, who empirically 
 
574 E. Davis, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 11 October 2010, p. 20. This 
belief was later vindicated by the evidence that radioactive fallout had been blown inland, spreading radiation 
throughout the West of the UK, the North East of England, and registering as far away as Norway and the 
Netherlands. See, J. Blok, R. Dekker and C. Lock, ‘Increased Atmospheric Radioactivity in the Netherlands 
after the Windscale Accident’ Applied Science Research, 7.0 (1985), pp. 150ff; N. Stewart and R Crooks, 
‘Long-range Travel of the Radioactive Cloud from the Accident at Windscale’, Nature, 182.0 (1985), pp. 627f; 
T. Bergan, M. Dowdall, and O. Selnaes, ‘On the Occurrence of Radioactive Fallout over Norway as a Result of 
the Windscale Accident, October 1957’, Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, 99.0 (2008), pp. 50- 61. 
575 Author’s interview with Albert Donald, 3 March 2019. 
576 Daily Express, 23 October 1957, p. 2; Barrow News, 18 October 1957. 
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proved the fire’s threat to public health. Whilst the UKAEA were using radiation levels 
recorded at the Sellafield site, scientists knew that these figures hid the extent of airborne 
radiation downwind of the plant. Ministry officials explained that “the greater part has been 
retained by the Windscale chimneys [and] only a small amount has been distributed over the 
works site.”577 Despite this, tests conducted by local scientists had proved that in the event of 
an accident, radiation levels would be higher a couple of miles away from the plant, rather than 
at the site itself. They explained that “on a chimney, the maximum fallout tends to be 
somewhere downwind, not somewhere immediately adjacent to the chimney.”578 Concerned 
about the extent of local contamination, a number of Sellafield scientists decided to take their 
own independent measurements at their homes within Seascale. These findings were 
completely incongruous with the UKAEA’s publicised measurements. One scientist, Dr Frank 
Leslie explained that “I took a tissue and rubbed it over my son’s shoes, and I was amazed to 
find the count rate was 3,500 counts a minute. In the lab, if you had more than 600 counts per 
minute you were regarded as being contaminated, and there we were, six times the normal level 
in Seascale.”579 Similar findings were recorded by Piya Guneratne, who took his daughter’s 
shoes into the laboratory to check the radiation readings they registered, finding levels much 
higher than those published by the UKAEA.580 Marjorie Higham, a scientist at the plant who 
would go on to campaign against Sellafield as a County Councillor in the 1970s, recalled 
measuring colleagues on the day of the fire. She recalled that, “some of my friends had cycled 
from Seascale, along the edge of the sea and we discovered, to our horror, that their hair went 
off the scale of the instrument completely. At that time, we had not come across that amount 
of activity. The instruments had never been stretched to that limit…”581 Building upon the 
 
577 West Cumberland News and Star, 12 October 1957, p. 12. 
578 Inside Story: Our Reactor Is on Fire, D. Blakeway. London: BBC, 1990. 
579 Ibid. 
580 McSorley, Living in the Shadow, pp. 17f. 
581 Inside Story: Our Reactor Is on Fire, D. Blakeway. London: BBC, 1990. 
 210 
misgivings of the non-scientific public, these findings categorically and empirically proved 
that local people had been exposed to dangerously high levels of radiation and that this had 
been covered-up by the nuclear authorities.  
 
Part of a growing cohort of local scientists concerned about the threat to the public, Dr 
Leslie published his findings in the Manchester Guardian on 15 October 1957, confirming that 
residents had been exposed to levels of radioactivity far in excess of those publicly released.582 
This subverted the utopian nuclear imaginary by debunking imaginaries of nuclear safety and 
exposing the deception of the UKAEA. Leslie’s revelations provoked a sharp backlash 
amongst the local community, as residents reacted with hostility towards attempts to 
“bamboozle” the local population.583 Residents explained that they were “quite horrified” by 
the incongruity between official and independent measurements and became convinced 
“something was radically wrong” with the information they were being given, rejecting the 
authority’s attempts to “pull wool over their eyes,” through the telling of a series of “lies” and 
“half-truths” designed to keep the incident “as quiet as possible.”584 Echoing public sentiment, 
the West Cumberland Times and the Daily Express spoke of a simmering undercurrent of 
“distrust” towards “the clam-mouthed” authorities operating under “a veil of secrecy.”585 
Likewise, local journalists pointed to the broader implications these revelations had upon 
public safety, declaring that Leslie’s figures had brought about a “complete lack of confidence 
 
582 Manchester Guardian, 15 October 1957. Leslie’s whistle-blowing incensed Prime Minister Harold 
MacMillan, who held very little respect for the pronouncements of what he considered ‘rogue scientists’ such as 
Leslie, who he later referred to in his private memoirs as “an opinionated ass.” (National Archives, (PREM 
11/2156); see also Arnold, Windscale, p. 62. 
583 F. Madge, ‘Ambleside Oral Archive’, interviewed by SF, 21 August 1990; Leslie remarked that it was 
“highly unsatisfactory that the authorities should be able to hush these things up.” (Inside Story: Our Reactor Is 
on Fire, D. Blakeway. London: BBC, 1990.) 
584 E. Davis, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 11 October 2010, p. 20; F. 
Madge, ‘Ambleside Oral Archive’, interviewed by SF, 21 August 1990; Whitehaven Archive and Local Study 
Centre ‘The Case Against THORP: Windscale and West Cumbria’, Friends of the Earth, p. 13, (Egremont 
Folder); Inside Story: Our Reactor Is on Fire, D. Blakeway. London: BBC, 1990. 
585 Daily Express, 17 October 1957, p. 9; West Cumberland News, 9 November 1957, p. 5. 
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amongst the public in the operation of this business.”586 By eroding public trust in the UKAEA, 
his revelations bolstered public fears about the unknown quantities of radiation they had been 
exposed to, helping embed dystopian imaginaries of nuclear technologies as a threat to public 
health.  
 
The local community’s lack of trust in the nuclear authorities heightened public 
anxieties about the long-term and hidden effects of radiation upon their bodies. Here, the 
invisibility of radiation, the UKAEA’s control over the production and dissemination of 
radiation knowledge, and the public’s lack of faith in their ability to tell the truth generated “a 
proliferating physic anxiety as potentially exposed individuals realised their inability to 
evaluate [nuclear] risk.”587 Impassioned locals wrote to the local newspaper demanding “we 
know something happened at Windscale, but what? Let us tear away the veil of secrecy and 
admit there is danger from these reactors!”588 Restricted from knowing if and to what extent 
they had been irradiated, and the potential long-term implications this may or may not have, 
local citizens lost the ability to measure and quantify their exposure or exercise any kind of 
control over their bodies, as the after-effects of radiation hung “in the abyss of scientific 
uncertainty.”589 In his research on nuclear sites, anthropologist Joseph Masco has argued that 
radiation exposure has a series of profound psychosocial effects and greatly increases anxieties 
amongst those exposed. He explains that radiation executes its “own uncanny form of manifest 
destiny, traveling an unpredictable course through ecosystems and bodies, creating “new social 
beings [and] new tactile experiences of everyday life” as citizens engage with and fashion 
possible futures for themselves on the back of their exposure.590 In short, radiation exposure 
 
586 West Cumberland Times, 2 November 1957, p. 7. 
587 Masco, Nuclear Borderlands, p. 12. 
588 West Cumberland Times, 19 October 1957, p. 6; West Cumberland News and Star, 14 October 1957.  
589 Brown, Plutopia, p. 308. 
590 Ibid. 
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(whether real or imagined) encouraged citizens to imagine their future health and engage with 
the possibility that they could suffer from radiation-induced illnesses at any point in the future. 
This echoes the findings of environmental studies examining the long-term effects of chemical 
contamination, which have found that exposure to chemical or radioactive toxins causes 
individuals to evaluate the likelihood of health effects further down the line. 
 
In their study of chemical contamination in the New York district of Love Canal, 
Martha Fowlkes and Patricia Miller found that people were “required to articulate coherent 
perspectives about the actual or potential implications of the chemicals on their well-being.”591 
Similar processes were at play in the West Cumbrian context, where citizens were forced to 
evaluate the relative likelihood of experiencing health defects as a result of the incident. In this 
way, the breakdown of trust relations between the nuclear industry and the local community 
meant that local people were left to speculate about the amount of radiation they had received 
and imagine the future effects this may have. Citizens became dislocated in an imagined 
temporal ellipsis, wherein the effects of radiation could manifest at any given moment. This 
helped embed imaginaries of nuclear technologies as a threat to public health by forcing 
citizens to imagine and reconcile themselves within a potential future characterised by the 
deleterious effects of radiation upon their bodies. Furthermore, it also forced local people to 
imagine the impact of radiation exposure upon their families and young children. This proved 
a major source of consternation amongst parents who had unwittingly exposed their children 
to radiation, as the exceptionally fair weather on the day of the fire meant that many children 
were outdoors in the open air whilst the fire raged. 
 
 
591 M. Fowlkes, and P. Miller, Love Canal: The Social Construction of Disaster (Washington DC: Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 1983), pp. 55f. 
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Attempts to embed and protect the utopian STIM by not warning the local public about 
the fire thus had the opposite effect, engendering public fears about the possible health effects 
radiation exposure may have had on their children. A frequent feature of oral interviews was 
respondents’ reference to where their children were at the time of the fire. This was never a 
question put to interviewees but something that respondents volunteered as they arranged their 
memories and encoded them in a narrative structure. Oral historians have shown that the 
structure given to an individual’s memories can reveal a lot about that person’s relationship 
with the histories they are retelling.592 Specifically, Lynn Abrams has argued that oral 
historians should observe “how people shape their narratives in order to make a point”, 
analysing the way they structure their memories in order to “suit the story they are telling and 
the meaning they wish to impart.”593 By framing their memories of the fire around their 
children, interviewees demonstrated anxieties about the long-term impact of radiation upon the 
human body, particularly those of young children.   
 
One example came from a local farmer, who explained that “we had two sisters who 
both had babies at the time. During the Friday they were parked outside, right next to the factory 
fence. One was just four months old and one was 18 months. The wind was coming from the 
west and it was drifting our way… We were quite annoyed when we found out because it was 
enough for the workers the other side of the fence to go home and we had these young 
babies…”594 Here, we see how he structured his life-story around the potential impact the fire 
may have had upon his sisters’ children. His inability, or conscious choice not to conclude this 
 
592 In her study into the role of emotion within the oral history interview, historian Katie Holmes suggests that 
memories are “at once something bigger and something more interior than the life-history, related to 
consciousness, self, and the way that self is told or performed.” (K. Holmes, ‘Does it Matter If She Cried? 
Recording Emotion and the Australian Generations Oral History Project’, The Oral History Review, 44.1 
(2017), p. 68. 
593 Abrams, Oral History Theory, pp. 108, 128f. 
594 McSorley, Living in the Shadow, pp. 12, 17, 24; For further examples, see interview with M. Davis, 
‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 16 December 2010. 
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passage of speech also indicates his uneasy relationship with this history, as the possible 
consequences of the fire extended into the present and he contended with the possible dormant 
or future health problems that may result. Framing his narrative around the most vulnerable 
members of society, we can see how the fire supplanted the utopian imaginary of nuclear safety 
as citizens conceived of and imagined a future characterised by the negative health effects of 
radiation. 
 
3.4: Milk Ban.  
 
The threat posed by radiation was made clear by the UKAEA’s October 12th decision 
to prevent the consumption of local milk supplies, which had become contaminated with 
excessive quantities of radiation during the fire. Scientists were troubled by high radioactive 
iodine levels in local milk, which was known to concentrate in the thyroid glands of infants.595 
No scientific literature existed which offered any guidance for this particular kind of nuclear 
accident, since most studies at this point focused on the impact of nuclear weapons, and 
specifically related to lifetime doses rather than accidental exposures. Studies had “not yet 
addressed the question of radiological protection in once-in-a-lifetime emergency for the 
general population; and it had developed a model for a standard man, but not for a standard 
child or baby.”596 The limited data available suggested that levels of Iodine 131 in milk should 
not exceed 0.3 micro-curies per litre; since it had been established that damage could occur 
 
595 Arnold, Windscale, pp. 55f. At this time, (and as a consequence of the government’s vigorous pursuit of 
nuclear technologies), adequate radiation protection standards had not yet been established. Limited knowledge 
of radiation had been hurriedly translated into a series of thresholds levels which covered an array of industrial 
plants and research laboratories handling multiple types of radioactive material; many of which were calculated 
from what limited data and theory was available. The fire revealed the deficiency of these models, as scientists 




above this point. Tests of local milk showed levels between 0.4 and 0.8 micro-curies per litre 
from October 11 (the day after the fire was discovered) onwards.597 The decision was then 
made to prevent the consumption of local milk by instigating a milk ban within an 80 square 
mile radius. This was later extended to 190 square miles and lasted up to a month.598 
 
The disposal of milk collected from local farms publicly showcased the threat of 
consuming irradiated foodstuffs and played a major role in embedding dystopian imaginaries 
of the harmful consequences of nuclear technologies. Owing to the invisible nature of the 
radiation released and the fire’s location deep within the boundaries of the Windscale plant, 
the threat to the public was not immediately discernible. In her study of Belarusian 
communities exposed to fallout from the Chernobyl nuclear plant, Olga Kuchinskaya argues 
that “radiation risks and health effects are not always obvious or immediately observable for 
those experiencing them.”599 In this way, the milk ban provided a tangible measure of the fire’s 
threat to public health, and a visual representation of the extent of contamination beyond the 
factory perimeter.  
 
Despite official attempts to present the ban as an exercise in conservatism, this decision 
had a symbolic role in undermining the institutionally pedalled vision of nuclear technologies 
as offering a clean, safe, and abundant source of energy.600 The destruction of locally sourced 
milk appeared to contradict official assurances that there was no danger posed to the public 
 
597 Ibid. 
598 Ibid., pp. 34- 37.  
599 O. Kuchinskaya, ‘Articulating the Signs of Danger’, p. 405. 
600 It has been argued that “the news of the milk ban created more anxiety within the general public than the fire 
itself” and became the factor that “really scared the public both nationally and locally.” (R. Batten, ‘A 
Significant Moment in the Development of Nuclear Liability and Compensation: Dealing With the 
Consequences of the Windscale Fire 1957’, Ex Historia, 3.0 (2011), p. 95; T. Hall, Nuclear Politics: The 
History of Nuclear Power in Britain (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1986), p. 62; Welsh, Mobilising 
Modernity, pp. 98f. 
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and became one of the ways in which the fire’s impact could be actualised by the public. Oral 
respondents frequently referenced the sight of a UKAEA Land Rover patrolling the country 
lanes in the surrounding area taking milk samples for testing, recalling news bulletins which 
showed thousands of litres of milk being poured down the drain.601 The interviews 
demonstrated that the destruction of local milk functioned as a form of collective memory 
which helped actualise the threat posed to locals’ well-being. This overwhelmingly superseded 
the imaginary of nuclear safety that had largely characterised the period up until this point, 
forcing locals to reconcile with the potential harmful effects of radiation upon their bodies. 
Furthermore, it actively embedded dystopian imaginaries amongst local citizens who became 
concerned about the health effects of consuming local produce in the three days between the 
fire and the implementation of the milk ban.  
 
The milk ban embedded imaginaries of radiation hazard by disclosing the threat to 
public health from the consumption of local foodstuffs. Residents had received no warning to 
stop consuming other types of local produce whilst the fire had spewed contamination onto the 
surrounding countryside over the previous days. Interviewees recalled that they had been 
consuming local vegetables, fruit, and milk for days before they were informed of its potential 
hazards.602 Dorothy Bateman explained that “they never once came to monitor the garden, we 
grew and ate our own vegetables and fruit. But we’ve never been checked, and nobody has 
ever come to ask us anything.” This omission fed into a narrative of victimhood and 
 
601 J. Johnson, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by G. Wilkinson, 24 June 2010, p. 6; K. 
Smith, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 19 March 2010, p. 10; Author’s 
interview with Isobel George, 6 March 2019.  
602 E. Dawson, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by G. Wilkinson, 13 July 2010, p. 26; A. 
Barnes, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by G. Wilkinson, 4 August 2020, p. 11; Interview 
with M. Davis, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 16 December 2010, p. 24. 
It was also later established that milk up to three times the permissible level had been sold in Grasmere, a fact 
which was omitted from the Medical Research Council’s report into the fire, published in November 1957. 
(Observer, 3 January 1988.). 
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exploitation, as local people like Dorothy engaged with the dominant power relations of the 
nuclear industry, remarking that “we were very naive and trusting. But we weren’t being 
protected by anybody, not the NRPB [National Radiological Protection Board], the 
government, not Copeland environmental health – nobody.”603 The image of milk being 
destroyed therefore provided tangible evidence of an otherwise invisible disaster, formalising 
the danger posed to the local public through their consumption of local food contaminated with 
harmful levels of radioactivity. In this way, the milk ban espoused the fire’s direct threat to 
public health and helped embed dystopian imaginaries of radiation hazard by pointing to the 
possible health effects of consuming local produce. Furthermore, the milk ban had a series of 
negative effects on local farmers, who suffered financially from the after-effects of the fire on 
local markets. 
 
3.5: Farming Communities. 
 
Tracing the contours of public sentiment during this period, it is possible to identify an 
increasing current of anxiety within farming communities in the aftermath of the fire, as 
farmers repeatedly identified radiation as a threat to their income and livelihoods. Whilst this 
sentiment failed to manifest into any form of direct protest towards the UKAEA or Sellafield 
itself, we can see a growing pattern of concern towards radiation as farmers embedded a series 
of undesirable futures characterised by the negative effects of radioactive contamination. This 
was centred around overlapping concerns regarding the economic impact of radiation upon 
farming economies and anxieties about the radiobiological threat to cattle, arable land, and 
farm produce. In the first instance, farmers were particularly aggrieved, as having been 
 
603 McSorley, Living in the Shadow, p. 24.  
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identified as farms affected by radiation, many lost income as the price of their produce and 
land fell in the months following the fire. 
 
The Milk Marketing Board initially reimbursed farmers for the milk that had been 
poured away. However, compensation only continued for a month and many farmers suffered 
from long-term financial losses as people refused to buy their produce and land prices 
plummeted.604 Whilst restrictions only lasted for a few days in some areas, interviewees 
remarked that “it wasn’t a seven day wonder, cos the aftermath took a lot of dealing with, you 
know,” referencing the long-term effects of the ban on local markets.605 Wynne, Waterton, and 
Grove-White have noted that “farmers’ dependency on annual lambing or full quotas of milk 
means that their economic viability rests heavily upon environmental factors”, identifying that 
“any public perception of radioactive blight on farm products” places farming families in an 
economically vulnerable position.606 This was especially true for the sheep farming fell 
communities, who relied upon the Autumn sale of sheep for much of their annual income. For 
these communities, the timing of the fire could not have been worse, falling in the middle of 
the most important time of the year.607  
 
 
604 In fact, many farmers saw this as a financial opportunity and profiteered from this scheme in the short-term 
by watering down the milk and registering larger yields than normal. Multiple respondents stressed that milk 
production increased during the weeks following the fire, as canny Cumbrian farmers sought to capitalise on the 
chaos by adding water to the milk levels. One interviewee recalled that “because nobody was bothering any 
longer measuring cream content or volumes of milk, it was all being poured down a drain and the farmers were 
being compensated… all sorts of allegations went around like the milk yield shooting up!” (I. Rule, ‘Sellafield 
Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 19 November 2010, p. 6; K. Smith, ‘Sellafield 
Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 19 March 2010, p. 11; West Cumberland News, 26 
October 1957, p. 11; See also National Archives, ‘Farm Forum – A Momentous Meeting’, 31 October 1957, 
(MAF 298/54). 
605 D. Crellin, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 4 March 2010, p. 12. 
606 Wynne, Waterton and Grove-White, Public Perceptions, p. 8. 
607 “Sheep farms, particularly fell-farms, earn most of their annual income in the few autumn weeks from 
September to November.” See, J. Rebanks, The Shepherd’s Life (Penguin: London, 2015), p. 108. 
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Local newspaper reports emphasised the incident’s “disastrous aftermath for the 
farming community”, estimating losses of £50,000 as the public stopped purchasing local 
products.608 Reports from the period referenced the substantial financial losses “incurred by 
farmers through falls in livestock price and the refusal of housewives to buy meat, eggs and 
vegetables produced in the banned areas.”609 These narratives emerged in the national press, 
with the Daily Mirror acknowledging farmers’ desperate attempts to “convince the people 
outside the area that the farms, the livestock and the vegetables in Cumberland were worth 
buying.”610 Animals from restricted areas were marked with yellow paint, creating what one 
market dealer called “a buyer resistance [to their livestock],” as a number of disgruntled 
farmers complained to the National Farmers’ Union (NFU) that their cattle were “doomed and 
their farms valueless.”611 A report in the local West Cumberland News and Star also explained 
that police at an Exeter market had forbidden a farmer to sell a group of cows originating from 
nearby Ulverston, due to fears that they would be too radioactive for consumption.612 These 
incidents not only emphasised the deleterious effects of the nuclear industry upon farming 
economies but aligned with farmers’ existing prejudices against the nuclear industry as an 
 
608 Farmers received £50,000 as compensation for 3,050,000 litres of milk which were destroyed. (National 
Archives, ‘Copy letter sent to Mr. Drake from Donald Perrott’, 25 October 1957, p. 2, (AB 8/763); West 
Cumberland News, 26 October 1957, p. 1.) 
609 West Cumberland News, 26 October 1957, p. 1. Furthermore, the price of land plummeted as local farms 
became tainted by the negative publicity that surrounded the area. In particular, Lorna Arnold’s study of the fire 
references one farmer who, beholden by public anxieties regarding the contamination of his crops and livestock 
sought to sell his farm and move further away from Sellafield. Unable to find a willing buyer, he was ultimately 
forced to accept a price considerably below market value for his land. See, Arnold, Windscale, p. 70. 
610 Daily Mirror, 18 October 1957, p. 17. Press reports noted the “concern amongst the agricultural population 
about the effects, if not of radioactivity on their stock, at least of the reception that same stock will have if it is 
put on the market.” Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, (Nuclear Energy Folder); see also National 
Archives, ‘Notes of a Meeting Held in Mr. Crooks’ Office 2.30 p.m, 25 October 1957’, p. 2, (MAF 250/210). 
611 Hall, Nuclear Politics, p. 59; National Archives, (MAF 298/54), National Archives, ‘Farm Forum – A 
Momentous Meeting’, 31 October 1957, p. 1, (MAF 298/54). 
612 Newspaper reports explain that contaminated cattle were marked with yellow paint, and their irradiated 
thyroid glands were removed and buried “no less than two feet below ground… as a precaution.” (West 
Cumberland News and Star, 17 October 1957; West Cumberland News and Star, 23 October 1957.) 
 220 
incursion upon rural life. This helped embed an imaginary of the nuclear industry (and more 
specifically radiation) as a dystopian imposition upon farmers’ livelihoods and way of life. 
 
Intertwined with fears about declining revenues and ongoing debates about public 
health, farmers were also deeply concerned about the long-term effects of radiation upon their 
produce, cattle, and arable land. The fire thus helped embed dystopian imaginaries of nuclear 
technologies as a threat to farming interests, the wellbeing of their animals and crops, and 
public health more broadly. Internal correspondence within the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Foods made just after the fire recognised that “there is a great deal of uneasiness 
in this country both among the general public and the farming community about radioactivity. 
This has been made worse by the Windscale accident.”613 Referencing contemporary attitudes, 
local residents recalled that “there was certainly a lot of panic in the area” as farmers “were 
frightened that contaminated dust or something’d settle on their fields.”614 Fears about radiation 
were not altogether new, as farming communities had expressed concerns about radiation on 
several occasions throughout the previous decade. As early as 1947, Labour M.P. for 
Whitehaven, Frank Anderson, voiced the concerns of local farmers that atomic science could 
induce some form of “industrial disease” within the area, expressing unease about the effects 
of radiation, which were “not well known.”615 Likewise, in 1955 only two years before the fire, 
the West Cumberland News and Star noted the “widespread alarm throughout West 
Cumberland” caused by a French newspaper article which claimed that Sellafield’s radioactive 
emissions could render local animals sterile, whilst a series of articles in the Sunday Chronicle 
investigating the effects of radiation at nuclear facilities had, in the words of one local author, 
 
613 National Archives, ‘Letter to Mr. Pennison from unknown author,’ (MAF 298/68).  
614 A. Barnes, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by G. Wilkinson, 4 August 2020, p. 15; D. 
Crellin, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 4 March 2010, p. 11.  
615 Bracey, Industry and the Countryside, p. 104. 
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left the farming community “deeply perturbed.”616 This suggests that prior to the fire there was, 
if not a deep rooted anxiety, but an underlying scepticism amongst the farming community 
about the possible effects radiation could have. The fire tapped into this undercurrent of 
concern, formalising and helping embed a dystopian imaginary of nuclear technologies as a 
threat to the economic interests of the farming community and the health of the public more 
broadly. 
 
In the aftermath of the fire farmers increasingly voiced their anxieties about the long-
term consequences of radiation. Writing in 1960, Sinclair observed that “for the first time since 
the factory began operating, anxiety began to creep into the minds of the farming community”, 
who expressed concerns about levels of radiation in the local area and the ability of scientists 
to control them.617 This is reflected in oral accounts, as residents explained, “I think one of 
their problems was after the fire when it was admitted that actually some of the boffins didn’t 
know what to do. That, for the locals was their worst sort of fear, that there was this sort of 
dragon in their midst and did the boffins really know how to cope with the emergencies and 
the crises?”618 This passage exposes the profound sense of vulnerability felt within local 
farming communities, as the fire exposed the industry’s inability to adequately protect them. 
Local farmer Ken Mawson explained that we “lost confidence there and it’s never been fully 
regained since.”619 The level of concern amongst local farmers culminated in an emergency 
public meeting of the NFU in the local village of Egremont, where farmers demanded a full 
government inquiry “into the effect of radiation not only on milk, but on farm-stock.”620 Here, 
 
616 West Cumberland News and Star, 12 November 1955. 
617 Sinclair, Windscale, p. 6. 
618 M. Todd ‘Ambleside Oral History Group’, interviewed by J. Pilgrim, 2013, p. 10. 
619 K. Mawson, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 6 August 2010, p. 18. 
620 West Cumberland Times, 23 October 1957, p. 12; see also, The Times, 23 October 1957, p. 6. 
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farmers expressed their profound concerns about the potential long-term implications of the 
incident, constructing imagined futures of land and animals harmed by radioactivity. 
 
Expressing the concerned views of members, an NFU spokesman told the local press 
that whilst business interests may be satisfied that the fire represented no threat to their 
operations, “farmers have still to be convinced that there is no long-term effect on their 
livestock through the contamination of grass by iodine.”621 A similar meeting in the village of 
Gosforth a couple of days later drew “the biggest gathering of NFU members a Whitehaven 
branch meeting has ever attracted.”622 Local reporter William Newall, who attended the 
meeting, described the tone of the meeting as extremely tense, with an eight-man panel of 
experts from the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Foods (MAFF) and the UKAEA being 
“thrown to the lions”, subjected to a group of concerned farmers who “fired a barrage” of 
questions at them.623 Newall describes how farmers interrogated the officials, asking “would 
young calves fed on milk and growing stock running out on grass, feel any after-effects of 
iodine radiation?” and demanding “what assurance can we have that a radio-active fallout will 
not occur again?”624 These public meetings demonstrate how the imaginary of nuclear safety 
broke down amongst local farming communities, who imagined a dystopian future 
characterised by the threat of radiation and the long-term effects of prolonged exposure upon 
their land and livestock.  
 
 
621 At this meeting Windscale Manager H.G. Davey told farmers not to be concerned by “the rumours flying 
about”, impressing upon them that “it is in your interest to see that confidence is maintained- first, among 
yourselves [and] in agricultural products in this area,” warning farmers that “unfounded rumours [should] have 
no place in your attitude towards the future.” (West Cumberland News, 26 October 1957, p. 11; West 
Cumberland Times, 23 October 1957, p. 12.) 
622 West Cumberland News, 26 October 1957, p. 11. 
623 National Archives, ‘Farm Forum – A Momentous Meeting’, 31 October 1957, p. 1, (MAF 298/54); West 
Cumberland News, 26 October 1957, pp. 11.  
624 Ibid. 
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Concerned about the mounting levels of tension amongst farming communities, 
government officials sought to protect the imaginary of nuclear safety by suppressing the true 
extent of radiation releases. This points to official efforts to embed and stabilise the utopian 
imaginary in the face of increasing public resistance. In the period following the fire, 
government ministers wrote to one another with suggestions to placate anxious farmers and to 
“do something to satisfy farming opinion that the government had a firm hold on the situation” 
and “allay the general uneasiness.”625 It was therefore decided to amend the radiation figures 
for the period prior to the fire to cover-up previous incidences of radioactive contamination.  
 
Beginning in 1955, the UKAEA had deliberately and secretly released substantial 
quantities of radioactive strontium-90 into the atmosphere “as part of a deliberate and organised 
scientific experiment.”626 Officials, already under considerable pressure from farming 
interests, expressed their concern that this would “cause considerable alarm” if, in the aftermath 
of the fire, the public became aware of this.627 Seeking to mitigate a public backlash, officials 
authorised that the limit for human exposure to strontium-90 could be raised eight-fold, in order 
to retrospectively account for the increased discharges and thus “remove all need for concern 
 
625 National Archives, ‘E.P Keely, ‘New Permissive Levels for Radio-isotopes: Meeting with Sir Harold 
Himsworth and Sir William Slater, 3rd November, 1958’, (MAF 298/68).  
626 These emissions had first been discovered in 1955 when a study into local contamination found excessively 
high levels of radiostrontium in the district around Windscale. (National Archives, ‘Standby Statement,’ (HLG 
120/297) Despite this, these findings were not released to either the public, or the wider scientific community 
and had been “suppressed, until it became unavoidable, in the course of reporting on the 1957 fire, to disclose 
it.” (National Archives, ‘Letter to Mr. Pennison from unknown author,’ (MAF 298/68); National Archives, ‘F.J 
Ward to Smith, Officer of the Minister for Science, 6 April, 1960,’ (HLG 120/297) Whilst the matter had been 
brought to the attention of Prime Minister Harold MacMillan, he “gave instructions that the matter should be 
kept secret.” (National Archives, (AB 16/2689); Welsh, Mobilising Modernity, p. 88; McSorley, Living in the 
Shadow, p. 110; National Archives, ‘Letter to A.C. Spark from unknown author’, 20 th April 1959, (MAF 
298/68); National Archives, (HLG 120/297); Arnold, Windscale, p. 37. 
627 National Archives, ‘14 March, 1960’, (HLG 120/297). In a private meeting, Sir Harold Himsworth, the 
distinguished secretary of the Medical Research Council, acknowledged “how difficult the situation would be if 
recent findings in the Windscale area for SR.90 in milk had become known.” He recognised that, “the figures 
disclosed around Windscale works would give rise to a good deal of public anxiety when they become known 
unless very carefully handled.” (National Archives, ‘E.P Keely, ‘New Permissive Levels for Radio-isotopes: 
Meeting with Sir Harold Himsworth and Sir William Slater, 3rd November, 1958’, (MAF 298/68). 
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regarding human health.”628 This drastically “watered down” the severity of the releases, 
ensuring that they could be presented as having amounted to nowhere near the authorised 
limits, despite the fact that they had, at time of release, exceeded these limits.629 This speaks to 
the changing pattern of public attitudes in the aftermath of the Windscale fire. Whilst 
previously public awareness and concern about radioactivity was so low that the UKAEA felt 
able to deliberately expose the local population to excessive quantities of radiation as part of a 
scientific experiment, following the fire the government were forced to carefully stage-manage 
the release of radiation figures so as to stabilise the imaginary of nuclear safety. This suggests 
that the fire contributed to an increasing awareness and anxiety towards radiation more broadly, 
as farming communities imagined the undesirable health effects this would have on their cattle, 
land, and public health. Indeed, the release of these figures did very little to assuage the 
concerns of local farmers, who embedded imaginaries of radiation hazard by pointing to 
deformities and abnormalities amongst their livestock in the aftermath of the fire.  
 
In the aftermath of the fire, farmers noticed a series of peculiar, unfamiliar health 
problems amongst their animals, and began to correlate the strange array of defects with the 
radiation they received from the plant. Examining lay responses to nuclear contamination, 
historian Davide Orsini has argued that “in order to make invisible risks (such as radiation) 
visible, nonexperts and experts alike rely on interpretations of environmental and bodily signs 
to provide practical evidence through which they can objectify and represent risk in tangible 
 
628 This increased the permissible limits from 250 to 2000 Sieverts per gram of calcium in milk. Whilst the fire 
had made it impossible to suppress the releases indefinitely, public officials and ministers concocted a PR 
campaign through which they could strategically time the admission of the Strontium releases so as to minimise 
public resistance. (National Archives, ‘Letter to A.C. Spark from unknown author’, 20th April 1959, (MAF 
298/68); National Archives, ‘Standby Statement,’ (HLG 120/297) 
629 National Archives, ‘F.J Ward to A.P.G. Brown,’ 15 August 1960, (HLG 120/297). 
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ways.”630 Orsini’s study found that ordinary people infer nuclear risk by using environmental 
and biological signs as “inferential evidence for the presence or absence of 
radiocontamination.”631 He argues that local people, “lacking direct or indirect knowledge of 
the object (radiation) had to infer its presence or absence by observing their surroundings to 
see whether radiation effects, as imagined through abstractions of its conceivable 
consequences, were or were not evident.”632 For West Cumbrian farmers, the number of 
observed health defects amongst their cattle provided a form of empirical evidence which, 
whilst highly subjective, pointed towards the negative effects of radiation upon local animals. 
In this context, the strange array of mutations and abnormalities suffered by Cumbrian farm 
animals in the aftermath of the fire helped embed dystopian imaginaries of nuclear technologies 
as a threat to public health more broadly. One local farmer, Mr T. Wallbank, noticed that his 
cattle and poultry had begun suffering from severe lesions from late 1957 and into 1958. 
Observing similar incidences from other farms in the locale, he directly correlated these 
abnormalities to the effects of the Windscale fire and the Strontium releases, noting that the 
legions on the muzzles of his cows had not occurred prior to the fire and ceased in 1958, when 
Strontium contamination ended.633 A number of farmers noticed similar deformities amongst 
their livestock.634 In the 7 December 1958 edition of national newspaper the Sunday Graphic, 
local farmer Craven Hodgson wrote that he had spoken to several farmers who “had 
experienced trouble with their calving cows.”635 He added that half of his herd had shed their 
 
630 D. Orsini, ‘Signs of Risk: Materiality, History, and Meaning in Cold War Controversies over Nuclear 
Contamination,’ Comparative Studies in Society and History, 62.3 (2020), p. 522.  
631 Ibid., p. 540. 
632 Ibid., p. 536. 
633 National Archives, (AB 6/2072; NE75, NE75A; ARC 97/58; ARC 337 A/58; ARC 338/58; ARC 338 A/58; 
ARC 798 A/58; ARC 789 A/58; ARC 800/58); Arnold, Windscale, pp. 70f.) 
634  Cattle suffering from these ailments became known locally by the derisive moniker “atomic herds.” 
(Cumberland Evening Star, 18 September 1958 p. 7.) 
635 National Archives, Extract from Sunday Graphic, dated 7 December 1958, (AB 16/2328); R. Batten, ‘A 
Significant Moment in the Development of Nuclear Liability and Compensation,’ p. 100. 
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hair, leaving “large bare patches on their sides.”636 Other residents recalled the abnormally 
large number of dead sheep following the fire. One Sellafield employee later recounted that 
her Godmother had “looked out of her hotel window and saw sheep dead in the fields.”637 
Imagining the potential links between these issues and radiation exposure, a number of worried 
farmers, including Mr Wallbank pressed their cases for compensation with the NFU and their 
local M.P., Frank Anderson. 
 
 Despite efforts to gain recognition and compensation for their deformed cattle, MAFF 
and the NRPB rejected that these issues were related to Sellafield in any way. Anderson 
remained steadfast in his belief that “authorities had behaved, and were behaving badly in this 
manner, and were concealing vital evidence.”638 Likewise, George Curwen, local NFU 
chairman also complained of under-hand tactics, stating that “naturally the Atomic Energy 
Authority want us to delay our claims… give them enough time and they’ll dodge the issue 
altogether.”639 Here, the lack of trust between the public and the nuclear industry produced 
specific ways of thinking about the relationship between sick cattle and radiation exposure. In 
his study of radiation risk in the US, François Diaz-Maurin has argued that the inability of 
nuclear authorities to “take seriously the anecdotal evidence provided by the local community 
can only exacerbate public distrust. And this distrust is more likely to form when experts are 
recognised as outsiders to the community affected by an environmental and health problem.”640 
Here, various aspects of local resistance came into alignment, as prejudices about 
 
636 National Archives, Extract from Sunday Graphic, dated 7 December 1958, (AB 16/2328). 
637 Daily Mail, 19 March 2011. <dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1367776/UK-Government-covered-nuclear-
reactor-blaze-caused-death-cancer.html> [accessed 5 July, 2019].) 
638 National Archives, ‘Mr Frank Anderson M. P’, 11 September 1958, p. 57, (MAF 298/54).  
639 Sunday Express, ‘Windscale Farmers Talk of New Fear’, 5 January 1958, p. 3. 
640 F. Diaz-Maurin, ’Chronic Long-term Risk of Low-level Radiation Exposure: Bridging the Lay/expert 
Divide’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 74.5 (2018), p. 338. 
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insider/outsider identities combined with anxieties about nuclear secrecy to heighten public 
concerns about the effects of radiation. This embedded disparate strands of the dystopian 
imaginary, as farmers’ cultural biases fed into and co-produced attitudes towards radiation as 
a significant threat to public health. 
 Tracing the evolution of this imaginary, it becomes clear that it took shape and became 
embedded amongst farming communities in the months and years following the fire, as its 
long-term consequences became more readily apparent. Contrary to popular forms of cultural 
opposition, this resistance was not characterised by direct action, or even clear patterns of social 
organisation, but manifested itself in a deep-rooted cultural opposition towards the nuclear 
industry amongst local farming communities. Exploring their social interactions and indeed 
their conscious choice not to interact with the industry, we can see that farming communities 
held, articulated, and embedded dystopian imaginaries of radiation hazard in subtle and in-
direct ways that are not immediately obvious if one is looking for patterns of direct action or 
protest. 
The sociotechnical imaginary emerges as a potent way of exploring and historicising 
localised resistance, revealing that at times farming communities internalised their resistance 
to the nuclear industry and expressed it as much in what they didn’t do as what they did. This 
understanding takes its lead from the agency of the imagination as an intellectual plane capable 
of performing social work and transcending the often preferred and over-privileged categories 
of deeds and actions.641 As Wynne, Waterton and Grove-White have demonstrated, just 
because ordinary people do not engage in displays of direct and active resistance, does not 
mean they are accepting or supporting of them.642 On the contrary, citizens “may be at best 
 
641 S. Jasanoff, and S. Kim, (eds.), Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication 
of Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), pp. 1- 33. 
642 Wynne, Waterton and Grove-White, Public Perceptions, p. 24.  
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ambivalent about the hazardous activity and its controlling bodies, but they do not necessarily 
express these misgivings or worse in public, because they feel they would be exposed to 
denigration, [or] that it would be a futile protest.”643 Often, a lack of direct opposition to a 
hazard is taken as a sign of the public’s tacit support, or even apathy towards it. If one scratches 
beneath the surface however, this veneer of public acceptance is proved superficial, as 
ostensibly ‘supportive’ citizens are found to hold deeply embedded resistant attitudes towards 
potential hazards and the organisations that control them. This is particularly true of local 
farmers, who remained deeply convinced that they had suffered from the effects of radiation 
and that this had been suppressed by the nuclear authorities. 
 
After four years of consistent appeals and letter-writing to various government bodies 
and figures, Mr Wallbank gave up his pursuit of compensation in 1961. Still unsatisfied by the 
findings, he concluded that the government would never own up to the true extent of 
contamination, deciding that “it would be a waste of everybody's time to pursue his arguments 
any further.”644 The decision not to appeal further for compensation reveals how deeply 
embedded farmers’ mistrust in the nuclear industry had become- equally convinced that they 
had been exposed to harmful quantities of radiation and that the UKAEA would never admit 
any wrongdoing. The decision not to continue fighting the UKAEA on matters of radiation 
exposure and compensation should therefore be understood not as an act of defeat but 
paradoxically, an act of resistance which reveals not only the presence of dystopian imaginaries 
but their power as a social agent. Local farmers, such as, Mr Wallbank transcended the 
unfavourable power dynamics enacted over them by the nuclear industry, constructing 
subversive strands of knowledge which juxtaposed the might of the nuclear enterprise against 
 
643 Ibid. 
644 Arnold, Windscale, pp. 70f. 
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local farmers who did not have the power to challenge or prove the ill-effects of radiation 
exposure. In this way, the illusion of acceptance hid the farmers’ overt lack of trust in the 
nuclear authorities and the deeply embedded nature of dystopian imaginaries of radiation 
hazard. The permanence of this imaginary becomes particularly apparent when we look at how 
farmers responded to the debates over radiation following the Chernobyl disaster over thirty 
years later, in 1986. Here, farmers demonstrated how dystopian imaginaries of nuclear secrecy 
and radiation hazard had become ingrained within agricultural communities, responding to 
official claims about radioactive contamination by mobilising their experiences of having been 
misled and denied compensation following the 1957 fire. 
 
Local farmers were deeply suspicious of official attempts to monitor and restrict the 
sale of agricultural produce in the aftermath of Chernobyl, articulating concerns that the 
disaster was being used as a smokescreen to cover-up another incident at Sellafield. In his study 
of the socio-cultural effects of Chernobyl, sociologist Brian Wynne found that Cumbrian 
farming communities refuted scientific claims on the basis of “the untrustworthy way in which 
the experts and authorities had treated them over the 1957 fire, and the longer history of 
perceived misinformation surrounding Sellafield.”645 He found that many farmers embedded 
their reading of Chernobyl “firmly within the context of the unpersuasive and untrustworthy 
nuclear institutional body language which had denigrated them for thirty years or more.”646 
Nearly thirty years after the Windscale fire, farmers framed their responses to Chernobyl 
through imaginaries of nuclear secrecy and radiation threat. One explained that “this hasn’t 
come from Russia… not with that lot on our doorstep!”647 Public scepticism was not just 
restricted to members of the farming community, either. Interviewees recalled that it was “not 
 
645 B. Wynne, ‘Misunderstood Misunderstanding’, p. 291. 
646 Ibid. 
647 Ibid., pp. 288- 291.  
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only farmers that said, oh it's all come from Sellafield,’” explaining that “there were still locals 
that said it was nothing to do with Chernobyl, it was Sellafield where it came from.”648 This 
attests to the role of the Windscale fire in dissolving the trust relations between the local public 
and the nuclear industry, in so doing subverting the utopian STIM and deeply embedding 
dystopian imaginaries of nuclear secrecy and radiation threat. The following section will 
examine this process by focusing upon nuclear workers, arguing that official attempts to blame 
the fire on operating staff dissolved the trust relations between the UKAEA and local workers, 
who responded by scrutinising the levels of safety within the plant, embedding dystopian 
imaginaries about the long-term effects of radiation upon their bodies.   
 
3.6: Nuclear Workers. 
 
 The industry’s treatment of its workforce both during and in the aftermath of the fire 
further eroded the public’s trust in the UKAEA and helped embed dystopian imaginaries of 
radiation hazard. Many workers had been only yards away from the burning reactor whilst the 
fire raged, unprotected and unaware of the deadly radiation seeping into the atmosphere around 
them. Despite this, staff were only advised to take precautionary measures three days after the 
fire began and around twelve hours since it had been discovered.649 In many cases, workers 
had not been officially informed of an incident, but were aware that something was seriously 
wrong from the high readings on their radiation monitors. Unsure of the radiation source, 
workers in buildings adjacent to the burning reactor had shut off air conditioning units in a 
desperate attempt to minimise the amount of radiation they received. Interviewees described 
 
648 K. Mawson, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 6 August 2010, p. 41. 
649 Inside Story: Our Reactor Is on Fire, D. Blakeway. London: BBC, 1990. 
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that their monitors had gone “absolutely bananas” as they frantically tried to reduce their 
exposure by taping up window and door seals. One man trapped in an adjacent building recalled 
his horror at measuring “a beam of contam coming through the keyhole… like a torch beam.”650 
Concerned staff reported their high exposure readings to plant managers who assured them that 
their exposure posed no threat to their health and that any contamination would be “walk[ed] 
off on the way home.”651 Deeply perturbed by the lack of warning and futile advice given to 
them, concerned workers appealed to their union representatives, who declared “a state of 
dispute… until independent investigators examined the site.”652 Union members expressed a 
clear lack of faith in the UKAEA, demanding that “we should get in an outsider to tell us the 
truth!”653 This reflected workers’ concerns that official reports were being “fiddled” and that 
there were “things on the site contaminated to a degree which could not possibly be safe.”654 
This alludes to the cyclical relationship between public trust and nuclear concern, as the 
UKAEA’s failure to communicate with its workers embedded dystopian imaginaries of 
radioactive danger. The subsequent governmental report played a key role in this process by 
revealing official attempts to cover-up the true cause and severity of the fire, calling into 
question the safety of local workers.  
 
 Published as a governmental White Paper on 8 November 1957, the official report 
fabricated evidence which obfuscated the government’s role in causing the fire and instead 
publicly blamed the Windscale staff. This provoked a sharp backlash amongst workers who 
felt an acute sense of injustice at being publicly blamed for a fire that they had either been 
 
650 G. Whitney, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 29 July 2010, p. 13.  
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responsible for extinguishing, or knew nothing about. Lorna Arnold’s history of the fire gives 
a comprehensive overview of Prime Minister Harold MacMillan’s decision to amend the 
contents of the government’s internal report into the fire, conducted by Sir William Penney.655 
Whilst Penney had assigned collective responsibility for the fire to the atomic energy 
establishment and the political demand for a thermonuclear bomb, MacMillan’s public report 
attributed the fire “to an error of judgement by operating staff.”656 MacMillan’s paper was 
designed as a sanitised version of events, which, by linking the phrases “faults of judgement” 
with the inherent “weaknesses of organisation” throughout the UKAEA, was intended to 
exonerate the Windscale staff, whilst retaining the government’s credibility.657 Nonetheless, 
the White Paper “seemed to point an accusing finger at certain avoidable mistakes by a very 
few, comparatively junior staff.”658 Whilst this satisfied political desires for a full inquiry into 
the fire and appeased the majority of the general public, it became a major source of local 
opposition amongst the Windscale staff who felt “deeply wronged” at being made the 
scapegoats for the fire.659 Characterising attitudes amongst ordinary men, Deputy Works 
Manager Tom Tuohy later referred to the government officials who shifted the blame onto his 
 
655 Penney’s report found that the political demand for a megaton thermonuclear bomb had been the major cause 
of the disaster. MacMillan’s private memoirs reveal he was gravely concerned about the Penney Report 
provoking a public backlash or, worse still, undermining Britain’s newly nuclear alliance with the United States. 
MacMillan considered, “the report, as it stands, might put in jeopardy our chance of getting Congress to agree to 
the President’s proposal.” (Arnold, Windscale, pp. 80- 83.) In response, he ordered that all copies of the report 
be destroyed, stating that “it is extremely important… that there is no leakage of the Penney Report.” (For 
further reading, see Arnold, Windscale, pp. 82- 96; National Archives, (PREM 19/2140); National Archives, 
(MAF 298/160); Hamblin, Poison in the Well, pp. 122f; A. Horne, MacMillan: The Official Biography (London: 
MacMillan, 2008), p. 53.) 
656 Welsh has argued that “the need for political legitimation was particularly intense as the accident revealed 
that the nuclear enterprise had proceeded ahead of the necessary regulatory frameworks before adequate public 
health and safety measures could be ensured.” (Welsh, Mobilising Modernity, p. 97.) 
657 Arnold, Windscale, p. 87.  
658 Ibid. 
659 Official UKAEA historian Lorna Arnold, later wrote of the Windscale men, “after an accident which had 
become inevitable, they had acted with outstanding courage, resourcefulness and devotion to duty. Yet their 
actions had been publicly blamed at the highest level as contributing materially to the fire.” (Arnold, Windscale, 
pp. 117, 135; National Archives, (AB 16/2318); National Archives, (AB 38/51); National Archives, (AB 
16/2698). 
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men as “a shower of bastards.”660 Chief Engineer Christopher Hinton was equally outraged and 
expressed his disappointment at the treatment of the Windscale staff, who had been subjected 
to significant criticism in the national media.661 
 
 Workers were pilloried in the national press who made repeated reference to “human 
misjudgement”, “inexperienced operators” and staff “not well qualified scientifically for the 
job.”662 The Daily Express even went so far as to identify one worker who they deemed 
responsible for “the initial mistake” which led to the fire.663 The unfortunate worker identified 
had not been on duty at the time and eventually received an apology from the newspaper.664 
Plagued by negative media coverage, workers appealed to their staff association, the Institute 
of Professional Civil Servants who produced a memorandum for the UKAEA, in which they 
raised nine major objections and sought to “defend its members whose professional integrity 
had been impugned” by the inaccurate judgements made by the White Paper and the subsequent 
media coverage.665 This incited a tremendous amount of acrimony amongst workers who 
bitterly resented the blame being passed onto them by the government. Lorna Arnold described 
that “the reaction then was very, very bitter because they felt that blame which was not theirs 
had been, by implication loaded onto them, by being made to look as though they did not know 
what they were doing and that it was all their fault.”666 Similarly, a senior figure working at the 
Atomic Energy Research Establishment at Harwell recalled that “I think it was absolutely 
 
660 Daily Telegraph, ‘Tom Tuohy Obituary’ <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1582801/Tom-
Tuohy.html> [accessed 23 January, 2020]. 
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disgraceful to then cast the blame onto junior people who had no means of defending 
themselves.”667 This was a sentiment shared by the Windscale men, one of whom explained 
that “the fact that they seemed to be blaming people for what they did, and the wrong people 
at that... I think was very bad... we were resentful at the time.”668 Another described the White 
Paper as “a terrible shock”, admitting that “that attitude lives on now, even fifty years later.”669 
For the men who had fought the fire and received substantial quantities of radiation in their 
heroic attempts to bring it under control, this represented a particularly cruel blow; a dystopian 
imposition from an unscrupulous executive intent on pursuing nuclear technologies whilst 
remaining ignorant of the human or psychological cost to its employees. This subverted the 
imaginary of public confidence in nuclear science, as the trust between political leaders, 
nuclear scientists, and ordinary people began to unravel. Supplanting this imaginary, the fire 
helped embed an alternative vision of the future whereby nuclear workers could not trust the 
authorities to safeguard their interests or tell the truth about nuclear incidents. This had a 
profound impact upon the long-term attitudes of ordinary workers who, having witnessed the 
industry’s duplicity first-hand, began to question the levels of safety within the plant. 
 
 In the years following the fire, workers, decoupled from their political and operational 
loyalties by their callous mismanagement at the hands of the UKAEA, began to question the 
long-term health effects caused by their fire-fighting efforts. As one local put it, “if the 
government had covered up the cause of the fire and blamed innocent men, what else could 
they be hiding?”670 Here workers, attentive to their inability to access exposure records and 
their general lack of autonomy, engaged with the potential dystopian consequences caused by 
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their over-exposure during the fire, carving out a psychological and ontological space in which 
they considered the possible effects of radiation on their bodies. Exploring this process, the 
following section will again demonstrate the reciprocal relationship between public trust in 
nuclear authorities and attitudes towards nuclear safety, as weakening trust relations helped 
embed dystopian imaginaries of radiation danger and nuclear hazard. 
 
 The government’s cover-up of the cause of the fire caused workers to query the true 
amount of radioactivity they had received. Official records indicated that all the men who had 
tackled the fire had been kitted out with respirators, film badges, and protective clothing.671 
Conversely, oral history interviews with workers who had fought the fire revealed that there 
was little concern for the safety of the men tackling the blaze, who heavily disputed the 
radiation readings provided and asserted their own levels of exposure. Former employee, Joe 
Farrell argued that scant attention was paid to safety during the fire, and massive radiation 
doses went unregistered.672 Another worker remembered that there were very few safety 
precautions taken. He explained that “I was called up from the company hostel where I lived, 
given a pole and told to get on with it. We would simply post the burning fuel elements out of 
the [reactor] channels as best we could.”673 This was an explanation accepted by future BNFL 
board member Harold Bolter, who recalled that “it was a matter of all hands to the pump... 
there wasn't time to organise things properly.”674 The hurried nature of responses, coupled with 
the industry’s attempts to pin the blame onto innocent workers embedded dystopian 
imaginaries of radiation danger, as employees imagined a discrepancy between recorded and 
real exposure levels.  
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Many workers believed that they had been exposed to far more radiation than was 
recorded by the UKAEA, or indeed safe. Arthur Wilson, who had been on duty at the time the 
fire was discovered, recalled that “the ones who had to go in and sort out the mess, some of 
them got very high doses and I'm sure things weren't recorded properly then.”675 This was an 
allegation levelled by several workers, who raised concerns about the future ramifications these 
doses might have. One of these men, Piya Guneratne explained that “I have my grave doubts 
about the measurements taken in the 1950s. I am not satisfied that all the doses I have had in 
the nuclear industry have been recorded. I believe that for some doses you could multiply the 
amount five or six times to get the true figures.”676 This was a claim which was repeated in 
subsequent compensation cases, where the official record-keeping during the early days of the 
industry was revealed to be incredibly patchy and poorly documented.677 Deeply suspicious of 
the radiation levels they had received, workers revealed that they began testing the UKAEA’s 
measurements for proof of their over-exposure. These independent tests can be read as acts of 
resistance, as workers imagined official attempts to over-expose workers and suppress the 
evidence. 
 
Concerned that radiation levels were higher than the UKAEA were telling staff, Arthur 
Wilson explained that he began deliberately handing in over-exposed film badges to see if he 
was pulled out of working in radioactive areas of the plant and decontaminated, as per 
operational guidelines. He explained that “I decided to test them. I took my radiation badge 
 
675 McSorley, Living in the Shadow, p. 1. 
676 Ibid., p. 21. 
677 Bolter, Inside Sellafield, p. 40. (Pile foreman Edward Davis explained that “the radiation dose we were 
allowed to take then is much higher than it is today. I think if we took the same kind of dosages today there'd be 
questions asked in the House of Parliament… but that was life then.” (Windscale: Britain’s Biggest Nuclear 
Disaster, S. Aspinall. London: BBC, 2007.) 
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and sat it on top of a very radioactive source in the separation plant. I knew it was radioactive 
because I had a Geiger counter with me. I then went off and did a job in a nice clean area. I 
came back, got the badge, handed it in and waited. Not a beep out of them. That badge must’ve 
shown I was over exposed, there is no way round it.”678 For men like Arthur, the incongruity 
between their own figures and those given by the UKAEA was symptomatic of industry 
attempts to cover-up the true extent of their exposure. This embedded dystopian imaginaries 
of radiation as a threat to his health, converting “the merely imagined… into the durability of 
routines and things” in the form of an over-exposed radiation badge.679 Furthermore, the act of 
self-monitoring also served as a conscious attempt to resist the power structures which denied 
workers’ access to knowing the levels of radiation they had been exposed to. In his visual 
geography of the Chernobyl exclusion zone, Thom Davies has suggested that “without Geiger 
counters and scientific training, an individual has no way of knowing if their backyard is safe 
or ‘dirty.’” He argues that “self-monitoring serves as a way of re-asserting the power denied of 
local inhabitants.”680 The desire to self-monitor therefore represented something more than an 
attempt to establish radiation levels, but an act of resistance; a conscious and calculated act 
designed to subvert the unfavourable power dynamics enacted upon nuclear workers and local 
residents. In this way, workers like Arthur performed their resistance by constructing 
subversive strands of radiation knowledge, at once imagining and performing an alternative 
reality whereby workers were able to establish safety levels and transcend the industry’s 
control over radiation knowledge.  
 
 
678 McSorely, Living in the Shadow, pp. 2f. 
679 Jasanoff, ‘Imagined and Invented Worlds’, in S. Jasanoff, and S. Kim, (eds.), Dreamscapes of Modernity, p. 
323. 
680 T. Davies, ‘A Visual Geography of Chernobyl: Double Exposure’, International Labour and Working-Class 
History, 84.1 (2013), p. 127. 
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The awareness that the UKAEA were doctoring radiation figures prompted workers to 
speculate about the true amount of radiation they had been exposed to, imagining the potential 
consequences that this may have upon their bodies. This helped embed the imaginary of nuclear 
danger as citizens correlated health problems they had experienced in the years following the 
fire with the long-term effects of radiation on their bodies. Whilst these claims have always 
been vociferously denied by the UKAEA and later BNFL (although some cases have resulted 
in out-of-court settlements, which BNFL stressed were goodwill gestures and not an admission 
of guilt), they are indicative of the permanence and embedded nature of imaginaries of nuclear 
danger amongst sections of the community, for whom the radiobiological legacy of the 
Windscale fire can be found in the number of local people who have suffered from health issues 
and cancers in the years since.681 
 
During interviews, residents repeatedly stressed the links between their health problems 
and the 1957 fire. For locals who suffered from uncommon types of cancers or experienced 
significant health problems in their youth, these experiences reinforced imaginaries of nuclear 
danger, understood as a direct consequence of the Windscale fire. Alex Bryson, who grew up 
next to Sellafield explained that “there is no doubt in my mind that there is a link” between her 
thyroid cancer and the radiation dose she received during the fire. Alex was a child at the local 
girls’ school in 1957, one of a number of girls outside playing hockey whilst the reactor burned, 
a factor she directly correlated to her diagnosis with thyroid cancer, a type of cancer extremely 
uncommon and most commonly caused by exposure to radiation.682 One moving example came 
from former employee Cyril McManus, who had taken early retirement from Sellafield after 
receiving too much radiation. He described that he had become “a radiation leper”, 
 
681 Bolter, Inside Sellafield, p. 151.  
682 McSorley, Living in the Shadow, p. 15.  
 239 
simultaneously “a free-man, but plutonium exposed…”683 Having vividly engaged with the 
effects of radiation on his own body, Cyril tragically succumbed to cancer a few months after 
the interview. Likewise, former worker Piya Guneratne developed cancer of the lymph glands, 
a condition he too directly attributed to the fire. He explained that, “the radiation exposure that 
caused my cancer obviously came from the dose I received whilst I was at Windscale.”684 This 
was an all too common theme within the local community, as citizens sought to articulate 
coherent perspectives and imagine the effects of the Windscale fire upon their bodies. 
 
For many local people, the number of rare health problems experienced within the local 
community were proof that they had been over-exposed to radiation. One local woman 
explained how she grew up watching her neighbours suffer from rare types of cancer. She 
explained that “it is impossible to prove that the illnesses were caused by the fall-out from the 
fire, but we just knew.”685 Likewise, other residents interpreted the passing of family members 
through the lens of the Windscale fire: “My godmother died of cancer in her fifties. It was never 
established whether the disease was linked to her exposure to radiation, but our family certainly 
suspect she was one of Windscale’s many silent victims.”686 These examples show how local 
people disengaged with the narratives of industry and state which assured them that no health 
effects could be attributed to the fire. Instead, we see locals articulating subversive strands of 
 
683 C. McManus, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 12 March 2010, p. 47. 
684 He explained that, “my consultant at the royal infirmary is of the opinion, and so are his team of doctors, that 
this can only be caused by radiation.” (McSorley, Living in the Shadow, p. 21; ‘Links Between Nuclear Industry 
Workers and Leukaemia’, ITN News, 23 January 1992, <https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/video/links-
between-nuclear-industry-workers-and-leukemia-itn-news-footage/815904386> [accessed 2 September 2019]). 
Similarly, the widow of “Windscale’s Radioactive Man” Stan Ritson, one of the men who had pushed the 
burning fuel elements out the back of the blazing reactor with scaffolding poles, pressed for compensation 
following his premature death, aged just 50. In another case, Elizabeth Reay sued Sellafield for £150,000 
damages after her husband, George Reay, a Sellafield fitter died after a twelve-year fight with stomach cancer. 
(Bolter, Inside Sellafield, p. 164; McSorley, Living in the Shadow, p. 49.) 
685 Daily Mail, 19 March 2011. <dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1367776/UK-Government-covered-nuclear-
reactor-blaze-caused-death-cancer.html> [accessed 5 July, 2019]. 
686 Ibid. 
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radiation knowledge and embedding dystopian imaginaries of nuclear danger, constructing an 





This chapter has shown that the Windscale fire exposed the misleading nature of the 
utopian nuclear imaginary, challenging and in many cases overwriting imaginaries of nuclear 
safety. The accident not only provided irrefutable proof that nuclear technologies could go 
wrong but, by exposing official attempts to hide the threat that they posed to the public, eroded 
the local community’s trust in both the UKAEA and the government to adequately protect 
them. By analysing oral testimonies which provide a new and unique insight into the fire, 
alongside local and national newspaper articles and archival sources, we can see how declining 
public trust heightened citizens’ concerns about the threat that the fire, and radiation more 
broadly posed to public health. This helped embed dystopian imaginaries of radiation hazard 
as citizens were forced to articulate coherent perspectives on personal and public health 
through the lens of incomplete, partisan, and overtly misleading information provided by the 
nuclear industry. Engaging with this process through the lens of the STIM framework, we can 
see that the fire prompted a much greater degree of localised resistance than previous studies 
have acknowledged, as local citizens imagined the extent of their exposure to radiation, its 
effects upon the human body, and the long-term health implications that this may have upon 
them and their families. This also alludes to the delicate production of nuclear meaning making 
at both local and national scales, with the Windscale fire representing a watershed in social 
responses to nuclear technologies, as citizens began to increasingly publicly challenge official 
explanations and reassurances regarding their environmental effects. As the following chapter 
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will show, the period from the Windscale fire (1957) to the Windscale enquiry (1977) was 
characterised by the embedding of a dystopian nuclear imaginary which highlighted the 
environmental, radiobiological, social, and ethical implications of nuclear technologies to resist 




4: The ‘Windscale Inquiry’. 
 
This chapter will focus on the decision to reprocess foreign nuclear fuels at Sellafield 
and the Local Public Inquiry surrounding the subsequent construction of the Thermal Oxide 
Reprocessing Plant (known as THORP) on the Sellafield site.687 The ‘Windscale Inquiry’ as it 
became known, offers a window into the contested and fluid nature of nuclear culture during 
the 1970s. Taking this focus, this chapter will argue that the Windscale Inquiry provided a 
highly public ‘contact zone’ between competing nuclear imaginaries, as the officially 
maintained utopian imaginary clashed with a new dystopian STIM which extended issues of 
environmentalism, secrecy, state power and its geographic distribution, domestic governance, 
and morality into debates around nuclear technologies.688 Tracing the emergence of this 
dystopian imaginary, I will demonstrate that the inquiry produced new kinds of resistance 
towards nuclear technologies, which were not only predicated upon their viability and 
necessity, but also towards the state and methods of governance that sustained them. I argue 
that nuclear reprocessing became a conduit for wider social inequalities and their spatial 
components, representative of a nefarious ‘nuclear state’, socially and geographically detached 
from the British public and in particular, ‘peripheral’ communities where these technologies 
would be located. Ultimately, this saw the localised forms of resistance witnessed in the 
previous chapter give way to more widespread resistance amongst the national public, as 
ordinary citizens (often assembled in organised groups) inextricably linked the expansion of 
the nuclear industry with dystopian environmental, social, and moral futures. This develops the 
final strand of this chapter, which argues that the inquiry represents an important window into 
 
687 The name ‘Local Public Inquiry’, whilst the inquiry’s official title, is somewhat misleading as it suggests the 
inquiry was largely a local issue. On the contrary, the inquiry attracted a great deal of national and international 
interest and involved a number of national NGOs, pressure groups, and global experts. 
688 The term ‘contact zone’ borrows from Mary Louise Pratt’s interpretation, and will be covered in more detail 
in the subsequent pages. See, M. Pratt, ‘Arts of the Contact Zone’, Profession, 91.0 (1991), p. 34. 
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social attitudes towards nuclear technologies during the 1970s, where scant historiographical 
attention has been directed.689 This contributes to the broader argument that the anti-nuclear 
politics of the 1980s were directly shaped by the dystopian nuclear imaginary that emerged and 
took shape throughout the 1977 Windscale Inquiry.  
 
Focusing on the 1970s, this chapter sits within a relatively under-researched period of 
Britain’s nuclear history, sandwiched between the anti-nuclear decades of the 1960s and 1980s. 
This echoes broader trends in British historiography, where the 1970s have represented 
something of a “lost decade”, largely characterised as a depressing, unfashionable decade, left 
unexamined “in the shadows of its immediate neighbours.”690 Andrew Tompkins’ recent study 
of European anti-nuclear movements argued that the 1970s “is often seen as a transitional 
period in Western Europe, sandwiched historically between the upheavals of the late 1960s and 
 
689 For evidence of this trend, see J. Burkett, ‘Re-Defining British Morality: ‘Britishness’ and the CND, 1958-
68’, Twentieth Century British History, 21.2 (2010), pp. 184- 205; H. Nehring, Politics of Security: British and 
West German Protest Movements and the Early Cold War, 1945-1970 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); 
A. Young, Femininity in Dissent (London: Routledge, 1990); McKay, ‘Just a Closer Walk’, pp. 261- 281; J. 
Schell, The Fate of the Earth and the Abolition (California: Stanford University Press, 2000); A. Rojecki, 
Silencing the Opposition: Antinuclear Movements and the Media in the Cold War (Illinois: University of Illinois 
Press, 1999); L. Wittner, ‘Gender Roles and Nuclear Disarmament Activism, 1954-1965’, Gender and History, 
12.1 (2000), pp. 197- 222; L. Scott, ‘Labour and the Bomb: the First 80 Years’, International Affairs, 82.4 
(2006), pp. 685- 700; M. Phythian, ‘CND’s Cold War’, Contemporary British History 15.3 (2001), pp. 133- 
156; J. Stafford, ‘Stay at Home: The Politics of Nuclear Civil Defence, 1968- 1983’, Twentieth Century British 
History, 23.3 (2012), pp. 383– 407; J. Preston, ‘The Strange Death of UK Civil Defence Education in the 
1980s’, History of Education, 44.2 (2015), pp. 225- 242; C. Laucht, and M. Johnes, ‘Resist and Survive: Welsh 
Protests and the British Nuclear State in the 1980s’, Contemporary British History, 33.2 (2019), pp. 226- 245; 
Atashroo, ‘Weaponising Peace, pp. 170- 186; Cordle, Late Cold War Literature and Culture. 
690 Scholars have traditionally subscribed to and proliferated popular epistemologies of the 1970s as a period of 
sustained decline, pointing to issues such as strikes, the three-day week, the ‘winter of discontent’, power cuts, 
stagflation, uncollected rubbish, and ‘declinist’ colloquialisms such as Britain as “the sick man of Europe.” See, 
L. Black, ‘An Enlightening Decade? New Histories of 1970s Britain’, International Labour and Working-Class 
History, 82.0 (2013), p. 174. For exceptions to this trend, see D. Haslam, Young Hearts Run Free: The Real 
Story of the 1970s (London: Harper Perennial, 2010); H. Sounes, Seventies: Sights, Sounds and Ideas of a 
Brilliant Decade (London: Pocket Books, 2006); G. De Groot, The Seventies Unplugged: A Kaleidoscopic Look 
at a Violent Decade (London: Pan Books, 2010); L. Black, H. Pemberton, and P. Thane (eds.), Reassessing 
1970s Britain (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013); A. Turner, Crisis? What Crisis? Britain in the 
1970s (London: Aurum Press, 2008); A. Beckett, When the Lights Went Out: Britain in the Seventies (London: 
Faber and Faber, 2009); N. Ferguson, (et al)., The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective (Cambridge: 
Belknap, 2010).  
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the revival of Cold War tensions in the 1980s.”691 Despite this, recent years have seen a number 
of revisionist accounts as scholars have identified the period as one of social rupture, where 
counter-cultural movements flourished.692 In their study of British social life, cultural 
historians Laurel Forster and Sue Harper position the 1970s as “a period of extraordinary 
cultural ferment”, where “there was a restless push against old boundaries and limitations.”693 
This perception is shared by political historian Mark Garnett, who argues that the 1970s were 
characterised by a disillusionment with democracy, government, and mainstream political 
organisations.694 Elsewhere, Robinson et al. have taken this one step further, identifying the 
1970s as a turning point in the second-half of the Twentieth Century, pointing to the rise of 
popular individualism and the “breakdown of social democracy” throughout the decade.695 
They have argued that the role of the state in ordinary life came under challenge and scrutiny 
by increasingly vocal activist groups and ordinary citizens, who became “less deferential [and] 
more critical of government and knowledge elites.”696 The Windscale Inquiry can be read 
within this broader trend, as ordinary people and environmental activist groups resisted the 
state ordained pursuit of nuclear technologies, mobilising a range of arguments that centred on 
the incursion of the state within ordinary life, and anxieties about the impact of nuclear 
reprocessing on the environment. In this regard, the inquiry was not only the product of the 
growing political and social unrest characteristic of the decade, but also of the growth and rapid 
 
691 Tompkins, Better Active than Radioactive! p. 4. 
692 L. Segal, S. Rowbotham, and H. Wainwight, Beyond the Fragments: Feminism and the Making of Socialism 
(London: The Merlin Press, 1979).  
693 L. Forster, and S. Harper (eds.), British Culture and Society in the 1970s: The Lost Decade (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 8.  
694 M. Garnett, From Anger to Apathy: The Story of Politics, Society and Popular Culture in Britain since 1975 
(New York: Vintage, 2009). 
695 E. Robinson (et al.), ‘Telling Stories about Post-war Britain: Popular Individualism and the ‘Crisis’ of the 
1970s’, Twentieth Century British History, 28.2 (2017), p. 271.  
696 They explain that “people were increasingly insistent, by the 1970s about defining and claiming their 
individual rights, identities and perspectives [as] many expressed desires for greater personal autonomy and 
self-determination, even if these desires were not realised.” See, Robinson et al., ‘Telling Stories’, pp. 273, 302; 
Black, Pemberton, and Thane, Reassessing 1970s Britain, p. 5.  
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expansion of the environmental movement which, beginning in the 1960s, had become a major 
agent for social change throughout the industrialised world. 
 
In the period between the Windscale fire (1957) and the decision to reprocess nuclear 
fuels at Sellafield (1974), political scientist John McCormick argues that “there had been an 
environmental revolution.”697 Traditionally associated with the publication of Rachel Carson’s 
Silent Spring (1962), and the recognition of the dangers of radioactive fallout from nuclear 
testing, by the early years of the 1970s these nascent environmental concerns had “blossomed 
into a fervent mass movement which swept the industrialised world.”698 Numerous studies have 
examined this transition, pointing to the aforementioned effects of thermonuclear testing and 
pesticides on the environment, but also to a series of environmental disasters such as the 
spillage of the oil tanker ‘Torrey Canyon’ off the coast of South-West England in 1967, the 
Aberfan disaster in Wales in 1966, and the Sahelian droughts throughout the 1970s as raising 
public awareness of environmental issues and “creating a new climate of heightened public 
activism.”699 The Windscale inquiry was therefore the product of these trends, as a growing 
 
697 J. McCormick, Reclaiming Paradise: The Global Environmental Movement (London: Belhaven Press, 1989), 
p. 47.  
698 McCormick, Reclaiming Paradise, p. 47; see also D. Worster, Nature’s Economy: A History of Ecological 
Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 340; J. McNeill and C. Unger, ‘The Big Picture’ in, J. 
McNeill, and C. Unger (eds.), Environmental Histories of the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), p. 11. 
699 McCormick, Reclaiming Paradise, p. 62. For further reading on the rise of the environmental movement, see 
J. McNeill, ‘The Environment, Environmentalism, and International Society in the Long 1970s’, in N. Ferguson 
et al., The Shock of the Global, pp. 263- 278; R. Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the 
Poor (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2011); McNeill and Unger, ‘The Big Picture’, in McNeill and Unger, 
(eds.), Environmental Histories; J. Hamblin, Arming Mother Nature: The Birth of Catastrophic 
Environmentalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Hamblin, Poison in the Well; Worster, Nature’s 
Economy; For further reading on the Torrey Canyon disaster, see A. Green, and T. Cooper, ‘Community and 
Exclusion: The Torrey Canyon Disaster of 1967’, Journal of Social History, 48.4 (2015), pp. 892- 909; T. 
Cooper, and A. Green, ‘The Torrey Canyon Disaster: Everyday Life, and the ‘Greening’ of Britain’, 
Environmental History, 22.1 (2017), pp. 101- 126; For pesticides, see R. Carson, Silent Spring (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1962). For Aberfan, see M. Johnes, ‘Aberfan and the Management of Trauma’, 
Disasters, 24.1 (2000), pp. 1- 17.  For the Sahelian drought, see C. Agnew, and A. Chappel, ‘Drought in the 
Sahel’, GeoJournal, 48.0 (1999), pp. 299- 311. 
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sense of public unrest, declining faith in democratic governance, and an increasing anxiety 
about the long-term effects of society’s activities upon the environment came into direct 
collision. Windscale thus became as much about issues of governance, ecology, and the 
relationship between the state and populace, as it was about nuclear energy. This illuminates 
one of the most significant aspects of the inquiry: it functioned as a fulcrum through which 
ordinary citizens and oppositional factions resisted the imbrication of state and nuclear power, 




In 1971 control of the Sellafield site had passed from the UKAEA to the newly formed 
British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL).701 In 1974, BNFL began negotiating with a consortium of 
Japanese electricity companies to reprocess their spent nuclear fuel, ultimately committing to 
reprocessing spent nuclear fuel from Japan, Germany, Switzerland, Spain, Italy, and Sweden, 
as well as handling Britain’s domestic supply.702 This instigated a significant public backlash 
 
700 This was aided and abetted by the rise of environmental activist groups such as Friends of the Earth and latterly 
Greenpeace, who had risen to political prominence throughout the 1970s as an increasingly vocal (and direct) 
critic of nuclear technologies. Their contribution to the inquiry and anti-nuclear debate more broadly will be 
considered within the following two chapters- for further reading see F, Zelko, Make it a Greenpeace: The Rise 
of Countercultural Environmentalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
701 The change was the result of a demerger of the UKAEA's product divisions, under the Atomic Energy 
Authority Act of 1971. This saw the UKAEA split into three sections: Radiochemical Centre Ltd assumed 
production of medical and industrial radioisotopes; BNFL took over the production of nuclear fuel and fissile 
material at Springfields, Capenhurst, Windscale, Calder Hall and Chapelcross; whilst the UKAEA retained 
control over research activities at Harwell. For further reading, see W. Patterson, Going Critical: An Unofficial 
History of British Nuclear Power (Colorado: Paladin Press, 1985), p. 17. 
702 An attempt had been made to reprocess oxide nuclear fuel in the late 1960s, when building B204, previously 
used to separate plutonium from other fissile materials, was converted into an oxide reprocessing plant. This 
experimental building operated until September 1973 when a serious ‘blow-back’ incident occurred, which 
contaminated thirty-five workers and increased the plant’s discharge of iodine-131 by a factor of forty. Despite 
the limited success of this venture, it was on the basis of this experimental research that BNFL based the 
economic and scientifically credibility of reprocessing. See, Bolter, Inside Sellafield, p. 146; C. Aubrey, D. 
Grunberg, and N. Hildyard, (eds.), ‘Nuclear Power: Shut it Down: An Information Pack on Nuclear Power and 
the Alternatives,’ The Ecologist, (1990), p. 319. 
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in the U.K following a Daily Mirror article entitled ‘Plan to Make Britain World’s Nuclear 
Dustbin’, published in October 1975.703 This damning critique of the reprocessing of foreign 
fuels marked the beginning of a major public inquest into nuclear power, culminating in a Local 
Public Inquiry into the planning application for the new Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant 
(THORP) to be constructed on the Sellafield site.704 For 100 days between Summer and 
Autumn 1977, the Cumbrian town of Whitehaven, situated just up the coast from Sellafield, 
hosted what became known as the ‘Windscale Inquiry.’ 
 
The inquiry was commissioned by the Labour government under James Callaghan at 
the behest of Secretary of State for the Environment, Peter Shore, who had been asked to ratify 
Cumberland County Council’s decision to authorise the THORP project. This decision had 
been met with staunch opposition by environmental groups, such as Friends of the Earth (FoE), 
and the local anti-nuclear organisation Half-Life. Similar opposition came from the 
Conservation Society, the Town and Country Planning Association and South Lakeland 
District Councillor Edward Acland, all of whom called upon the Labour government to refer 
the matter to a public inquiry, presenting a petition with more than 18,000 local signatories 
collected over just ten days.705 Unwilling to accept final responsibility on the matter, 
Environment Secretary Peter Shore, together behind-the-scenes involvement from Secretary of 
State for Energy Tony Benn, decided to call a Local Public Inquiry, announced by Shore on 7 
 
703 Daily Mirror, 21 October 1975, p. 1; C. Aubrey, Thorp: The Whitehall Nightmare (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), p. 5.  
704 Aubrey, Thorp, p. 6; Bolter, Inside Sellafield, p. 169. 
705 H. Herring, ‘Energy Utopianism and the Rise of the Anti-nuclear Power Movement in the UK’, unpublished 
PhD thesis, The Open University, (2003) <http://oro.open.ac.uk/59417/1/288345.pdf> [accessed 25 August 
2019], pp. 55ff; G. Boyle, Nuclear Power: the Windscale Controversy (Milton Keynes: The Open University 
Press, 1983), p. 21; B. Wynne, Rationality and Ritual: the Windscale Inquiry and Nuclear Decisions in Britain 
(London: British Society for the History of Science, 1982), p. 82. 
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March, 1977.706 Overseen by High Court Judge, and future Lord Justice of Appeal Sir Justice 
Roger Parker, the remit of the inquiry was to establish the viability and necessity of the 
construction of the THORP plant on the Sellafield site for the purposes of reprocessing spent 
nuclear fuels from domestic and foreign nuclear reactors.707  
 
Whilst the inquiry appeared to all intents and purposes as a judicial review into the 
legality and viability of reprocessing at both the Sellafield site and possible future locations 
throughout Britain, the government was under no obligation to act upon the findings of the 
inquiry, despite its length and public cost. Local public planning inquiries are not judicial 
proceedings, in spite of their appearance. Rather they enable “interested parties to come 
together, and present their arguments and evidence and examine a specific proposal in 
detail.”708 In this way, they serve as “advisory mechanisms”, designed to aid the 
“implementation of a pre-existing policy” by “informing the minister’s mind” regarding the 
proposed impact of a particular application.709 Indeed, it is important to note that both 
Cumberland County Council and the government had publicly announced their support for the 
THORP project in March and November 1976 respectively, some months before the inquiry 
 
706 Herring has written that Tony Benn saw the nuclear power debate as an opportunity to “practice his ideas on 
open government, and thus have a great debate on all aspects of nuclear policy in Britain.” In the build-up to the 
inquiry, Benn had organised two public debates on nuclear power, held in Westminster in January and June 
1976 respectively. See, Herring, ‘Energy Utopianism’, pp. 66, 71. 
707 In doing so, the inquiry heard a dizzying array of scientific, political, social, and environmental 
interpretations from both sides of the nuclear debate; encompassing testimonials and evidence from scientific 
experts both within and outside of the nuclear industry, environmental and political organisations, BNFL itself, 
and local citizens- both as individual witnesses and organised collectives. For a comprehensive overview of key 
players at the inquiry, and a summary of their arguments, see D. Pearce, L. Edwards, and G. Beuret, (eds.), 
Decision Making for Energy Futures: A Case Study of the Windscale Inquiry (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 
1979), pp. 236- 296. 
708 E. Rough, ‘Policy Learning Through Public Inquiries? The Case of UK Nuclear Energy Policy, 1955-61’, 
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 29. 0 (2011), pp. 24- 45. 
709 R. Wraith, G. Lamb, Public Inquiries as an Instrument of Government (London: Allen and Unwin, 1971), p. 
31; Wynne, Rationality and Ritual, p. 53.  
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convened.710 We may therefore consider Windscale within the wider context of other nuclear 
inquiries, all of which had resulted in planning applications granted, despite localised 
objections (see Fig. 1.0). In this regard, the Windscale Inquiry was no exception, as the 
recommendations given by Lord Justice Parker found in favour of the THORP plant, advising 
that the plant should be built without delay to obviate storage and disposal problems and “keep 
the nuclear industry alive.”711 This was a decision strongly endorsed and ratified by James 
Callaghan’s Labour government, who ultimately authorised the project in the House of 
Commons in May 1978.  
  
 
710 Pearce, Edwards, and Beuret, Decision Making for Energy Futures, p. 135. In this regard, it seems 
reasonable to agree with Drapkin’s argument that public inquiries served a mere strategic political function, 
providing a “safety valve” through which opponents could “blow off steam.” (D. Drapkin, ‘Development, 
Electricity and Power Stations: Problems in Electricity Planning and Decisions’, Public Law, 19.0 (1974), p. 
243.) This echoes scholarly work on civil defence which has suggested that official protection procedures 
represented a necessary façade and were designed so as to be politically defensible rather than practically 
applicable. In this way, Windscale represented the fore-runner to a series of nuclear planning procedures 
throughout the 1980s which offered a politically expedient smoke-screen from which to defend nuclear policy-
making. (M. Grant, After the Bomb: Civil Defence and Nuclear War in Britain, 1945–68 (Palgrave MacMillan: 
Basingstoke, 2010), pp. 8f; J. Preston, ‘The Strange Death of UK Civil Defence Education in the 1980s’, 
History of Education, 44.2 (2015), p. 226.) 
711 Daily Telegraph, ‘Sir Roger Parker Obituary’, 23 May 2011 
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/8531683/Sir-Roger-Parker.html> [accessed 7 April 2019]; 
Aubrey, Thorp, p. 7; R. Parker, The Windscale Inquiry: Report by the Hon, Mr. Justice Parker, presented to the 






Dates Duration Outcome 
Bradwell April-May 1956 5 days Permission Granted  
  
Hunterston January-June 1957 12 days Permission Granted  
  
Hinkley Point May 1957 2 days Permission Granted  
  
Trawsfynyndd February 1958 3 days Permission Granted  
  
Dungeness February 1958 3 days Permission Granted  
  
Oldbury April-May 1960 3 days Permission Granted  
  
Wylfa May-June 1961 4 days Permission Granted  
  
Sellafield June-November 1977 100 days Permission Granted  
  
Sizewell B Jan 1983 2 years Permission Granted  
  
Hinkley Point C 1988 1 year Permission Granted 
Fig. 1.0: ‘Public Inquiries into the Construction or Expansion of Nuclear Power Plants (1956-1988)’, (H. 
Herring, ‘Energy Utopianism and the Rise of the Anti-nuclear Power Movement in the UK’, unpublished PhD thesis, 
The Open University, (2003) <http://oro.open.ac.uk/59417/1/288345.pdf> [accessed 25 August 2019], p. 22.) 
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Despite the anti-nuclear lobby’s failure to prevent the construction of THORP, the 
inquiry represents a nuanced insight into cultural attitudes towards nuclear technologies during 
the 1970s and the social processes behind their creation. The inquiry brought into contact 
disparate elements of the anti-nuclear lobby and formalised a new dystopian imaginary, serving 
as a ‘contact zone’ for public debates over the environmental impact of nuclear technologies, 
state-secrecy, and the nefarious methods of political and social governance that they 
engendered. This draws upon the work of Mary Louise Pratt, who has defined contact zones 
as “social spaces where cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in contexts of 
highly asymmetrical relations of power.”712 This is a fitting description of the inquiry process, 
as a space in which the concerns and anxieties of local individuals and a host of newly-formed 
political and environmental alliances met the combined political and economic might of the 
military-industrial complex for the first time.713 Windscale therefore represented the first public 
audit of nuclear power in the environmental era.714 This offered a “a rare point of contact 
between the public, national groups, policy makers and industry,” bringing the officially-
maintained, utopian imaginary of nuclear power into direct conflict with a new, dystopian 
imaginary of nuclear technologies as a threat to the environmental, social, and political fabric 
of British society.715  
 
The following section will examine this process, arguing that the historical value of the 
inquiry can be found by reading ‘against the grain’ of official narratives and discourse and 
 
712 Pratt, ‘Arts of the Contact Zone’, p. 34. 
713 Whilst public inquiries relating to nuclear energy had occurred in the past, these had been far smaller in 
scope. All seven up to this point had lasted for a combined thirty-two days, in comparison with Windscale’s one 
hundred. Likewise, no inquiry had taken place in the previous sixteen years, during which time the 
environmental movement had emerged and taken a front seat in debating issues of nuclear power and radiation. 
(R. Williams, The Nuclear Power Decisions: British Policies 1953-1978 (London: Croom Helm, 1980), p. 263.) 
714 C. Conroy, What Choice Windscale? the Issues of Reprocessing (London: Friends of the Earth and 
Conservation Society, 1978), p. 5. 
715 E. Rough, ‘Policy Learning Through Public Inquiries?’, p. 24. 
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through close attention to the range of assumptions and subjectivities disclosed throughout the 
various debates and examinations within the inquiry process.716 Once again, the sociotechnical 
imaginary offers a nuanced framework to think through these responses, as the state-sponsored 
imaginary of nuclear prosperity clashed with a public imaginary of nuclear technologies as an 
environmental threat and an abuse of state power unfairly burdened by geographically isolated 





This section will demonstrate how the Windscale Inquiry helped embed dystopian 
imaginaries of nuclear secrecy as a threat to the rights of ordinary civilians, particularly at the 
local level where citizens imagined the THORP project through the lens of the industry’s 
history of public deception and subterfuge. Through the testimonies of local witnesses at the 
inquiry (both independent and affiliated to NGOs and environmental groups such as FoE), we 
can see how local people resisted official attempts to situate the THORP project within the 
utopian STIM by mobilising memories of being misled over the Windscale fire. The fire had a 
marked effect on the way local citizens imagined the THORP project. Residents drew 
comparisons between the present debate and the fire, remarking that “I began to worry from 
the first 1957 incident and I have become more and more concerned as the years have gone on, 
as I have heard more and more of minor incidents that have not been disclosed to the public.”717 
During the inquiry one local councillor testified that “my own experience as a member of the 
Cumberland fire service at the time of the 1957 accident led me to have little confidence in the 
management of the works’ complex at Windscale. Nothing that has happened since has made 
 
716 A. Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2009). 
717 Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, (DH/372/1/60). 
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me chance my views.”718 Residents referenced the “difficult relationship between the local 
community and the BNFL works [whereby] fear, suspicion, and unease bore heavily in the 
minds of local people.”719 Others complained that “the past performances of BNFL and their 
apologists have served us, the local community, very badly in the past, and accounts for much 
of the mistrust and suspicion that still exists.”720 Here, the historical conduct of the nuclear 
authorities contributed towards present-day scepticism, as citizens invoked memories of the 
fire to resist official attempts to embed the THORP project within the utopian STIM. 
Conversely, local citizens constructed dystopian imaginaries of nuclear secrecy as an over-
extension and abuse of state power. Specifically, citizens challenged the industry’s repression 
of the local population, embedding dystopian imaginaries of nuclear technologies as a threat to 
democratic values and freedom of speech.   
 
Residents used the inquiry as a means to challenge local power relations, embedding 
dystopian imaginaries of nuclear secrecy as a subversion of local interests. As the region’s 
largest employer, they explained that BNFL dominated the local economy and controlled local 
politics. Describing the unequal power relations this imposed, locals alluded to the culture of 
silence and fear that this had cultivated amongst ordinary people, a process they described as 
“blackmail operating at its crudest.”721 One local farmer and Greenpeace supporter explained 
that people weren’t prepared to speak out against the plant because “they've made the whole 
population dependent on them; their bread and butter comes from them.”722 Another resident 
 
718 National Archives, ‘The Windscale Planning Inquiry: Proof of Evidence given by Mr. Bill Dixon’, (AT 
103/267), p. 4. 
719 Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, ‘James Mitchell, FoE West Cumbria to Council Clerk, 20th 
August 1978’, (YSPC 1/170).  
720 Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, (YSPC 1/170). 
721 Whitehaven Archive and Local Studies Centre, (24/ NUC), The Windscale File: A Lay Guide to Living (and 
Dying) with a Nuclear Neighbour, (London: Greenpeace, 1983), p. 1. 
722 Ibid. 
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described how they were “frightened” of the nuclear industry, adding that “they are so powerful 
in West Cumbria they could do what they liked.”723 This was a point repeatedly made by FoE 
who claimed to be representing anxious citizens, a great many of whom “are wary of the 
claimed benefits to be derived from the expansion, but since the majority have some connection 
with the plant, they are afraid to speak out.”724 Several local residents admitted they did not 
feel able to speak freely about the plant for fear of recrimination, social ostracism, or indirectly 
harming the career prospects of family members and friends employed at the plant. One 
resident explained that “people are genuinely afraid to speak up because of jobs.”725 Two local 
women, Florence Corkhill and Marjorie Higham (who had measured the levels of radiation in 
her colleagues’ hair after they had cycled into work during the Windscale fire), commented 
that many “do not feel free to come to this inquiry to voice any objection they may have”, 
adding they felt “unable to speak freely” since “their livelihood is threatened if the planning 
permission for the THORP plant is refused.”726 Mrs Higham admitted that local people were 
“afraid that their jobs or careers will suffer, or that they “might inadvertently say something 
out of turn.”727 Residents expressed similar sentiments when interviewed years later. They 
outlined that “very, very few lone voices raised against them [BNFL]”, explaining “that just 
reflects how the nuclear industry has managed the whole population.”728 In this context, 
citizens imagined the THORP expansion as a threat to the cultural autonomy of local people, 
embedding dystopian imaginaries of nuclear technologies as cultivating a hostile climate of 
fear and suppressing public opinion. 
 
723 P. Adamson and O. Adamson, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by J. Lister, 20 August 
2010, p. 12. 
724 Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, (DH/372/1/60), p. 3.  
725 McSorley, Living in the Shadow, p. 34. 
726 Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, ‘The Windscale Planning Inquiry: Proof of Evidence given 
by Nurse Florence Corkhill’, (DH/372/1/60), p. 7; Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, ‘The 
Windscale Planning Inquiry: Proof of Evidence given by Marjorie Higham,’ (DH/372/71), p. 2.  
727 Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, ‘The Windscale Planning Inquiry: Proof of Evidence given 
by Marjorie Higham,’ (DH/372/71), p. 2.  
728 M. Steele, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 20 August 2010, p. 27 
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Local groups and independent politicians developed this point, complaining about a 
state-sponsored policy of “suppression” and “censorship” enacted upon the local people, who 
were being given “unbalanced” and “misleading” information about THORP through BNFL’s 
stage-management of local politics.729 Specifically, they argued that BNFL exerted undue 
influence over policymakers. In particular, they refuted the council’s decision to allow BNFL 
use of a council owned building in Whitehaven to host a three month-long exhibition displaying 
the alleged benefits of reprocessing. Their sense of injustice was particularly acute, since FoE’s 
attempts to set up an ‘alternative public exhibition’ on the economic and environmental issues 
of reprocessing were rejected by the council, on the grounds of it being controversial. This 
decision was derided by local groups and independent politicians, who referenced “the 
conspiracy of silence” cultivated by the nuclear industry through its control of local politics.730 
One local resident surmised the situation, describing that BNFL was like “an octopus with 
tentacles… its arms spread everywhere.”731 Similar claims came from local councillor Bill 
Dixon, who explained that his opposition to the THORP proposals had collapsed because of 
pressure placed upon some of his supporters by a “leading local politician who is also a 
Windscale employee.”732 Having granted BNFL permission to develop THORP, he divulged 
that two members of the council planning committee were BNFL employees, but had not 
declared a conflict of interests when voting on the proposal.733 Laying bare the extent of 
BNFL’s influence within local politics, the inquiry revealed the industry’s involvement within 
ostensibly democratic processes. This helped embed dystopian imaginaries of nuclear secrecy 
 
729 National Archives, ‘The Windscale Planning Inquiry: Proof of Evidence given by Chris Haworth’, (AT 
103/267), p. 6. 
730 Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, (DH/372/1/60), p. 4. 
731 N. Garbutt, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 22 March 2010, p. 27. 
732 National Archives, ‘The Windscale Planning Inquiry: Proof of Evidence given by Councilor Bill Dixon’, 
(AT 103/267), p. 2.  
733 Ibid. 
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by depicting the nuclear industry’s role in undermining local democracy and misleading the 
local public.  
 
 BNFL, for its part, sought to counter the notion that it operated in secret from the local 
population by emphasising the role of intermediary bodies such as the Local Liaison 
Committee (LLC). Set up as one of the recommendations following the 1957 fire, the LLC was 
designed to act as a go-between for plant management and the local community. Conversely, 
this organisation substantiated the dystopian STIM by demonstrating the lack of political 
autonomy afforded local citizens who were excluded from voicing their concerns by the 
group’s highly selective membership and representation. Opponents argued that the LLC held 
very little credibility in the eyes of the local population, who saw it as a public relations vehicle 
designed to foster an illusion of transparency. Since its conception, the committee had met 
infrequently and had failed to establish any meaningful channel of communication between the 
management and local public. Indeed, local citizens looked upon it with scepticism and 
hostility, interpreting it as a façade and “nothing more than a white-washing front-
organisation… stage-managed by BNFL [to produce] a blocked channel of communication to 
the public.”734 This was a claim reinforced by the LLC’s own members, one of whom admitted 
the group was “absolutely useless… it was just staged.”735 Another former member explained 
that the committee “never disseminated anything to anybody.”736 She explained that the 
majority of people on the committee had never attended a meeting, and “most of the authorities 
that were represented on it didn't exist.”737 She described that the LLC was smokescreen for 
 
734 National Archives, ‘The Windscale Planning Inquiry: Proof of Evidence given by Peter Haworth’, (AT 
103/267), p. 7.  
735 A. Postlethwaite, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by G. Wilkinson, 18 March 2010, p. 
11. 
736 M. Higham, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by G. Wilkinson, 23 March 2010, p. 31. 
737 Ibid. 
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BNFL to canvass favour with local leaders by “giving everybody a nice lunch” to “butter them 
up.”738 This criticism reflected the make-up of the group, whereby BNFL officials held the 
positions of Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Treasurer of the Committee, and made up a vast 
majority of its representatives.739 This helped embed dystopian imaginaries of nuclear secrecy 
as residents argued that BNFL’s vast political influence and stage-management of 
organisations such as the LLC maintained a gagging effect upon the local population, through 
which it was able to foster an illusion of public support for its activities. Furthermore, BNFL’s 
status as a government organisation produced concerns about the affinity between nuclear 
stakeholders and government ministers, through which the nuclear industry appeared to not 
only have the tacit support of the state but was to an extent devolved from and beyond the 
jurisdiction of democratic politics. This point formed one of the most potent arguments against 
the THORP expansion, as local residents communicated dystopian imaginaries of nuclear 
technologies as an ancillary mechanism of state power. 
 
The repression of local opinion was linked to the state both through their overall 
management of BNFL, which fell under the jurisdiction of various government ministries and 
through the official narratives procured by government ministers, who asserted that the 
THORP project was wholeheartedly endorsed by the local West Cumbrian population. This 
was a point strongly rejected by the local public, as local witnesses testified that “this is untrue” 
adding that “there are a great many people who are seriously worried and against the expansion 
of Windscale,” and that “the bulk of the population does not support this proposal.”740 This 
 
738 On the one occasion she did recall a council representative complaining about the levels of radioactivity 
found in the Irish Sea, she explained that BNFL “told the county council representatives to muzzle him.” (Ibid.) 
739 Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, (YSPC 1/170), pp. 10; National Archives, ‘The Windscale 
Planning Inquiry: Proof of Evidence given by Chris Haworth,’ (AT 103/267), p. 6. 
740 National Archives, ‘The Windscale Planning Inquiry: Proof of Evidence given by Jean MacLeod’, (AT 
103/267); Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, ‘The Windscale Planning Inquiry: Proof of Evidence 
given by Nurse Florence Corkhill’, (CH/372/1/60), p. 7. 
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subverted the government’s official line, whereby the Secretary of State for the Environment, 
Peter Shore had told the House of Commons that the local population was overwhelmingly in 
favour of the THORP expansion.741 Proving that this perception “defied all credibility”, local 
objectors had obtained the signatures of some 27,000 local residents over a period of just five 
days, all of whom called for an independent inquiry to express their objections to the THORP 
expansion.742 The discrepancy between government statements and local opinion helped 
embed dystopian imaginaries of state power, revealing the government’s suppression and 
ignorance of local attitudes. The FoE were particularly vocal on this matter, arguing that the 
incongruity between official narratives and public opinion exposed the superficial pretence of 
popular support for the THORP project. FoE referred to the industry’s “multi-million pound 
propaganda exercise” which maintained a façade of public support “despite the fact that it 
[THORP] is opposed by the majority of the population.”743 This confirmed the concerns of the 
Director of Planning for the THORP project, who privately admitted to government ministers 
that “those supporting BNFL’s proposals in total consisted essentially of company 
employees.”744 Similar points were also made by local residents such as housewife Enid Huws-
Jones, who told the inquiry that it was only government and industry figures who backed the 
proposals, adding that “people outside the industry seem to feel bewildered.”745 These 
arguments blended into and merged with a wider criticism of the role of the state in sustaining 
the power of the nuclear industry as anti-nuclear opponents embedded dystopian imaginaries 
centred around the autocratic powers of ‘the nuclear state.’ 
 
 
741 The Times, 3 November 1976. 
742 Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, ‘The Windscale Planning Inquiry: Proof of Evidence given 
by Nurse Florence Corkhill’, (CH/372/1/60), p. 7 
743 Windscale Archives and Local Studies Centre, (YDSO/184/1/2); C. Aubrey (et al)., Nuclear Power: Shut it 
Down! p. 449. 
744 National Archives, (AT 103/267). 
745 National Archives, ‘The Windscale Planning Inquiry: Proof of Evidence given by Enid Huws Jones’, (AT 
103/267). 
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4.3: ‘Nuclear State.’ 
 
 
The concept of the ‘nuclear state’ derives from the German political writer Robert Jung 
who coined the term in 1970, denoting the hierarchical order which sustains and proliferates 
the development of nuclear technologies.746 The following section of the chapter argues that 
concerns over nuclear secrecy fed into dystopian imaginaries of a centralised, authoritarian 
‘nuclear state’ detached from and at odds with the British public. This echoes scholarly work 
on late Twentieth Century anti-nuclear protest culture, which has shown that nuclear resistance 
was rarely focused entirely on a single-issue such as reprocessing, but was often “entwined 
with wider political and moral concerns.”747 In many cases “the specific anti-nuclear position 
might not be precisely defined” and instead may represent “a generalised expression of outrage 
or fear [or] a nebulous desire to challenge the assumption that nuclear [technologies] were an 
inevitable part of contemporary experience.”748 In this context, nuclear issues often functioned 
as “a vehicle to protest against government policy more broadly”, reflective of “wider political 
problems rather than a self-contained issue in themselves.”749 As the following section will 
demonstrate, debates over reprocessing borrowed from and fed into a more nuanced and 
complicated set of attitudes towards contemporary society, state hegemony, and 
authoritarianism. These broader contexts helped embed the dystopian STIM, as nuclear 




746 R. Jung, the Atomic State: From Progress to Inhumanity (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1970); Aubrey, Nuclear Power, 
p. 449. 
747 C. Laucht, and M. Johnes, ‘Resist and Survive: Welsh Protests and the British Nuclear State in the 1980s’, 
Contemporary British History, 33.2 (2019), p. 227.  
748 Cordle, Late Cold War Literature and Culture, p. 49. 
749 Laucht, and Johnes, ‘Resist and Survive’, p. 227. 
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Opponents to nuclear power, such as The Windscale Appeal, The Oxford Political 
Ecology Research Group, Greenpeace, and scientific figures used the inquiry to challenge the 
relationship between the state and nuclear industry. This helped embed dystopian imaginaries 
of an autocratic nuclear state unrepresentative of the British public. Representatives of the 
Windscale Appeal argued that the relationship between nuclear science and the state had 
produced a techno-scientific elite of policymakers and scientists, at once “out of control and 
able to tap government money at will” and removed from the general public in their pursuit of 
increasingly hazardous nuclear technologies.750 Likewise, opponents from the Ecologist 
magazine argued that “the UKAEA, BNFL, the electricity boards and the reactor building 
industry have created a highly centralised technological elite that enjoys full-bodied 
government backing”, referring to the “immense” power of the pro-nuclear lobby.751 Sir Kelvin 
Spencer, former Chief Scientist at the Ministry of Fuel (which oversaw much of the early work 
on Britain’s civil nuclear power program), was particularly critical of the state’s “lavish 
financing of nuclear activities.”752 He argued that:  
 
Nuclear energy has gathered a momentum which has made it almost unstoppable. 
Instead of recognising that some of the problems are unsolvable on any acceptable time 
scale and at an acceptable cost- the controlling bodies nationally and internationally set 
up to set safety standards have lowered those standards as and when expedient, so that 
the nuclear juggernaut could go on.753  
 
 
750 Pearce, Fallout, p. 107. Elsewhere, the Oxford Political Ecology Research Group (PERG) argued that 
nuclear power had become a symbol of the status quo. It centred its criticisms around the belief that the 
successful construction of the THORP project represented “the continuation of the present pattern” and existing 
social hierarchies. (Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, (DH/372/89), p. 82.) 
751 Aubrey, Nuclear Power, p. 449. 
752 Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, (DH/372/86), p. 31.  
753 Ibid. 
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This reflected the concerns of many at the inquiry that nuclear technologies were incongruous 
with the prosperity of wider society. Exploring energy infrastructure projects, James C. Scott 
coined the term ‘high modernism’ to describe how civil projects such as nuclear power  
substantiated the hegemony of the state, particularly over the environment and ordinary 
citizens.754 This process is reflected in Fig. 2.0, published by the Scottish Campaign to Resist 
the Atomic Menace (SCRAM). Whilst not a major voice at the inquiry, SCRAM’s image shows 
that anti-nuclear protestors held deep-seated concerns about the increasing power of the nuclear 
state over the British public. This helped embed dystopian imaginaries of nuclear technologies 
as a threat to the interests of the British public, as reprocessing became a conduit for broader 




Embroiled within debates over state hegemony, the inquiry rapidly encompassed 
broader social and cultural elements as the issue of reprocessing became a prism through which 
the socio-cultural fabric of British society was subject to interrogation and contest. Whilst 
much of the inquiry was devoted to issues of nuclear scientific and technical concern, this 
represented a point of departure from which oppositional groups mounted a broader challenge 
to the legitimacy of the nuclear state. The following section will demonstrate how opponents 
 
754 J. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999).  
Fig. 2.0: SCRAM (Scottish Campaign to Resist the Atomic Menace), ‘Energy Bulletin’ (April/May 1978). 
 262 
of nuclear power linked seemingly disparate elements such as nuclear secrecy and issues of 
community liaison with wider social critiques of capitalism and the relationship between 
citizens and state, imagining a dystopian future whereby nuclear technologies were 
accompanied by the rise of a police state and the suppression of civil liberties.755 
 
4.4: Police State. 
 
 Local activists argued that THORP represented an encroachment of state power upon 
the British public, imagining the suppression of their civil liberties under the creeping advances 
of the police state.756 Quoting from the foreword of Aldous Huxley’s dystopian 1932 novel 
Brave New World, the West Cumbrian branch of FoE invoked Huxley’s prophetic warning that 
the “non-human fact of atomic power” would disrupt “all the existing patterns of life… and 
new patterns will have to be improvised to conform” with the “far from painful operations 
directed by highly centralised totalitarian governments.”757 In this context, FoE imagined a 
future reality rooted in contemporary experience, pointing to the armed nuclear police-force 
housed at Sellafield as a cautionary symbol of nuclear expansion.758 Whilst Sellafield had 
always maintained a small police presence, the THORP application planned to create a full-
time armed nuclear police-force with extensive powers and legal jurisdiction throughout the 
local area. Anti-nuclear groups argued that this represented a threat to freedom of expression 
and the rights of ordinary civilians. Whilst the Atomic Energy Authority Constabulary was 
 
755 This gives a more detailed insight into British social history, as the issue of nuclear reprocessing offers a 
window into the social relationships between government and citizenry within late twentieth century Britain. 
Using the Windscale inquiry as an access point into this social dynamic, it becomes clear that the decision to site 
the THORP reprocessing plant at Sellafield contributed to an increasing social distance between the public and 
the state, instigating an othering process which saw the ‘nuclear state’ emerge as a coherent entity, removed and 
socially unrepresentative of the British public.  
756 Tompkins, Better Active than Radioactive! p. 30.  
757 A. Huxley, Brave New World (London: Chatto and Windus, 1932). 
758 Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, ‘FoE Souvenir Programme’, (YDSO 184/1/2). 
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ostensibly under the control over the government, both national and West Cumbrian branches 
of FoE expressed scepticism regarding the extent of its autonomy from the government, 
arguing that this represented “the only private police force in the country unaccountable to any 
democratic organisation.”759 This formed a key argument amongst local anti-nuclear groups, 
who cautioned against the increasing autonomy of the nuclear industry, embedding an 
imagined future whereby “we may ultimately find ourselves paying for nuclear power with our 
cherished civil liberties.”760 This reflected broader social trends throughout the 1970s, as the 
centralisation of police and state power came under increasing public examination. 
 
 In their study of the role of the police in British society, John Brewer et al. have argued 
that throughout the latter half of the Twentieth Century there was “a growing politicisation of 
policing and what appeared to be an increasing use of the police force for partisan political 
ends.”761 Here, they identify that the public resisted the “enhanced resources and powers 
bestowed [upon the police] by a supportive government”, arguing that this was linked “to 
trends towards authoritarianism and centralisation within the British state” more broadly.762 
Police and state power, they argue, existed in a symbiotic relationship which came under 
“almost universal attack” throughout the 1970s.763 Robert Reiner identifies the 1970s as a 
period of change, whereby state and police power increasingly homogenised, with “deleterious 
consequences” for the relationship between ordinary people, the police, and the state.764 In this 




761 This study analyses multiple national contexts, although only work focusing on Britain is referred to here. (J. 
Brewer (et al.), (eds.), The Police, Public Order and the State: Policing in Great Britain, Northern Ireland, the 
Irish Republic, the USA, Israel, South Africa and China (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 1996), p. xiii.) 
762 Ibid., p. xiiif. 
763 Ibid., p. xiv. 
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(NCCL), and the National Peace Council framed their responses towards nuclear technologies 
through the context of wider social and civic unrest. They imagined the increased power of the 
police as a symbol of a dystopian future whereby civil liberties came under threat from the 
creeping advances of the state. In this context, nuclear power was seen as an ancillary 
mechanism to extend state power and surveillance under the guise of nuclear security. 
 
 In his transnational study of anti-nuclear movements, environmental historian Andrew 
Tompkins argued that opponents feared that “the security apparatus necessitated by nuclear 
power was a means by which the state would extend its power over citizens.”765 He argues that 
nuclear technologies were pejoratively viewed as  “the perfect symbol of a new order, one that 
would be based on the technocratic power of the state [and] military-police power.”766 In this 
context, imaginaries of nuclear power were influenced by contemporary attitudes towards state 
power and policing. A visual representation of this process is offered in Fig. 3.0, where a female 
FoE member protesting against THORP brandishes a placard which directly links the 
development of nuclear technologies with the increasing power and autonomy of the police.  
 
765 Tompkins, Better Active than Radioactive! p. 57. 
766 Ibid. 
Fig. 3.0: G. Boyle, Nuclear Power: The Windscale Controversy (Milton 
Keynes: Open University, 1983), p. 21. 
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Whilst this shows police constables and activists smiling, seemingly enjoying a level of 
cordiality, this alludes to the emergence and performance of dystopian imaginaries amongst 
sections of British society. Here the police presence served as a tangible representation of an 
imagined dystopian future, imbricating nuclear technologies with the centralisation of police 
and state power.  
 
Opponents argued that the expansion of the nuclear project would result in increased 
levels of surveillance over ordinary people, as attitudes towards the police state fed into and 
embedded dystopian imaginaries of state repression. Debates thus centred around the 
surreptitious control of civilians by the police state and its encroachment upon daily life, as 
opponents testified to the increasing surveillance of their activities and “a growing climate of 
suspicion towards all opposition to nuclear power.”767 Throughout the inquiry, groups such as 
the Oxford Political Ecology Research Group (PERG) and FoE described that nuclear power 
represented “the reality of a system that requires ever more centralisation, bureaucratic decision 
making, and the consequent loss of freedom for the individual in the organisation of daily 
life.”768 This built upon the sentiments of a report published by the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution in 1976.769 This had argued against the proposed Windscale 
expansion, acknowledging that the further development of the nuclear programme would 
necessitate the cessation of civil and political rights, increasing surveillance and the 
centralisation of state power. Presented as evidence at the inquiry by FoE, the report argued 
that the nuclear programme would require “unprecedented security service examination of 
political beliefs and personal associations of many people working in non-government sectors 
 
767 P. Wright, The Times, 28 October 1976. 
768 Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, (DH/372/89), p. 83.  
769 Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, Nuclear Power and the Environment, (London: HMSO, 
1976). Also known as the ‘Flowers Report’, after its chairman, Sir Brian Flowers.  
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of the electricity industry.”770 This, it acknowledged, “might include the use of informers, 
infiltrators, wire-tapping, checking on back accounts and the opening of mail.”771 These 
concerns not only painted a bleak picture of daily life under the power of a nuclear-police state, 
but were based upon precedents elsewhere in Europe and Australia, where nuclear technologies 
had placed significant restrictions upon citizens’ rights.  
 
Concerns regarding the encroachment of the nuclear state upon daily life were 
reinforced by the presence of the National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL) at the inquiry, 
who embedded dystopian imaginaries of state repression by referencing global trends. The 
NCCL argued that the transportation of plutonium necessitated as part of the THORP project 
could “only be made relatively safe by infringements of civil liberties.”772 They also cautioned 
against the haunting spectre of a police state, embedding a dystopian future whereby 
“informers, spies, phone tapping, mail opening, rubber bullets, and tear gas” became an 
increasing feature of daily life.773 These fears were based upon precedents elsewhere 
throughout Europe, particularly France and Germany, which had seen multiple violent protests 
between ordinary civilians, anti-nuclear groups, and political authorities.774 Tompkins has 
shown that anti-nuclear protests in France and West Germany were often characterised by 
police checkpoints, armoured vehicles, heavily armed police, stun grenades, and water 
cannons, describing that “the state's heavy-handed repression of protest [represented] a sign of 
the police state that nuclear power necessarily entailed.”775 Referencing these global trends, the 
 
770 P. Wright, The Times, 28 October 1976. 
771 Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, ‘FoE Souvenir Programme’, (YDSO 184/1/2). 
772 M. Morris, and M. Pithers, Windscale: A Summary of the Evidence and the Argument (London: Guardian 
Newspapers, 1977), p. 93.  
773 Ibid. 
774 For a comprehensive reading on this subject, see Nehring, Politics of Security: British and West German 
Protest Movements and the Early Cold War, 1945-1970; and Tompkins, Better Active than Radioactive!  
775 Tompkins, Better Active than Radioactive! pp. 2, 3, 57. 
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NCCL also warned about the effects of Australia’s highly controversial uranium transportation 
programme, quoting from the words of the Australian Council of Trade Unions, who explained 
that “uranium is putting Australian against Australian… it raises the terrible possibility of 
bloodshed in the streets.”776 These examples fed into and formalised dystopian imaginaries by 
warning that the transportation of plutonium and other fissile materials could have similar 
consequences in Britain.777  
 
Speaking into an imagined future of state repression, both FoE and Greenpeace 
explained that the THORP project would result in the surveillance of anti-nuclear groups and 
prominent individuals who were suspected of anti-nuclear dissent. Greenpeace activists already 
held deep suspicions that anti-nuclear groups had already been infiltrated in the lead up to the 
inquiry and that subversive tactics had been used to undermine them ahead of the inquest.778 
This belief was well-founded, as it was later proven that environmentalists protesting against 
expansion of the nuclear plant at Sizewell had been systematically spied upon and bugged, 
having had their phones tapped at the behest of MI5 who employed a group of infiltrators to 
“manoeuvre themselves into specific groups of objectors and obtain recordings or 
transmissions of specific conversations.”779 Whilst no evidence directly proved such activities 
at Sellafield, activists noted the presence of new members in the build-up to the inquiry, 
recognising “one or two people at our meeting who we felt weren’t quite our sort of 
campaigners.”780 Stopping short of directly claiming that they had been infiltrated by either 
 
776 Morris, and Pithers, Windscale: A Summary, p. 93.  
777 Similar arguments were raised in 1980, when Manchester City Council refused the transportation of nuclear 
materials through its territories, becoming the first of a series of county, district, and city councils to declare 
themselves a ‘Nuclear-free zone.’ For further reading, see Atashroo, ‘Weaponising Peace’, pp. 170- 186. 
778 J. Cutler, ‘Surveillance and the Nuclear State’, Index on Censorship, 18.6-7 (1989), p. 445. (The author was a 
TV documentary maker who was affiliated to FoE and Greenpeace during the inquiry.)  
779 In a similar incident two protestors opposing the nuclear dump at Fulbeck in Lincolnshire were beaten up and 
assaulted by unknown assailants who appeared to have links with the Ministry of Defence, whilst their legal 
representative had her car broken into and confidential papers searched. (Ibid.) 
780 Ibid.  
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government spies or private agencies seconded to monitor their activities, activists expressed 
fears of a dystopian future where this would become the norm, arguing that nuclear 
technologies represented a weapon of an increasingly autocratic nuclear state.  
 
 The NCCL warned that the infringement of civil liberties would in future make up an 
essential part of the nuclear industry, embedding an imagined dystopian future which linked 
nuclear reprocessing with the cessation of workers’ rights. They argued that if THORP went 
ahead, workers would be subjected to increasing surveillance and monitoring, explaining that 
“workers would be thoroughly vetted by checks on their families and friends,” whilst 
“scientists, even their wives and friends, who had shown any radical leanings- perhaps at 
university- would find it hard to get a job” within the industry.781 Opponents suggested that 
trade unions would be banned “and strikes outlawed because of the threat to national security”, 
whilst “transport workers would come under police surveillance” as “potentially subversive” 
threats to domestic security.782 In this context, they contended that “wide powers of search 
would be used” with ordinary citizens coming under surveillance: “files would be opened on 
them, mail intercepted, phones tapped, bank accounts revealed [and] citizens might well have 
to carry identity cards.”783 This, they argued, would encourage an atmosphere whereby 
informers and spies would operate “and agents provocateur would emerge.”784 Once again, 
these fears were not without substance, as a BNFL public relations officers later admitted that 
they held company files on specific protestors, and individuals were routinely placed within 
 





anti-nuclear groups to monitor and spy upon their activities.785 Here, we can see a wider critique 
of the subversive methods of governance that accompanied nuclear technologies, as opponents 
resisted the increasing surveillance and vetting processes by the nuclear state. In this context, 
the THORP debate borrowed from and fed into public imaginaries about the totalitarian power 
of the state, and the declining political and moral values of government. The inquiry therefore 
needs to be situated within a wider context of an increasing social resistance to state control, 
as attitudes towards nuclear power and the THORP expansion simultaneously embodied and 
embedded dystopian political, social, and moral imaginaries.  
 
4.5: Moral Outlook. 
 
 Nuclear power was situated within broader debates regarding post-war British society, 
as opponents argued that nuclear technologies were symptomatic of declining social and moral 
values. As we have seen, the inquiry encompassed a multitude of social elements which 
constructed “a shared critique of ‘nuclear society.’”786 Whilst opponents held a variety of anti-
nuclear sentiments, often incongruous with one another, their resistance sought to symbolically 
and practically oppose the cultural and political direction of British society, “even if they did 
not necessarily agree on the precise nature of the problems or solutions.”787 In this context, 
controversies surrounding the THORP application “signalled not only differing views on 
nuclear strategy, but a whole host of other beliefs”, reproducing in microcosm a series of 
 
785 One worker was sacked for being a member of environmental group Greenpeace. Despite the lack of 
evidence against him, twenty-eight-year-old Phillip Cundy was sacked by BNFL who suspected him of leaking 
plant information as he had been seen wearing a Greenpeace badge. (Cutler, ‘Surveillance and the Nuclear 
State’, p. 448.)  
786 Tompkins, Better Active than Radioactive! p. 29.  
787 Laucht, and Johnes, ‘Resist and Survive’, p. 237. 
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broader debates regarding the direction and morality of society.788 Engaging with the various 
arguments put forward throughout the inquiry, we can see that the issue of reprocessing came 
to symbolise diametrically opposite ways of looking at the world, as pro- and anti-nuclear 
factions constructed divergent social futures based upon the proliferation or cessation of 
nuclear technologies. For its opponents, further nuclear development had profound moral 
implications for the future, representative of an outdated way of viewing society and the 
relationships between government and populace, and humanity and the environment. This 
belief is epitomised in the cartoon below (Fig. 4.0), which neatly summarises anti-nuclear 
protestors’ belief that nuclear technologies led to a lower quality of life, committing society to 
a dystopian future of economic prosperity at the expense of declining living standards and the 
suppression of ordinary individuals.  
 
788 D. Cordle, ‘Protect/Protest: British Nuclear Fiction of the 1980s’, British Journal of the History of Science, 
45.4 (2012), p. 658.  
Fig. 4.0: G. Boyle, Nuclear Power: The Windscale Controversy (Milton Keynes: Open University, 1983), p. 51. 
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During the inquiry, opponents such as PERG and FoE embedded their opposition to 
THORP within a broader critique of capitalism and state greed. Local residents centred much 
of their criticism around the perceived financial incentivism of the state, which looked to 
reprocessing as a potent cash-cow. One local woman testifying for FoE lamented: “has this 
country really reached the depths where we have become so besotted with our own decline in 
world status, that we face danger and degradation in this county by becoming a dustbin to the 
world- for money?”789 The reprocessing of foreign waste therefore became symptomatic of a 
series of negative social changes, through which Sellafield and the THORP project embodied 
“all that is wrong with the nuclear industry and with the kind of society it promotes.”790 As 
literary historian Dan Cordle has argued of nuclear weapons, competing views on nuclear 
power “often revealed entirely antithetical conceptions of the social world” and “came to 
epitomise a Cold War logic run amok.”791 This strand of resistance had a particularly left-wing 
focus, as left-leaning opponents imbued nuclear power with specific political and social 
epistemologies. They spoke of a “growing change in human values [and] a growth of 
conflicting philosophies” within which “nuclear power has become a symbol of that conflict 
in values.”792 This betrayed a broader resistance to the social technocratic climate of the late-
1970s which saw the rise of a more radical form of Conservatism under Margaret Thatcher and 
a wider crisis of faith in the political establishment during the Labour years of Harold Wilson 
and James Callaghan.793 In this context, debates over nuclear reprocessing drew upon broader 
 
789 National Archives, ‘The Windscale Planning Inquiry: Proof of Evidence given by Jean MacLeod, (AT 
103/267.) 
790 Whitehaven Archive and Local Studies Centre, (24/ NUC), The Windscale File: A Lay Guide to Living (and 
Dying) with a Nuclear Neighbour, (London: Greenpeace, 1983), p. 1. 
791 Cordle, ‘Protect/Protest’, p. 658; Cordle, Late Cold War Literature, p. 5.  
792 Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, (DH/372/89), p. 82. 
793 For another reading on the decline of British society during the 1970s, see K. Morgan, ‘Britain in the 
Seventies – Our Unfinest Hour?’, French Journal of British Studies, 22.0 (2017), pp. 1- 18. 
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socio-political conflicts, helping embed dystopian imaginaries of state greed and Britain’s 
declining morality. 
 
Protests against economic capitalism were a feature of the anti-nuclear movement 
elsewhere in Europe, specifically in France in Fessenheim and Malville, and West Germany at 
Kalkar, where opponents depicted nuclear technologies “as a symbol of capitalism or the 
state.”794 In Britain, opponents mobilised similar beliefs, arguing that nuclear power 
represented “the unacceptable face of capitalism” and the manifestation of an industrialised 
way of looking at ordinary people and the natural world as an economic resource, rather than 
an entity in their own right.795 This left-leaning focus dovetailed with emergent strands of 
environmental and ecological resistance towards nuclear technologies, as the environment 
became a key pressure point in debates regarding reprocessing.  
 
Environmental activists embedded dystopian imaginaries of the environmental 
consequences of nuclear power, locating these imagined futures within the similarly dystopian 
social order envisioned by groups such as the NCCL and PERG, as together, groups opposing 
THORP fashioned a series of undesirable futures predicated on the environmental, moral, and 
social consequences of nuclear reprocessing. Here, resistant nuclear imaginaries overlapped 
and intertwined with one another, producing new, vociferous forms of resistance towards the 
nuclear project. The everyday forms of resistance witnessed in the past aligned with wider (and 
more organised) forms of resistance in the shape of the emerging environmental movement, to 
challenge and interrogate the dominant nuclear imaginaries cultivated by the state. This gives 
an indication of why resistance to the nuclear project was far greater during the Windscale 
 
794 Tompkins, Better Active than Radioactive! p. 3. 
795 Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, (DH/372/95), p. 13.  
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Inquiry than had been witnessed before, as shared ideas motivated and mobilised people to 
resist nuclear proliferation and create change.   
 
 Propelled forward by the success of books such as Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring and 
the work of Stanford biologist Paul Ehrlich, by the late 1970s the ecological and environmental 
movements had begun to radically transform the way elements of society viewed the 
interrelationship between human life and the global environment. In the eyes of environmental 
groups represented at the inquiry such as Greenpeace, FoE, and the ad-hoc consortium the 
‘Windscale Appeal’, the issue of nuclear reprocessing embodied the mismanagement of the 
natural environment and reflected outdated modes of thinking that were incongruous with the 
attitudes and fundamental principles of the age of ecology.796 The following section will 
examine how the issue of environmentalism dovetailed with existing critiques of nuclear 
governance to produce new forms of nuclear resistance, largely unseen in the British context 
prior to this point. Here, I will make the argument that the Windscale Inquiry represented a 
significant moment in the evolution of the environmental movement in the UK which, having 
bubbled under the surface of debates regarding nuclear technologies throughout the previous 
decade and a half (during which it had amassed a considerable following), galvanised and 
propelled itself into the heart of the anti-nuclear movement.797  
 
796 McCormick, The Global Environmental Movement; McNeill, ‘The Environment, Environmentalism, and 
International Society’, in Ferguson, The Shock of the Global, pp. 263- 278.  
797 This augments the findings of studies examining social responses to nuclear technologies in multiple national 
contexts, which have found that public resistance tends to lie muted and dormant within society. Specifically, 
environmental geographer Karen Parkhill and anthropologist Françoise Zonabend have noted that public 
attitudes towards nuclear technologies “bubble to the surface” at particular moments of temporary anxiety, 
conflict, or social change. This also reflects the thinking of sociological practitioners who have suggested that it 
is at times of conflict and crisis that socio-cultural identities become most visible to the external observer. (S. 
Gunn, and R. Morris, ‘The Spatial Turn: Changing Histories of Space and Place’, in S. Gunn, and R. Morris, 
(eds.), Identities in Space: Contested Terrains in the Western City Since 1850 (London: Ashgate Publishing, 
2001), p. 9; K. Parkhill, D. Venables, and P. Simmonds, ‘From the Familiar to the Extraordinary: Local 
Residents’ Perceptions of Risk When Living With Nuclear Power in the UK’, Transactions of the Institute of 
British Geographers, 35.1 (2010), pp. 39- 58; Zonabend, The Nuclear Peninsula, p. 124.  
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As sociologist Roger Williams has demonstrated, environmental groups had become 
increasingly critical of nuclear power throughout the 1970s. He argued that, whilst “opposition 
to nuclear power had increased throughout the seventies in all the liberal democracies, drawing 
strength from a substantial measure of international co-ordination, the movement in Britain 
remained distinctly muted until the Windscale issue in 1976-7.”798 Whilst more traditionally 
associated with the later efforts of Greenpeace, the involvement of environmental groups (such 
as FoE and the consortium of environmental groups represented by the Windscale Appeal), 
fused the multifaceted concerns of local residents and the social and moral arguments against 
reprocessing within the framework of the broader environmental movement, laying the 





As the previous chapter demonstrated, the Windscale fire had raised local concerns 
about the environmental effect of nuclear technologies. These fears were largely based on the 
environmental consequences of issues like radiation and particularly how they pertained to 
human (and farm-animal) health. Throughout the inquiry, we can see how these localised 
 
798 This is something of a simplification, as environmental resistance towards nuclear technologies had been 
growing since the early 1960s, and global environmental factors were one of the key reasons for the Partial Test 
Ban Treaty of 1963. In the British context, the two organisations most associated with leading the 
environmental movement against nuclear power, Friends of the Earth and latterly Greenpeace did not emerge 
until the 1970s. Specifically, beginning in 1973, FoE began to oppose nuclear power, despite having “shown 
decided favourability towards nuclear power between 1970 and 1973”, whilst Greenpeace had devoted their 
initial efforts towards opposing nuclear weapons, and then turned their attention towards ecological issues such 
as marine preservation and whale hunting. (Williams, The Nuclear Power Decisions, pp. 262f; Herring, ‘Energy 
Utopianism’, p. 50; Zelko, Make it a Greenpeace, pp. 112- 161; For further reading on the history and trajectory 
of the environmental and ecological movements see op. cit., ref 709. 
799 This will be covered in more detail within the following chapter.  
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concerns were galvanised by the wider environmental movement, producing new forms of 
resistance which advanced the belief that nuclear technologies (and their pollutants) 
represented outdated modes of thinking regarding society’s relationship with, and stewardship 
of, the natural environment. Nuanced forms of resistance emerged, as the localised imaginaries 
of radiobiological contamination witnessed in the previous chapter underwent a process of 
extension, amalgamating with and feeding into dystopian imaginaries of environmental 
pollution operating at broader national and international levels.  
 
 By examining the witness testimonies and the range of arguments mobilised throughout 
the inquiry by local residents, we can see that the local public increasingly interpreted the 
nuclear project through the lens of the environmental movement. Environmental discourse 
saturated the inquiry, as local residents described the environmental impact of the plant as both 
“a stunning assault” and indicative of “the daily social and domestic life of an increasingly 
polluted world.”800 Pointing to the much lower levels of pollution emitted by the Cap de la 
Hague nuclear plant in France, opponents criticised BNFL’s apparent disregard for the 
environmental impact of its activities, and its “immense threat to our fragile environment.”801 
This is reflected in the Greenpeace cartoon pictured below (Fig. 5.0), which characterises the 
French reprocessing plant as a model of environmental cleanliness, in marked juxtaposition 
with its British equivalent, seen leaking nuclear waste into the environment and spewing 
contaminants into the atmosphere.  
 
800 National Archives, ‘The Windscale Planning Inquiry: Proof of Evidence given by Enid Huws-Jones,’ (AT 
103/267).  
801 Whitehaven Archive and Local Studies Centre, (24/ NUC), The Windscale File: A Lay Guide to Living (and 




Opponents argued that Sellafield posed a substantive threat to the marine environment. 
This was particularly emphasised by a delegation from the Isle of Man government, who 
contended that “considerable anxiety had been expressed in the island about the expansion, and 
particularly about Irish Sea pollution”, emphasising the “possible danger arising from the long-
term build-up of radioactivity in the sea.”802 Local fisherman also expressed their fears that 
increasing discharges would see the area off the Cumbrian coast closed to fishing, as it was in 
area to the south of Sellafield where sewage pollution meant they were no longer allowed to 
fish for shellfish.803 Here, the specific concerns of local fishing interests dovetailed with a 
broader international consensus on the hazards of marine discharge, as regional interest groups, 
together with the environmental movement co-produced dystopian imaginaries of THORP and 
 
802 Morris, and Pithers, Windscale: A Summary, p. 70. 
803 Ibid. p. 66; For further reading, see P. Ineson, Pollution in Cumbria (Huntingdon: Institute of Terrestrial 
Ecology, 1985). 
Fig. 5.0: Whitehaven Archive and Local Studies Centre, The Windscale File: A Lay Guide to Living (and 
Dying) with a Nuclear Neighbour, (London: Greenpeace, 1983), p. 18, (24/ NUC), 
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the Sellafield plant more widely as an environmental scourge.804 This was a point forcibly 
impressed by FoE and the Lancashire and Western Sea Fisheries Joint Committee, who pointed 
to the presence of airborne plutonium in the area surrounding the plant and the high levels of 
radioactive caesium 134 and 137 discovered in fish caught in the Irish Sea and off the coast of 
Western Scotland. This, they claimed, had caused “significant genetic damage to the general 
population,” referencing a recent report by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Foods 
which had shown that local fish eaters were exposed to “one-third of the maximum allowable 
[radiation] dose in their diet alone.”805 Concerns about the levels of marine contamination were 
a feature of opposition from both English and Scottish groups, such as SCRAM, who published 
the image below (Fig. 6.0) in their Atomic Energy Bulletin during the inquiry. This 
demonstrates how environmental groups embedded dystopian imaginaries of nuclear power as 
a dual threat to humanity and nature as an ecological and environmental hazard.  
 
804 This was a significant strand of the environmental movement, which had asserted the hazards of marine 
contamination throughout the previous twenty years, culminating in the London Convention of 1975, an 
international agreement to restrict the pollution of the sea by the dumping of pollutants. Environmental 
historian, Jacob Hamblin’s book Poison in the Well gives a detailed insight into the issues of radioactive waste 
disposal throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, showing that, through the routine releases of radioactive 
effluent from Windscale, and the marine dumping of radioactive waste, Britain discharged more radionuclides 
into the ocean than any other Western nation. Hamblin has shown that “in the Atlantic, where the lion’s share of 
waste was dumped, Britain was responsible for some 77.5 percent” of the radiation found in the sea. 
Furthermore, he evidences that Britain was responsible for over 40% of the global radioactive waste dumped at 
sea between 1946 and 1993. (Hamblin, Poison in the Well, p. 253; Hamblin, Arming Mother Nature; Elsewhere, 
Frank Zelko provides a detailed insight into Greenpeace’s activities in this area, see Zelko, Make it a 
Greenpeace; see also, M. Schenker, ‘Saving a Dying Sea: The London Convention on Ocean Dumping’, 
Cornell International Law Journal, 7.0 (1973), pp. 32- 48. 
805 Morris and Pithers, Windscale: A Summary, pp. 66, 92; Whitehaven Archive and Local Studies Centre, (24/ 
NUC), The Windscale File: A Lay Guide to Living (and Dying) with a Nuclear Neighbour, (London: 
Greenpeace, 1983), p. 18.   
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Concerns about Sellafield’s environmental impact were reflected in the work of a local 
poet, Norman Nicholson, who authored the poem ‘Windscale’ in 1972, in which he denounced 
what he saw as the deliberate contamination of the local environment.  
 
Windscale 
The toadstool towers infest the shore:  
Stink-horns that propagate and spore 
Wherever the wind blows.  
Scafell looks down from the bracken band, 
And sees hell in a grain of sand,  
And feels the canker itch between his toes.  





This is a land where the dirt is clean, 
And poison pasture, quick and green,  
And storm sky, bright and bare;  
Where sewers flow with milk, and meat  
Is carved up for the fire to eat,  
And children suffocate in God’s fresh air.806 
 
This poem embodied local sentiments towards the perceived environmental blight of the 
nuclear industry as local residents allied with wider environmental groups such as FoE, PERG, 
and Society for Environmental Improvement (amongst others) to resist imaginaries of nuclear 
safety and embed dystopian imaginaries of nuclear technologies as a threat to the environment. 
Such arguments were not altogether new, and as we have seen, debates over nuclear safety had 
been ongoing (to varying degrees) for as long as the nuclear industry had been operating. 
Despite this, the inquiry saw the environmental consciousness of the local public galvanise, as 
the industry’s poor safety record merged with wider social and moral concerns to produce 
ardent, more vociferous imaginaries of nuclear technologies as a threat not only to public 
health, but to the environment more broadly.  
 
 The inquiry laid bare the extent of the plant’s poor safety record, aligning dystopian 
imaginaries of environmental hazard with wider concerns towards the state’s management of 
nuclear technologies. From the mid-1950s, Sellafield’s safety levels entered into a sustained 
period of decline, as multiple incidents of atmospheric and marine contamination befell the 
 
806 N. Nicholson, A Local Habitation (London: Faber and Faber, 1972).  
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plant.807 The plant’s safety record was so bad that by the end of the 1970s, Windscale had 
become “for many people... a byword for the dirty end of a dangerous industry.”808 Official 
UKAEA historian Lorna Arnold explained that the plant’s chequered history of incident, 
mishap, and “near-misses” had made the names ‘Windscale’ and ‘Calder’ a byword for 
environmental negligence, so much so that BNFL decided to re-brand the plant ‘Sellafield’ 
shortly after the inquiry in an attempt to whitewash its recent past and avoid any further 
negative publicity.809 This speaks to the deeply embedded nature of dystopian imaginaries at 
both local and national levels, as officials were compelled to change the plant’s name in an 
attempt to disassociate nuclear technologies with imaginaries of environmental hazard. 
 
Differing in their severity, the inquiry revealed that there had been a total of 194 
recorded incidents between 1950 and mid-1977, as plant leaders were forced to admit that there 
had been a number of incidents that had been covered-up by management.810 Only the previous 
year, there had been a substantial leak of radioactive water discovered from silo ‘B38’, found 
by chance during building work.811 Subsequent attempts to rectify this had uncovered another 
huge leak from adjacent ‘Building 701’, which was thought to have been empty. From 
‘Building 701’, 100,000 curies of radioactive strontium and caesium had escaped, seeping into 
the groundwater over a period of eight years before the leak was discovered.812 (To place this 
leak into context, less than one millionth of a curie of radioactivity can prove lethal depending 
 
807 Future public relations manager, Harold Bolter acknowledged that “there had been a lamentable lack of 
investment in Sellafield for some years. Housekeeping standards on the site had fallen and morale was low.” 
See, Bolter, Inside Sellafield, p. 90. 
808 Macgill, The Politics of Anxiety, p. 12. 
809 Arnold, Windscale 1957, p. xiii. 
810 For further reading on the industry’s history of incidents, see Arnold, Windscale 1957; Pearce, Fallout: 
Disasters, Lies; B. Wynne, C. Waterton and R. Grove-White, (eds.), ‘Public Perceptions’, pp. 1- 78; Aubrey, 
Thorp; Bolter, Inside Sellafield; Blowers, The Legacy of Nuclear Power. 
811 Harold Bolter gives a comprehensive overview of this incident, in his 1996 book, Inside Sellafield. See pp. 
92ff.  
812 BNFL chief Con Alday ruefully told the Financial Times that “people forgot it was there and they shouldn’t 
have.” (Ibid., p. 92.) 
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on which organ it is absorbed by).813 These incidents bolstered public concerns about the 
environmental impact of nuclear technologies and contributed to a wave of hostile public 
opinion against the plant’s perceived environmental mismanagement. This process is 
characterised in the cartoon sketch below (Fig. 7.0), published in the Daily Telegraph. This 
image depicts an irate BNFL official and a sheepish scientist as little concerned about the 
effects of radioactive contamination, focusing instead on the negative press coverage it would 
engender. Whilst a satirical swipe at BNFL, this image embodies public attitudes towards the 
integrity and environmental negligence of the nuclear industry. This unified environmental, 
political, and moral strands of the dystopian imaginary, imagining state efforts to pursue 
nuclear technologies and cover-up their hazardous effects. The experiences of local citizens 
helped embed this imaginary, pointing to recent incidents of radioactive contamination that 
had been suppressed by the nuclear industry.  
 
 
813 Ibid., pp. 93f.  
Fig. 7.0: G. Boyle, Nuclear Power: The Windscale Controversy (Milton Keynes: Open University, 1983), p. 29. 
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Residents explained that BNFL regularly conducted hazardous discharges without 
informing the public. They described a recent incident whereby radioactive effluent was 
released into the local River Calder without public knowledge. Witnesses called by FoE told 
the inquiry that residents had not been warned about the contamination of the river, despite the 
fact that it served as a popular bathing spot amongst locals. They lambasted BNFL’s careless 
attitude towards the environment, and in particular its failure to inform the local population, 
especially as “children were still allowed to bathe whilst the river-bed was being excavated in 
an effort to remove contaminated material.”814 Sceptical residents highlighted that it was only 
since additional scrutiny had been placed on the plant by opposition groups and media outlets 
in the run up to the inquiry that BNFL had begun to truthfully communicate with the local 
population. They noted that “of late many more incidents have been notified and we wonder 
how many more have been hushed up in the past.”815 In this context, attitudes towards state 
secrecy blended with environmental anxieties to formalise and embed imaginaries of nuclear 
technologies as an environmental hazard.       
           
 Local citizens’ experiences of nuclear secrecy blended with and co-produced social, 
moral, and environmental strands of the dystopian imaginary. Locals explained that the official 
radiation figures did not reflect the numerous incidents which were covered up by management, 
but known to the public. Referencing the recent river contamination, one resident explained 
that, “although at that time I knew no one who was employed at Windscale or even who was 
connected with the plant, I was quite aware of the incident in question…”816 This aligned with 
broader concerns about the morality and transparency of managers and politicians in charge of 
the nuclear programme. One local witness admitted that, “it worries me tremendously to read 
frequent reports of leakages from the plant, yet we are always assured that there is “no danger.” 
My technical and scientific skill is nil, yet I cannot understand how anyone with a vestige of 
 283 
humanity can insist in the face of frequent spillages and leakages of these deadly substances 
that there really is no danger.”817 In this quote the environmental, political, social, and moral 
strands of the dystopian imaginary came together, as local citizens constructed and 
disseminated an idea of the nuclear industry as an environmental threat; at once complicit in 
the contamination of the local area and the systematic cover-up of its activities. As the 
following section will demonstrate, the effects of local environmental pollution had a profound 
impact upon local attitudes towards the THORP proposals, as local citizens increasingly 
refuted the socio-spatial implications of the environmental risks they were being exposed to in 




The environmental costs of reprocessing, whilst ostensibly a national and global issue, 
resonated profoundly amongst local people, who looked to the decision to cite the THORP 
project in West Cumbria as indicative of wider social inequalities, and their perceived 
marginalization at the hands of the nuclear state. Examining where nuclear infrastructures are 
located, environmental geographer Andrew Blowers has used the sociological concept of 
‘peripheralisation’ to describe the social inequalities of nuclear citing policy and its spatial 
implications.818 He has described the Sellafield region as “the archetype of a peripheral 
community”, identifying the region’s geographic remoteness, economic marginalization, 
 
814 National Archives, ‘The Windscale Planning Inquiry: Proof of Evidence given by Jessie Norman’, (AT 
103/267). 
815 Ibid. 
816 National Archives, ‘The Windscale Planning Inquiry: Proof of Evidence given by Jean MacLeod’, (AT 
103/267), p. 5. 
817 Ibid. 
818 Blowers , The Legacy of Nuclear Power; Blowers, and Leroy, ‘Power, Politics and Environmental 
Inequality: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Process of Peripheralisation’, Environmental Politics, 
3.2 (1994), p. 222. See also, K. Bickerstaff, '“Because we’ve got History Here”: Nuclear Waste, Cooperative 
Siting, and the Relational Geography of a Complex Issue', Environment and Planning A, 44.0 (2012), p. 2621. 
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political powerless, social homogeneity, and proximity to an environmental hazard (in the form 
of Sellafield) as the defining characteristics of its peripheral status on the fringes of mainstream 
society.819 Developing this final point, he contends that these socio-spatial relations have led 
to the local community carrying a “disproportionate share of the burden of environmental 
degradation or risk resulting from modern environmental processes” and adopting a servile 
relationship with the nuclear industry.820 Building upon these insights, the following section 
will show that the environmental, social, and political costs of reprocessing helped embed a 
locally-specific dystopian imaginary, as local citizens imagined their marginalisation at the 
hands of the nuclear state. Demonstrating the role of identity in this process, I will demonstrate 
how subjective notions of ‘peripherality’ fed into and embedded environmental, political, and 
social strands of the dystopian imaginary. 
 
 This reading of subjectivity has implications for our understanding of STIM, showing 
the role that identity plays in embedding and resisting sociotechnical imaginaries, whilst also 
highlighting the social processes which underpin formations and expressions of identity. This 
sits alongside work on subjectivity by social psychologists Roy Baumeister and Mark 
Muraven, who have argued that identity “does not come into being in a vacuum” and can be 
more accurately understood as adaptation to a social context. Here, they argue, individuals 
 
819 This owes something to the notion of ‘core and periphery’ and even Hechter’s concept of ‘internal 
colonialism’ indicative of a hegemonic ‘core’ region exploiting ‘peripheral’ communities located on the fringes 
of mainstream society. However, “in contrast to the geographical notion of a ‘periphery’, which is synonymous 
with distance to a centre and being situated on the fringes of a city, region or nation, research on 
‘peripheralization’ describes the production of peripheries through social relations and their spatial 
implications.” (See, M. Kuhn, ‘Peripheralization: Theoretical Concepts Explaining Socio-Spatial Inequalities’, 
European Planning Studies, 23.2 (2015), p. 367; M. Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British 
National Development (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1998), pp. 202ff; See also, A. Blowers, and P. 
Leroy, ‘Power, Politics and Environmental Inequality: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Process of 
Peripheralisation,’ Environmental Politics, 3.2 (1994), pp. 197- 228; B. Wynne, ‘Misunderstood 
Misunderstanding: Social Identities and Public Uptake of Science’, Public Understanding of Science, 1.3 
(1992), pp.  281- 304.) 
820 Blowers, and Leroy, ‘Power, Politics and Environmental Inequality’, p. 222. 
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exercise “considerable choice and influence on their identities”, fashioning a version, or 
multiple versions of the self which “enable them to get along best in that context.”821 This is 
an interpretation shared by geographer Keith Halfacree, who explains that identities can be as 
much a product of what we, as “what we are not.”822 Baumeister and Muraven go on to explain 
that “the self constructs for itself a definition that allows it to get along reasonably well in its 
social environment, reflective both of the hegemony of these social relations, but also local 
citizens’ uneasiness with them.”823 Developing this understanding, identity can be understood 
as a historical window into and a product/producer of sociotechnical imaginaries, as citizens 
respond to and resist particular orderings of power. The following pages will demonstrate how 
local citizens adapted to the dominant power relations of the nuclear state by producing and 
performing new forms of identity.824 I will demonstrate how these subjectivities helped embed 
the dystopian imaginary by challenging the socio-spatial inequalities of peripheralisation, 
imagining a regional future characterised by the deleterious environmental, political, and social 
costs of reprocessing.  
 
This builds upon the work of anthropologist Joseph Masco, who has examined the 
relationship between nuclear technologies and identity. Masco shows that where nuclear 
projects are situated reveals the state’s equation of citizenship, producing “human and 
environmental costs that are borne by particular bodies in particular places.”825 He explains 
that these consequences evoke new forms of social identity amongst the citizens who bear 
 
821 Baumeister, and Muraven, ‘Identity as Adaptation to Social, Cultural, and Historical Context’, Journal of 
Adolescence, 19.0 (1996), p. 405. Roy Baumeister has written extensively on the self, for further reading, see R. 
Baumeister, ‘The Self’, in D. Gilbert, S. Fiske, and G. Lindzey (eds.), The Handbook of Social Psychology 
(Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1998), pp. 680- 740. 
822 Robertson, and Richards (eds.), Studying Cultural Landscapes, p. 16.  
823 Baumeister, and Muraven, ‘Identity as Adaptation to Social, Cultural, and Historical Context’, Journal of 
Adolescence, 19.0 (1996), p. 415.  
824 Ibid., pp. 405- 415. 
825 Masco, Nuclear Borderlands, p. 12.  
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them, as they engage with nuclear technologies and the state which controls and sustains 
them.826 Expanding upon his findings within the context of this chapter, we can see that local 
citizens resisted the social inequalities of reprocessing by emphasising (and resisting) their 
identity as the recipients of “everyone’s else’s unwanted nuclear waste.”827 Furthermore, 
within articulations of resistance at the inquiry and in the years since, we can see that local 
people imagined reprocessing as indicative of an undesirable future whereby their handling 
and storage of hazardous nuclear waste pushed them to the fringes of British society.828  
 
 The arrival of foreign nuclear fuels exacerbated the peripheral nature of the region by 
becoming the location for both domestic nuclear waste and the major global storage facility for 
spent nuclear fuels. Here, the citing of THORP on the Sellafield site intensified “the sense of 
local stigma in being seen as a weak and subservient community”, forced to adopt a servile 
relationship with the nuclear industry.829 This sentiment was encapsulated by the Daily 
Mirror’s emotive metaphor of Britain, and particularly West Cumbria, as the ‘World’s Nuclear 
Dustbin’, in an article published in October 1975 (Fig. 8.0).830 This article galvanised the anti-
THORP agenda amongst the local population and embedded the dystopian imaginary, showing 
that the government was prepared to sacrifice the safety of the local public in the pursuit of 
hazardous nuclear technologies and lucrative reprocessing contracts. In this context, the safety 
 
826 Ibid. 
827 Wynne, Waterton and Grove-White, (eds.), ‘Public Perceptions’, p. 38.  
828 Ibid. 
829 This also had economic dimensions as local citizens expressed anxieties that the economic hardship seen 
after the decline of the iron and steel industries could be replicated if reprocessing become economically 
unviable. They stated that “West Cumbria’s past prosperity was built on the contribution of coal and iron, and 
the subsequent decline of both has left a legacy of social, economic and environmental deprivation, and the 
parallel between the past and the present can be drawn, we think, all too clearly.” Similarly, they emphasised the 
plant’s socio-economic impact which would further increase their dependency on the nuclear industry by 
draining labour from other occupations, inducing immigration, and stalling the development of other industry. 
These factors, coupled with the plant’s limited lifespan appeared to represent a threat to the future economic 
prosperity of the region, further marginalising the local community by leaving the area almost entirely reliant on 
the nuclear industry. (Whitehaven Archive and Local Studies Centre, (YSPC 1/170), p. 12.) 
830 Daily Mirror, 21 October 1975, p. 1.  
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of the local population appeared as a trade-off in the state’s production of energy, as citizens 
refuted the “risks to which Cumbrians are exposed in the ‘national interest.’”831 In this way, 
the environmental inequalities of nuclear technologies produced specific forms of identity 
which helped embed the dystopian imaginary, as citizens resisted the exploitation of the local 




831 Whitehaven Archive and Local Studies Centre, (24/ NUC), The Windscale File: A Lay Guide to Living (and 
Dying) with a Nuclear Neighbour, (London: Greenpeace, 1983), p. 7. This article also betrayed the xenophobic 
undertones that accompanied the public’s response to reprocessing foreign nuclear waste. This bore striking 
similarities with public reactions to reprocessing in France, where Zonabend found “there is no getting away 
from the fact that genuine popular mobilisation occurred only when demonstrations were directed against the 
unloading of spent fuel from other countries.” It appears as though the issue of domestic reprocessing was one 
issue, but the arrival of foreign nuclear waste was another entirely. This further emphasised the region’s 
peripherality, not only at a national but international level, as the chosen location for the bulk of the world’s 
hazardous nuclear waste. (Zonabend, The Nuclear Peninsula, p. 65.) 
Fig. 8.0: Daily Mirror, 21 October 1975, p. 1. 
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Residents resisted the THORP project by emphasising their peripheral identity, 
complaining that “the risks associated with nuclear projects would not be borne by the 
bureaucrats in capital cities who planned them or by the managers of energy companies that 
profited from them, but rather by those living close to the sites in question.”832 They 
complained that West Cumbria was becoming increasingly marginalised by the siting and 
operational practices of the nuclear state, which subjected the region to hazardous elements of 
the nuclear fuel-cycle. One local resident stated that “I am appalled that the government has 
taken so few steps to safeguard the people in this county. On the contrary it seems to me they 
are in favour of this proposed expansion regardless of us, who have no alternative but to remain 
in the area no matter our feelings and fears.”833 Others explained that “it was tacitly 
acknowledged it was a dangerous plant and so we’ll put it somewhere out of the way, so it 
affects as few people as possible.”834 This saw direct comparisons made between West 
Cumbria and the desert location of the Manhattan project in Los Alamos, as citizens referenced 
their geographic remoteness, emphasising that the government thought of Cumbria as the 
British equivalent to “the middle of the desert”, remarking pointedly “except it’s not a 
desert.”835 Within this context, THORP appeared as “an injustice imposed on them by outside 
powers whose intervention in local affairs might harm residents and their material interests”, 
as locals bore a disproportionate share of the economic and environmental burden of 
reprocessing whilst others benefitted.836  
 
 
832 Tompkins, Better Active than Radioactive! p. 34.  
833 National Archives, ‘The Windscale Planning Inquiry: Proof of Evidence given by Jean MacLeod’, (AT 
103/267).  
834 E. Robson, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 19 March 2010, p. 6. 
835 D. Raaz, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by J. Lister, 16 March 2010, p. 13.  
836 Tompkins, Better Active than Radioactive!, p. 34.  
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Concerns over the region’s peripheral status aligned readily with existing social 
attitudes towards the incursion on local life by the rich and powerful, and the imposition of 
London-centric policy-makers upon northern communities.837 This was predicated upon long-
standing resentments towards the supposed ‘othering’ of the north by southern policy-makers, 
through which the region had been “’northernised’ as an inferior place” that existed “in contrast 
to Southern England.”838 This sentiment was a feature of oral interviews conducted years later, 
as it appears as though these peripheral identities have only grown stronger over time. 
Residents explained that hazardous facilities were more commonly placed in the North, stating 
that “there's a lot more fuss about a [nuclear] new-build at Bradwell, or places down South than 
there would be about the Sellafield site.”839 Here, we can see how peripheral identities helped 
embed dystopian political and social imaginaries revolving around the centralisation of power 
within Southern England, and a perceived political imbalance between the North and South.840 
Similar sentiments were contained within a local newspaper reports a few years after the 
inquiry, which mocked that “the real way to solve the differences between the two sides would 
be to move the nuclear industry to the South East... if Battersea Power Station became 
‘Windscale's Laundry’ then any problem would be solved by the government within six 
months.”841 The same article added, “given that Southeast England has as good a water supply 
as the Lake District, would BNFL have been allowed to operate on the Thames estuary and 
discharge plutonium waste off the Kent coast? It is this suspicion that anything nasty is 
acceptable as long as it occurs north of Watford that rouses anger in those affected.”842 In these 
 
837 Ibid. 
838 J. Paxman, The English: A Portrait of a People (London: Michael Joseph Ltd, 1998), p. 157; P. Taylor, 
‘Which Britain? Which England? Which North?’, in D. Morley, and K. Robins (eds.), British Cultural 
Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 136.  
839 M. Kipling, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 7 January 2010, p. 13. 
840 West Cumbria therefore became a periphery within a periphery; an area of social marginalization and 
economic depravity within an already neglected area of the UK.  
841 West Cumberland Times and Star, 19 November 1983, p. 13. 
842 Ibid., p. 12.  
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examples, we can see how local citizens responded to the siting policies of the nuclear industry 
by producing new forms of ‘peripheral’ identity. These subjectivities contributed to a sense of 
ostracism between West Cumbria and wider society, helped embed an imagined dystopian 
future wherein local citizens were separate from mainstream British society. 
 
The environmental costs of reprocessing and its social implications contributed to a 
weakening of the bonds between the state and local public by decoupling citizens from notions 
of the nation-state. Joseph Masco argues that “the social contexts informing nuclear projects 
evoke questions about historical presence and identity, often of race and rights, always of 
citizenship and sacrifice.” He shows that “how individuals engage the nuclear complex puts 
them in a tactile experience not only with [nuclear] technology... but also with the nation state 
that controls it.”843 Developing this argument, we can see how the issue of reprocessing drove 
a wedge between the state and local citizens, who increasingly imagined themselves as the 
collateral pawns of a detached and nefarious nuclear state. Residents complained that “the 
people of this county have always been the last in the queue for any government aid and jobs”, 
using this as a pragmatic basis for their beliefs that “I don't think we should be exploited by 
people who don't have to suffer the consequences of their decisions by virtue of their abode!”844 
Embittered residents sardonically asked, “would a reprocessing plant be acceptable in 
Whitehall?” and satirised government policy: “Oh its dangerous- we don’t want it down here, 
but it’s okay to be dangerous in Cumbria…”845 Here we see how the socio-spatial inequalities 
of reprocessing fed into local identities and helped embed dystopian nuclear imaginaries by 
weakening the bonds of citizenship between the local population and the nation-state. This had 
 
843 Masco, Nuclear Borderlands, p. 12. 
844 West Cumberland Times and Star, 26 November 1983, p. 8. 
845 D. Raaz, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by J. Lister, 16 March 2010, p. 13; 
Whitehaven Archives and Local Studies Centre, (DH/372/1/60), p. 3.  
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profound implications for local citizens’ understanding of ideas of nationhood and the wider 
Cold War conflict itself as citizens “made connections between the nuclear threat and the wider 
state of British and global society.”846  
 
Literary scholar Dan Cordle has argued that nuclear hazards mobilise shared forms of 
human identity, as “the omnipotent threat of nuclear technology can decouple people from 
allegiance to their political masters and against the citizens of another country, and suggests 
instead alliances between peoples against their political establishments.”847 Applying his recent 
work on 1980s nuclear-themed literature, we can see that the THORP project contributed to an 
increasing schism between the local public and the state by reconceptualising the protagonists 
and antagonists within the wider Cold War conflict. By focusing on the shared environmental 
threat posed by the THORP project (and nuclear technologies more widely), local citizens 
reconceived the British political establishment as “complicit in threatening ordinary people” 
through its possession of nuclear technologies and a seeming scant regard for the 
environmental and social costs this bore upon host communities. Cordle argues that this shift 
saw the axis of conflict over nuclear policy shift from horizontal conceptions of the Cold War 
as a conflict between competing nation-states, to a vertical orientation of ordinary civilians 
versus political establishments, their leaders, and “the nuclear-military machine.”848 By 
locating the social and environmental costs of nuclear reprocessing within one specific locale 
(particularly one which had expressed a vociferous and vocal opposition to it), the THORP 
proposals embedded the dystopian nuclear imaginary by placing the local population at odds 
 
846 Laucht ,and Johnes, ‘Resist and Survive’, pp. 227- 237. 
847 Cordle, Late Cold War Literature, p. 666.  
848 Ibid., p. 129; Cordle, ‘Protect/Protest’, p. 666. Kate Brown makes a similar point in Plutopia, where she 
argues that workers at the US nuclear facility in Richland saw themselves as either front-line workers at the 
precipice of the battle against Communism, or the collateral victims of the state's reckless pursuit of nuclear 
supremacy. See, Brown, Plutopia, p. 21. 
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with the state. This sheds new light upon the significance of the Windscale Inquiry as a moment 
of profound social rupture between the local community and the nation; a development which 
not only informs our understanding of the chronology of nuclear cultures, but points to the 
significance of the 1970s in shaping anti-nuclear activism of the following decade. 
 
 By engaging with the wider concerns registered within the inquiry, we can see that the 
issue of reprocessing helped embed dystopian social, political, and environmental imaginaries, 
offering a glimpse into the 1970s as the decade which foregrounded the resistance towards 
nuclear weapons, power production, and state throughout the 1980s. The Windscale Inquiry 
therefore challenges existing scholarly understandings of the decade, pointing to the mid-1970s 
as a period in which social resistance towards the nuclear state and governance; traditionally 
associated with the decade of the 1980s, emerged at a localised level within West Cumbria, 
dovetailing with similar sentiments amongst national and transnational anti-nuclear groups 
such as Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, and the National Council for Civil Liberties, amongst 
others. The inquiry’s role in embedding the dystopian imaginary renders it an important turning 
point in the chronology of public attitudes towards nuclear technologies in a period which has 
been largely ignored by nuclear and Cold War scholars. Often eschewed in favour of the anti-
nuclear decades of the 1960s and 80s, we can understand the inquiry as a crucial turning point 
in social attitudes towards nuclear technologies and the state. This shows the evolution of 
nuclear imaginaries between the initial periods of optimism and nuclear utopianism which 
emerged and became embedded in British society throughout the 1940s and 1950s, and the 
overt nuclear resistance which characterised social attitudes throughout the 1980s. 
 
 This chapter has argued that the inquiry not only offers a bridge between utopian and 
dystopian nuclear imaginaries, but points to this evolution as part of a process. Where the 1960s 
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were largely characterised by resistance towards weapons proliferation, the 1980s saw 
arguments about weapons proliferation merge with a broader rejection of the nuclear state. 
Previous studies have characterized the 1980s as a period in which the social contract between 
state and citizenry broke down over issues of nuclear policy, giving rise to a ‘politics of 
vulnerability’ amongst anxious citizens who felt they could not rely upon the state to ensure 
their ‘security’ from nuclear technologies.849 Engaging with the myriad of concerns raised 
within the inquiry, it appears as though the historical flashpoints favoured amongst the existing 
historiography, such as the Three Mile Island incident in 1979 and the bungled release of the 
Civil Defence pamphlet ‘Protect and Survive’ in 1980, sat within an existing current of social, 
environmental, and political resistance to nuclear policy substantiated throughout the 
Windscale inquiry. We may therefore consider the Windscale Inquiry as a point of departure 
which helps us understand the broader social, political, and cultural resistance to the nuclear 





Exploring the Windscale Inquiry through the lens of the sociotechnical imaginary, this 
chapter has demonstrated how reprocessing induced new forms of nuclear resistance and 
helped embed a new dystopian nuclear imaginary at both local and national levels. Predicated 
upon issues of nuclear secrecy, the social and geographic centralisation of state power, 
government incursion upon personal freedoms, a perceived decline in social morality, and the 
state’s environmental negligence, this imaginary both produced and was produced by a series 
of political, moral, social, and environmental concerns, bringing these issues into direct contact 
 
849 Cordle, Late Cold War Literature; Cordle, ‘Protect/Protest’, pp. 653– 669; Nehring, Politics of Security; 
Grant, After the Bomb; Phythian, ‘CND’s Cold War’; Burkett, ‘Re-Defining British Morality’; Bolsover, and 
Minnion, (eds.), The CND Story (London: Allison and Busby, 1983).  
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with the imaginaries of nuclear utopianism propagated by the state. Exploring this process 
throughout the inquiry, we can see how anti-nuclear groups and ordinary citizens resisted 
nuclear expansion, imagining further nuclear development as representative of an undesirable 
future whereby ordinary people would become increasingly marginalised by the autonomous 
powers of the nuclear state and subjected to the hazardous environmental effects of nuclear 
technologies. This moves our understanding of the 1970s as a period of relative social stability 
between the anti-nuclear decades of the 1960s and 1980s, foregrounding the significance of the 
decade in shaping the social upheavals and mass anti-nuclear movements of the 1980s. 
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5: ‘Nuclear Dustbin/Nuclear Laundry’. 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated how public support for nuclear technologies 
declined throughout the 1970s, particularly amongst the local population and sections of the 
public concerned with issues of environmentalism and civil liberties, as nuclear power became 
imbricated within wider social, environmental, and political inequalities. Through the analysis 
of contemporary source material such as documentary film, local and national newspaper 
articles, government paperwork, and oral testimony, this chapter will argue that the 1980s were 
defined by clear patterns of resistance towards the nuclear power programme at both local and 
national level, as a dystopian nuclear imaginary became embedded within British society. 
 
This chapter centres on two significant incidents involving Sellafield during November 
1983 which generated mass media attention and placed BNFL under intense scrutiny. The first 
was the broadcast of an exposé television documentary by Yorkshire Television on 1 
November 1983, entitled Windscale: The Nuclear Laundry.850 This focused upon the 
significant excess of cancers amongst children in the immediate vicinity of the Sellafield plant, 
attributing this excess to the atmospheric and marine discharges emanating from Sellafield. 
This was followed on 19 November 1983 by a major contamination incident where radioactive 
materials were discharged into the Irish Sea, causing a radioactive slick to severely contaminate 
the Cumbrian shoreline. Together, these two incidents placed BNFL and Sellafield at the centre 
of a political and public health crisis as the national media imbricated nuclear power with 
excess levels of childhood cancer and global marine contamination. Taking these two incidents 
as a point of departure, I will show how events at Sellafield built upon and formalised the 
 
850 Windscale: The Nuclear Laundry, G. McKee, N. Gray, Yorkshire Television: ITV, 1983. The documentary 
was released by ITV on 1 November, 1983 as part of the ‘First Tuesday’ programme which ran between 1983 
and 1993. It can be accessed at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gidQewCtTqY&t=1480s> [accessed 3 
January 2019]. 
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dystopian environmental and ecological imaginary which emerged during the Windscale 
inquiry. In particular, I will demonstrate how the media coverage which accompanied these 
events embedded a dystopian sociotechnical imaginary which 1) stressed the hazardous 
environmental effects of nuclear power, 2) emphasised the threat to public health through the 
contamination of the marine and atmospheric environments, and 3) inextricably linked 
radiation, and more specifically Sellafield, with an observed excess of cancers both within the 
immediate vicinity of the plant, and throughout the North-West and Scotland. 
 
 The chapter explores how this this process was more diverse and nuanced at the local 
level, as citizens were forced to mediate between the dystopian imaginary which emerged in 
the national media, and the assurances provided by BNFL, which assured them that the plant 
represented no threat to public health. This leads to the final strand of this chapter, which 
explores how local citizens became caught between competing imagined nuclear futures and 
ultimately responded to this context by producing their own locally specific forms of nuclear 
knowledge which were simultaneously the product of these imaginaries and their own 
experiential knowledge. By unravelling the social processes behind these responses and 
identifying that citizens inferred nuclear risk by relying upon their own experiences and 
interpretations of nuclear technologies, the industry that controlled them, and their innate 
knowledge of the local environment, it is clear that residents used this repository of knowledge 
to make sense of and fashion their own intensely localised nuclear imaginaries.  
 
The sudden influx of national attention which accompanied these incidents alludes to 
Sellafield’s role as a barometer and arbiter of public opinion; an important social agent capable 
of both reflecting and shaping nuclear imaginaries. This also makes a broader point about the 
power of rural, peripheral communities in national social life. Marianna Dudley's work on wind 
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energy in Orkney has shown that peripheral communities are “materially and imaginatively 
capable of disrupting” state power and dominant cultural imaginaries. This chapter 
substantiates this belief, pointing to Sellafield's role in the production of national nuclear 
culture, and the role of ordinary people as agents of social change.851 Furthermore, this calls 
for a greater engagement with the role of nuclear sites such as Sellafield in shaping the 
historical trajectory of British attitudes towards nuclear technologies. This case study is 
particularly poignant, falling in the period immediately prior to the Chernobyl disaster in the 
former Soviet Union in 1986. Whilst historical (and recently, televisual) accounts of the 
development of nuclear power throughout the 1980s have (rightfully) emphasised the role of 
the Chernobyl disaster in shaping both societal and political responses to nuclear technologies, 
this chapter shows that the British public’s rejection of nuclear power can be traced back 
further.852 This provides a nuanced insight into the evolution of nuclear culture between the 
latter years of the 1970s and into the 1980s, as the British public increasingly resisted the 
alleged benefits of nuclear power, instead engaging with and asserting an imagined dystopian 
future, wherein nuclear power represented an environmental scourge and a substantial threat 
to the public health of the nation.  
 
5.1: Windscale: The Nuclear Laundry. 
 
 The broadcast of Windscale sat within a current of anti-nuclear televisual depictions 
throughout the early 1980s in popular comedic televisual programmes such as Spitting Image, 
 
851 M. Dudley, ‘The Limits of Power: Wind Energy, Orkney, and the Post-war British State’, Twentieth Century 
British History, 31.2 (2020), p. 316. 
852 The literature on Chernobyl is vast. For a select list of recommendations for further reading, see K. Brown, 
Manual for Survival: A Chernobyl Guide to the Future (New York: W.W. Norton and Company Ltd, 2019); J. 
Mahaffey, Atomic Accidents: A History of Nuclear Meltdowns and Disasters: From the Ozark Mountains to 
Fukushima (New York: Pegasus Books, 2015); A. Blowers, and D. Pepper, Nuclear Power in Crisis: Politics 
and Planning for the Nuclear State (Asbury: Nichols Publishing Company, 1987); ‘Chernobyl’, C. Mazin, and 
J. Renck, Home Box Office (HBO), 2019. 
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Only Fools and Horses, and The Young Ones, as well as darker, more politicised terrestrial 
films such as Threads, On the Eight Day (1984), The Day After (1983), and the infamous The 
War Game (1985). Indeed, only a few months prior to Windscale, ITV had broadcast an anti-
nuclear documentary by John Pilger, entitled The Truth Game, which adopted a similar 
investigative, exposé style to highlight the threat nuclear technologies posed to ordinary people 
through their destructive power and government propaganda. Whilst documentary sources are 
designed to reflect and embed a specific agenda, they also function as historical documents, 
capable of reflecting “dominant patterns of vision” from the period of their creation, providing 
a discursive context for making sense of social imaginaries.853 It is their inherent subjectivity 
that provides their value as historical sources, not as “a passive depository of facts but an active 
process of creation of meanings.”854 In this way, we can see how the number of nuclear-themed 
televisual sources from this period serve as a “testimony to the anxieties of their creators”, 
reflecting a wider pattern of public concern towards nuclear technologies, which helped to 
“underline and naturalise distrust of the nuclear state” and embed anti-nuclear imaginaries 
within national culture.855 
 
Sitting within this current of televisual depictions, Windscale detailed the findings of 
recent research from a team of experts at the University of Manchester, who had identified a 
ten-fold increase in childhood leukaemia cases within Seascale and hypothesised a causal 
relationship between these cancers and radioactive emissions from the Sellafield plant.856 
 
853 P. Rabinowitz, ‘Wreckage Upon Wreckage: History, Documentary and the Ruins of Memory’, History and 
Theory, 32.2 (1993), p. 119; Hogg, ‘Normalising Nuclear War’, in Cronqvist, Farbøl, and Sylvest, (eds.), Cold 
War Civil Defence. 
854 A. Portelli, ‘What Makes Oral History Different’, in R. Perks and A. Thomson (eds.), The Oral History 
Reader (Routledge, London, 2006), p. 38. 
855 L. Bennett, ‘The Bunker: Metaphor, Materiality and Management’, Culture and Organization, 17.2 (2011), 
pp. 158; Hogg, British Nuclear Culture, p. 153.  
856 J. Day, and J. Cross, ‘Am-241 From the Decay of Pu-241 in the Irish Sea’, Nature, 292 (1981), pp. 43- 45. 
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Produced by Yorkshire Television and broadcast by ITV as part of the ‘First Tuesday’ series 
of programmes, Windscale depicted Sellafield as the cause of local childhood leukaemia cases 
within Seascale. Noting the upward trend in cancer cases since the plant’s construction and 
specifically since the 1957 fire, the programme identified an apparent causal relationship 
between childhood cancer and radiation exposure. Whilst a community the size of Seascale 
would expect less than one case of childhood leukaemia in this period, the programme found 
ten separate cases within the locale, a figure later amended to fourteen as subsequent cases 
were identified.857 The programme traced atmospheric radiation figures throughout the region 
and recorded the radioactivity of household dust from local residents’ vacuum bags, which 
were collected and analysed by a team of experts from the University of Manchester. Viewers 
were shown that plutonium, americium, ruthenium, and caesium could be found in measurable 
doses within local homes, as residents were found to be living alongside and breathing in 
radioactive dust particles. Atmospheric testing also found greater-than-average concentrations 
of radiation within the Ravenglass estuary, local beaches, and Seascale, which were many times 
more radioactive than could be accounted for by background radiation. Taking these figures, 
the programme identified Sellafield as the source of the ‘clusters’ of local cancers. This 
animated local and national anxieties about Sellafield’s long-term environmental and 
biological impact, producing a volatile blend of intense media and public scrutiny which placed 
the nuclear industry firmly on the back-foot. Even the Times alluded to the film’s “most 
alarming disclosures”, whilst the national BBC News acknowledged that “the evidence seems 
very damning…”858 Thus the burden of proof fell upon industry figures to disprove claims that 
 
857 Initial figures only took into account individuals who still resided in the area, those who had moved away 
and become ill, or were unknown to the documentary makers did not form part of initial statistics. For further 
reading, see Macgill, Politics of Anxiety, p. 30; McSorley, Living in the Shadow, p. 130. 
858 The Times, 31 October 1983; BBC News, 31 October 1983; for further pre-broadcast national news reports, 
see the Guardian, Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail, Daily Express, Daily Star, and Morning Star (all 31 October 
1983). 
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nuclear power represented an environmental and biological hazard. In this manner events 
would conspire against BNFL as its efforts to disprove these allegations were toppled by a 
major incident at the plant a mere fortnight later.  
 
 
5.2: The ‘Beach Incident’. 
 
The Windscale documentary attracted the attention of environmental group 
Greenpeace, which had become increasingly concerned about nuclear power following the 
Windscale Inquiry and the meltdown of an American nuclear reactor at Three Mile Island in 
Fig. 1.0: A still from the documentary, which presented the apparent 
correlation between the Sellafield plant and rare types of childhood cancer 
within the local area. (See cit. 911). 
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1979.859 Spurred on by the strength of public responses to the documentary, in November 1983 
the Greenpeace marine vessel ‘Cedarlea’ (Fig. 2.0) anchored offshore from Sellafield and 
started monitoring the levels of radiation within the Irish Sea.  
 
Soon after monitoring began, on 14 November a team of divers taking radiation measurements 
(Fig. 3.0) discovered high concentrations of radioactive effluent at the end of Sellafield’s 
marine discharge pipeline.860 Their Geiger counters revealed a reading of 200 times normal 
background radiation along the pipeline, where a highly radioactive solvent slick had formed, 
floating on top of the sea.861  
 
859 This was a partial meltdown of reactor number two at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station in 
Pennsylvania, USA. This incident released substantial quantities of radioactive iodine into the environment and 
has been understood as a significant factor in the decline of the American civil nuclear programme from the 
1970s onwards, as public and political opinion increasingly turned against nuclear power production. For further 
reading, see J. Gofman, and A. Tamplin, Poisoned Power: The Case Against Nuclear Power Plants Before and 
After Three Mile Island (Emmaus: Rodale Press, 1979), p. xvii; J. Walker, Three Mile Island: A Nuclear Crisis 
in Historical Perspective (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004). 
860 Greenpeace had also been loosely involved in the making of the documentary in a consultancy role and the 
director of Greenpeace UK, Peter Wilkinson featured as one of the interviewees within the programme and was 
one of the studio guests invited to debate the show’s findings as part of the ‘First Tuesday’ broadcast.  
861 Such was the extent of this radioactivity that the equipment used by the divers was later classified as 
radioactive waste and, in an ironic twist, had to be disposed of at the nearby Drigg waste repository. (Daily 
Telegraph, 21 November 1983; National Archives, ‘Correspondence between Mr Handyside and F.S. Feates’, 
18 November 1983, (AT 31/55). 
Fig. 2.0: The Greenpeace Vessel ‘Cedarlea’ 
<https://media.greenpeace.org/archive/MV-Cedarlea-27MZIFINBWLY.html> 
[accessed 28 October 2019]. 
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The slick was the result of a massive contamination incident at the Sellafield plant just 
days earlier, where highly radioactive effluent was released down the pipeline and into the Irish 
Sea. During the annual shut-down of reprocessing plant ‘B205’ on the night of 10 November 
1983, radioactive liquid was sent from B205 to a sea tank, designed to store and monitor 
effluent prior to sea transferral. This triggered an alarm, showing that the liquid was too 
radioactive to be safely released to sea. Following instructions, plant operators tried to return 
the effluent to B205, pending long-term storage or treatment.862 Despite this, the internal 
pipeline between the two plants had become blocked, leaving plant operators with only one 
option; to release the radioactive effluent to sea. Measuring equipment indicated that the 
effluent was significantly radioactive, yet could be safely dispersed at sea without a substantial 
 
862 Operators were poorly trained and ill equipped for an incident of this nature, forced to follow procedures laid 
out in instruction manuals, covered in pencil annotations and later deemed “out-of-date” and “open to 
misinterpretation.” (National Archives, ‘BNFL Sellafield Discharge of Liquid Radioactive Waste to the Irish 
Sea Leading to Closure of a Beach: Report 2’, 23 November 1983, p. 1, (AT 31/55). 
Fig. 3.0: ‘Greenpeace Inflatable off Windscale Taking Samples of Nuclear 
Radiation’, <https///media.greenpeace.org/archive/Greenpeace-Inflatable-off-
Windscale-taking-samples-of-nuclear-radiation--UK-27MZIFLP0P0P> 
[accessed 28 October 2019]. 
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increase in radiation levels.863 However, plant operators were unaware that the effluent had 
mixed with a highly radioactive layer of ‘crud’ at the base of the sea tank.864 This produced a 
mixture which, once released into the Irish Sea, formed a deadly cocktail of radioactive solvent 
which sat atop the sea’s surface as the calm sea and wind conditions began to float the slick 
back towards the shore. Over the coming days, radioactive flotsam washed up along the 
Cumbrian shoreline, contaminating a ten-mile stretch of beach with radioactive seaweed, 
solvent, and debris. After Greenpeace revealed the extent of the contamination, a small section 
of coastline was temporarily closed by armed police as official monitoring efforts took place. 
After eleven days of consistent high readings and flotsam appearing along the coastline, on 30 
November the Department for the Environment closed a forty kilometre stretch of coastline 
between St Bees in the North and Eskmeals in the South, initiating a six-month ban on public 
access to the Cumbrian coastline.865 
 
Together with the Windscale documentary only days before, the beach incident 
contributed to a wave of local and national opposition against Sellafield as the plant became 
embroiled in a public relations scandal which saw nuclear power linked with childhood cancer 
victims through atmospheric and marine pollution. With the public still reeling from the 
findings of Windscale, the timing of the beach incident could not have been worse for BNFL. 
Together, the two incidents “became inextricably mixed in the public mind, especially outside 
West Cumbria”, bolstering the anti-nuclear agenda and producing what one BNFL director 
 
863 BNFL later admitted that “at the time, there was no quantitative estimate of total activity discharged in this 
period and no samples were taken.” National Archives, (AT 31/55).  
864 ‘Crud’ has a specific definition within nuclear reprocessing. BNFL’s own glossary defines it as “particulate 
material which collects at the boundary between an aqueous and solvent layer during extraction. In nuclear 
reprocessing it contains degradation products of solvent caused by the intense radioactivity. The crud itself is 
very radioactive.” National Archives, ‘BNFL Sellafield Discharge of Liquid Radioactive Waste to the Irish Sea 
Leading to Closure of a Beach: Report 2’, 23 November 1983, p. 1, (AT 31/55); National Archives (AT 31/59); 
F. Pearce, Fallout: Disasters, Lies, and the Legacy of the Nuclear Age (Boston: Beacon Press, 2018), p. 108. 
865 National Archives, (AT 31/59).  
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described as an “overwhelming extent of public antipathy towards the site.”866 In isolation, 
either of these incidents would have represented a considerable body-blow for BNFL. 
Together, they posed a legitimation crisis as the nuclear industry became besieged by an 
overwhelmingly critical tide of national public opinion. The sudden national attention afforded 
the 1983 controversy did not come into being in a vacuum; rather it built upon and formalised 
the dystopian environmental and ecological imaginaries which took shape during the 
Windscale inquiry. Together, Windscale and the beach incident provided two concrete 
incidents which actualised and made real the imagined, hypothetical dystopias developed 
throughout the inquiry. They represented a corporeal manifestation of these undesirable 
environmental and radiobiological futures. No longer were these imaginaries purely 
hypothetical, or indeed ‘imaginary’, but they had become a material reality; an uncomfortable 
present that impinged upon pasts, presents, and futures.  
 
Rosanna Farbøl's recent article on the role of ‘ruin towns’ (training facilities in which 
villages were deliberately ‘ruined’ to create life-like and realistic training grounds for civil 
defence responses) has pointed towards the important role material artefacts play in embedding 
particular imaginaries. Drawing upon previous research on the cultural agency of 
landscape and the power of fallout bunkers in shaping British culture, she argues that “the 
debris and rubble of [the] ruined village gave “mass and solidity” to the imaginary and 
dystopian war civil defence prepared for.” 867 Developing her insights, I will argue that 
Sellafield and the surrounding areas acted as a stage for a dystopian future manifested through 
the hazardous discharge practices of the nuclear industry. Through the efforts of Windscale and 
 
866 Bolter, Inside Sellafield, p. 214.  
867 R. Farbøl, ‘Ruins of Resilience: Imaginaries and Materiality Imagineered and Embedded in Civil Defence 
Architecture’, in Cronqvist, Farbøl, and Sylvest, (eds.), Cold War Civil Defence in Western Europe, p. 1; Mitchell, 
Landscape and Power; Bennett, ‘The Bunker’, pp. 155– 173; S. Jasanoff, ‘Imagined and Invented Worlds’, in S. 
Jasanoff, and S. Kim, (eds.), Dreamscapes of Modernity, p. 322. 
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the national media, the West Cumbrian coastal region (and by extension, neighbouring land 
areas and places linked by ocean currents or domestic tributaries) “imagineered” a future 
characterised by radioactive contamination, providing the “merely imagined” environmental 
and ecological dystopias observed during the previous chapter, with “concrete, tangible 
expression.”868 In this way, the controversies of 1983 “added materiality, spatiality, realism 
and presence to what was largely speculative, discursive and imaginary,” providing “shape, 
mass and solidity to the imagined nuclear catastrophe” and formalising the dystopian 
environmental and radiobiological imaginary of nuclear power.869 
 
Events such as the Three Mile Island power plant incident in the US had raised the 
British public’s “concerns about impacts on health and environment and fear about [nuclear] 
accidents.”870 The Windscale inquiry in the UK increased public awareness of Sellafield’s 
environmental impact and issues of nuclear environmentalism more broadly. Both incidents 
confirmed and reinforced dystopian nuclear imaginaries, which influenced how citizens 
understood and conceptualised the events of 1983. This points towards the evolution and 
embedding of a dystopian nuclear imaginary at the national level throughout the latter years of 
the 1970s and into the 1980s. The following section will demonstrate that the media played a 
vital role in this process, sustaining the public’s engagement with issues of nuclear 
contamination and helping further embed an imagined dystopian future wherein nuclear power 
represented an environmental and biological threat to the British public.  
 
868 D. Monteyne, Fallout Shelter: Designing for Civil Defense (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2011); Farbøl, ‘Ruins of Resilience’, p. 3.  
869 Farbøl, ‘Ruins of Resilience’, pp. 3, 28. 
870 As historian Natasha Zaretsky explains, Three Mile Island “revived earlier fears of radiation and rerouted 
them to nuclear power plants.” See, N. Zaretsky, ‘Atomic Nightmares and Biological Citizens at Three Mile 
Island’, in E. Conze, M. Klimke, and J. Varon, (eds.), Nuclear Threats, Nuclear Fear and the Cold War of the 
1980s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 56; See also, A. Blowers, ‘Why Dump on us? Power, 
Pragmatism and the Periphery in the Siting of New Nuclear Reactors in the UK’, Journal of Integrative 
Environmental Sciences, 7.3 (2010), p. 164; Hecht, Being Nuclear, p. 10; Cordle, ‘Protect/Protest’, p. 665. 
 306 
5.3: The Role of the Media. 
 
Sheila Jasanoff has argued that “it often falls to legislatures, courts, the media, or other 
institutions of power to elevate some imagined futures above others.”871 The following section 
will show how the sustained engagement of the media helped elevate dystopian nuclear futures 
and embedded these imaginaries within British society. In his study of official and unofficial 
nuclear narratives within late Twentieth Century Britain, historian Jonathan Hogg has argued 
that newspaper articles play an important role in both shaping and reflecting public opinion; 
“often pitched at what is assumed to be the dominant worldview or to appeal to an assumed set 
of shared opinions.”872 Newspaper articles might be used as “a window into the social creation 
and reinforcement of [nuclear] meaning”, observing how the print media simultaneously 
reflected and helped embed resistant nuclear imaginaries at the national level by conveying 
particular assumptions about the threat of radiation.873 The sequential timing of the two 
incidents was key to this process, ensuring that the story survived multiple news cycles and 
captivated the print media over several weeks.  
 
The sustained media engagement ensured that debates regarding nuclear safety were 
thrust into public consciousness, increasing people’s scepticism and sense of vulnerability 
towards nuclear power. Studies of risk-perception have found that heightened media coverage 
serves to compound residents’ anxieties about the issue in hand, often leading people to 
“overestimate the probability of certain risks” by devoting a disproportionate amount of 
coverage to them and making their consequences more comprehensible to the 
 
871 S. Jasanoff, ‘Future Imperfect’ in Jasanoff, and Kim, (eds.), Dreamscapes of Modernity, p. 4.  
872 Hogg, British Nuclear Culture, pp. 8- 11. 
873 Ibid., p. 11. 
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public.874 Research on the communication of risk by Malcolm Peltu has shown that journalistic 
symbols, language, and imagery used to convey and communicate nuclear issues often leads 
to negative evaluations and connotations being drawn.875 This is recognised within wider 
nuclear literature, where it is a well understood phenomenon that “heightened coverage of 
nuclear power, even where balanced or slightly pronuclear, will tend to increase public fears 
and thus opposition.”876 Anthropologist Joseph Masco and literary scholar Dan Cordle have 
identified that even ‘protection’ discourses only heighten public anxieties about nuclear issues, 
providing “a sense of increasing and heightened insecurity” by exposing the public's “intense 
vulnerability” towards nuclear technologies.877 In this context, the degree of media engagement 
in the controversies exacerbated public fears towards radioactivity and prompted a greater 
degree of engagement with its imagined dystopian consequences.  
 
Evidencing this growing trend, regional newspapers throughout the UK, particularly 
within the North-West and Scotland, devoted a significant amount of coverage to the 
controversy, and the potential ramifications it may have upon various locales. Whereas 
previously opposition had been largely restricted to elements of the local population and the 
environmental movement, the national scale of press responses reflected the public’s growing 
awareness and concern about the cumulative effects of Sellafield’s discharges. A pattern of 
concern began to emerge at the national level, as different groups began to recognise the threat 
of marine contamination upon regional and national scales. This reflected both the public’s 
 
874 G. Barnes, J. Baxter, A. Litva (et al), ‘The Social and Psychological Impact of the Chemical Contamination 
Incident in Weston Village, UK: A Qualitative Analysis’, Social Science and Medicine, 55.0 (2002), p. 2229; 
Eiser, van der Plight, and Spears, Nuclear Neighbourhoods, p. 111.  
875 M. Peltu, ‘The Role of the Communications Media’, in H. Otway, and M. Peltu, (eds.), Regulating Industrial 
Risks: Science, Hazards, and Public Protection (London: Butterworth, 1985), pp. 128- 148. 
876 Eiser, van der Plight, Spears, Nuclear Neighbourhoods, p. 111. 
877 Cordle, Late Cold War Literature and Culture, p. 48; Masco, Nuclear Borderlands, p. 3; See also A. Mazur, 
‘Media Influences on Public Attitudes toward Nuclear Power’, in W. Freudenberg, and E. Rosa, (eds.), Public 
Reactions to Nuclear Power: Are There Critical Masses? (Washington: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 97- 114. 
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increasing anxiety towards the health and environmental effects of nuclear power and a 
widening of scale, as an ostensibly localised incident animated regional and national concerns. 
 
Scottish newspaper reports revealed citizens’ anxieties about the levels of Sellafield 
radiation in coastal fishing waters and possible pathways to the population.878 Analysing the 
content of various newspaper outlets and ministerial speeches, it is clear that citizens expressed 
strong concerns about the recent statistical rise in cancers throughout Western Scotland, 
drawing upon environmental dystopian imaginaries which offered discursive and political 
support to claims of contamination. Indeed, several newspapers and local Labour M.P., George 
Foulkes argued that Sellafield was responsible for contamination along the West coast of 
Scotland and increasing levels of leukaemia within the region. This developed the insights 
within Windscale, which emphasised the wider threat not just to the Cumbrian population, but 
to the coastal communities surrounding the Irish Sea. Fig. 4.0 shows how concerns over marine 
pollution were emphasised by visual elements within Windscale, which played a significant 
role in embedding dystopian environmental and biological imaginaries. 
 
878 Recently uncensored government files also reveal that similar concerns were held in Northern Ireland, where 
ministers warned that “the question of radioactive pollution from Windscale and the associated cancer scare has 
raised a great deal of concern in certain coastal areas of the district, for example at Kilclief (County Down).” 
‘NI state papers: Files Reveal Secret Dumping of Radioactive Waste’ <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-




Peter Bennesved and Casper Sylvest have drawn attention to the ways in which visual 
media play an important role in embedding imaginaries of nuclear futures, pointing to the 
significance of visual (and moving) media in “structure[ing] the imagination of nuclear war 
and ways of surviving such a catastrophe.”879 They describe that film served as “a potent 
medium [...] aimed at large audiences” which possesses “special properties in relation to 
authenticity, anticipation, persuasion, and disciplining.”880 This develops James Carey's 
argument that “communication is a symbolic process whereby reality is produced, maintained, 
repaired, and transformed,” extolling the role of moving imagery in “assist[ing] the 
 
879 Bennesved, and Sylvest, ‘Embedding Preparedness, Assigning Responsibility: The Role of Film in 
Sociotechnical Imaginaries of Civil Defence’, in Cronqvist, Farbøl, and Sylvest, (eds.), Cold War Civil Defence 
in Western Europe, p. 3.  
880 Ibid., p. 5. 
Fig. 4.0: A Still from the Windscale Documentary showing the Dispersion of 
Radionuclides along the Western Coast of England and Scotland. 
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imagination of audiences in negotiating leaps between the present and the future, fear and hope, 
realism and utopianism.”881 In this context, the visual depiction of radioactive contamination 
dispersing and washing up along the shore-line of the North-West and Western Scottish 
seaboards provided a potent visual symbol of an otherwise invisible threat, giving material 
form to dystopian imaginaries of environmental and radiobiological nuclear hazards; 
playing an important role in both “publicly performing” and, given Windscale's national 
audience and position on prime-time terrestrial television, “institutionally stabilising” the 
dystopian imaginary of nuclear environmental and radiobiological threat.882 Substantiating the 
validity of this image, the programme’s creators accompanied it with a reference from a recent 
government report, in which scientists had found that Sellafield’s marine discharges were 
contaminating coastal waters and aquatic life within the Irish Sea, and introducing a toxic 
pathway into the human body through the consumption of irradiated fish and the ingestion of 
radiative silt particles washed up along the Solway Firth.883 This added to the image’s 
authenticity, as together these visual and textual elements embedded a dystopian imaginary of 
the environmental and radiobiological hazard posed to the British public by the Sellafield plant.  
 
The report was also published as a major feature in the Glasgow Herald, wherein it 
described that between 1980 and 1981 “high radiocaesium concentrations in fish from the 
western Irish sea and Scottish waters” led to a 30% increase in the collective radiation dose to 
the UK population, with Scottish doses purported to be even higher.884 The Galloway News 
 
881 Ibid., p. 7; J. Carey, Communication as Culture (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 19. 
882 Jasanoff, and Kim, ‘Future Imperfect’, pp. 4f. 
883 Within Windscale, Dr Phillip Day had taken readings of silt from the Solway Firth in South-Western 
Scotland, finding levels of radiation well above background readings; Northern Echo, 21 November 1983, p. 
14.; D. Pierson, R. Cambray, P. Cawse (et al.), ‘Environmental Radioactivity in Cumbria’, Nature, 300 (1982), 
pp. 27- 31. 
884 Glasgow Herald, 21 November 1983, p. 14; A. Mackenzie, and R. Scott, ‘Radiocaesium and Plutonium in 
Intertidal Sediments from Southern Scotland’, Nature, 299 (1982), pp. 613- 616. 
 311 
explained that samples of household dust from nine homes in the coastal village of Kippford 
contained “amounts of plutonium.”885 Alongside the claims within Windscale, these newspaper 
articles embedded a dystopian imaginary which foregrounded the recent rise in cancer cases in 
Western Scotland as the product of radiation from Sellafield. This imaginary became 
embedded at multiple levels of Scottish society. A House of Commons discussion on the 
Sellafield discharges was punctuated by the Labour M.P for Carrick, Cumnoch, and Doon 
Valley George Foulkes, who explained that “there was a great anxiety among Scottish people 
that leukaemia increases in Western Scotland were linked to higher radioactivity levels in 
Scottish waters”, whilst the M.P. for the Western Isles, Donald Stewart expressed that “there 
is a good deal of alarm” amongst his constituents.886  
 
These interventions show how anxiety was not restricted to areas in the immediate 
vicinity of Sellafield. Another report from the Glasgow Herald acknowledged that “people as 
far away as the Western Isles are worried about the possibility of waterborne radioactivity 
exposing their children to leukaemia.”887 This concurred with recent scientific reports which 
showed that Hebridean citizens had eight times as much radioactive caesium 137 in their 
kidneys than English citizens, a finding that researchers believed was due to “output from 
Windscale.888 The Scottish Campaign to Resist the Atomic Menace (SCRAM) noted that the 
sediments of the Irish Sea contained over a quarter of a tonne of plutonium, adding that “no 
civilising and cautious industry [could] really justify the casual pumping of a known 
 
885 Galloway News, 3 November 1983.  
886 Ibid.; Guardian, 1 December 1983. 
887 Indeed, this was an issue George Foulkes M.P. repeatedly pushed over the following years. (See Hansard, 21 
May 1984; 20 June, 1984; 9 July 1984; 12 July 1984; 23 July 1984; 21 December 1984; 24 February 1984; 8 
April 1986; 22 April 1987, <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/people/mr-george-foulkes/index.html> 
[accessed 3 November, 2019]; Glasgow Herald, 21 November 1983; Whitehaven News, 8 December 1983. 
888 D. Newton, G. Tyler, E. Williams, (et al.), ‘Caesium-137 Levels in Residents of the Scottish Mainland and 
Hebrides’, Health Physics, 42.5 (1982), pp. 735-738; ‘Windscale: The Nuclear Laundry’, G. McKee, N. Gray, 
Yorkshire Television: ITV, 1983. 
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carcinogen of plutonium’s toxicity into an enclosed, shallowed and heavily fished waterway 
such as the Irish Sea”, describing the health effects upon the Scottish people as “nothing short 
of a scandal.”889 Figs 5.0 and 6.0, taken from the October/November 1983 edition of the bi-
monthly SCRAM Journal epitomise Scottish attitudes towards BNFL’s contamination of the 
marine environment, depicting the murky and bulbous protuberance of the Sellafield pipeline, 
secreting toxic nuclear waste into the clean, tranquil marine environment.  
 
The images’ visual similarity to the male reproductive system presents the juxtaposition 
between its life-bestowing capabilities and the deadly effects of radioactive pollution. 
Specifically, Fig 6.0 represents the immorality of marine pollution, invoking cultural and 
biblical imagery of the serpentine qualities of the pipeline to depict its immoral threat to 
ordinary civilians. This also invokes Sellafield’s threat to the public through the consumption 
of irradiated foodstuffs. The spoonful of radioactive waste alludes to the contamination of 
seafood and the threat to the public through the consumption of local produce. These textual 
and visual sources show how Scottish citizens drew upon Windscale and the findings of recent 
 
889 ‘The Anti-Nuclear and Safe Energy Journal’, SCRAM, 38.0 (October/November 1983), p. 3. 
Figs. 5.0 and 6.0 (left to right): Taken from ‘The Anti-Nuclear and Safe Energy Journal’, 
SCRAM, 38.0 (October/ November 1983), p. 3. 
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government and public health studies, confirming dystopian imaginaries of Sellafield as a 
threat to the health of the Scottish public through the carcinogenic effects of marine discharge 
and the irradiation of fish supplies.  
 
Similar patterns of concern appeared throughout Northern England, as Sellafield’s 
discharges became an increasingly regional and national issue. Newspaper outlets throughout 
the North-West devoted a considerable amount of attention to the incidents, specifically to the 
monitoring procedures ongoing along the coast.890 Reports emphasised the high radioactivity 
within the Irish Sea, noting that monitoring efforts had uncovered “bits of string, seaweed and 
plastic […] with a radioactive reading of 1000 times the normal level.”891 These reports 
exacerbated public anxieties about the threat of radiation, referring to the “growing fears of a 
health hazard from dumping by nuclear plants.”892 The Blackpool Gazette demanded “a nuclear 
doom-watch on the county’s coastal waters”, whilst the Lancashire Evening Post called for 
“strong measures to check the threat to Lancashire’s beaches from radioactive waste.”893 This 
asserted the regional threat Sellafield posed, again drawing definitive links between the plant 
and its recent spike in cancer deaths. As observed in the Scottish context, Sellafield became an 
ecological scapegoat for a series of environmental and biological problems throughout the 
North-West and Scotland, as regional newspapers correlated existing health statistics with the 
nuclear industry, contributing to a dystopian imaginary whereby Sellafield was responsible for 
local cancer excesses. These regional patterns formed part of a broader trend throughout 
 
890 It is possible, and indeed likely, given the amount of national coverage devoted to these incidents that similar 
findings could be observed elsewhere throughout the UK, as various regional newspapers assessed the 
significance of these events upon their own locales. Given the time and resource constraints upon this project 
my own research was restricted to archives throughout the North-West and this therefore offers a potential 
avenue for future exploration. (Liverpool Echo, 27 January 1984, p. 20; Lancashire Evening Post, 8 December 
1983; Blackpool Gazette, 8 December 1983; Northern Echo, 21 November 1983, p. 14; Morning Star, 1 
December 1983.) 
891 Lancashire Evening Post, 8 December 1983. 
892 Ibid. 
893 Blackpool Gazette, 8 December 1983; Lancashire Evening Post, 8 December 1983. 
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England, whereby national newspapers conveyed a series of assumptions about the 
environmental and radiobiological costs of the nuclear industry. Indeed, Sally Macgill’s 
quantitative study of media reports on Sellafield during this period identified forty-eight 
separate newspaper and radio bulletins between 31 October and 4 November, which referenced 
issues of environmental or radiobiological damage.894 Taking a more qualitative analysis, I 
argue that by paying attention to the tone and content of national newspaper articles, we can 
see a significant shift towards sensationalist anti-nuclear discourse, particularly amongst 
tabloid articles, which simultaneously tapped into and exacerbated public anxieties towards 
radiation.  
 
Tabloid articles frequently emphasised what historian Peter Hales has identified as the 
‘sublime’ nature of nuclear technologies, focusing upon their dystopian qualities and depicting 
them as a subversion of the natural realm.895 This produced headlines such as ‘Radioactive 
Waste Washed on Beach’, and ‘Scandal of the Nuclear Poison,’ whilst reports deployed 
terminology such as “dangerous solvent” and “radioactive waste” to convey the otherworldly 
nature of the nuclear threat.896 One particularly egregious headline appeared in the Sun entitled 
‘Villages of the Damned: Sun Special on Families who Live in the Nuclear Shadow.’ This 
article told of cattle which “suffer from abnormalities,” spiders that were “big and strangely 
coloured” and “deformed geese.”897 Elsewhere, the Daily Express referred to the “horrific 
picture of evil cancer radiation getting into the sea, the air, the capital, the vegetables and 
eventually the people.”898 Somewhat more restrained yet no less fatalistic, the Daily Mail 
adopted the headings ‘Horror in the Hoover’ and ‘Wall to Wall Plutonium’ to describe 
 
894 Macgill, Politics of Anxiety, pp. 18- 23.  
895 P. Hales, ‘The Atomic Sublime’, American Studies, 32.1 (1991), pp. 5- 31. 
896 Sun, 21 November 1983. 
897 Sun, 1 November 1983. 
898 Daily Express, 2 November 1983, in Macgill, Politics of Anxiety, p. 21.  
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conditions within Seascale.899 Other articles concentrated on the dystopian realities of life for 
people living alongside the plant. One Daily Mirror article headed with ‘Breeding of a reign 
of fear’, explaining that “the fear that something in the air- nameless, unfelt and invisible- 
might slowly kill us all was once a basic plot of science fiction. Today, for some people, it is a 
fact of life.”900 The tone and content of these reports helped embed dystopian nuclear 
imaginaries at the national level by sensationalising their effects and presenting them as a major 
biological and environmental threat to the public.  
 
Whereas tabloid articles focused on the sensationalist and ‘sublime’ aspects of the 
incidents, broadsheet articles devoted more attention to the scientific debates which surrounded 
the controversies. Whilst ostensibly objective in their presentation, the tone and literary devices 
within these passages convey a clear current of nuclear critique, as traditional notions of the 
natural environment and the family unit were juxtaposed with the threat of radiation. Whilst 
the Observer carried the perfunctory and matter-of-fact headline ‘Children near Windscale 
Have High Cancer Levels’, it directly correlated this to the effects of Sellafield, referring to the 
documentary’s “revelations” and “findings”, despite the circumstantial and scientifically 
unproven nature of its allegations.901 The Sunday Times carried the more objective and open-
ended headline ‘Windscale Atoms May Have Given Children Cancer’ and spoke of the 
programme’s “claims” and “allegations”, although the imagery which accompanied the article 
depicted a local family holding large quantities of radioactive dust, captioned ‘the Merlin’s: 
Plutonium in the Vacuum Bag.’902 This added a particularly emotive dimension to the article 
by tying the findings to a specific family, emphasising the threat to the family unit and their 
 
899 Sun, 1 November 1983; Daily Mail, 31 October 1983; MacGill, Politics of Anxiety, p. 18.  
900 Daily Mirror, 4 November 1983, p. 2 
901 Observer, 30 October 1983; MacGill, Politics of Anxiety, p. 17.   
902 Sunday Times, 30 October 1983; MacGill, Politics of Anxiety, p. 17.   
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young children; explaining that “they could not sensibly and rightly take the risk of bringing 
up two sons in a house so particularly or uniquely exposed to radioactivity as theirs was.”903 
Pictorial or textual assumptions about the threat of radiation upon young children became an 
enduring feature of newspaper reports both during the incident and over the following decade. 
Historian Natasha Zaretsky has argued that images of young children “have often been used to 
represent environmental risk” as a powerful cultural and biological symbol of species 
reproduction.904 Tabloid and broadsheet newspapers alike frequently accompanied articles 
with images of children, often playing in the foreground of the plant’s foreboding and 
monolithic cooling towers. (See Figs. 7.0 and 8.0) This was also a feature of press releases 
from Greenpeace, as the visual imagery of young children playing in the shadow of the 
Windscale piles became a cogent representation of the dystopian realities of nuclear power 
production. (see Figs. 8.0 and 9.0)  
 
 
903 Guardian, 3 October 1989.  
904 Zaretsky, ‘Atomic Nightmares and Biological Citizens’, p. 64. 
Figs. 7.0 and 8.0: (from left to right): Daily Express, 1 November 1983, p. 15; ‘Sellafield reprocessing 
plant, Cumbria, UK. Children in the nearby village of Seascale, showing proximity to plant’, 
<https:///media.greenpeace.org/archive/Sellafield-reprocessing-plant--Cumbria--UK--Children-in-the-




The Times also emphasised the hugely emotive dimensions of childhood leukaemia by 
accompanying articles with images of local children. Released a few years later following a 
new scientific hypothesis into the links between cancer and radiation, Fig. 10.0 depicts a young 
child, innocently playing whilst the surrounding environment is silently contaminating her.  
Figs. 10.0 and 11.0: (from left to right) The Sunday Times, 30 August 1992, p. 3; The 
Times, 16 February 1990. 
Fig. 9.0: Observer Magazine, 29 May 1989. 
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This carries a huge amount of emotional capital, emphasising the juxtaposition between 
childhood innocence and the omnipotent threat of radiation. Likewise Fig. 11.0 offers a striking 
image of a little girl smiling at the camera whilst her concerned father places an arm around 
her shoulder, conveying a powerful set of assumptions about radiation’s threat to children and 
its violation of the natural order. Her innocence and joy contrast with the concern and paternal 
instinct displayed by her father, further emphasising the horror of radiation which could not be 
detected by the child but threatened her, and the psychological burden placed upon the family 
by the unseen spectre of radioactivity. By mobilising fears regarding the destruction of the 
natural family unit, the tone and imagery pertained within these articles presented nuclear 
technologies as a physiological deviant, more subtly but no less acutely emphasising the 
sublime nature of the nuclear threat and its dystopian consequences. This strand of journalism 
dovetailed with references to the region’s traditional agricultural subsistence, through which 
newspapers made explicit the risk posed not just to local children, but to the wider British 
public through the consumption of irradiated farm produce. This reinforced the radioactive 
realities at the heart of the dystopian imaginary, inextricably linking environmental and 
radiobiological imaginaries and foregrounding human suffering at the heart of the anti-nuclear 
imaginary. 
 
Both local and national newspaper articles argued that West Cumbrian agricultural and 
fish produce posed a biological threat to the wider British public, stressing radiation’s 
carcinogenic effects on crops and animals destined for human consumption. The West 
Cumberland Times and Star wrote that “cattle unlucky to be grazing the fields around the plant 
are subjected to 100 times the normal level of radiation.”905 This is perhaps somewhat 
 
905 West Cumberland Times and Star, 26 November 1983, p. 8; West Cumberland Times and Star, 5 November 
1983, p. 12. 
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surprising, given the injurious consequences such reporting would have upon local industry. 
Whereas local media reports following the 1957 fire had been keen to downplay the effects of 
radiation (see Chapter 4), it is significant that local media responses to the 1983 controversies 
did not; alluding to a deeper pattern of public concern at the local level, and the embedded 
nature of dystopian nuclear imaginaries during this period. Similar examples also appeared at 
the national level. A double page feature within the Sun (Fig. 12.0) depicted an image of 
ostensibly contaminated livestock with the emboldened headline ‘Animals Carrying Danger.’ 
The accompanying caption alluded to the substantial radiation received by the cattle, referring 
to “cows grazing- but in the background is the plant that has contaminated the fields.”906  
 
Indeed, this report caused significant alarm amongst senior government officials. A copy of 
the article within the National Archives carries a hand-written annotation by the Secretary of 
State for the Environment, Patrick Jenkin, in which he describes it as “a very disturbing article 
 
906 Sun, 24 November 1983. 
Fig. 12.0: Excerpt from the Sun, available in National Archive File (AT 31/55). 
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which will cause us a lot of trouble!”907 This shows how officials were reacting to the 
dissemination of dystopian imaginaries, but also to the sort of investigative (and sometimes 
sensationalist) exposés that were quite common in the early 1980s.908 Similar tropes appeared 
elsewhere. The Bath and Wiltshire Evening Chronicle described “sheep presumably destined 
to be lamb chops browsing in a field so radioactive that it was a danger to anyone who walked 
there,” whilst another Sun article explained that local eggs “had so much radioactivity that if 
you held them for an hour you would have had a year’s dose.”909 These reports helped embed 
dystopian imaginaries at the national level by inextricably linking the localised effects of the 
plant with the wider British public through the consumption of irradiated farm produce.  
 
Similar patterns can be identified in reports on local fishing, which similarly 
emphasised the hazards posed by West Cumbrian fish. Newspaper reports frequently alluded 
to irradiated fish in the Irish Sea, referring to the “tide of pollution” from Sellafield along the 
Cumbrian shore.910 Where Windscale showed that fish-eating locals had exceeded the official 
limit for radiation exposure, newspaper articles emphasised the threat to the public, asserting 
that “the fish are too radioactive to eat, and high levels of radioactive particles have been found 
in the livers of local wildlife.”911 Even local newspapers recognised that “fish caught near the 
Sellafield discharge pipe do have a higher level of radiation than fish taken from areas further 
 
907 National Archives, (AT 31/55). 
908 For further reading, see L. Willnata, and D. Weaver, ‘Public Opinion on Investigative Reporting in the 
1990s: Has Anything Changed since the 1980s?’ Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 75.3 (1998), 
pp. 449- 463; D. Underwood, From Yahweh to Yahoo! The Religious Roots of the Secular Press (Champaign: 
University of Illinois Press, 2002). 
909 Bath and Wiltshire Evening Chronicle, 5 November 1983; Sun, 24 November 1983.  
910 Whitehaven News, 8 December 1983, p. 17.  
911 A government report acknowledged that “although it has not yet been picked up by the media… doses to the 
critical group of the population had actually breached the ICRP-recommended limit for annual exposure.” In 
reality, this had been stated within the Windscale documentary. See, National Archives, , ‘Internal 
correspondence between William Waldegrave M.P. and advisors’, p. 1, (AT 31/55); Irish Independent, 27 May 
1988. 
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away from the plant,” with figures “significantly higher than usual.”912 Curiously, these local 
reports often featured a higher level of technical or scientific understanding than national 
reports, supporting Brian Wynne’s argument that local host communities often hold specialist 
knowledge of nuclear technologies, and radiation effects.913 Whilst BNFL were adamant that 
local fish were within acceptable levels for public consumption, the two controversies and the 
subsequent press coverage convinced many people otherwise. Reports spoke of a “fish scare” 
within the local community, with one article detailing that residents “who purchased fresh fish 
regularly from the trawlers were so alarmed that they threw away the entire contents of their 
deep freeze.”914 These reports inextricably linked Sellafield with the contamination of British 
food supplies, bringing the issue of nuclear contamination right into people’s homes and onto 
their dinner plates, further reiterating the nuclear industry’s role as an environmental pollutant.  
 
Oral interviews revealed the long-term impact of these media reports, as locals 
explained that many local people still refuse to eat locally caught fish. Here, they acknowledged 
that the negative press coverage “put people off… it put everybody off”, with several residents 
explaining that that “a lot of people stopped eating sea foods you know, especially the bottom 
feeding sea foods,” whilst others added, “we don’t eat seafood from round here anymore.” 915 
One resident remembered that  “we all used to [pick covins] as a kid, but I haven't seen anybody 
 
912 West Cumberland Times and Star, 3 December 1983, p. 19. 
913 Wynne, Waterton, and Grove-White, (eds.), Public Perceptions, p. 35; Wynne, ‘Misunderstood 
Misunderstandings’, pp. 281- 304. 
914 Blackpool Gazette, 8 December 1983; Whitehaven News, 8 December 1983, p. 17; See also, McSorley, 
Living in the Shadow, p. 112. 
915  N. Garbutt, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 22 March 2010, p. 25; J. 
Jones, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 20 August 2010, p. 20; C. 
McCourt, interview with A. Alexander, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 1 
October 2010, p. 14; A. Alexander, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 1 
October 2010, p. 15. 
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do that for a long time now.”916 One local woman related that “I haven’t eaten local seafood 
since. Thankfully now we have the supermarkets, and I don’t have to. Ever since then I’ve 
avoided it because God knows what it’s been swimming in.”917 Another specified that the 
media coverage in 1983 convinced him to avoid the beaches altogether, explaining that “I never 
took my kids to St Bees [a local beach] after that for the whole of their lives.”918 This attests to 
the long-term impact of the negative media coverage surrounding the incidents, even at the 
local level where it may be assumed that locals’ familiarity with the sea and relationships with 
local fisherman may have precluded a major shift in public attitudes. Here, we can see how the 
press coverage dovetailed with an undercurrent of public concern substantiated by Windscale 
and the beach incident to embed dystopian nuclear imaginaries at the local level, as many 
citizens lamented their local environment and the organisms within it as contaminated.   
 
These dystopian imaginaries were perpetuated by the tone of newspaper coverage 
which carried an overt cultural dimension, stressing the impact upon local fishing communities 
devastated by the contamination and unable to sell their produce. Whilst such reports arguably 
perpetuated the plight of local food producers, newspaper articles frequently lamented the 
impact of the controversy on the local fishing trade, using emotive language to paint a picture 
of traditional, hard-working fishing communities devastated by the environmental negligence 
of the nuclear industry. This imbued the dystopian imaginary with a further cultural dimension, 
depicting nuclear power as a dangerous and dirty modern industrial process which literally 
 
916 Interviewees explained that the local fishing industry had never recovered after the controversies. They 
explained that the negative publicity surrounding both incidents “cost us millions”, pointing to the decline in 
covin and mussel picking along the coast, which had formerly been a popular local pastime and source of 
income. (N. Garbutt, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 22 March 2010, p. 
25; A. Alexander, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 1 October 2010, p. 14; 
J. Jones, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 20 August 2010, p. 20.) 
917 Author’s interview with Isobel George, 6 March 2019. 
918 A. Alexander, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 1 October 2010, p. 15.  
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poisoned traditional, respectable work, dependant on an unpolluted environment. Indeed, these 
narratives echoed the visual contrast between the local children and the monolithic shadow of 
the cooling towers depicted earlier, further embedding Sellafield as a social and cultural 
dystopia, as well as a radiobiological and environmental one.  
 
Between November and December 1983, a series of local and national articles 
explained that fish sales along the Western coast were rapidly declining, emphasising the 
deleterious consequences of the controversy upon local communities. The Whitehaven News 
explained that “a number of residents in the village are trawlermen, owning their own boats. 
Their fish, which was once eagerly sought after on the shore as it was landed, is now considered 
by many to be contaminated. As a result, there is a likelihood that they will either be put out of 
business or suffer financial hardship.”919 This was a point forcibly impressed by Workington 
M.P., Dale Campbell-Savours, who requested compensation for “fishermen in West Cumbria 
[who] are having difficulty marketing their fish following recent publicity about the level of 
radioactivity around Windscale.”920 Whilst his request was refused, the plight of local 
fishermen became a feature of national newspaper reports. Many of these articles contained 
comments from struggling fishermen, who had to destroy their unsold hauls or give up fishing 
altogether.921 One fisherman told the Times that his customers now avoided locally-sourced 
 
919 Whitehaven News, 8 December 1983, p. 17.  
920 Michael Joplin M.P, acting on behalf of MAFF replied that “it is most unlikely that the recent incident 
involving some temporary contamination of the beach close to the Sellafield pipeline will have had any effect 
on fish supplies in the area” and as such, “it would not be appropriate for us to pay compensation.” (Hansard, 24 
November 1983) <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written-answers/1983/nov/24/windscale-fish-
supplies> [accessed 20 August 2020]. 
921 Liverpool Daily Post, 8 December 1983. 
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fish, explaining mournfully, “I have had seven customers in the last ten days.”922 This formed 
a pattern throughout Autumn 1983, as the consistent negative press coverage not only presented 
the dystopian imaginary with a further cultural dimension, but also convinced residents that 
locally caught fish were not safe. 
 
Public concerns were such that many local establishments refused to buy fish caught 
off the Cumbrian coast. The Times sympathetically depicted the cultural and moral paradox 
wherein local retailers were forced to denounce their neighbours and boycott local produce, 
iterating the plight of a local vendor who, having endured three weeks of minimal sales, had 
displayed a sign saying “no local fish sold here.”923 A similar article appeared in the West 
Cumberland News and Times (Fig. 13.0), which observed that “the market for locally caught 
fish is being destroyed and some retailers are putting up signs to tell the public that their fish 
is not locally caught.”924  
 
 
922 The Times, 5 December 1983. This bears striking similarities to the response of the Cornish fishing 
community following the Torrey Canyon oil spill disaster of 1967. Environmental historians Anna Green and 
Tim Cooper have examined social responses to the disaster, finding that the overwhelming response amongst 
the local community “was one of intense fear for their livelihoods.” See, A. Green, and T. Cooper, ‘Community 
and Exclusion: the Torrey Canyon Disaster of 1967’, Journal of Social History, 48.4 (2015), p. 900; T. Cooper, 
and A. Green, ‘The Torrey Canyon Disaster: Everyday Life and the 'Greening' of Britain’, Environmental 
History, 22.1 (2016), pp. 101- 126. 
923 The Times, 5 December 1983. 
924 West Cumberland Times and Star, 3 December 1983, p. 17.  
Fig. 13.0: West Cumberland Times & Star, 3 December 1983, p. 17. 
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The sympathetic tone of these articles appeals to the reader’s compassion, painting a picture of 
a local community financially devastated and internally ruptured by the environmental 
negligence of the nuclear industry, as proud fishing communities were forced to abandon their 
livelihoods and local businesses renounced their neighbours’ produce in a desperate attempt to 
retain customers. By emphasising the cultural consequences of marine contamination, these 
articles simultaneously perpetuated the links between nuclear energy and environmental 
contagion whilst casting a binary between the might of the nuclear industry and the relative 
helplessness of the local ‘peripheral’ community who bore the costs of their malfeasance. This 
conveyed a powerful set of cultural assumptions about the industry’s deleterious consequences 
upon local people, and its wider threat to the region’s existing industries and its traditional way 
of life; inextricably linking the nuclear industry with a series of imagined dystopian 
environmental, biological, and social futures.  
 
Through the analysis of newspaper narratives, it is clear that the print media sustained 
and perpetuated the public’s engagement with the controversies at Sellafield throughout the 
early part of the 1980s. The print media occupied a central role in the co-production of nuclear 
meaning-making as the extent of regional and national coverage devoted to nuclear issues, 
coupled with the linguistic, syntactical, and image choices which accompanied them ensured 
that nuclear power became enveloped within a series of imagined undesirable futures, 
characterised by issues of environmental and marine contamination and excess cases of 
childhood leukaemia. This contributed to a hostile climate of opinion towards nuclear 
technologies at both national and public level, despite the fact that these links remained 
hypothetical and had not been scientifically proven.  
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The following section of this chapter explores the epistemological void between the 
dystopian imaginaries pedalled by the print media and the narrative of public safety advanced 
by BNFL. This created a specific set of social conditions whereby the local population were 
dislocated between competing nuclear imaginaries, ultimately responding to this context by 
producing their own locally specific forms of nuclear knowledge.    
                         
5.4 Competing Nuclear Imaginaries       
           
 Despite the concerning statistics raised by Windscale, the controversial beach incident, 
and overwhelmingly unfavourable newspaper coverage, BNFL had not broken any laws or 
exceeded accepted limits for radioactive discharge.925 For this reason, BNFL denied any 
wrong-doing or culpability in both instances, stating that their atmospheric and marine 
discharges fell within the limits accepted by the British nuclear industry. Whilst both incidents 
questioned the validity of these limits, which were significantly higher than anywhere else in 
the world and had not been amended for over two decades, BNFL were adamant that since they 
had not breached these limits, neither scenario posed a threat to public health. This created a 
paradigm whereby BNFL refuted that they had acted improperly, whilst others felt legitimated 
in their belief that they had discharged far more radiative material than was safe to do so. 
Furthermore, the lack of scientific consensus meant that little definite ‘evidence’ existed and 
scientific conclusions were contingent and little more than working hypotheses. This dislocated 
the public between a series of contested imagined futures, as different groups sought to quantify 
the degree of risk posed by the plant, variously disputing the validity of the regulatory 
frameworks adopted by the British nuclear industry and the accuracy of the measurements 
provided by BNFL.926  
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The following section will explore how, as Jasanoff argues, “multiple imaginaries can 
coexist within a society in tension or in a productive dialectical relationship.”927 This thesis has 
concentrated on the contested nature of nuclear meaning-making, and I will now more fully 
conceptualise the emergence of two distinct nuclear imaginaries that existed in tension in the 
early 1980s. The first asserted the dystopian environmental and biological consequences of 
nuclear technologies, which was reflective of an undesirable future whereby nuclear 
technologies were responsible for excess cancers amongst the local population and posed a 
substantive threat to public health. The second was predicated upon the utopian credentials of 
nuclear power as a safe and controllable means of energy production which represented no 
danger to the public through adherence to strictly regulated monitoring procedures. Observing 
the dynamic interplay between these two competing imaginaries at both the local and the 
national level, the following section will argue that public responses to Windscale and the 
beach incident were the product of these distinct imaginaries, as the public variously contested 
the biological and environmental significance of both incidents; ultimately producing their own 
forms of knowledge which were the product of this context. 
 
5.5: Threshold Doses. 
 
Foundational to these debates were conflicting scientific attitudes towards threshold 
doses; radiation limits deemed ‘safe’ and below which no harm could occur. Whilst threshold 
 
925 It was later found that BNFL had in fact exceeded authorised dose limits for marine discharge, but had 
covered this up by averaging the discharges out over a three-month period, bringing it back in line with standard 
limits. For this they were subsequently fined a total of £70,000 by the Crown Prosecution Service, for failing to 
“minimise the exposure of persons to radiation and failing to keep adequate records.” See, Aubrey, Thorp, p. 22. 
926 The dichotomy between these two positions was neatly surmised by a senior government minister who 
conceded that, “although the discharges from Sellafield meet the internationally recommended safety limits, the 
government fully appreciates the public concern that has arisen following the Yorkshire Television programme 
and the incident last November involving contamination of the beach.” National Archives, (AT 31/59). 
927 Jasanoff, ‘Future Imperfect’, in Dreamscapes of Modernity, p. 4. 
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doses had been discussed within the nuclear industry since its inception, by the early 1980s a 
growing cadre of British scientists refuted the notion that any limit existed, asserting that any 
exposure to radiation carried with it a degree of risk.928 Despite this, BNFL stuck rigidly to its 
belief that dosages had been carefully regulated and therefore it could not be responsible for 
local cancers. Industry experts claimed that Sellafield emitted one thousandth of the radiation 
necessary to cause the number of cancers observed, dismissing claims that eating locally 
sourced fish or visiting local beaches could result in the numbers of leukaemia cases identified 
by researchers.929 In Windscale, a company spokesman argued radiation could not be 
responsible, unless “virtually all the children at Seascale have been exposed to at least ten, and 
perhaps a hundred times natural radiation every hour of every day, every day of every year, 
and every year of their lives” adding that “the activity levels are known and that is just not 
contemplatable.”930 Further company statements refuted the links between Sellafield and 
cancer, explaining that employee cancer rate was below the national average. Instead 
spokesmen emphasised alternative risk factors, arguing that “a fortnight’s holiday in polluted 
London carried a greater health risk than lying for a whole year on the beach near Windscale,” 
adding that “the relative risk from Windscale was low” and that “there is no risk free life 
 
928 British researchers argued that BNFL should follow the USA and Canada, who had reduced the threshold 
dose to a fifth of the British level, pointing to the French Cap de la Hague plant which discharged far less 
radioactivity than Sellafield, despite being involved in much the same processes. Studies had found that the 
public exposure from Sellafield was “a thousand times what is considered reasonably achievable elsewhere, and 
up to twelve times the United States’ Environmental Protection Agency regulatory limit for such installations.” 
Similarly, monitoring of Seascale homes found radiation ten times the maximum limits permitted in the Rocky 
Flats nuclear-weapons producing region of the US, 2500 times garden soil levels for the rest of the country, and 
levels of Americium-241 17,000 times higher than the rest of the UK. See, W. Inkret, J. Taschner, and C. 
Meinhold, ‘A Brief History of Radiation Protection Standards: A Hard Look at the Data,’ Los Alamos Science, 
23.0 (1995), pp. 116- 123; Hamblin, Poison in the Well; Sun, 24 November 1983; Aubrey, Thorp, p. 25; 
McSorley, Living in the Shadow, p. 110.) 
929 Guardian, 23 November 1983. 
930 Peter Mummery in ‘Windscale: The Nuclear Laundry’, G. McKee, N. Gray, Yorkshire Television: ITV, 
1983. 
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available.”931 BNFL’s refusal to engage with Sellafield’s potential role in these statistics 
polarised public debates between the definitive posture adopted by the industry and the 
concerns of non-industry experts, who were much less confident in BNFL’s conclusions.  
 
External scientific figures articulated sincere doubts about the validity of BNFL’s 
claims and the underpinning logic by which they concluded that the local area was safe.932 
Recent studies had found that the established logic of dispersal theory was flawed; radiation 
did not dilute in open water, as had been the justification for discharge levels in the past.933 It 
had been found that plutonium concentrated in the layers of silt on the seabed, and was washed 
up along the shore, dried by the sun and blown inland. A visual representation of this process, 
produced by the Observer Magazine, is shown below, in Fig. 14.0.934  
 
 
931 Whitehaven Archive and Local Studies Centre, ‘Health and Safety Executive Report on Windscale, ‘The 
Management of Safety’, in ‘Cumbria Area Heath Authority: Leukaemia and other cancers in Cumbria’, (NGR 
84-89); Evening News and Star, 29 November 1983; National Archives, ‘Press briefing for Question Time’, 
(AT 31/55). 
932 This acknowledged that since BNFL’s workforce was substantially below the average age of the population, 
its statistically below average number of cancer cases proved very little. (McSorley, Living in the Shadow, p. 
41.)  
933 West Cumberland Times and Star, 19 November 1983, p. 12. (This was also the subject of a feature in the 
Guardian on 9 December 1983.) 
934 These findings were later the subject of a series of studies, see R. Pentreath, (et al.), ‘The Impact on Public 
Radiation Exposure of Transuranium Nuclides Discharged in Liquid Wastes from Fuel Element Reprocessing at 
Sellafield, UK’, in Radioactive Waste Management (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1983), pp. 
315-29; J. Howorth, and A. Eggleton, ‘Studies of Environmental Radioactivity in Cumbria: Part 12. Modelling 
of the Sea-to-land Transfer of Radionuclides and an Assessment of the Radiological Consequences’, (London: 
HMSO, 1988); W. McKay, W. Pattenden, and J. Branson, ‘Studies of Environmental Radioactivity in Cumbria: 
Part 10. Some Radionuclides in Near-shore Seawater 1980-84’, (London: HMSO, 1987); For local media 
coverage on the preliminary findings of these reports, see West Cumberland Times and Star, 19 November 
1983, pp. 1, 12ff; West Cumberland Times and Star, 26 November 1983, pp. 6- 8; West Cumberland Times and 
Star, 10 December 1983, p. 1. 
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Indeed, sediments examined near the Sellafield pipeline found twenty-six times more 
radioactivity than at the Pacific Islands contaminated by US weapons tests during the 1950s, 
which had been deemed too radioactive to host human life.935 Meanwhile, scientists at Harwell 
had discovered that “plutonium covered silt and sea spray has caused widespread fallout over 
a 50 mile section of the Cumbrian coast from St Bees to Barrow, at between 200% and 700% 
of ‘normal’ levels from weapons fallout…”936 Furthermore, another recent study had shown 
that the human body was “far more susceptible to radiation than current models supposed,” as 
new figures suggested that human livers may absorb between ten and one-thousand times the 
radiation previously suggested.937 This new information rendered the established discharge 
limits (and BNFL’s defence) obsolete, as it became clear that marine radioactivity behaved 
very differently than previously thought, and the human body absorbed far more radiation than 
accommodated for by the established limits. This threw into severe doubt the validity of the 
 
935 Worster, Nature’s Economy, p. 340; McSorley, Living in the Shadow, p. 108. 
936 A subsequent study by the Commission of European Communities, entitled ‘Project Marina’ found that 
Sellafield was the primary source of annual radiation exposure to European citizens, exceeding the total 
combined exposure from background radiation, all other nuclear sites, weapons testing, Chernobyl, and stored 
waste. (National Archives, (AT 31/56); Hamblin, Poison in the Well, p. 252.  
937 National Archives, ‘PERG, ‘The Windscale Discharges: A Briefing Document on the Implications for Health 
in Surrounding Communities Part Three: A History of PERG Assessments’, (AT 31/56); For local media 
coverage on this report, see West Cumberland Times and Star, 12 November 1983, p. 12; West Cumberland 
Times and Star, 19 November 1983, p. 12. 
Fig. 14.0: Observer Magazine, ‘The Radioactive Sea’, 20 May 1984, p. 19. 
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limits to which BNFL were supposedly adhering and opened up competing schools of thought 
between those who, like BNFL, believed the discharges were legitimated by the accepted limits 
and those who believed these were far too high and no safe threshold existed for radiation.938  
 
Where the experts could not agree on whether Sellafield posed a risk to the public, local 
attitudes were even more confused, as scientific figures variously asserted that radioactivity 
could be monitored and controlled to a safe level, and yet deadly toxic in any quantity. BNFL 
concluded that one could spend 500 hours per year walking through the silt at the nearby 
Ravenglass Estuary before reaching the maximum permitted exposure. Conversely, a 
researcher from Manchester University, Dr Phillip Day found radiation figures twenty-five 
times higher than BNFL, providing a “maximum permitted exposure of twenty hours a 
year.”939 Likewise, BNFL claimed that a person would have to eat twenty pounds of silt in 
order to reach annual radiation limits, whilst medical experts such as US Medical Officer Carl 
Johnson and Dr R. Scott of the Molecular Biology Department at Edinburgh University, 
explained that less than ten grams could cause cancer.940 These inconsistent and incompatible 
findings did little to assuage the general public who became caught between scientific claim 
and counterclaim, with local citizens forced to accept plutonium in their homes yet feel 
comforted by official statements that these findings were somehow “insignificant.”941 This 
muddied the waters for citizens hoping for a credible explanation for the high incidence of 
childhood cancer cases and added to the general sense that nobody knew for certain what 
exposure could be accurately deemed ‘safe’, and what or who could be believed. Seeking to 
 
938 This reflected the nature of the debate; whereby scientific research could only prove that nuclear power was a 
dangerous industry or leave the question open. This position was neatly summarised by an article in the 
Guardian, which contended that “it can never be proved that they (nuclear technologies) are not dangerous and 
thus public doubts […] can never be entirely set at rest.” Guardian, 23 November 1983. 
939 West Cumberland Times and Star, 5 November 1983, p. 12.  
940 West Cumberland Times and Star, 19 November 1983, p.12. 
941 Guardian, 17 November 1983.  
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rectify this confusion, the government commissioned distinguished medical scientist Sir 
Douglas Black to chair a report into the cancer clusters surrounding the plant, with the aim of 
establishing whether or not the observed cancer excess could be accounted for by present, or 
historical activities at Sellafield. 
 
5.6: The Black Report. 
 
 
The ‘Black Report’ was a lengthy investigation throughout 1984, headed up by some 
of the UK’s top physicians and nuclear experts. It was commissioned at the behest of Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher, who had become sufficiently concerned about the allegations 
aired in Windscale, and the subsequent negative media coverage to personally intervene in 
the matter.942 The inquiry was designed to “consider the evidence concerning the alleged 
cluster in the neighbourhood of Sellafield, and its causation, [and] to determine the need for 
any further research and make recommendations.”943 Despite its clear remit, the inquiry 
failed to provide conclusive evidence to substantiate or nullify the links between Sellafield 
and local cancers. The subsequent ‘Black Report’, published in the Summer of 1984 found 
that since “doubts remain […] the hypothesis of a connexion between the proximity of the 
nuclear plant and the excessive leukaemia rate cannot be fully eliminated.”944 Even Sir 
Douglas Black emphasised the uncertain nature of his findings. When asked about the overall 
cause for the cancer excess, he told reporters, “quite honestly, we don’t know and nobody 
 
942 Macgill, Politics of Anxiety, p. 20. 
943 It has been suggested by Sally Macgill that the Black Report was little more than a political response to the 
panic invoked by the ‘nuclear laundry’ documentary and as such was designed to placate public opinion in the 
immediate aftermath of broadcast rather than offer a long-term solution to the issues it raised. (Macgill, Politics 
of Anxiety, p. 127; Hansard, 2 November 1983. <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written-
answers/1983/nov/02/sellafield-radioactive-material> [accessed 3 January 2020]) 
944 D. Black, Investigation of the Possible Increased Incidence of Cancer in West Cumbria: Report of the 
Independent Advisory Group, (London: HMSO, 1984); See also, M. Dousset, and H. Jammet, ‘Cases of 
Leukaemia in the Sellafield Area: The “Sir Douglas Black” Report,’ General Nuclear Review, 5.0 (1984), pp. 
460- 466. 
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does.”945 The report’s failure to identify a specific factor, or series of factors which could 
adequately account for the cancer statistics created an epistemological vacuum in which the 
government effectively ceded control over the content of nuclear meaning-making by 
admitting it did not know whether the industry was responsible for the cancer cases or not. 
By tacitly acknowledging the possible links between radiation and cancer yet failing to 
identify an over-arching cause, the ‘Black Report’ failed to provide the public with any clear 
findings, leaving them socially dislocated between competing nuclear narratives.946 
 
Studies on toxic contamination have found that affected communities often become 
“trapped” between differing interpretations of risk which heighten “concern, anxiety, and 
frustration” by providing “confusing, inadequate or contradictory information about the 
pollution.”947 Developing these insights, I will show how the inability of scientific experts to 
reach anything resembling consensus had a series of profound social effects, particularly in the 
local context where residents had to mediate between competing nuclear imaginaries when 
constructing lay understandings of nuclear risk. The following pages will examine the dynamic 
interplay between these competing imaginaries at the localised level, arguing that citizens 
 
945 Whilst his official report recognised that the cancers could not be accounted for by the recorded levels of 
radiation, this acknowledged that the cancers were either: down to chance- a conclusion unlikely to satisfy 
concerned locals and statistically calculated as being one in one million; the result of inaccurate figures provided 
by BNFL; or the product of flawed threshold doses- each of which had been suggested by the Windscale 
documentary several months earlier. (National Archives, (JA 367/53); Evening News and Star, 7 September 
1984; Evening Mail, 7 September 1984; MacGill, Politics of Anxiety, p. 45.) 
946 In his book Slow Violence, Robert Nixon has argued that poor and socially ‘peripheral’ communities are 
often “abandoned to sporadic science at best and usually no science at all.” In this approximation, the local West 
Cumbrian community, whilst afforded the status of a government inquiry, were left without any definitive or 
harmonious scientific consensus on which to base their responses. (Nixon, Slow Violence, p. 15.) 
947 S. Couch, ‘Environmental Contamination, Community Transformation and the Centralia Mine Fire’, in J. 
Mitchell, (ed.), The Long Road to Recovery: Community Response to Industrial Disaster (New York: The 
United Nations University, 1996); Barnes, Baxter, Litva (et al), ‘The Social and Psychological Impact of the 
Chemical Contamination Incident in Weston Village, UK’, p. 2230; A. Baum, J. Singer, and C. Baum, ‘Stress 
and the Environment’, Journal of Social Issues, 37.0 (1981), pp. 4- 35; D. Unger, A. Wandersman, and W. 
Hallman, ‘Living Near a Hazardous Waste Facility: Coping with Individual and Family Distress’, American 
Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 62.1 (1992), pp. 55- 70. 
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responded to this context by forging their own forms of nuclear meaning-making and lay 
knowledge. This echoes the findings of scholars examining incidents of nuclear contamination 
in multiple national contexts.948 Writing about the disaster at Three Mile Island in the US, 
historian Natasha Zaretsky has shown that residents became “caught between two contending 
claims - those of Met Ed executives who insisted that no one had been harmed, and those of 
nuclear industry critics.”949 This section of the chapter will show how, faced with similar claims 
over competing nuclear knowledge, local residents “attempted to chart a path between these 
two opposing interpretations”, by constructing their own independent forms of nuclear 
meaning-making.950  
 
Local citizens constructed their own attitudes about the risk posed by Sellafield by 
leaning upon their own experiences and understandings, aligning these with various social 
imaginaries. Ultimately, these conclusions can be understood as both the product of their 
experiences and the contested social conditions in which they were made. This develops the 
work of environmental geographer Karen Parkhill, who has argued that citizens conceive of 
risk through their “experiences of living in close proximity to socio-technical and 
environmental hazards” and STS scholar Brian Wynne, who has argued that “definitions of 
risk are fundamentally open to social negotiation.”951 Both Wynne and Parkhill have shown 
that public definitions of risk are both simultaneously real and constructed as citizens engage 
with social representations of potential risk factors such as nuclear technologies, alongside their 
 
948 See Zaretsky, ‘Atomic Nightmares and Biological Citizens’; O. Kuchinskaya, ‘Articulating the Signs of 
Danger: Lay Experiences of Post-Chernobyl Radiation Risks and Effects’, Public Understanding of Science, 
20.3 (2011), pp. 405– 421; T. Davies, ‘A Visual Geography of Chernobyl: Double Exposure’, International 
Labour and Working-Class History, 84.1 (2013), pp. 116- 139.  
949 Zaretsky, ‘Atomic Nightmares and Biological Citizens’, p. 66. 
950 Ibid. 
951 K. Parkhill, D. Venables, and P. Simmonds, ‘From the Familiar to the Extraordinary: Local Residents' 
Perceptions of Risk When Living With Nuclear Power in the UK’, Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers, 35.1 (2010), p. 40. 
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experiences of these technologies themselves.952 Put simply, social attitudes towards nuclear 
technologies are simultaneously the product of the local public’s experience of these 
technologies, and competing cultural representations of them.  
 
Together with Claire Waterton and Eric Grove-White, Brian Wynne has argued that 
attitudes about environmental risks “[cannot] be divorced from wider social-contextual 
experiences and judgements.”953 Elsewhere, J. Richard Eiser, Joop van der Plight and Russell 
Spears have argued that “the feeling of danger and threat is a subjective judgement based on 
evidence”, both attained through direct experience and that which is available in the public 
domain.954 This has been examined in greater detail in a study by Judith Petts et al., who found 
that lay publics rationalise risk by “draw[ing] upon multiple information sources and 
understanding” such as “personal experience [and] grounded knowledge.” The public construct 
risk knowledge by marrying their local knowledge and experience with “diverse and divergent 
arguments” often found within the public arena.955 This builds upon psychologist Phil Brown’s 
notion of “popular epistemology,” as “the process by which laypersons gather scientific data 
and other information” and “direct” and “marshal” this knowledge through social 
representations of particular risks.956 Petts argued that local people used their own experiences 
and understandings to interpret competing social conceptions of risk from diverse sources such 
as the media, public institutions, official bodies, and government. This suggests that the public 
were not “passive absorbers” of media or official information, but rather collected and absorbed 
 
952 Wynne, Waterton, and Grove-White, (eds.), Public Perceptions, p. 22; Parkhill, Venables, and Simmons, 
‘From the Familiar to the Extraordinary’, p. 40. 
953 Wynne, Waterton, and Grove-White, (eds.), Public Perceptions, p. 52. 
954 Eiser, van der Plight, Spears, Nuclear Neighbourhoods, p. 169.   
955 J. Petts, (et al.), Social Amplification of Risk: The Media and the Public, Contract Research Report 329/2001 
(Sudbury: HSE Books, 2001), pp. i, ix-x. 
956 P. Brown, ‘Popular Epidemiology and Toxic Waste Contamination: Lay and Professional Ways of 
Knowing,’ Journal of Health and Social Behaviour, 33.0 (1992), pp. 267– 81. 
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social information that aligned with their experiential understandings and existing world-
view.957 Engaging with this reading, we can see how local people forged attitudes towards 
Sellafield by aligning their experiential understandings of nuclear technologies with coherent 
social representations of them, in so doing producing new forms of nuclear meaning-making 
which were simultaneously produced by, amplified, or attenuated particular nuclear 
imaginaries. This moves us towards a more nuanced reading of the way in which socio-
technical imaginaries of nuclear technologies influence public perception at the localised level, 
as citizens align their experiences with particular nuclear imaginaries to produce their own lay 
interpretations and nuclear meaning-making. This also explains how citizens at the localised 
level, even within a community as small and relatively insular as West Cumbria, can hold a 
series of complex, layered, and often opposing attitudes towards nuclear technologies.  
 
Local opinion was divided amongst people who believed the excess of cancers was 
caused by Sellafield, those who refuted these links entirely, and those who engaged with both 
sides of the debate, simultaneously acknowledging the potential risk posed by the industry but 
unconvinced by the purported links to cancer. As Brian Wynne and environmental sociologist 
Sally Macgill have argued, the West Cumbrian public possess a complex set of contradictory 
and seemingly incoherent attitudes towards Sellafield.958 Where these studies have identified 
the conflicting range of social attitudes, I will attempt to unravel the social processes behind 
their creation, offering the sociotechnical imaginary as a theoretical device around which to 
think through the complex, multi-layered, and nuanced nature of public responses to nuclear 
controversy. Whereas these inconsistencies could be interpreted as an example of lay people’s 
 
957 Petts, (et al.), Social Amplification of Risk, pp. i, ix-x. 
958 Wynne, Waterton, and Grove-White, Public Perceptions, p. 43; MacGill, Politics of Anxiety, p. 13; A. 
Blowers, and P. Leroy, ‘Power, Politics and Environmental Inequality: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of 
the Process of ‘Peripheralisation’, Environmental Politics, 3.2 (1994), p. 205.  
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lack of expertise and indeed ‘fickleness’ towards nuclear technologies, this chapter argues 
precisely the opposite; that these apparent inconsistencies are the product of local citizens’ 
attempts to respond to, and reconcile competing social representations of a potential 
environmental hazard within their own experiential world-view.959 Acknowledging that these 
responses are the product of fluid, and contested sociotechnical imaginaries more accurately 
historicises and rationalises the complexity of these positions, recognising that “in the real 
world people have to reconcile or adapt to living with contradictions which are not necessarily 
within their control to iron out.”960 Acknowledging that these responses were a product of the 
contested social conditions in which they were made, we can see how local citizens produced 
their own forms of nuclear knowledge by mediating between competing social representations 
of nuclear technologies and their own experiences of them. In this regard, the industry’s 
historical impunity convinced many local people that not only were BNFL hiding the truth 
from them, but that these incidents were evidence of Sellafield’s major threat to public health.  
 
5.7: Trustworthiness of BNFL. 
 
The following section will argue that many local citizens responded to the controversy 
through their experiences of being misled by the nuclear industry through the 1957 fire, the 
recent leaks from buildings ‘B38’ and ‘701’ in 1976, and the pollution of the river Calder in 
1977. These memories and past experiences left the local population with little confidence in 
BNFL’s trustworthiness, foreclosing a dystopian future whereby the present controversy 
represented a significant threat to public health despite the assurances provided by BNFL. 
Brian Wynne’s work in this area has found that lay people’s knowledge of nuclear issues is 
 
959 Wynne, ‘Misunderstood Misunderstandings’, pp. 299f.  
960 Ibid. 
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often forged through a set of institutional ‘trust’ relations between the public and official 
institutions, such as BNFL.961 Likewise, Xiang Fang’s more recent study of local responses to 
nuclear power in China argued that people draw upon their “everyday life experiences” when 
forming opinions about nuclear technologies.962 Marrying these two insights, we can see how 
local citizens responded to the controversy by framing debates about nuclear safety through 
their historical experiences of being misled by official nuclear institutions, and their lack of 
trust in BNFL. In this context, Sellafield’s history of high atmospheric and marine 
contamination, coupled with its chequered legacy of public misinformation formed a major 
strand of the dystopian nuclear imaginary. 
 
Newspaper reports, oral history interviews, internal industry, and government 
documentation indicate that many locals believed they were again being misled by BNFL and 
that Sellafield posed a significant threat to the public. Public distrust therefore formed a key 
strand of the dystopian imaginary, and was a feature of local newspaper reports and letters from 
residents, which carried titles like “Halt Flow of Nuclear Waste Immediately”; “BNFL 
Conceals Truth!” and demanded the industry “stop jeopardizing the lives of the people!”963 
Reports criticized BNFL’s “deceptive propaganda” and complained that “their record of 
keeping the public adequately informed leaves much to be desired.”964 Indeed, disillusioned by 
yet another incident, one writer went so far as to publish an open letter to an anti-nuclear group, 
imploring them to send him a copy of their application form so he could join.965 One article in 
the West Cumberland Times and Star referenced the industry’s legacy of misinformation, 
 
961 Ibid. 
962 X. Fang, ‘Local People’s Understanding of Risk from Civil Nuclear Power in the Chinese Context’, Public 
Understanding of Science, 23.3 (2014), pp. 283- 294.  
963 West Cumberland Times and Star, 19 November 1983, p. 12. 
964 West Cumberland Times and Star, 24 December 1983, p. 10. 
965 West Cumberland Times and Star, 26 November 1983, p. 8; West Cumberland Times and Star, 5 November 
1983, p. 12. 
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asking “is it surprising that the public are concerned about the health hazards of operations at 
Windscale and Sellafield?”, whilst another queried “in what other areas is the company 
working in the dark?”966 Here, Greenpeace’s role in uncovering and reporting the beach 
discharge incident ahead of BNFL contributed to public scepticism, as the incident was viewed 
as yet another attempt to conceal a public hazard.967 This recent incident, coupled with the 
industry’s historical reticence to communicate truthfully with the local public led many people 
to believe that this was not an isolated incident, and that high-level contamination incidents 
had occurred in the past but gone unreported to the local public.  
 
A substantial proportion of the local population viewed the beach incident as evidential 
proof that the industry regularly conducted illegal and unsafe releases. This was a view shared 
by senior government officials at the Department of the Environment, who privately admitted 
that “I do not believe the incident would have come to light without Greenpeace.”968 
Sellafield’s Senior Press Secretary, Harold Bolter, later admitted that “I got the distinct 
impression that there had been similar discharges of solvent and crud in the past, but the strong 
tides and heavy swell of the Irish Sea could normally be relied upon to carry the material away 
from the shore and disperse it.”969 Even Windscale Works Manager, John Donahue, admitted 
that “I can’t give a 100% guarantee that there hasn’t been such material on the beach 
 
966 West Cumberland Times and Star, 24 December 1983, p. 10; West Cumberland Times and Star, 12 
November 1983, p. 12. 
967 Here, Greenpeace were particularly vocal about the industry’s legacy of misleading the public. During an 
interview following the screening of the Windscale, Director of Greenpeace UK Peter Wilkinson explained that, 
“I simply don’t believe them, that’s the simple answer. They said that dumping radioactive waste at sea was 
safe, the international community said that wasn’t the case and it was stopped. They were wrong over the 
Windscale fire, they said that it created no damage whatsoever- in fact it created over 30 thyroid cancers. They 
were wrong over the toxicity of plutonium and the fact is that people aren’t daft. People know if you have a 
cancer inducing agent and you are discharging it into the sea and it’s coming back to the land then it’s going to 
cause problems.” Peter Wilkinson in ‘Windscale: The Nuclear Laundry’, G. McKee, N. Gray, Yorkshire 
Television: ITV, 1983. 
968 National Archives, ‘William Waldegrave to Secretary of State,’ 12 December, 1983, (AT 31/56). 
969 Bolter, Inside Sellafield, p. 100. 
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previously.”970 Greenpeace challenged BNFL to “tell us how often this has happened in the 
past”, demanding “how many beaches have been contaminated without public knowledge?”971 
Similarly, the local anti-nuclear organization ‘Barrow Action Group’ emphasized their 
concerns that “similar slicks may have come ashore in the past” and not been reported.972  
 
These concerns were shared by local citizens, who strongly doubted that the release 
was an isolated incident. One resident explained that “I don’t think it’s the first time it’s 
happened and that’s what worries me” and that “similar incidents have been covered up.”973 
Local woman Dorothy Bateman explained that “we seemed to learn of all the accidents from 
the TV. They probably didn’t tell us as they would see it as “frightening the natives, I don’t 
believe anything they say now.”974 Another admitted that “it’s happened once and you don’t 
know when it will happen again- they don’t always tell you.”975 This contributed to a popularly 
held belief that BNFL regularly released unauthorized and unsafe levels of radioactivity, a 
perception that was repeated throughout the oral interviews. Residents revealed that illegal 
discharges “would be done at the dead of night” describing how workers were told to “just you 
know, get on with the job sort-of-thing.”976 One man who worked on the sea tanks explained 
that, “there used to be a saying down there, ‘you can shove a lot of stuff out on a big tide and 
a black night!’”977 Another noted that “this isn’t just due to one incident. Ten years ago, 
anything to get rid of went out to sea.”978 In these examples, we can see how locals interpreted 
the beach incident through the lens of the industry’s past misdemeanours, constructing their 
 
970 Whitehaven News, 10 May 1984. 
971 Daily Telegraph, 21 November 1983. 
972 Daily Star, 1 December 1983, p. 12. 
973 Macgill, Politics of Anxiety, pp. 184f.  
974 McSorely, Living in the Shadow, p. 166. 
975 Macgill, Politics of Anxiety, p. 193.  
976 E. Robson, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 19 March 2010, p. 9. 
977 D. Head, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by J. Lister, 25 January 2010, p. 24. 
978 Macgill, Politics of Anxiety, p. 184. 
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own forms of nuclear knowledge wherein large quantities of radioactive material were 
regularly discharged into the ocean and omitted from the official figures. 
 
Responding to these claims, BNFL insisted that the beach release was an isolated 
incident, and that the radioactivity released “represented no hazard to the public.”979 Despite 
these assertions, many local people rejected BNFL’s claims, constructing their own 
understandings of the event from first-hand reports of local men who had been on shift during 
the incident. Whilst BNFL referred to the release of “a small slick of solvent” and 
“categorically denied” that it posed an environmental hazard to the public, locals pointed to the 
claims of process workers who explained that the discharge was far greater than official figures 
suggested. Initial BNFL press releases explained that 500 curies of radioactivity had been 
released, totalling “just over twice the permitted daily emission rate,” of which, “a significant 
proportion of the curies were recovered.”980 Despite this, workers on shift during the incident 
explained that the amount of material discharged was 7500 curies, over twenty-times the 
permitted daily limit, of which none had been recovered.981 This explanation was accepted by 
many local people, who referenced the major clean-up operation (depicted in Figs. 15.0 and 
 
979 This statement emphasised that “the danger to the public from this isolated incident is extremely small and 
can be eliminated by the advice that has been given to people on a 10-mile stretch of coast not to use the 
beaches unnecessarily for the time being or handle objects washed up by the sea.” Then Press Secretary at 
Sellafield, Harold Bolter later admitted that he took “no pride” in these statements, which were “inaccurate and 
far too reassuring.” (National Archives, ‘Correspondence between C.E. Henderson and Mr Shaw’, 7 December 
1983, (AT 31/56); Bolter, Inside Sellafield, pp. 101f.) 
980 Sun, 21 November 1983; Bolter, Inside Sellafield, p. 101; National Archives, ‘H. Bolter, to Mr P Chan 
(Atomic Energy Division, Department of Energy) and officials from BNFL, NII, and Dept of Environment’, 19 
November 1983, (AT 31/55); National Archives, ‘Correspondence between C.E. Henderson and Mr Shaw’, 7 
December 1983, (AT 31/56). 
981 A worker admitted that “no-one knew what to do with it, so it was pushed down the line out to sea.” This 
was later confirmed by government officials, who concluded that BNFL’s measurements were inconsistent with 
the findings of the DoE. (Sun, 21 November 1983; Sun, 24 November 1983; National Archives, ‘Secretary of 
State, Meeting with Peter Walker,’ 14 December 1983, (AT 31/59); Bolter, Inside Sellafield, p. 101; National 
Archives, ‘Correspondence between Allan G. Duncan and Secretary of State’, 6 January 1984, (AT 31/59); 
McSorely, Living in the Shadow, p. 62. 
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16.0) as proof that the radioactivity discharged was not only in excess of official figures, but 




Writing in the West Cumberland Times and Star, one resident expressed that “any 
credibility BNFL might have once had has been blown sky-high with men and boats 
contaminated, and beaches closed. If, as BNFL have said, there is no danger, then why close 
the beach?”983 Another explained that “I don’t know what they shove out, but it must be too 
high or people wouldn’t be going on about it.”984 In this way, the decontamination procedures 
and the closing of the beach further embedded the dystopian imaginary, providing a visual 
symbol of nuclear power’s dystopian environmental and radiobiological consequences. 
Drawing upon Rosanna Farbøl’s argument that Danish ruin towns “embedded a sociotechnical 
imaginary that emphasised resilience, survival and regeneration,” we can see how the visual 
symbolism of the clean-up operation, coupled with the physical closure of local beaches 
 
982 Sun, 21 November 1983; Bolter, Inside Sellafield, p. 101; National Archives, ‘H. Bolter, to Mr P Chan 
(Atomic Energy Division, Department of Energy) and officials from BNFL, NII, and Dept of Environment’, 19 
November 1983, (AT 31/55). 
983 West Cumberland Times and Star, 26 November 1983, p. 8. 
984 Macgill, Politics of Anxiety, p. 181. 
Figs. 15.0 and 16.0: (from left to right): <http://www.lakestay.co.uk/hot.htm> [accessed 3 April 
2020]; 'Sellafield Nuclear Plant', Alamy Image, ref: G45X5K. 
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simultaneously emphasised BNFL’s duplicity, the environmental threat posed by nuclear 
contamination, and the wider links to public health, at once consolidating and embedding these 
strands of the dystopian imaginary.985 
 
Expressing a marked disregard for BNFL’s assurances, local citizens attached more 
credibility to information provided by trusted local individuals, as BNFL’s claims of a minor 
incident were at odds with evidence provided within the community and their experiences of 
beach closure and official decontamination procedures. Exploring responses to Torrey Canyon, 
historians Anna Green and Tim Cooper have argued that environmental disasters increase 
locals’ inclusivity and dependency on local, ‘insider’ social networks.986 In this context, 
citizens derived their understandings from their experiences of being misled by the industry 
and testimony from trusted social actors such as local neighbours and increasingly, the 
environmental group Greenpeace, who had first made them aware of the beach incident. This 
attests to a wider cultural shift, whereby local people increasingly engaged with the dystopian 
nuclear imaginaries propagated by Greenpeace and recognized the important role they played 
in regulating a hazardous and otherwise unscrupulous industry.  
 
Whilst local attitudes towards Greenpeace were understandably mixed, with some 
resenting their efforts as little more than “dangerous publicity stunts” which had a negative 
effect on the public perception of the area, locals increasingly acknowledged the important role 
they played in regulating the nuclear industry and restricting the amount of radioactivity 
discharged by BNFL.987 The local public chose to support the activities of Greenpeace, 
 
985 R. Farbøl, ‘Ruins of Resilience’, p. 22f. 
986 Green, ‘Community and Exclusion’, pp. 899- 909; Cooper, and Green, ‘The Torrey Canyon Disaster’, pp. 
101- 126. 
987 C. McCourt, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by J. Lister, 17 September 2010, p. 15.  
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constructing an imagined future whereby their involvement (however meddlesome or 
inconvenient) was more desirable than the dystopian consequences of allowing BNFL to 
operate unregulated. Numerous interviewees conveyed their (sometimes begrudging) 
admiration for Greenpeace, admitting that “while we may not agree with tactics… if that’s 
caused things to be modified and procedures put in place then… well and good.”988 Residents 
commented that “Greenpeace has opened the eyes of people round here”, with one man 
admitting, “I had a sneaking admiration for people like Greenpeace. They had balls.”989 Others 
expressed their respect for the group, recognising that “what they did to us in 1983 was a wake-
up call, it was undoubtedly the right thing to do.”990 A local farmer explained that he felt 
reassured with Greenpeace monitoring BNFL. He explained that “there you’ve got a lot of 
people are watching them, which is a good thing.”991 Local support for Greenpeace was 
acknowledged by a senior BNFL official, who later admitted that “the public was becoming 
increasingly dissatisfied” with BNFL’s management of the plant, and “by maintaining a high 
profile for its direct action while attacking the inadequacy of government controls, Greenpeace 
came to be regarded as the true regular of Sellafield by many people, even in Cumbria.”992 This 
reflects a significant social change whereby Greenpeace became the regulatory actor so that 
society could ‘trust’ BNFL.993 The significance of this fundamental shift lay in the legitimation 
of Greenpeace in a “public interest watchdog role over the nuclear industry”, as local citizens 
increasingly saw BNFL as a threat to public health and their wellbeing.994  
 
 
988 Guardian, 23 November 1983; M. Kipling, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. 
McCourt, 7 January 2010, p. 20.  
989 E. Robson, ‘Sellafield Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by C. McCourt, 19 March 2010, p. 15.  
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Analysing this shift from a sociological perspective, we can see that this represents a 
“fundamentally different model of society compared to that assumed in orthodox accounts of 
risk regulation.”995 Within traditional societal models, the centres of authority are assumed to 
be government departments such as the Departments for the Environment and Energy, or 
formal institutions such as the Ministry for Agriculture, Fisheries and Foods or the National 
Radiological Protection Board.996 Here, we see these relationships break down and the place 
of government replaced by informal groups such as Greenpeace who assumed the regulatory 
role in the eyes of the public, delineating a wider lack of public trust in BNFL and the 
government’s ability to ensure public safety. Residents explained that “among the general 
public there’s been a lack of confidence, not only in BNFL, but in DoE and NRPB [as well].”997 
Others claimed, “I trust Greenpeace more than anybody else – if it was there they’d say so. 
There’s too many backhanders to sweep the truth under the carpet.”998 This was a common 
perception, as locals explained that “I don’t trust the NRPB as watchdogs… Greenpeace are 
better”, whilst others stated “Greenpeace do a good job… I’d sooner listen to their view than 
BNFL.”999 Here, local citizens produced independent accounts of risk regulation, drawing upon 
their experiences of being misled by the nuclear industry and their lack of trust in official 
government institutions to emphasise Greenpeace’s vital role in regulating the nuclear industry 
and assuring public safety.  
 
However, a significant body of local opinion looked to external groups such as 
Greenpeace and the national media with distain, rejecting the purported links between nuclear 
power and cancer as the product of media embellishment and scare-mongering. Whilst a cohort 
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of locals celebrated Greenpeace’s role in holding BNFL accountable and regulating its 
activities, numerous citizens argued that they had provided an unwelcome level of national 
media coverage, which had sensationalised the controversy.1000 This echoes the findings of 
environmental geographers Jamie Baxter and Daniel Lee, who observed that residents living 
near a hazardous facility viewed outsiders’ negative views of the facility and the town as a 
greater threat than the facility itself.1001 The tone and content of national media reports was a 
particular source of frustration for local people, who argued that the media was largely culpable 
for the levels of uncertainty within the region and criticized its role in generating public 
anxiety.1002 Citizens resisted the dystopian imaginaries cultivated by national media outlets, 
explaining that “it was like being ‘the village of the damned’” and emphasising the negative 
social effects this had wrought upon the local population.1003 Interviewees recalled that “people 
in the village felt very resentful of the media for trying to blame this cluster on Sellafield 
because there was no doubt that people were trying to find something to fling on to 
Sellafield.”1004 They explained that “the national press was being awful” and going round 
looking for dramatic stories that would tarnish the plant’s reputation.1005 One resident 
complained that “most people know someone who has been approached for comments only to 
find later that what they’ve said has been doctored enough to be interpreted in a different 
way.”1006 Another woman recounted being interviewed by a reporter from the Guardian who 
turned her words into a polemic against Sellafield. Where she had emphasised that her three  
children were healthy and stressed her desire to see more scientific studies of local cancers, he 
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had written down that her husband had suffered from a radiation overdose and that she was 
anxious for future generations.1007 This typifies the type of media reporting which caused 
resentment amongst locals who resisted dystopian nuclear imaginaries as the product of 
distortion and exaggeration by the national media.  
 
Local newspaper articles published letters from local people with titles such as ‘Beware 
Sensationalism’, with local commentators complaining about the effects of press speculation 
upon public opinion, arguing that these reports “are biased towards panic of the public, or 
sensational journalism.”1008 A similar article diagnosed a case of “Sellafield syndrome”, 
arguing that the effects of the national media had produced a sustained case of “nuclear 
neurosis” amongst the public, whereby “everything from cancer to the inability of some 
children to read well is being blamed on Windscale.”1009 The medical and psychological 
language mobilised here reflects local opinion that locals were the victims of a form of mass 
hysteria and moral panic, devoid of substance and exacerbated by the national media. Residents 
explained that there was nothing to fear from Sellafield, bitterly recalling that “it was all 
sensationalised by the bloody media.”1010 In this context, sections of the local population 
displayed a marked lack of engagement with the controversy, constructing their own forms of 
nuclear knowledge which refuted the links between Sellafield and cancer cases as little more 
than media sensationalism.  
 
In many cases, citizens exhibited an awareness and identification with both sides of the 
debate, holding seemingly incoherent attitudes towards Sellafield as both a potential 
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radiobiological risk, whilst rejecting the causal links between the plant and the cancer 
excess.1011 In this context, local people performed their own understanding of radiation debates, 
mobilising their knowledge and experience of the local environment to produce an array of 
alternative explanations for the cancer excess. Some expressed alternative environmental risk 
factors, such as chemical and sewage discharge; others explained that whilst they did not 
believe local cancers were radiation induced, they refused or felt unable to dismiss the links 
entirely. Here, citizens responded to competing imagined nuclear futures by drawing upon their 
experiences and understandings of local health patterns, changes and continuities in the local 
environment, and alternative risk factors to produce their own forms of nuclear meaning-
making.  
 
A feature of local responses was the number of people who held independent 
hypotheses about the cancer cases, as citizens drew upon their own experiences and 
understandings to make sense of the controversy. Some identified the number of old people in 
the surrounding area as proof that the plant was not dangerous, answering questions about the 
plant’s safety by explaining that “there are a lot of old people in Bootle.”1012 Others used the 
apparent lack of cancer in their family to refute the purported links between Sellafield and 
cancer, explaining that if a link existed they would either have developed cancer themselves or 
known someone who had. One resident explained, “I know of no-one who has cancer”, whilst 
others responded directly to the claims of the Windscale documentary, stating that “I don’t 
know of one case of cancer in my generation or amongst my school friends” and “all my school 
friends are ok.”1013 In some cases, they mobilised experiences of the 1957 fire to validate their 
 
1011 Brian Wynne has argued that confusion, ambivalence, and inconsistencies in structures of understanding 
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attitudes, explaining that they had not seen any ill effects of the incident amongst their own 
family. Two women both referenced the good health of their husbands as proof of the industry’s 
safety, explaining that “my husband was a baby in a pram actually out on it in ‘57 and he’s 
okay” and “my husband’s mother was pregnant with him during the ‘57 fire and he’s grown 
up to be healthy so I don’t worry.1014 For these women, the lack (or latency) of any 
radiobiological symptoms from this event legitimated their belief that the present controversy 
did not represent a threat to public health. Of note, however, is that one of these women 
caveated her beliefs, explaining that “perhaps if you ever did develop cancer you would turn 
and look at BNFL.”1015 This admission betrays the latent and lurking fear amongst many people 
that Sellafield had the capacity to induce health problems in the future, and that any articulation 
of the plant’s safety had to be framed by the acknowledgement that cancer links could not be 
fully repudiated. 
 
The temerity of local people to draw permanent conclusions indicates some level of 
lingering concern amongst local people, or at the very least an ongoing recognition that the 
plant could be an environmental risk and public health hazard.1016 For many, the number of 
unusual health defects observed amongst the population provided some measure of 
circumstantial evidence that linked the plant with the region’s poor pattern of public health. In 
her study of Belarusian responses to Chernobyl, Olga Kuchinskaya observed that lay people 
often inferred risk by drawing potential links between unexplained health defects and an 
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Stories: Oral History Project’, interviewed by J. Lister, 21 January 2011, p. 22.) 
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environmental hazard (in this case, Chernobyl). She explained that “collecting anecdotal data 
and observing the prevalence and character of particular health problems serve[d] as the 
foundation for articulating radiation health effects.”1017 This also echoes Karen Parkhill’s study 
of community responses to the Bradwell nuclear plant in Essex, where she found that “any 
illness whose cause could not be immediately identified was also a source of [public] unease” 
for residents concerned about the nuclear industry’s potentially harmful effects upon public 
health.1018 Similar patterns were observed in West Cumbria, where local citizens drew links 
between Sellafield and the number of peculiar viruses common to the local area. 
 
Residents explained that the local area endured a poor record of public health, with 
citizens regularly suffering from a number of peculiar illnesses and viruses. A local nurse 
explained that “here we get the same silly virus every couple of months… I think it affects the 
cerebral fluid from the shoulders down… that puzzles me.”1019 Referencing the alleged links 
to the plant, locals observed that “there are things in this area that do seem to be a lot higher 
than other areas. It obviously does....you just think, well is it to do with that?”1020 For many, 
the current controversies framed these health phenomena and placed them in a new light. One 
resident explained that “we do get an awful lot of viruses around here […] I used to think that 
there was nothing to worry about but now I do.”1021 Another local asked the damning question, 
“why are there so many people with odd cancers around here?”1022 These observations, whilst 
not proof of the industry’s effect on public health, allude to a delicate and ever-present concern 
amongst the local public that the plant may be in some way linked to the strange health defects 
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experienced by the population. These examples also speak to the significance of individual 
experience in shaping people’s attitudes, revealing how local citizens relied upon their 
experiences of the world around them, constructing their own forms of nuclear knowledge by 
evaluating these experiences within the context of competing social imaginaries.  
 
The role of experience in the production of nuclear knowledge is particularly evident 
in the myriad of explanations offered by the local population for the cancer excesses. Whilst 
local residents often acknowledged the potential environmental risk posed by the nuclear 
industry, they frequently emphasised alternative risk factors to account for the local cancer 
statistics. Geoffrey Barnes’ study of a chemical contamination incident in the Cheshire village 
of Weston in 2000 found that incidents of one type of pollution often lead to people engaging 
with other, similar types of hazard. Barnes explained that residents exposed to chemical 
contaminants became “more conscious of other pollution incidents” in the surrounding area.1023 
A similar process can be observed in West Cumbria, where citizens used their experiential 
knowledge of the local environment to subsume the threat of radioactive discharge within a 
wider history of marine pollution from industrial processes. One suggestion was that the cancer 
figures were unrelated to Sellafield and the product of marine discharges by the local chemical 
plant, Marchon. When questioned about the environmental effects of Sellafield, a former local 
diver expressed his belief that “Marchon probably did more harm.”1024 His experiences diving 
off the Cumbrian coast led him to believe that the chemical industry represented a greater 
environmental hazard. In this belief he interpreted the absence of marine and aquatic life in the 
vicinity of the Marchon works as proof of the chemical industry’s environmental threat. He 
explained, “I’ve dived off the Marchon site and the rocks were barren- there was nothing… I 
 
1023 Barnes, Baxter, Litva (et al), ‘The Social and Psychological Impact of the Chemical Contamination Incident 
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put that down to whatever they were discharging, chemical-wise [...] Whereas off the Sellafield 
site there is plenty of stuff growing on the pipe, all the way out and on the end of the pipe […] 
there’s plenty of fish life and sea life out there.”1025 Other residents expressed similar attitudes, 
explaining that “Marchon was a big public hazard”, whilst another commented “Marchon put 
an awful lot of stuff into the sea [and] killed an awful lot of seaweed… I wouldn’t ever totally 
trust Marchon either.”1026 Another interviewee explained that she would not eat local fish or 
swim in the sea, not because of the nuclear industry, but because of the chemical works.1027 
Experiential knowledge of the chemical industry and marine eco-system produced a locally 
specific belief that the environmental risk posed by the chemical industry represented a far 
greater hazard to public health than Sellafield. One resident articulated his view that “I’m sure 
the chemical industry as a whole causes more ill health and deaths than Sellafield, but no-one 
seems to worry about that.”1028 His view was that radioactive material was not particularly 
exceptional or dangerous, in marked juxtaposition to the dystopian imaginary. Others were 
defensive of Sellafield, complaining that “maybe more questions should be asked as to what 
chemical factories discharge”, arguing that “we don’t know what other companies around the 
world are putting into the sea.”1029 These both carry a subtle recognition that Sellafield carries 
with it a degree of environmental risk, yet interestingly frames this risk within the context of 
other risks deemed more threatening. This has similarities with the work of STS historian 
Davide Orsini, who has argued that everyday people produce locally specific knowledge about 
radiation by interpreting changes or continuities in their own environment.  
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Orsini has shown that public attitudes are not simply random or the product of 
conspiracy theories, but rather local residents “formulated hypotheses about the presence or 
absence or radio-contamination on the basis of evidence they gained through daily observations 
[and interactions with] the surrounding environment...”1030 He explains that local residents 
“interpreted material changes and continuities” in the local environment and drew conclusions 
on the basis of their own understanding.1031 Lacking credible explanations for the cancer 
excesses or clear expert interpretations of nuclear risk, local residents constructed their own 
forms of nuclear knowledge, inferring radiobiological risk “by observing their surroundings to 
see whether radiation effects, as imagined through abstractions of its achievable consequences, 
were or were not evident.”1032 In this way, citizens responded to the lack of information 
available to them by constructing ideas and understandings that made sense to them and could 
be superimposed upon existing patterns of experience and understanding. In this instance, 
taking the presence and abundance of marine life at the end of the Sellafield discharge pipeline 
as evidence of its environmental safety; contrasting this with the barren and unfertile conditions 
near the Marchon chemical plant, to infer the relative environmental risk from the chemical 
works was therefore much greater than from Sellafield and consequently, more likely to be 
responsible for local cancers.  
 
Whilst the environmental observations of local citizens like Peter McLean led him to 
believe that Sellafield was safe, other residents like local fisherman David Todd, found 
environmental signs that the plant was responsible for changes in the local eco-system, 
inferring the presence of radiobiological risk to the public from these observations. David 
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recalled his experiences of catching local fish with severe deformities. He explained that “many 
local people have seen fish which have got abnormalities on the surface [and] wort-like growths 
over their bodies… the fishermen have a name for them, ‘Windscale fish’, and throw them 
straight back into the water.” He explained, “I’m not a fish expert, but if these marks had 
happened on a human being I’d be suspecting that this person had a form of skin cancer.”1033 
Fishermen like David drew upon their observations and understandings of environmental 
patterns to infer environmental and radiobiological risk, as the presence of deformed and 
mutated fish served as an indicator of the plant’s threat to the environment and public health. 
Similar observations were made by local bird-watchers, who noted the declining local 
population of nesting gulls as indicative of the area’s dangerous levels of radiation. Locals 
noted that the number of Oystercatchers, Ringed Plover, Shelduck, and Red-Breasted 
Mergansers had declined over the past decade, with the numbers of Nesting Gulls shrinking 
alarmingly. Whereas, in 1975 the number of nesting gulls was estimated at 12,000, local 
enthusiasts and ornithologists noted that, by 1981 numbers were down to 2213. In his study of 
gull population in Ravenglass, Neil Anderson writes that “concern about these declines was 
expressed in the local and national press, mainly because of the possible link with radionuclide 
pollution from Sellafield.”1034 Furthermore, in 1985, the birds, famous for returning to their 
birthplace for annual breeding, took flight and never returned to the area again. Locals 
attributed this to “excessive radiation in the birds’ food and their general environment.”1035 
Indeed, writing in 1992, author Douglas Botting observed that “in 1985 the birds decided that 
the level of radioactive pollution from nearby Sellafield had reached unacceptable levels, and 
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the huge colony of black-headed gull and the four species of breeding tern all departed.”1036 
Further proof came from one local enthusiast, who decided to test this hypothesis and examined 
eggs taken from local nesting areas, finding severe genetic deformities which were consistent 
with excess exposure to radiation.1037 These environmental signs were taken locally as 
evidence of nuclear contamination, as residents leaned upon their own experiences and lay 
interpretations of radiation effects and changes in the local environment to infer the 
radiobiological risk posed by Sellafield not only to local eco-systems, but also to the local 
public. 
 
Meanwhile, other residents drew contrasting conclusions, refuting the risk posed by the 
plant by interpreting continuities in the local environment as proof of the relative absence of 
risk. One resident explained his belief that Sellafield carried no discernible risk by pointing to 
the health of the local trees and fauna. He contended that “we have lichen on the trees, that to 
me is a sign of clean air.”1038 Others pointed to the lack of visual threat in the local environment, 
explaining that “it’s still far healthier than a smoky city- I’d prefer to bring children up here 
than there.”1039 Another resident explained that the relative risk of living near Sellafield was 
far lower than living in an industrial area. He compared the “fresh air here [with] the industrial 
areas like Runcorn where the smell is terrible, even with the windows shut.”1040 Here, residents 
inferred the lack of environmental risk from Sellafield by juxtaposing the thick, acrid nature of 
urban pollution with the lack of visual environmental evidence for radioactive pollutants.1041 
 
1036 D. Botting, Wild Britain: A Traveller's and Naturalist's Handbook (London: Ebury Press, 1992), pp. 87f. 
1037 McSorely, Living in the Shadow, p. 105. 
1038 Macgill, Politics of Anxiety, p. 183. 
1039 Ibid., 182. 
1040 Ibid., p. 192.  
1041 For further reading on the invisibility of radiation and its psychosocial effects, see Kuchinskaya, 
‘Articulating the Signs of Danger’; Davies, ‘A Visual Geography of Chernobyl’; Zaretsky, ‘Atomic 
Nightmares’; G. Hecht, ‘The Work of Invisibility: Radiation Hazards and Occupational Health in South African 
Uranium Production’, International Labor and Working-Class History, 81.0 (2012), pp. 94– 113. 
 356 
This recognised that, whilst the plant may carry some degree of risk, this threat was minimal 
compared to other environmental hazards; an attitude epitomised by one resident who 
responded to a question about Sellafield’s safety, stating that “there’s a risk in anything- it’s 
the degree of risk that needs to be assessed.”1042 This engagement with alternative 
environmental risk factors which could account for the excess cancers was a persistent feature 
of local attitudes, as citizens emphasised a number of other plausible explanations. 
 
Local people produced an array of interpretations which variously attributed the cancers 
to the chemical industry, an existing local precedent dating back to the 1900s, and the local 
sewage system. Indeed, one resident acknowledged that it was almost impossible to know what 
to believe, owing to the number of different opinions.1043 Many older residents refuted that the 
cancers had anything to do with the plant at all, emphasising the region’s historically above-
average incidence of cancers. People explained that the region had suffered from a higher-than-
average number of cancer cases since the beginning of the Twentieth Century, describing that 
“the leukaemia business goes back as far as 1911 in this area!”1044 Others pointed to similar 
clusters elsewhere in Britain, in both the North-East and Milton Keynes.1045  One man added 
that “I think there was a similar cluster around Teesside- and that ain’t nuclear!”1046 Citizens 
made sense of the current controversy by mobilising their experiential knowledge and 
memories of the area before the plant was constructed, concluding that the modern cancer 
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clusters had a historical precedent which pre-dated the nuclear industry, and therefore the 
excess cancers must be unrelated to Sellafield.  
 
Adopting a similar line, others attributed the cancer cases to the historical practice of 
marine sewage discharge. One resident explained that “someone put out a report not long ago 
which said it could be due to the sewage system. The pipes are made of asbestos so it could be 
to do with the effluent pumped out. I don’t believe it’s radiation, so I’d like to believe in other 
causes.”1047 Others explained that long-before Sellafield began operating “there used to be a 
thing called Seascale bug” explaining that “the kids would all get this sickness and diarrhoea” 
after playing on the beach. The cancer cases became seen as an extension of this pre-existing 
phenomenon, as the historical role of the sea in making people ill formalised local attitudes 
that “I reckon it [the cancer cluster] was from the beach” as residents understood that the 
cancers were the result of “some disease vector in the poorly managed wastewater system.”1048 
These examples attest to the way in which the local population responded to the content of 
competing nuclear imaginaries by leaning upon their experiences and understandings of the 
local environment, constructing their own subversive strands of knowledge which 
simultaneously drew upon, amplified, or attenuated imaginaries of nuclear safety, and 
environmental and radiobiological hazard.  
Conclusion. 
 
Using sociotechnical imaginaries as a frame for analysis, this chapter has pointed to the 
significance of both documentary film and the beach contamination incident from 1983 in 
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shaping public attitudes towards nuclear technologies, but also of the role that Sellafield (and 
the surrounding community) played as a product and producer of nuclear culture. I have shown 
how events at Sellafield contributed to a broader current of anti-nuclear culture during the early 
years of the 1980s, exploring how the imaginary of nuclear utopianism was challenged and 
subverted at the national level, as resistant groups within the media, the public, and the 
environmental movement forged dystopian nuclear imaginaries of environmental and 
radiobiological hazard and embedded these within British nuclear culture. Furthermore, this 
chapter has also examined responses to this process at the localized level, arguing that the 
friction between these competing imaginaries produced a set of social conditions which 
dislocated the local public between competing claims over nuclear knowledge. Here, we see 
the emergence of multiple imaginaries upon multiple scales. This reveals the inherent mobility 
of the STIM life-cycle model, echoing recent suggestions that these phases might be more 
accurately thought of as ‘processes’, which may develop chronologically or simultaneously.1049 
The emergence of multiple nuclear imaginaries also suggests that the concept of the socio-
technical imaginary may be better thought of in the plural; particularly with regard to nuclear 
STIMs, echoing the claims of nuclear historians such as Jeff Hughes who have called for a 
more thorough investigation of the plurality of British experiences to the nuclear condition.1050 
STIM offers a useful conceptual framework to historicise the spectrum of British experiences 
of nuclearisation, showing how citizens responded to nuclear imaginaries by relying upon their 
own experiential understandings of the nuclear industry and radiation, alongside their innate 
knowledge of the local environment. This leads us towards an understanding of local people as 
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agents of social change, who produced their own forms of locally specific nuclear knowledge 






Reflecting upon Sellafield’s position within everyday life in West Cumbria, former 
teacher Isobel George explained that, “well, you don’t think about it really… if it weren’t here, 
well I’m not sure if the area would have survived. It’s part of who we are now. On the one hand 
it’s been a great provider of jobs and money for people, but you know, you’ve got this 
outstandingly beautiful part of the world and then this whacking great nuclear power plant in 
the middle of it- it’s part of the scenery… although I’d really rather it wasn’t.”1051 This 
interpretation neatly surmises the nuanced and complicated position that Sellafield holds within 
everyday social life in West Cumbria, as both a powerful institution which has brought positive 
changes to the local area, and a domineering material and social structure which has 
fundamentally altered the local landscape, patterns of local life, regional identity, and the rural 
character of the region. Tracing the evolution of socio-cultural attitudes towards nuclear 
technologies between 1945 and 1992, this project poses several interesting questions for 
localised studies of nuclear culture, particularly those pertaining to individual sites. This asks 
fundamental questions about how specific sites reflect, produce, and alter the public’s attitudes 
towards nuclear technologies; the geographic scope of these effects; and how these attitudes 
fed back into and shaped wider regional and national responses. 
 
Using Sellafield as a case study, this project has pointed to the role of material sites as 
an arbiter of nuclear culture- a physical, social, and cultural structure which is capable of 
reflecting, shaping, and being shaped by (in short, co-producing) public attitudes towards 
nuclear technologies. This is particularly true in the localised context where these sites interact 
 
1051 Author’s interview with Isobel George, 6 March 2019. 
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with and colour the everyday life of local people, whose experiences and interactions with the 
site help shape their attitudes towards nuclear technologies.  
 
Sellafield also played a fundamental role in shaping social responses to nuclear 
technologies at both the local and national scale, as representations of the plant helped structure 
and embed particular imagined nuclear futures within society, whilst in other cases, they helped 
new resistant imaginaries originate and become embedded into everyday life. Sitting across 
methodological approaches within the field of nuclear culture and the STS concept of STIM, 
this echoes recent work which has called for a more thorough appreciation of the localised 
variants of nuclear cultures, and how these contexts informed national responses to nuclear 
technologies.1052 This points to the dynamic interplay between the local and national contexts 
in the production of nuclear culture, as the imagined visions of state were understood, resisted, 
and extended in rural contexts where the physical and social infrastructure of the nuclear 
industry was mainly located. It also dovetails with the findings of an upcoming edited 
collection which considers the role of sociotechnical imaginaries in structuring responses to 
civil defence in Western Europe, alongside a wider trend of STS literature which showcases 
the presence and agency of sociotechnical imaginaries within everyday life.1053  
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Exploring the case study of Sellafield, this thesis has shown that specific nuclear sites 
became “enmeshed in performing and producing diverse visions of the collective good”, 
embedding, institutionally stabilising, and publicly performing specific nuclear futures.1054 It 
has also demonstrated that ordinary people exercised a degree of agency over the 
embeddedness of these futures. Jonathan Hogg has argued that nuclear imaginaries were 
“strengthened and made durable once [they] became intertwined with localised contexts [...] 
and individuals working within them.”1055 Developing this claim, this project has demonstrated 
that local contexts and individuals also possess the power to disrupt and challenge these 
imaginaries, embedding their own resistant imaginaries which simultaneously espoused an 
alternative imagined future to the one propagated by the state. This demonstrates the centrality 
of ordinary people, localised contexts, and rural ‘peripheral’ communities in the production 
and performance of nuclear culture. Furthermore, it also demonstrates that these sites (and 
individuals working and living within them) can resist and challenge dominant imaginaries of 
sociotechnical progress, disrupting the flow of power from the urban core to the rural periphery. 
This points towards the immense power of ordinary people as agents of social change, capable 
of substantiating, challenging, and re-defining ‘top-down’ narratives of sociotechnical 
progress.  
 
Together, the nuclear culture and STS strands of this project have combined to 
demonstrate the plurality of cultural responses to the nuclear age, the presence and power of 
sociotechnical imaginaries to shape and inform these responses, and the agency of ordinary 
(and often socially peripheral) individuals and communities to resist, challenge, and redefine 
dominant cultural assumptions about nuclear technologies and their place within British 
 
1054 Jasanoff, ‘Future Imperfect’, p. 15.  
1055 Hogg, ‘Normalising Nuclear War’, in Cronqvist, Farbøl, and Sylvest, (eds.), Cold War Civil Defence in 
Western Europe, p. 9. 
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society. This understanding has radical implications for our understanding of British nuclear 
culture, eschewing the urban bias within the historiography and calling for a more thorough 
appreciation of the complexities of the British nuclear story. In particular, this recognises the 
need for a greater degree of scholarly engagement with the remote (and predominantly rural) 
nuclear sites in which the infrastructure of the nuclear programme was located, and their wider 
role in shaping cultural responses to nuclear technologies at a range of geographic scales.  
 
The sociotechnical imaginary emerges as an key investigative and exploratory tool 
which helps to do this, identifying the diverse range of nuclear cultures which make up the 
history of British responses to nuclearisation, the sociotechnical processes behind their 
creation, and also how these cultural expressions and representations of nuclear sites sat 
alongside and co-produced broader social attitudes towards nuclear technologies, society, and 
the state.1056 By engaging with the imaginary as an intellectual plane capable of diverse cultural 
work, this has stepped away from traditional empirical studies of the field, demonstrating the 
significance of the imagination as a social agent which structured public responses to nuclear 
technologies. The concept of the imaginary helps reveal not only the historical arc of social 
responses throughout the second half of the twentieth century, but also the sociotechnical 
processes behind their creation. This has pointed to shifting social attitudes not as the product 
of undiscernible forces or random events, but as part of an evolutionary process through which 
nuclear ideas originated, became embedded within society, and were subject to resistance and 
redefinition by sections of society. This has provided a nuanced understanding of the role of 
nuclear technologies in everyday life throughout the second half of the twentieth century, 
demonstrating how nuclear science embedded itself and became embedded in “social practices, 
 
1056 See, Cronqvist, Farbøl, and Sylvest, (eds.), Cold War Civil Defence in Western Europe. 
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identities, norms, conventions, discourses, instruments and institutions- in short, in all the 
building blocks of what we term the social.”1057 
 
Despite the enormous utility of the STIM concept as a vehicle for analysis, it is not 
without its limitations. At once a major strength and an inherent weakness is the life-cycle 
model, which attempts to structure the evolution and trajectory of imaginaries as they originate, 
become embedded, resisted, and extended within society. Compartmentalising the life-cycle of 
STIMs into these distinct phases provides a neat, linear pattern which distorts these phases into 
a binary, deterministic pattern. Whilst the findings of this study loosely correspond to these 
phases, it is an oversimplification to suggest that each phase followed the other sequentially. 
Rather, these phases overlapped, intersected, and in many cases competed directly with one 
another, as social agents wrestled for control over nuclear meaning-making. This aligns with 
the findings of recent research which has suggested that these ‘phases’ may be more accurately 
thought of as ‘processes’, a framework exploratory and spacious in nature; something to think 
with(in) rather than a theory or concept to be mechanically applied. With this distinction, the 
life-cycle model offers a “heuristically useful structure for analysing the operation and life-
cycle of nuclear imaginaries”, attentive to the ways in which they overlap and compete with 
one another.1058 This refinement provides a well-rounded interpretation which is attentive to 
the complexities of social responses to nuclear technologies.  
 
The second key limitation with the STIM framework is the concept’s loose handling of 
structure and agency. Jasanoff’s original formulation argued that imagined futures “originate 
in the visions of single individuals or small collectives”, rising to the status of an imaginary 
 
1057 Jasanoff, States of Knowledge, p. 3.  
1058 Cronqvist, Farbøl, and Sylvest, (eds.), ‘Introduction,’ in Cronqvist, Farbøl, and Sylvest, Cold War Civil 
Defence in Western Europe, p. 11. 
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when “the originator’s vanguard vision comes to be communally adopted.”1059 This understood 
imaginaries as “collectively held, institutionally stabilised, and publicly performed visions of 
desirable [or undesirable] futures.”1060 This understanding places too much emphasis on the 
collective and performative aspects of imaginaries. By prioritising deeds and actions, this 
indirectly reduces the power of the imaginary as an intellectual plane capable of performing 
social work. This fails to account for the power of ordinary people to resist, challenge, and 
embed imaginaries in subtle ways that are elusive and less visible to the external observer. As 
we have seen, localised communities such as farmers often internalised their resistance, 
embedding dystopian imaginaries which were rarely articulated or performed outside their 
social group. This raises questions about the distinctions Jasanoff identifies as characterising 
an imaginary.  
 
When we analyse imaginaries at the localised level, the “collectively held, 
institutionally stabilised, and publicly performed” criteria becomes more elusive.1061 How 
many people are required for an imaginary to be “collectively held?”… Who are the institutions 
who can “stabilise” them?... What does it mean to “publicly perform” an imaginary? These 
distinctions, particularly when considered in small social groups, such as the community local 
to West Cumbria, become unclear. For instance, can the radiobiological concerns of a handful 
of scientists, such as Frank Leslie, Marjorie Higham, and Piya Guneratne be considered an 
imaginary? Do they constitute a collective? Furthermore, the criteria of becoming 
“institutionally stabilised” does not account for the domineering power structures of the 
UKAEA/BNFL within the local community which hamstrung local people from being able to 
voice a clear, coherent opposition to the plant. If an imaginary needs to be “institutionally 
 
1059 Jasanoff, ‘Future Imperfect’, in Jasanoff, and Kim, (eds.), Dreamscapes of Modernity, p. 4. 
1060 Ibid., p. 4. 
1061 Ibid., p. 4. 
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stabilised” in order to become an imaginary, then the industry’s stage-management of local 
politics and ostensibly democratic groups such as the Local Liaison Committee (LLC) means 
that only UKAEA/BNFL can originate and disseminate nuclear imaginaries. This  
understanding conflicts with the findings of this thesis, which has emphasised the agency of 
ordinary people in originating and embedding their own resistant imaginaries which resist 
hegemonic orderings of sociotechnical power. This is something of a weakness within the 
STIM concept, which has only been partially addressed within the STS literature. Whilst 
Jasanoff and Kim have moved away from their original nation-centric approach to STIMs, this 
thesis has shown that imaginaries can operate on a smaller geographical scale, pointing to their 
power and complex cultural agency within an intensely localised context. This understanding 
sits alongside and corroborates the previous call for more studies of localised nuclear cultures 
and a mutual engagement between scholars of nuclear history and STS, which promises not 
only to broaden the field of nuclear culture, but also develop the ways in which we think about 
sociotechnical systems, the spatial and temporal flow of imaginaries, and the agency of 
ordinary people within this process.  
 
These conclusions have been informed by the oral histories and everyday experiences 
of local citizens, which lie at the heart of this project. Applying an interdisciplinary approach, 
this thesis has offered up a new conceptual framework which synthesised oral histories 
alongside existing archival documentation and newspaper narratives. This has provided both a 
nuanced insight into the range of social attitudes towards nuclear technologies, but also 
sketched out the contours of everyday life living alongside Britain’s first nuclear plant. Acting 
as “subversive strands of knowledge” these histories contrast with official nuclear narratives, 
 367 
providing a missing piece of Britain’s nuclear history and offering new interpretations of the 
nuclear age.1062  
 
Despite efforts to the contrary, the project was hampered by archival restrictions and 
the disruption of the COVID-19 pandemic, which prevented access to key archival series and 
restricted the number of interviews which could be conducted. Future research within the ES 
and AB series of files in the National Archives could offer fascinating insights into the socio-
cultural history of Sellafield and its wider role within British nuclear culture. Likewise, analysis 
of the contents of the Nuclear Archive in Wick (when accessible), could also provide a deeper 
insight into these areas. The loss of these two archival repositories forced me to engage more 
readily with the archival materials within the Whitehaven Local Studies and Archive Centre, 
which are due to be consolidated and reduced in size in the near future.  
 
The temporary restrictions over access to the National Archives therefore inadvertently 
provided a timely opportunity to analyse, preserve, and protect some of these records pending 
their disposal. Furthermore, this placed a greater emphasis on the oral history component of 
my research and the analysis of newspaper articles; indirectly realigning my research efforts 
with the study’s overall focus upon the everyday histories of the people who built, worked at, 
and lived alongside the world’s first commercial nuclear power plant. These sources have 
provided a new, rich, and layered insight into the range of British social responses to nuclear 
technologies, attentive to the ways in which nuclear science embedded itself and became 
embedded in “social practices, identities, norms, conventions, discourses, instruments and 
institutions” at both local and national scales.1063 Ultimately, this has cast a new perspective 
 
1062 Davies, ‘A Visual Geography of Chernobyl’, p. 127. 
1063 Jasanoff, States of Knowledge, p. 3.  
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upon the ways in which culture interacts with science and technology in the production of 
sociotechnical systems, and the respective roles of the state and citizenry in the co-production 
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